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EditionCamilo Borrero GarcíaEditorial Coordination:Helena Gardeazábal GarzónTranslation:Leslie CarmichaelErnesto ArchilaLuz María BernabóPatricia VilaJenny L. NewtonProofreading in English:Pauline CastroPhotographs:Concurso Nacional de Fotografía Documental �Los trabajos y los días�Escuela Nacional Sindical, concurso establecido desde 1994Grafic Concept:Marcela Otero M.Front cover photography:�Rostros� Jaime Otoniel. Concurso Nacional de Fotografía Documental �Los trabajos y los días�Escuela Nacional Sindical.Lay out:Sandra Patricia Sánchez D.CD Production:José Luis Castiblanco

ISBN: 958-644-092-3

Printed in Colombia

National Coordination of the Colombian Platformfor Human Rights, Democracy and DevelopmentCarrera 5 No. 33A-08, Bogotá, D.C., Colombiawww.plataforma-colombiana.orgemail: plataformaco@colomsat.net.coOctober 2004

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CONTENTS

� Tax structure and system of privileges 25Carlos Ossa Escobar

� The Constitution as an obstacle 31Collective Lawyers Group �José Alvear Restrepo�

� Public Spending and Social Rights 39Ricardo Bonilla González

� Inequality and Poverty 45Jorge Iván González

� Judicial Independence 51Latinamerican Institute for Alternative Legal Services - José Burgos

� Negotiation with United States: Isolation and unconditional acceptance 55Colombian Action Network on Free trade and FTAA, �Recalca�

� No �spell� can last four years� 61Democratic Security, Communications and Public OpinionCenter for Investigation and Popular Education, Cinep - Luis Fernando Barón

� Militarism before Dialogue 71Permanent Assembly of Civil Society for Peace

� Agricultural growth or rural development? 79Carlos Salgado

� Looking to the Future 9National Coordinator Colombian Human Rights, Democracy and Development Coordination Platform

� Patriotic Republicanism 13María Teresa Uribe de Hincapié

Context1

Needs and Rights2� Social malady and public policy 87

Corporation �Viva la Ciudadanía� - Libardo Sarmiento Anzola

� Education: Equity Is Not the Priority 99Corporation �Región� - Lina Correa, Ramón Moncada and Jaime Saldarriaga

� Public Health: Definite Burial 109Center for Investigation and Popular Education, Cinep - Natalia Paredes Hernández

� The precariousness of employment 119National Labor Union School - Research Center

� The Right to Food: The Hard Face of poverty 125Interdisciplinary Work Association - Project Aurora - Corporation �Viva la Ciudadanía�

� Housing: A Right or A Product? 133Fedevivienda - Alejandro Florián Borbón

� Environment: a slice of history 141Hildebrando Vélez

� Social Struggles in Colombia: Yes, but No 155Center for Investigation and Popular Education, Cinep - Social Movements Team

� ¡Like a Crab! Government response to Forced Displacement 165Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement

Conflict3� The Deepening of the War 173

Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement

� The Authoritarian Tone: Political and Civil Rigths and International Humanitarian Law 185Cinep�Human Rights and Political Violence DatabaseCceeu Observatory of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

� Witch hunt: Massive Detentions and Democratic Security 197Collective Lawyers Group �José Alvear Restrepo�Foundation Solidarity with Political Prisioners Committee

� The AUC, the Goverment and Society: The Contest is only Begining 205Mauricio Romero

� The Urban Conflict worsens 211Popular Training Institute - Rights and Urban Conflict Observatory - Jesús William Balbín

� ¿Who is responsible for the kidnapped? 219Juan Carlos Lecompte

� Antiunion Policy 223National Labor Union School - Research Center - Human Rights and Labor Area

� Journalism and Freedom of Expression: Colombia, a Reality in camouflage 231Claudia Julieta Duque

� Under attack: The Medical Mission in Colombia 237National Movement for Health and Social SecurityWorking Group on Health and Peace

� Chilhood and Youth: The footprints of the armed conflict 243Fundation �Cultural Rayuela�

� Peasants without land 255Germán Bedoya

� A forgotten world. Rights of Afro-Colombian Communities 259Black Communities Process in Colombia

� Boys and Girls but with Rights 265Corporation �Punto de Vida� - Ingrid Torres

� Women: a residual policy 273Tribunal Regional Women and ESCR

� Government, children and community mothers:privatization of services 279Colombian Comunication ServiceLatinamerican Institute for Alternative Legal Services

� An absent dimension: Human Rights of Adults 285Center for Investigation and labor Studies, �Cestra� - María Tila Uribe

� More than being invisible 293The Human Rights of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexualsGermán Humberto Rincón Perfetti

� Cultural Policies in Uribes� times 297Patricia Ariza

Populations4

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One year ago the Colombian HumanRights, Democracy and Develop-ment Coordination Platform, madeup of more than 90 non-governmentand social organizations, publishedThe Authoritarian Spell. Because of a

convergence of circumstances, our report onhuman rights during the first year of PresidentAlvaro Uribe�s government became a bestseller.

Having had a successful book brings de-mands and expectations for its authors. Thereis a reason it is said that sequels are never anygood, referring to the difficulty of emulating ex-cellence. The organizations that belong to theplatform are aware of this challenge and we riseto it with great responsibility. In doing so, let usclarify our objective, which is not to hog thespotlight on the news nor to figure at the cen-ter of a national controversy. In other words,our goal is not to seek publicity, and nor is it tocreate or foment a nucleus of political opposi-tion to the current administration.

The organizations that make up the HumanRights, Democracy and Development Coordina-tion Platform have a very specific objective: tomonitor the government�s commitment on thesubject of respect for and protection of all thehuman rights for each and everyone, in particu-lar the economic social and cultural rights.

This means we are looking at the govern-ment�s performance in light of very precise cri-teria: the comprehensive application of humanrights. As such we examine the public policiesthat are devised and implemented to ensure theirincreasing application, as well as the strategiesand projects in which these are made manifest.

Obviously we understand that this particu-lar perspective on which we base our evaluationis not the only way to assess the government.By considering other aspects it is possible to ar-rive at different conclusions than those that con-cern us, though it is the same government inquestion. Nonetheless, we wish to reveal ourstrategic interest, not only because it addresses

Looking to the Future

National CoordinatorColombian Human Rights, Democracy and

Development Coordination Platform

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the international obligations that the governmenthas made before various multilateral agencies,but also because this is the responsibility thatbrings meaning to public action.

As the Constitutional Court has repeatedlyinsisted, the development of the fundamentalrights, including the purely ESC rights, is whatsubstantiates and provides the reason for beingfor the social rule of law, both in terms of its eth-ical nature and its practice. Or, in other words,the reason why the state exists as an institutionis to guarantee the rights of its people. As suchits peoplehave every right to examine theprogressthat has beenmade and to demand accountabil-ity, independent of political affiliations.

At the same time the platform does not wishto limit its role to writing academic reports thatwill only be read by subject specialists. Our mis-sion as non-governmental human rights organi-zations pushes us to seek a wider audience andto provide analytical tools to social activists,community leaders, union members, humanrights defenders, and the public at large.

This is why we have asked all of our writersto make an effort to state succinctly, clearly andsimply the main results of the evaluations theyperformed. Although more work still needs tobe done in this area, this guidance gives thepublication a precise focus: to make these is-sues accessible to a broad and diverse cross-section of society, at the risk of simplifying orabridging some debates that we would other-wise express differently if we were writing for amore specialized audience.

OVERALL VISION

This report endeavors to take a comprehensivelook at the performance of Alvaro Uribe�s gov-ernment after two years in office. We have in-cluded the greatest number of fields of analysisthat it was possible for us to address thoroughlyand with dedication. Inclusive, as the diligentreader will observe, at the risk of evaluating sim-ilar government activities from more than oneperspective, whether the result is convergent or

divergent. We have divided the book into fourinterrelated sections. The first section containsthe articles that discuss context, allowing thereader to appreciate the strategic reasons forthe government�s actions, as well as its mainfallacies. Economic policies, public policy plan-ning, the strategies concerning the administra-tion of justice and the media, and even socialmobilization become, in this way, thresholds.These are the pieces in a jigsaw puzzle in whicheach and every part is interdependent.

The next two sections evaluate the gov-ernment�s policies and actions from a rights per-spective. The second section addresses the eco-nomic, social and cultural rights, such as theright to housing, to work, to health, to food, toeducation, and to the environment. The thirdsection is a summary of the state of the art onthe civil and political rights, such as the right tolife, to freedom and political participation, inter-national humanitarian law and the situation ofkidnap victims, among other issues.

Finally, the fourth section discusses the situ-ation that specific social groups face. This com-parative analysis draws attention to the needs andachievements of these groups and, at the sametime, shows the weaknesses or absence of gov-ernment polices for these groups that have oftenslipped into the sidelines. Women, children, Afro-Colombians, peasants, seniors, gays, bisexualsand transsexuals� In all, the polyphony of ourdiversity and their invisibility in the public light.

By way of presentation, the first article inthe book undertakes a general overview of thecurrent political regime. Although each article isindependent and reflects the views of the indi-vidual or institutional writers, an effort has beenmade to be consistent so that taken as a wholeany reader could gain a complete and substan-tiated idea of the overall situation for humanrights so far during Alvaro Uribe�s term in office.

From this perspective, we reiterate that ourintention is not to mount political opposition tothe government, andmuch less to surreptitiouslyreplace the political parties and social move-ments that fulfil this role. Our product is morespecialized, and perhaps as such it is more valu-

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able: to provide a guidebook to what should bepublic policy based on unconditional and com-prehensive respect for human rights, from ourperspective as non-governmental and social or-ganizations.

In this sense, it is an exercise with a view tothe future, to which we commit ourselves fromhere to the end of the current term in office, aswell as for governments to come. And we hopeto rise to the challenge every time with greaterobjectivity, proactivity, and commitment, inbuilding the society we seek: a Colombia basedon social justice, equity and democracy for all.

The platform is convinced that public dia-logue about the different aspects that affect lifein Colombian society is a collective construct. Webelieve that this is how the organizations and ex-perts who contributed to this publication feel. Wethank them for the valuable contribution of ideas,creativity and joint effort that is compiled here.

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Patriotic Republicanism

TINTRODUCTION

he current Government�s politicalregime has been described by manypolitical analysts as authoritarian, ashaving amilitaristic style, asbeing cen-tered on thewar and as having a neo-liberal tendency. These are theatri-

cal phrases that are very useful in the opposition�srhetoric but they contribute very little to the un-derstanding of the current national scenario. Itwould be more constructive to move from theadjectives to the explanations and this is exactlythe purpose of this small essay: to establish someof the issues of the public debate for a discussionon the Government�s practices and its short andmedium term tendencies.

Rather than characterizing the regime, it ismore helpful to analyze some of the strategiesand actions that the central Government, morespecifically the President and his group of advis-

María Teresa Uribe de Hincapié*

ers, have been implementing. If these continuein the same direction and with the same orien-tation they may end up seriously affecting boththe political regime and the democratic founda-tions on which the rule of law and the legitima-cy of the State are based on.

In most cases the Government�s practicesare not within the framework of pre-establishedmodels or pure theoretical principles. Usuallythey are an unusual combination of program-matic principles, social-cultural realities and po-litical demands. This is why it is so difficult todescribe a government such as the current one.As a result of its liberal tendencies one feelstempted to call it populist, Bonapartist, Cae-sarean or even dictatorial. A second look atthe events that have taken place during the pasttwo years, however, leads to consider these con-

* Professor of the Institute of Political Studes University of Antioquia.

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cepts in a relative manner and to establish itsdifferences and detachment from the puremodels.

If it were a populist Government it wouldbe lacking a nationalistic dimension which, con-sidering its unconditional support to the NorthAmerican Government, is nullified in practice.Furthermore, populisms have a strong socialcomponent in their government programs butfor this administration social policy is marginaland its fate depends on the success of the �dem-ocratic security�. Instead, this government�sinterest is on the fiscal adjustments that havesignificantly affected a wide range of low incomesectors of the Colombian society. The social in-dicators are mainly negative: increase in abso-lute poverty; slight reduction of unemploymentrates; a crisis in the health sector; quality of ed-ucation has deteriorated in order to increasecoverage; reduction of the budgets for culture,science and technology; and an almost totalneglect of university policy.

Bonapartism and Cesareanism seem closerto the current Government�s practices due toits vertical line of command and obedience andits way of directly relating with the populationskipping the institutional channels and traditionalintermediations. These practices, however, de-mand an almost absolute control of power bythe president and a public administration thatoperates correctly, almost as it were a machinethat transmits the commands from the pinna-cle to the base without interferences. Theoreti-cians say that imperium and potestas is requiredbut it is evident that the current Administrationfinds significant resistance from the other statebranches, the Armed Forces and from the legaland illegal regional and local powers and elites.The State continues to be an ineffective appa-ratus that has tremendous difficulties in control-ling its own bureaucracies. All this mainstream-ing, which is so characteristic of the Colombianculture, in practice nullifies the power of com-mand and obedience. Despite the reiteratedproposals of the President to adjust the institu-tionality of the public apparatus to suit his polit-ical interests there are still a few legal restric-

tions, social accusations and international de-mands that limit his authority and power.

The Administration�s practices seem morethe result of multiple interactions, tensions anddisagreements between the Government pro-gram and the display of several armed conflictsthat interweave and confront and also of thedynamics of a turbulent society that affirms thatit supports the President but is reluctant to ac-cept the frameworks he has designed. In otherwords, the Administration�s practices allegedlyresult from a blend between the President�s or-der and social-historical, economic and politicalones on which the people of this country basetheir lives.

Any conceptualization intended at exhaust-ing the actions of the government and the mainevents that have taken place during these twoyears of government would only be a teleologi-cal and retrospective reading. Therefore it isnecessary to introduce into the analysis the un-expected and imperative issues that any criticalsituation involves. In this way it might be possi-ble to rebuild an on-going process for which wedo not know the ending.

The fact that an independent candidate,without partisan sponsorships and with opendissidence from his own political organizationbecame President is a very fortuitous event inColombia�s historical tradition. It is also quiteexceptional for an iron fist and guerilla war ori-ented government proposal to triumph in acountry that for the last 200 years has had aweak state and a combination of war, diploma-cy and negotiations with different generationsof armed adversaries. These turnarounds, ac-cepted and supported by popular vote, revealwhat could be called the archeology of decep-tion which, yet again, led the public opinion�spendulum toward war. A government programwas perfectly tuned into this deception by offer-ing security, the defeat of the enemy by the mil-itary and a moralization of political habits.

The concurrence between both processes,nourished by an effective blend of fear and hope,did the rest of the work. In the Colombian peo-ple�s political imaginary, this situation progres-

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sively gave way to demands for a strong andalmighty government with enough authority andsupport to defeat the guerilla and to efficientlycontrol organized crime, even this involved giv-ing up liberal principles, citizen rights, social andlegal guarantees and everything that defines andlegitimizes democracy and the liberal rule of law.

All democracies are fragile and the pactsand deals are broken in the same way they arereached. Sovereignty, as a deliberative foun-dation, is precarious in nature and full citizenguarantees are seen as obstacles that shouldbe removed when security and military victoryare favored above everything else. Therefore,it seems necessary to temporarily remove theliberal government�s its constitutive stability inorder to ensure that public order is still in ef-fect. This is the old republican argument whichindicates that in order to preserve liberties theseshould be limited and that to guarantee demo-cratic stability human and citizen rights shouldbe suspended, neutralized, minimized or ig-nored.

The developments of the negotiations withthe FARC, which since the very beginning seemedto be confusing and at a standstill, along withthe fear of a society that is exhausted and in-timidated, ended up opening the door to Cae-sar, to the leader, to the providential man, thepredestined one to lead the peoples to paradise.Atmospheres of instability, confusion and diffuseviolence are propitious for the emergence ofmessianisms and the current President�s profilefitted perfectly with that desired imaginary. Thisis about different processes that, when coincid-ing in time, become modular and mark the spe-cific dimensions of both the practices and thestyle of the current President.

For the purpose of this essay I will onlymention three main foundations on which theGovernment seems to have progressed duringthe past two years: 1) Deterioration of the insti-tutionality of the public apparatus and the de-politicization of the society; 2) Security policyand the Army as a social organization model; 3)A patriotic trend or the search for a non-delib-erative foundation to preserve order.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PUBLIC APPARATUS�INSTITUTIONALITY AND THEDEPOLITICIZATIONOF THE SOCIETY

The practices of the current Administration de-velop in a double situation of tension: a mal-functioning administrative apparatus colonizedby legal and illegal private interests and criss-crossed by transversalities of different natureand the willingness of amessianic President whointends to show effectiveness and quick andcompelling results. As a result of the inertia ofthe bureaucratic structures there is a sort of ten-dency toward substituting the res publica withthe presidential figure. The effects are perversesince this causes a greater deterioration of theinstitutionality, which is opposed to the elector-al promises to strengthen the State and to in-crease its presence throughout the national ter-ritory. In order to guarantee that the orders arecomplied with and executed the President endsup substituting and replacing officers of differ-ent ranks and himself concentrating a large partof the channels through which institutional man-agement flows.

President Uribe�s government programseemed to have the republican language and vo-cabulary: advocate of a strong State orientedat protecting the common wellbeing; generatelove for the homeland and the Republic amonggovernment officials and the citizenry; re-insti-tutionalize political relations to avoid lobbyingand corruption; opt for a hierarchical order whereit is possible to defeat the enemies by the powerof arms; promote social stability; and guaranteethe necessary condition to increase national andinternational investment. Although republican-ism is a peaceful political language and it seeksprimarily to strengthen the institutional struc-tures � the res publica � avoiding, at all costs,personalization and any form of command andobedience that is not within the institutionalchannels and the legal regulations that sustainthem. The personalistic tendency, however, endsup consolidating the presidential figure andweakens the State even further, if this is at all

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possible. All in all, the republican rhetoric be-comes something else when faced with the real-ities of exercising power.

The President projects the image of some-one who: works without rest; is in several placesat the same time; can speak about and makedecisions on themost specialized issues; cleansup the mess and solves the problems; andstands up for and at the same time controls theministers, the military and high ranking officialswho in the past were untouchable. He uses themedia and the gatherings with a wide-rangingpublic to project this image. He does this inpublic and for the public. Therefore, the Ad-ministration�s success stories are not perceivedby the public opinion as a display of State man-agement and, instead, are seen as the personaldoing of the President. The failures, however,fall almost exclusively on the bureaucratic turfand the public institutions without affecting thePresident�s popularity.

This causes the different bureaucratic eche-lons, from the highest ranking national positionsto the lowest and local, to appear as appendicesor prolongations of the presidential power, andthe government officials look as if they were hisobsequious servers instead of managers who arethe first and foremost responsible for public pol-icies. This personalistic tendency, supported bythe presidentialism that is characteristic of Co-lombia�s political regime, has led to the apparentdivision between the President and the Govern-ment. The latter may be seen as inefficient, slowand obscure and the failures, ambiguities andmistakes fall on the public administration. Thesesituations and the normal erosion of every Ad-ministration, however, do not spill on the Presi-dent. He has maintained his popularity and thepublic opinion believes he is the one who solvesall those issues that the bureaucracy has not beenable to work out.

Messianic personalismhas serious effects onthe administrative structures, this is, on the ef-fort to strengthen the State because, at the end,it is substituting it and establishing a direct rela-tion between the President � the providentialman � and the masses, without passing through

institutional intermediation and the institutedchannels for such relationship and institutional-ity. In the best case scenario, it ends up beingsubordinated to the rhythm of commitmentsthat the President adopts during the multipleopportunities in which he displays his ferventactivity (the community councils are a clear ex-ample, but the government�s practices are notexhausted on these occasions). In the worsecase scenario, it creates parallel and informalstructures for decision making that generatepractically untenable situations: disputes be-tween instituted and instituting powers that canlead to different levels of collapse of the Stateand of the judicial system.

Another serious effect of this kind of man-agement and administration is that specific, lo-cal and predominantly corporate negotiationsaffect coherence and standardization in the de-sign of public policies and, at the end, it is im-possible to know where the great problems thataffect the Colombian society are being discussedand addressed. These government practicesreinforce fragmentation and the tremendousdifferences in the Colombian nation, resemblingmore the old structures of past regimes thanwhat a modern nation should be. The idea is toestablish direct contacts, without any interme-diation, with groups, instances, ethnic groups,neighborhoods, associations, corporations andlocalities, who will carry out differentiated nego-tiations for their specific demands with the headof the nation, this is the President. Micro-ad-ministration, as some people call it, carefullyavoids the formation of national-popular situa-tions, which is what happens in Latin Americanpopulist governments such as that of Venezue-la. It also prevents the creation of a politicalsociety � or Demos � different to the State thatmay guarantee, through citizen action, the nec-essary controls to avoid authoritarianisms andabuse of power, such as it happens in maturedemocracies.

The presidential effort to limit institutionaland public bureaucracy intermediation does notstop with the State apparatus. It also affectsother forms of political intermediation such as

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the parties, the local and regional powers, sub-ordinate elites and several social organizationsthat are associated with the traditional way ofmaking politics in the country. President Uribe�sinitial proposal especially emphasized Govern-ment transparency, meritocracy as the criteriafor the appointment of government officials andthe struggle against �politicking� and corruption.All this was enthusiastically applauded by hisvoters. In practice this typically republican andmoralist talk caused the disapproval and disqual-ification of the traditional political intermediar-ies, those whose function is to lobby betweenthe different local and regional groups and theCentral Government.

It is clear that there were objective reasonsto doubt the administrative transparency of afew public officers and to brand a number oftraditional intermediaries, among which are therepresentatives of the traditional parties, as cli-entelistic. However, this is no reason to sup-pose that it would be healthy for the democra-cy to nullify, eliminate or replace politicalintermediation with a direct relationship betweenthe President and the people because in theframework of the political activity is where de-mocracy is exercised, where pluralism is found-ed and built and, all in all, any form of public life.Traditional intermediation, however, continuesto have a great capacity to maneuver. Since itis very difficult to substitute it, the Administra-tion chose the old practice of neutralizing themwith the strategy of clientelistic governance thatthe President had strongly criticized and wascommitted to eradicate. The actions taken withthe legislators for the approval of the reelectionbill during the first round, among others, is anexample of this neutralization strategy.

The destruction of the state apparatus� in-stitutionality, the decline of the intermediationstructures and mechanisms and the tacit alli-ance between the President � the providentialman � and the people, nourished by very effec-tive communication strategies, will lead to thedeath of politics in the medium term: the citi-zens change their old loyalties to their partiesand organizations and turn to the President that

represents them, they all become one with him,and they silently walk from democratic plural-ism to authoritarian unanimism. Citizen partic-ipation is restricted to a mere action in a worldof fragmented and disperse needs and there aresignificant difficulties to obtain the inclusion ofadditional interests and demands. Debate nolonger has any sense, the opposition is seen asdangerous, politics is taken away its deliberativefoundation and, in the long run, there is a newre-enchantment. In other words, it is the es-tablishment of a political theology where dissi-dence, disobedience and dissent are consideredcrimes.

SECURITY POLICY: A NEWSOCIALORGANIZATIONMODEL?

No doubt the security policy was PresidentUribe�s government program�s strategic focalpoint and his electoral victory card. People wereled to believe that other overwhelming problemssuch as poverty, unemployment, the lack ofmodernization in agriculture sector, weak invest-ment, the fiscal crisis, forced displacement andall the other maladies of the world depended onthe security policy. Militarily defeating the gue-rillas, especially the FARC which seemed to havea greater margin to maneuver than the ELN,became a priority along with reaching an agree-ment or negotiation with the different paramili-tary groups who, at the beginning of this Ad-ministration, proposed a ceasefire. The struggleagainst the drug trafficking cartels was also inthe security agenda. In this context the PlanColombia, which came from the previous gov-ernment, was renewed. Also an effective extra-dition strategy was designed that received theapproval of the US Government.

Despite the different components, the secu-rity policy seemed to have very clear objectives:defeat the guerillas; harass them in their places ofrefuge; cut all their possible connections with dis-armed civilians; isolate them from their circula-tion corridors and from the areas where theyobtain supplies and recruit people; prevent them

18 Presentation

from having access to their financial resourcesobtained fromdrug trafficking; and stop them fromkidnapping and blackmailing people. Some ofthese duties have been carried out by the para-military in a few regions but the State needed aclear victory over subversion and, in order toachieve this it was necessary to strengthen theArmy by: increasing the number of soldiers; pro-vide them better logistical resources for a war ina difficult geographical area; and to have a moreappropriatemilitary intelligence strategy in place,since this seemed to be the Achilles heel in thefight against insurgency.

The importance of the Government pro-gram�s security policy and its predominant warorientation resulted inmost of the Government�sinstitutional and budget resources being direct-ed at this effort and established a clear militaris-tic profile in public management. The obses-sion was to win the war and everything else wassubject to this objective. Furthermore, the nameused for this armed conflict was quite unclear:it was called the war on terror, which is in linewith the North American Government after Sep-tember 11. This invisibilizes the armed conflict,it criminalizes it, it takes away all the referenceto politics that it may have and it closes the dooron any negotiation proposal or agreement.

The paradoxes were evident, however: awar was being waged which, in the words of thePresident himself, did no exist; and the Armywas used to reduce individuals accused of head-ing criminal gangs and drug trafficking delin-quents, which seemed more of a Police affairthat required the use of the Criminal Code thana confrontation against enemies. Furthermore,the criteria to confront the guerillas were differ-ent to those used to confront the paramilitarythus giving way to a double standard securitypolicy. While the guerillas were pursued, negoti-ations were conducted with the paramilitary, whowere also involved in drug trafficking and a fewof them were accused of horrible crimes andwere requested in extradition. Furthermore, thiswas the only group which had increased its num-bers and resources in the past few years. Thiswas contrary to the Government�s own thesis,

according to which negotiations should only beconducted with groups defeated militarily andnot with victorious ones that would be able tointimidate and impose onerous conditions in aroundtable dialogue. At the same time, the de-mands to suspend the hostilities to initiate apeace process could be dismissed in the case ofthe paramilitary.

The apparent ambiguities and paradoxes areelucidated once there is clarity regarding the in-tention of the security policy in terms of the war,counter-insurgence and the double standards.Although it is true that during this Governmentmore paramilitary and drug traffickers have beencaptured than during previous Administrationssecurity seems to depend on a sole factor: toterminate the guerilla at any cost. This includesthe cost of reducing public freedoms and citi-zen rights and to maintain an appropriate at-mosphere for human rights violations. This hasturned Colombia into one of the countries mostaffected by this scourge thus causing great con-cern among the international community. Thisis demonstrated by the United Nations reportsand the bulletins of numerous national and in-ternational NGOs.

Security based on an unprecedented mili-tary offense and the adoption of special stat-utes to control public order generated othertypes of insecurities which result from the re-strictions to legal guarantees, the temporarysuspension of normal legal resources, or whenthe judicial investigation bodies are substitutedbymilitary ones. Usually the illegal groups, whichare precisely the ones to which those measuresare directed at, are less affected by these inse-curities than the disarmed population that livesin guerilla influence zones. Massive arrests andabuses against civilians who are not involved inthe conflict are a palpable example of the inver-sion of the old saying �He who owes nothing isafraid of everything� (the real saying says �Hewho owes nothing is afraid of nothing�).

The security policy with its associated inse-curities contemplates other war strategies thatgo beyond the usual ones. Within the rule oflaw the Army is the institution in charge of pro-

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tecting public order and making war on internalor external enemies. The proposal of the cur-rent Government, however, is to turn war intoeveryone�s affair and involve civilians in militaryintelligence strategies such as surveillance, con-trol and information associated with what theseindividuals may think is suspicious or danger-ous. This has exponentially increased the infor-mant networks, on which a significant part ofthe Government�s war strategy is founded thusblurring or diluting the division between institu-tional (the Army) and social (the citizens) issues.These cooperant citizens, who intertwine withthe Army and the security organizations, out-line what could be called a scrutinized society,where trust among neighbors, past solidarity andloyalties, and the social networks are broken,dissolved and fragmented because anyone maybe an enemy or an informant. In this context ofmutual suspicion there is a decline in collectiveactions, public deliberation and social organiza-tion. Silence takes over and people withdraw totheir private and domestic lives. This is anotherway of contributing to the death of politics andthe destruction of the institutionality of the stateapparatus.

The strategy of the cooperants is reminis-cent of the republican thesis regarding the vir-tuous and armed citizen. This political schoolof thought considers that virtue consists on lovefor the homeland and obedience to the repub-lic. A virtuous citizen is an individual whosehomeland duties are above his/her rights, he/she is capable of giving his/her life and shed his/her blood and make the greatest sacrifices toguarantee order and defend the republic fromthe enemies. This is a sort of soldier citizen,who finds meaning in obedience and in protect-ing the institutions. The republicans believe thatthose are the active citizens, the ones who de-serve to be called citizens. The others, thosewho do not recognize war obligations, or are notconcerned with the fate of the res publica be-cause they are busy with their own privateworlds, or have liberal ideas on the separationbetween the State and the civil society and be-lieve that security is an activity that should be

carried out by a public entity, are not virtuous.Those are something like passive citizens,pseudocitizens who seem tremendously suspi-cious due to their lack of commitment with thehomeland.

The rhetoric of the current Government isreminiscent of the republican virtuous citizen.In practice, however, the Administration with-draws from its beliefs, because the informantsand collaborators are paid, therefore the privateinterest is above the public interest. Further-more, there is nothing more distant to virtuethan unfoundedly accusing or subjectively point-ing out a fellow citizen or using this resource tosettle old disputes, take revenge from a person-al enemy, become exonerated from old offens-es, or getting rid of uncomfortable or inconve-nient neighbors. These are frequent practicesamong the informant networks which significant-ly increase the insecurities of the security policyto a maximum.

What is unique about this strategy of incor-porating civilians into military surveillance andcontrol tasks is what lies beneath. In some way,the image projected is that of a society that ismobilized for war, organized around a center thatgeneratesmandates and prohibitions and is iden-tified with the common purpose of defeating theguerilla; a disciplined, organized and united so-ciety that obeys orders from above. This imageof a society that is watched over and watchful,which seems to be organized like an Army andconstituted by soldier-citizens, is far from whatstrong, pluralistic, deliberant and participativesocieties are. These kinds of societies also havea capacity to mobilize and to peacefully influ-ence and transform the decisions of the gov-ernments, as established in the 1991 PoliticalConstitution.

When themilitary characteristics of this gov-ernment arementioned they do not refer to con-ventional war situations such as a display ofPublic Forces, the purpose of taking over all thenational territory, peasant soldiers, punitive op-erations against the guerilla �sanctuaries�, pro-liferation of mountain infantry battalions or anincrease in logistic resources. Instead, it refers

20 Presentation

to that subtle but persistent tendency to shapethe society undermilitia parameters and to trans-form the citizen into a combatant with commit-ments and obligations in warfare scenarios.

A PATRIOTIC TREND OR THE SEARCH FOR ANON- DELIBERATIVE FOUNDATION TOPRESERVE ORDER.

After this Administration took office there wasan unusual proliferation of patriotic symbols.The flags waved in various places and means oftransportation, the colors of the flag were usedin clothes, face and body makeup, bracelets,handles and pennants; the hand in the chestduring the national anthem, fervor for the greatbattles, the heroes of the independence and theliberating Army. And, what is most significant isthe use of the word homeland, which had beenrelegated for many decades to the box of an-tiques. This word was incorporated into thepublic speeches and into the President�s vocab-ulary substituting other ideas such as nation,republic, country, state, society and people,among others, which although not equivalent,had served to designate what is now called withthis magic word.

Patriotisms are a substitute for nationalisms.They are displayed in countries where national-istic elements are not solid enough to build strongidentities on them. Patriotism is promoted tocontribute to social cohesion, to create perma-nent and durable relations among the people,to strengthen citizen loyalty with the state andto legitimize the political regimes. Also, patrio-tism becomes very important in countries thathave gone through decolonization processes,that have suffered international aggressions orwars or that have had civil wars � although inthese cases each one of the groups define them-selves as the defenders of the homeland and theopposing groups are considered unpatriotic.

Nationalisms vindicate ethnicity and terri-tory. Patriotisms, on the other hand, vindicateblood and death. Although the prior have theworse reputation, which in some cases is de-

served, patriotisms are not less violent, author-itarian and excluding.

Nationalisms and patriotisms have impor-tant political uses because they do not appealto reason, to reflection, to the evaluation of themeans and the ends, to calculation and fore-thought, or to a secularized view of personal in-terests to define the political preferences or thesupport to the governments. Instead, theytouch the feelings without any other consider-ations. Patriotism, or the love for the home-land, is equivalent to family belonging. It is iden-tified by emotional relationships that congregateall the citizens, united in brotherly interaction,around the �motherland�. .

Patriotism does not require reasons or justi-fications, it is not deliberative and it is not found-ed on agreements, contracts or consensus. In-stead, it is an identifying feeling that appeals toan imaginary of unity and cohesion. A patrioticfeeling is the greatest of citizen virtues, at leastthis is how republicans feel, and it seals a sacred,unchanging and irrevocable commitment be-tween the citizen and the State, between the peo-ple and the Government. At the same time itoffers a foundation, different than reason, to guar-antee legitimacy and to ensure command andobedience relationships. Therefore, patriotismoffers a fixed reference, coatedwith sacred views,to unify highly differentiated or fragmented pop-ulations. It is very useful in committing the peo-ple to war purposes that in some way involve inthe salvation of the homeland or that representdanger to the unity of the society.

The patriotic trend in the current Govern-ment�s rhetoric and language is perfectly consis-tent with its security policies. It is a strategy inthe field of culture, symbols, signs and collectiverepresentations in order to legitimize war; to jus-tify its morality, its inevitability and its need be-fore different publics; and to convince the peo-ple about the uselessness and risk of otherprocedures such as the negotiations or the hu-manitarian agreements. At the same time the pa-triotic speeches and symbols touch the public,the feelings and the emotions and they createthe necessary atmosphere to commit them all to

21Presentation

a purpose that, without the patriotic ingredient,would be much more difficult to defend.

It is premature, however, to elucidate towhat extend this patriotic tendency will consol-idate the identity and loyalty with the Govern-ment and its policies or whether the symbolsadopted will remain a superficial trend withoutsense, thus losing their effectiveness; or if thespeeches that support it will be substituted byothers when the pendulum of Colombia�s histo-ry moves back to the side of the peace agree-ments, the negotiation proposals and the lan-guage of reconciliation and forgiveness; or whenthe war loses its heroic and patriotic contentand starts being seen as what it is: a great hu-manitarian disaster.

A SMALL EPILOGUE�TOCONCLUDE

The current Government is breaking several ofColombia�s political traditions: the weak State;the practice of violence, more to intimidate thanto definitively destroy the enemy; a fortuitouscombination of war and politics or of arms andnegotiation; the tendency to try to reach pactsand agreements based on military force or in-timidation. This Government, armed with therhetoric of patriotic republicanism and with afirm and stubborn resolve to end a long war bydefeating the enemy once and for all, raises sev-eral questions in terms of the future: Will theelimination of the institutionality andmessianic,militaristic and patriotic tendencies remain andleave a long lasting trace on the State model, onthe kind of political regime and on citizen prac-tices? Or, on the contrary, transversalities, com-petition between the political sectors and dem-ocratic and pacifist initiatives will end upmarkingother paths for Colombian life?

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Tax structure andsystem of privileges

T

Carlos Ossa Escobar*

INTRODUCTION

he twelve tax reforms which havetaken place in Colombia since 1990have sought to adjust fiscal policyin order to achieve macroeconomicstability. However, these reformshave failed to achieve this purpose.

In one or two years, each reform loses all effect.Evasion and elusion of taxes have grown andcosts have increased more quickly than the newrevenue. In other words, to date a structuralreform of the tax code has not been achieved,and the fiscal deficit of the Central National Gov-ernment (CNG) has not been drastically reduced.Paradoxically the government of Uribe has un-dertaken two tax reforms and is preparing for athird in the second semester of 2004.

The countless tax benefits, both in incomeand sales tax which reduce the effective reve-nue stream have been the cause of a significant

lack of efficiency in the tax system. These bene-fits have become acquired rights, despite theinequity which they generate.

The explanation for these contradictions canbe found in what can be called �tax counter-reforms�. While on the one hand tariffs havegrown, the taxable base has broadened and in-deed new taxes have been created, on the oth-er hand the very same reforms have created newexemptions, exclusions, discounts, special de-ductions and other tax benefits, which have sig-nificantly eroded the income brackets on thebasis of which taxes are charged.

In all, taxes have increased significantly inthe last fifteen years in Colombia. That said, twoquestions beg to be asked: Who has had to car-ry the burden of these greater taxes? Have theprogressive principles of equity established in the

* President of the Autonomus University of Colombia. Ex-attorneyGeneral of the Republic.

26 Context

plied a substantial increase in public debt to evenhigher levels than those discussed below.

Under these circumstances and even withthe low levels of public inversion of the CNG ahuge gap between revenue and spending wascreated, which explains the high fiscal deficit5

of the CNG. del GNC. In effect, in 1990 the fis-cal deficit was of 2.2%; in 1999, 7.6%; ni 20026.2%, and in 2003 5.5% according to figuresprovided by the ministry of Hacienda6 .

Since tax reforms have proved ineffectual,the government has tried to borrow to coverthe difference between revenue and spending.The average payment for debt of the CNG was16.5% of GDP in 1990; 39.3% in 2000; 53.6%in 2003, figures which contrast sharply with the11.7% of GDP of the period of 1923-1998 (Dur-ing this time the worst debt never passed 17%of GDP). So Colombia�s CNGmoved from a debtof $27.5 billion (2003 pesos) in 1990 to $121.3billion in 2003, despite the twelve tax reformsapproved by Congress in this period.

political constitution of 1991 been adhered to?This article aims precisely to examine these twoquestions.

DIAGNOSTIC

The origins of recent tax reforms in Colombia liein the growing gap between government spend-ing and tax revenue, given that the former hasgrown more rapidly than the latter, particularlyin the 1990�s.

The tax revenues of the Central NationalGovernment (CNG) represented 10.7% of theGross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1990, 11.54%in 2000 and 13.6% (14.1% including the tax onassets) in 2003. In adjusted pesos of 2003, rev-enue has almost doubled from$15 billion in 1990to $30.97 billion in 2003, and $32.2 billion in-cluding the tax on assets which generate reve-nue of $1.2 billion in 2003.

In contrast, spending has grown at an ac-celerated pace. In effect, in 1990, the CentralNational Government�s expenditures constitut-ed 9.6% of the GDP; in 200 18.3%; and in 2003they reached 20.9% of GDP1 . Moreover, theproblem is not only the level of spending, butalso the inflexibility evidence in the organizationand prioritization of these expenditures. Stud-ies have indicated that 94% (96% including thedebt) of the budget is determined ex ante bylegal mandate, which is to say that the GeneralBudget of the Nation is inflexible2 . The compo-sition of expenditures has change dramaticallysince 1990. In 2003, 40% of spending was ac-counted for by social transfers and pensions,while in 1990 it was 33%, and costs associatedwith the public debt (20.4% of the total costgoes to interests3 versus 11.6% in 1990), ascan be seen in Table 1 and figure 1. Consequently,this composition of the budget left little spacefor public investment4 moving from a partici-pation of 18% in 1990 to 6.1% in 2003, giventhat the investment in the nation�s General Bud-get is considered �residual� when accounting forcurrent revenue and spending. Maintaining thelevels of participation of 1990 would have im-

1 Ministry of Hacienda and Public Credit, Medium term fiscal frameJune 2004, page 24.

2 Echeverri, Ferguson and Querubín (2004), The Political Battle for theNational Budget: Inflexibilities or fiscal survival in CEDE, ISSN 1657-7191, January.

3 Expenditures in the General National Budget only include paymentsfor the service of interest on debt. That is, it excludes payments ofamortizations because these affect the part which corresponds to tehfinancing of the fiscal deficit. Experts in this field make a particulartreatment in considering that the payment of interests forme part of�above the line� and the payment of amortizations relate to �belowthe line� figures.

4 According to the Manual of Programming for public investmentproduced by the Department of National Planning, investments aredefined as expenditures capable of generating revenue or of beingeconomically productive or which will be converted into social infra-structure. Supposing that the mentioned percentages correspond tothis definition , the comparison is clear. Nevertheless, Ayala, U andPerotti, Roberto (2000), The Colombian Budget Process, Fedesar-rollo, pages 17-19, maintain that many items which compose publicinvestment in Colombia do not meet these conditions.

5 International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1999), Manual on Fiscal Trans-parency, Washington, D.C., defines fiscal deficit = Emission of newdebt � amortizatio + sale of shares + privatizations + some quas-ifiscal operations (See Ayala et alius, op cit, page 19).

6 Ministry of Hacienda and Public Credit, Medium term fiscal frameJune 2004, page 24.

27Context

THE TAX BURDEN HAS BEEN REGRESSIVE7

In the last 30 years direct taxes have practicallydoubled, and the taxing of assets has been re-duced. Direct taxes, which represented 4.5% ofGDP in1970 moved to 4.2% in 1990, 4.3% in2000 and 5.6% (6,2% including taxes on assets)in 2003, while indirect taxes, which represented4.4% of GDP moved to 6.6% in 1990, 7.2% in2000 and 8.3% in 2003. In other words, directtaxes only grew 37% while indirect taxes grew87% from 1970-2003.

This substitution of burdens favored thefacility and effectiveness of revenue collection,but produced a high level of regressivity in thetax code, in addition to having a reduced house-hold consumption. In 1994, such consumptionaccounted for 65.9% of GDP within the econo-my�s aggregate demand and the correspondingrevenue from indirect taxes was 6.2% of GDP,and in 2002, household consumption fell to 63%of GDP and indirect taxes grew to 7.6% of GDP8 .

Likewise, a substitution of burdens has oc-curred within direct taxes. Income from employ-ment bore a higher tax burden than capital gains.A study produced by the Comptroller General�sOffice regarding tax policy evidenced two things:firstly, that taxpayers who receive a salary con-tribute $2.40 for every $100 in assets while thosewho receive income from capital contribute only$0,60 for every $100 above declared actives9 .Secondly, the tax structure regarding incomesignificantly favors those with higher incomecompared with workers earning less than 7 min-imum wages.10

This situation has grown worse owing to theapproval of the tax reform law 788 of Decem-ber 2002, which increased the burden on wag-es, diminishing the exemptions for salaries. Ineffect, until the fiscal year 2002, 30% of wageswere exempted from taxes on salaries and withthe reform this percentage dropped to 25%,which contrasts with an increase in exemptionsfor capital gains. The evidence of this greatertax burden for workers earning less than 7 min-imum wages can be seen in the tax revenue of

2003, compared with 2002. In effect, between2002 and 2003, the revenue from taxes on sal-aried income increased by $1.68 billion, andwithholdings accounted for 69% ($1.26 billionowing to greater withholding).

Consequently, wage earners of low incomehave borne the burden of the 16 tax reformssince 1974. This phenomenon has sharpenedwith President Uribe�s last two reforms, giventhat tax benefits tend to benefit proportionallymore taxpayers of higher income. The familiesor individuals who find themselves in these in-come levels enjoy tax benefits to a greater de-gree, as they can reduce definitively their incomebracket by first diminishing their total taxable

7 The concept of regressivity (versus progressivity) is easily under-stood, but difficult to measure in particular owing to the definition ofincome. David W. Pearce, ed., The MIT Dictionary of Modern Eco-nomics (4th ed. 1995), defines a �regressive tax� as �A situation inwhich the average tax falls as income rises�. Also for other authors,like Youngman, Joan (2002), �Enlarging the Property Tax Debate �Regressivity and Fairness�, October, in Tax Policy Readings, regres-sivity of a tax takes place when a tax burden is borne more bytaxpayers of lower income, measured when teh tax represents agreater percentage of their income, compared with taxpayers ofhigher income. In technical terms, it has to do with vertical equityin the sense that taxes ought to be paid according to the capacity ofthe taxpayers, although it also relates to horizontal equity, which is tosay that every individual in the same circumstances should be treatedthe same by the tax code. Therefore, the existence of exclusions andexemptions violates the principle of equity making the system lessjust (see Fox, W, 1994, Ohio`s Sales Tax: Current Conditions andPolicy Options, selected tables). In the state of Georgia, USA, studieshave measured that that a family with US$20,000 in annual incomepays taxes of 2.3% of their income, and another family with US$67,000,pays only 1.2%. Consequently one could draw from that the conclu-sion that this is a regressive regime owing to the number of exemp-tions which reduce the taxable base. (see Bahl, R and Hawkins, R,1997, The Sales Tax in Georgia, Issues and Options, Fiscal ResearchProgram, Georgia State University, Atlanta). Sánchez, F y Espinosa, S(2002), �Basic Diagnostic of the income situation of the nationalorder in Colombia�, pages 112-114, admit that the tax on aggregatevalue is a regressive tax which deteriorates the distribution of income,although their calculations for Colombia lead to contradictory con-clusions by stating that this tax is progressive in the course of refutinga study made by the DIAN (2001, �Progressivity of taxes on sales andincome of natural persons� in Cuadernos de Trabajo, December),which finds that the effective taxes or the relation between revenuefrom sales tax and expenditures is 2.9% for a person of strata 1 of 20reclassified strata ; 4.5% for strata 10, 5.3% for strata 18; 3.8% and3.5% for the last two strata 19 y 20, respectively.

8 CGR (2002), Redistribution of the Tax Burden in Colombia, Proposalsand Alternatives, ed Alfaomega Colombiana.

9 CGR (2002), Redistribution � op cit, page 68.10 CGR (2002), Redistribution �, op cit, page 61.

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Figure No. 1Figure No. 1Figure No. 1Figure No. 1Figure No. 1Evolution of revenue and spendingEvolution of revenue and spendingEvolution of revenue and spendingEvolution of revenue and spendingEvolution of revenue and spending

1990-20031990-20031990-20031990-20031990-2003(% GDP)(% GDP)(% GDP)(% GDP)(% GDP)

income11 eliminating from this figure thoseitems which do not directly constitute income,such as the distribution of utilities, dividends andparticipation as partner or shareholder, the in-flationary component of financial gains, volun-tary and obligatory contributions to Pensionfunds, and sums destined for savings to encour-age construction �AFC�. And surely those withsuch levels of income have the opportunity todiminish also their net taxable income, deduct-ing what corresponds to interests paid for mort-gages, donations12 , for instance to political cam-

paigns, and certain types of investments. In thisway, the taxable income of the wealthy is palpa-bly reduced.

In sharp contrast, low income workers canonly accede to a minimal part of these benefits,owing to their low ability to save and their lowerspending on education, health and housing, on

TTTTTable No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1Central National Government Spending 1990, 2003Central National Government Spending 1990, 2003Central National Government Spending 1990, 2003Central National Government Spending 1990, 2003Central National Government Spending 1990, 2003

Thousands of millons of current pesosThousands of millons of current pesosThousands of millons of current pesosThousands of millons of current pesosThousands of millons of current pesos

SourceSourceSourceSourceSource: Confis, Cálculos de la CGR.

CONCEPTCONCEPTCONCEPTCONCEPTCONCEPT VALVALVALVALVALUEUEUEUEUE PERCENTAGEPERCENTAGEPERCENTAGEPERCENTAGEPERCENTAGE VALVALVALVALVALUEUEUEUEUE PERCENTAGEPERCENTAGEPERCENTAGEPERCENTAGEPERCENTAGE19901990199019901990 OF PAROF PAROF PAROF PAROF PARTICIPATIONTICIPATIONTICIPATIONTICIPATIONTICIPATION 20032003200320032003 OF PAROF PAROF PAROF PAROF PARTICIPATIONTICIPATIONTICIPATIONTICIPATIONTICIPATION

19901990199019901990 20032003200320032003

Personal Services 557 24,6 8.974 19,0Territorial Transfers 567 25,0 12.536 26,5Pensions 186 8,2 6.086 12,9Other spending 288 12,7 7.140 15,1Interests 262 11,6 9.655 20,4Investment 408 18,0 2.880 6,1TOTAL 2.269 100.0 47.271 100.0

11 Income is understood as that which is received in cash or in hono-rariums, interests, dividends , rents and in the case of workersincludes salaries, bonuses, travel expenses, costs of representation,family subsidy, retirement pensions, disability.

12 There are limitations on donations.

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

21

23

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Revenue Spending

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which categories important privileges fall, bothin declarations andwithholding. Neither can theyavail themselves of the exempted salaries whichbenefit the high dignitaries of the State, or theexemptions on generous retirement pensionsthat a lucky few receive, nor can they take sig-nificant advantage of deductions for paymentof interest on loans for the acquisition of hous-ing, nor for donations, among others.

TAX BENEFITS VERSUS EQUITY

The fiscal cost of tax benefits is enormous. TheComptroller General�s office has calculated thatthe cost of salary related benefits in 1999 was$4 billion (adjusted 2003 pesos), which is to say1.8% of GDP, of which $2.3 billion were account-ed for by exempted salaries and $1.7 billion byexcluded income. The relevant figures calculat-ed by the DIAN are even higher. Its estimationreaches $6.1 billion for the remainder of 2004,which amounts to 2.5% of GDP.

Special deductions13 play an importantrole in the tax structure by reducing the taxablebase and producing inequities in the tax code.These deductions include donations, invest-ments and the servicing of debt. The agricultur-al, energy and financial sectors benefit most fromthese deductions. The following table shows thistype of deductions14 :

Although many of these deductions couldhave a fiscal or technical justification, the DIANdoes not have sufficient capability to realize itsdue fiscalization. Along these lines, these typesof deductions can contribute to fomenting eva-sion, elusion and corruption. Moreover, giventhat this is amatter of reducing the taxable base,these deductions translate into greater horizon-tal inequity in the tax system. The ComptrollerGeneral�s office warned in 2002 of the enormousfiscal holes which result from these privileges,which have no technical basis for being exclud-ed from the taxable base.

Despite these circumstances, the tax re-forms of President Uribe have maintained in

CATEGORYCATEGORYCATEGORYCATEGORYCATEGORY SPECIFICATIONSPECIFICATIONSPECIFICATIONSPECIFICATIONSPECIFICATION1. Donations1. Donations1. Donations1. Donations1. Donations

To public entities;not for profit; to political movements; to the Gustavo Mata-moros Corporation (125%), to sports organizations (125%); to scientific antechnological research projects (125%)

2. Investments2. Investments2. Investments2. Investments2. Investments

2.1 Agricultural Sector2.1 Agricultural Sector2.1 Agricultural Sector2.1 Agricultural Sector2.1 Agricultural Sector Investment in reforestation, repair of silos and wells, irrigation and dry lands

2.2 Energy sector2.2 Energy sector2.2 Energy sector2.2 Energy sector2.2 Energy sector Special factor of diminishing resources due to exploitation (15%);addition tothe special factor: 3%, and exemption of 10% annually, additional to normalestablished period of diminishing resources.

2.3 Other sectors2.3 Other sectors2.3 Other sectors2.3 Other sectors2.3 Other sectors Environmental control and protection. Opening of new bookstores.

3. Servicing of Debts3. Servicing of Debts3. Servicing of Debts3. Servicing of Debts3. Servicing of Debts Difficult charging: Individual: up to 33% of expired debt; General: between5% and 15%of total debt, according to date of expiration; truly lost debts:100%.Financial Sector: 100% individual provision of cartera perdida.Goods received in lieu of payment and leasing contracts: Increasingpercentage between 2000 and 2004. In advance: 100%.

4. Other4. Other4. Other4. Other4. Other Taxes:commercial and industrial , property, vehicular, registration andannotation, timber (80%).Source: Comptroller General�s office, DesignatedComptroller for Economy and public finances.

TTTTTable No.able No.able No.able No.able No.Special DeductionsSpecial DeductionsSpecial DeductionsSpecial DeductionsSpecial Deductions

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strength the tax benefits that erode tax reve-nues, instead of tearing them down. The newlyfavored sectors are energy companies, tourism,forestry, construction of housing, medical goods,software and seismic systems for the hydrocar-bon sector. As regards sales tax, the law 788 of2002 also granted sales tax discounts for theacquisition of industrial machinery. Worst of all,tax benefits increase also through special laws.Law 818 of 2003 exempted from income tax allslow growing crops (rubber, oil palms, cacao,citrus y other fruits). Additionally, laws 812 of2003 (Development Plan) and 814 of 2003 werealso generous in offering new exemptions for theforestry and film industries.

Curiously, what governments write with thehand, they erase with the elbow. To quote sec-tions of the exposition of motives for law 633 of2000, the last tax reform of the Pastrana admin-istration: �Despite a decade of reforms, the sys-tem today continues to be complex, plagued byexemptions and insufficient tomeet the financialneeds of the nation�. The same exposition an-nounced that �In the current circumstances whatis required is a long term structural tax reformwhich simplifies the system and contributes tobalance public finances�. In order to achieve thisit would have been necessary to eliminate thepreferential treatment granted in the past to re-gionsandsectors.Nonetheless,despite thestudiesproduced by the Comptroller General�s office andthe revenue mission contracted by the Pastranaadministration, in addition to the opinions of sev-eral senior officials in Uribe�s administration, law788 of 2002 continued eroding the tax base andfavoring capital gains.

Nevertheless, article 87 of law 788 of 2002establishes: �For the purposes of fiscal transparency,the National Government will present a detailed an-nual report through the Budget for income and appro-priations bill, which will evaluate and make explicitthe fiscal impact of benefits, in addition to their sourceof funding be it through increased revenue or decreasedexpenditures�. Additionally, Law 819 of 2003 re-garding fiscal responsibility indicates that the fis-cal framework ought to contain �an estimation ofthe fiscal cost of exemptions, deductions and tax dis-

counts�. It remains to be seen whether these le-gal pronouncements are the result of the pres-sure by many members of Congress demandinga fundamental reform of the tax system, or astrategy on the part of the administration tomaintain indefinitely the hemorrhage of exemp-tions and privileges.

CONCLUSION

The administration of President Uribe has an-nounced a third tax reform within the space oftwo years. It has been evasive in committing it-self to a structural reform of the tax regime, de-spite the voices of a broad sector of membersof congress and the recommendations of theComptroller General�s office and the Fedesarol-lo revenue mission. Contrary to these recom-mendations, the administration is proposinggeneralizing and increasing sales tax and taxpensions.

It would seem that the Uribe administration,obsessed with immediate reelection, does notdare to touch capital gains or the enormous priv-ileges which favor the interests of big Capital. Itis therefore foreseeable that we will continue towitness a situation in which the burden of fiscalbalancing will continue to fall on the poor, indetriment to the progressiveness and equity es-tablished by the Constitution of 1991 in the Taxsystem.

13 �Special Decuctions� relate to benefits which favor natural personsor societies which have resources to give to not for profit entities, orto invest in long term investments or sectors which, owing to theirnature can deduct in various categories and reduce the taxable base.Tehyse deductions form part of �other deductions� that reduice thetaxable base by $18 of gross income of $100 (See CGR (2002),Redistribution�, op cit, page 64, table 3-12).

14 Ortiz, M (2203), The tax cost in income tax in Colombia, in CGR,Revista de Economía Colombiana.

31Context

The constitution asan obstacle

T

Collective Lawyers Group�José Alvear Restrepo�

he constitutional reforms carried outor proposed by the Alvaro UribeVélez government seek tomodify thevery structure of the state, includ-ing the administration of justice, withthe objective of placing all of the in-

stitutions under the control of the executivebranch. This would curtail elements that are es-sential to the social rule of law and affect theconstitutional progress achieved by the 1991Constitution.

The current government, directly andthrough its ministers, has made it understoodthat the Constitution is an obstacle to the un-folding of its democratic security policy, thatstresses the fight against terrorism. As such,many of its actions imply, in one way or anoth-er, the dismantling of the 1991 Constitution. Itis characteristic of an authoritarian governmentto seek to govern freely, without constitutionalrestraints and with minimum hindrance from theother branches of public power, modifying the

Constitution and the law in accordance with itspolicies and immediate interests.

In the president�s understanding, the pursu-anceof a community state requires national powerthat emphasizes security, whose foundation is asymbiosis between the state and the citizen,based on the theory of citizen duty in terms ofpublic security, and subordinating the demand forrights to military expediency in the framework ofthe doctrine of democratic security.

A PERMANENT STATE OF EXCEPTION

One of the most valuable advances in the 1991Constitution was the elimination of the state ofsiege.1 The state of siege consists of granting leg-islative powers to the president, by means of de-crees that in practice replace the Congress, giv-

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ing him power to intervene in the judicial branchand inclusivemaking it possible for civilians to betried by the military courts, or giving rise to high-ly controversial mechanisms such as the secretjustice system (faceless judges, prosecutors andwitnesses, with disguised voices and lawyers whoargue their cases before one-way mirrors).

From the start of his term in office, Presi-dent Alvaro Uribe has been rewriting this ten-dency to centralize power: he declared a stateof exception, called a state of internal distur-bance, four days after taking office.2 Under itsprovisions, the policy of centralizing legislativepower with the president and affecting the judi-cial branch returned. A new war tax was creat-ed.3 The president issued new criminal laws re-lated to gasoline theft,4 thereby infringing onrights and freedoms. Rehabilitation zones werecreated, really war zones or public order zones5

in which civil authority was superceded by mili-tary power (measures that the court had alreadydeclared unconstitutional in earlier rulings).

But the checks and balances held up and theConstitutional Court declared several of the presi-dential decrees unconstitutional, such as the de-cree to renew the state of internal disturbance, onthe grounds that it was unjustified. This caused thegovernment much displeasure and that is why ittook hold of the idea of reforming theConstitution.

In reaction to these rulings, the executivebranch sought, by means of a constitutional re-form, to substantially expand the president�srange of power by eliminating the juridical con-trols on the state of exception and by reducingthe powers of the Constitutional Court, a pro-posal that had not passed in Congress. The gov-ernment intended to decree a permanent stateof exception in such a way that the measuresthat infringed on rights and freedoms and thataffected the other branches of public powerwould not be declared unconstitutional. In Leg-islative Act No. 2 of 18 December 2003,6 Con-gress approved this second proposal in what hasbecome known as the Antiterrorist Statute.

With Uribe�s supporters backing the above-mentioned legislative act, articles 18, 24, 28 and250 of the Constitution would be modified. This

would replace the constitutional spirit thatsought to ensure that states of exception aretemporary and not permanent, and it wouldeliminate the constitutional prohibition againstallowing the military to serve in a judicial capac-ity. This trend is being referred to as the militari-zation of justice and it is contrary to the recom-mendations of different agencies from theUnitedNations7 and the Organization of AmericanStates8 whose reports have recommendedagainst granting judicial powers to the militaryforces. It furthermore revives the use of admin-istrative detentions from the 1886 Constitution�now allowed for up to 36 hours� a measurethat historically has facilitated forced disappear-ances and torture.

In the pursuance of the militarization of jus-tice, the statute allows raids or home searcheswithout a warrant,9 communications to be inter-cepted without a warrant,10 and what is most

2 Decree 1837 of 11 August 2002, By means of which a State ofInternal Disturbance is declared Throughout the National Territory.

3 Decree 1838 of 11 August 2002, By means of which a special tax iscreated to service the expenses in the General Budget of the Nationneeded to preserve Democratic Security.

4 Decree 44.910 of 23 August 2002, By means of which penal andpenal procedures measures are adopted against criminal organizatio-ns, and other provisions are declared.

5 Decree 2002 of 2002, By means of which measures are decreed tocontrol public order and to define the rehabilitation and consolida-tion zones.

6 As this article was being completed, the Constitutional Court madeits ruling in which it declared there were irregularities in the way thatthis constitutional reform was passed. As such the government andCongress must recommence the legislative process so that theConstitutional Court may rule on its constitutionality. Although thisprocess could take another two years, it is not likely that substantialchanges will be made to the bill that is submitted for approval, whichmeans that the objections raised here remain relevant.

7 Among other UN agencies, the Human Rights Committee, Conside-ration of Reports Submitted by States Parties, Document CCPR/C/79/Add.75, 5 May 1997, paragraph 23.

8 Among others, the Inter-Americana Commission on Human Rights.OAS/Ser.L/V/ II.102, Doc. 9, Rev. 1, Chap. V, E, Paragraph 9. That thestate shall adopt measures to ensure that the Military Forces do notexercise influence in penal justice, nor in individual penal cases.

9 Legislative Act 2 of 2003, article 2 that modifies and adds to article28 of the Constitution, reads, �A statutory law regulates the way that,without a court warrant, the specified authorities may undertakedetentions, raids and home searches�.�

10 Article 15 of the Constitution has a new text introduced by Article 1of Legislative Act 2 of 2003, that says, �toward the finality of preven-ting the preparation of terrorist acts, a statutory law shall regulate theway and the conditions by which the authorities specified therein,with serious founded cause, may intercept or open correspondenceor other forms of private communication, without a court order, andimmediately advising the Attorney General of the Nation��

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dangerous: it gives judicial police powers to themilitary forces,11 which include the gathering ofevidence such as interrogations, among others,not as an exceptional measure, but permanently.Thus justice would be transformed into an instru-ment of war to use against the opposition whileat the same time being a mechanisms for impu-nity for crimes committed during the conflict bythose in power. This is very dangerous in a coun-try in which of the 19 homicides perpetrated perday in the frameworkof the conflict, five takeplacein combat and 14 are civilians who have nothingto do with the armed conflict.

This practically puts us into a permanentstate of siege. Proof of this is the last part ofparagraph 2 in the Legislative Act, where it reads,�The functions referred to in sub-subparagraph4 of article 15, sub-subparagraph 4 of article 28,and paragraph 2 of article 250 that are intro-duced by this legislative act are granted for aperiod of four (4) years, renewable by an abso-lute majority by the Congress of the Republic.�It is as if Congress had decided to override theConstitution for four years.

Furthermore, this reform permits the regis-tration of the population and controls on theirmovements.12 These lists seek to make it easiertomanage the population but their misuse couldlead to more human rights violations.

The human rights NGOs challenged this leg-islative act in a lawsuit that is before the Consti-tutional Court, which in the end declared thelaw unconstitutional because of irregularities inits passage, without commenting on the con-tent. In the ruling it wrote:

Legislative Act 2 of 2003 constitutes theoverturning of indivisible aspects of the Consti-tution, because it disregards the clause on thesocial rule of law and its fundamental structures,as well as overturning the laws recognized in in-ternational human rights treaties that are partof the block of constitutionality. In the first place,this law violates fundamental aspects of theConstitution (point 1.1) such as: the separationof powers (point 1.1.1); the primacy of the in-alienable rights of the person (point 1.1.2) andthe prohibition against having military authori-

ties investigate civilians (point 1.1.3). Second,the legislative act as a whole violates the laws ofinternational treaties that are part of the blockof constitutionality (point 1.2.1) such as the rightto be tried by an independent and impartial judgeor court (point 1.2.1.a); the laws that apply tothe declaration and exercise of states of excep-tion (point 1.2.1.b); the principle of distinguish-ing between civilians and combatants (1.2.1.c);and the pro homine principle of international law(1.2.1.d). Furthermore the law violates specificstandards in treaties (point 1.2.2) such as theright to free circulation (point 1.2.2.a); the rightto personal freedom, the inviolability of the homeand correspondence (point 1.2.2.b); and theprinciple of strict legal reserve in the regulationof the fundamental rights (point 1.2.2.c).

REFORM TO THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL�SOFFICE

On 19 December 2002 Legislative Act No. 3 waspassed, modifying articles 116, 250 and 251 ofthe Constitution. With this reform the Prosecu-tor General�s Office lost its powers as judge, lim-iting its role to that of prosecution.13 Nonethe-less, powers were returned, although only duringtimes of exception, to order and make arrests,to carry out raids or search houses, and to in-

11 Legislative Act 2 of 2003, Article 4, which adds a paragraph to Article250 of the Constitution, that says, �To fight terrorism and crimesagainst public security, and in those places in the national territorywhere no judicial authority exists to which it is possible to turnimmediately or where access to ordinary judicial police officials isnot possible because of exceptional public order circumstances, theProsecutor General�s Office of the Nation shall create special Judi-cial Police units with members of the Military Forces�.�

12 Legislative Act 2 of 2003, article 2, that modifies article 24 of theConstitution, says, �The national government may establish the obli-gation to make a report of the residences of the inhabitants of thenational territory, in accordance with the law that is issued to thiseffect.�

13 One of the criticisms of the Prosecutor General�s Office had beenthat the office made accusations and presented evidence of criminalresponsibility, while at the same time acting as a judge in issuingarrest warrants, detaining people, deciding what cases should go totrial, among other powers that were considered excessive for theprosecution.

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tercept communications.14 This means in theend that it retains its judicial functions, whoseexistence was the pretext for the reform.

Beyond this paradox, the reform is not in thespirit of the 1991 Constitution: it politicizes jus-tice by establishing that the prosecutor generalmay freely designate and remove officials frominvestigations and cases. This leads to cases andinvestigations being handled in a subjectiveman-ner and without independence, given that theviews and the stance that the upper echelons ofthe Prosecutor General�s Office takes on a givencase will prevail over the views of any of the offi-cials because of the principle of hierarchy.

Also, the principle of opportunity, a mechanismfor impunity that is set down in the Law, is elevat-ed to the status of a constitutional precept.15 Thisconsists of the possibility to suspend, interruptor cease penal persecutionof a determined crime,in accordancewith the criminal policy of the pros-ecutor general and the government of the mo-ment. This is a situation with a tendency to wors-en because the newPenal ProceduresCode statesthat the prosecutor general, in conjunction withthe president, shall have veto power over certaininvestigations.16 As such, criminal investigations,that may include serious cases of corruption orcrimes by the state, may be thrown out with thislatestmechanism that facilitates impunity, violat-ing outright the autonomy and independencewith which the branches of public power shouldfunction.

CUTBACKS TO THE COURT�S POWERS

In the bill for Legislative Act 29 of October 2002,that was withdrawn before being presented toCongress for passage, the government soughtto partially modify article 242 of the Constitu-tion to limits the Constitutional Court�s indepen-dence. The attempt to modify the court�s con-trol of states of exception stands out. Forexample, it would have limited rulings on con-stitutionality to procedural matters. As such, astook place prior to 1991 with the Supreme Court,it was asking for merely notary functions, verifi-

cation that the decrees bear the signatures ofthe president and hisministers, but without com-ment on the content, meaning whether or notcause exists to justify declaring a state of excep-tion, or whether the measures adopted may vi-olate the Constitution by disregarding fundamen-tal rights and freedoms.

The same bill proposed setting a time limitfor making rulings on constitutionality, which isa mechanism that seeks to ensure that the laws,the Constitution and international human rightstreaties are in accordance. It proposed to im-plement a two-year time limit to challenge laws.It would also eliminate the court�s power to mit-igate the effects of its rulings over time and theinterpretation of the laws that are submitted forits consideration. It would prevent rulings frombeing applied to other related laws that have notexpressly been challenged. And it would forbidto court to issue orders to the authorities bymeans of its sentences.

The same bill also attacked the tutela (in-junction for the protection of constitutionallyguaranteed rights), the primary mechanism forthe defense of all human rights including the civil,political, economic, social, cultural and environ-mental rights. This government has constantlyquestioned the tutela and it has spared no ef-fort to seek to abolish or limit it. Perhaps be-cause it is a tool that allows each and every cit-izen to participate in the administration of justice,allowing the people to participate actively in thedefense of their rights, opposing the differentviolations and abuses that are committed at dif-ferent levels of public and private power.

14 Article 2 of Legislative Act No. 3 of 2002, the final paragraph of thefirst section says that as an exception it may make arrests, as well asnumber 2 in the article that says, �Carry out searches, raids, theseizure and interception of communications. In these events thejudge who fulfils the function of ensuring guarantees shall effect therespective subsequent control.�

15 Legislative Act 3 of 2002, article 2 that modified article 250 of theConstitution that says that the prosecutor �May not, consequently,suspend, interrupt, nor renounce penal persecution, except in thosecases established by law for the application of the principle ofopportunity regulated within the framework of the state�s criminalpolicy�.�

16 Article 66 on the entitlement and obligation of penal action, NewPenal Procedures Code.

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In summary, the reform attempt rangedfrom limiting tutelas to the juridical and eco-nomic feasibility of complying with the rulings,to eliminating tutelas that proposed modifyinglaws, ordinances or changes to the develop-ment plan or a national, departmental or terri-torial budget. In the end, it sought to head offrulings that uphold economic, social and cul-tural rights and that would require spendingand budgetary allocations, as most of theserulings would entail.

THE FAILED POPULARREFERENDUM

Another of the government�s strategies to re-form the Constitution was to call a referendumthat was held in October 2003.17 In the end theinitiative did not pass because each of the ques-tions failed to get sufficient yes votes. Nonethe-less, the process was the focus of considerableeffort by Alvaro Uribe Vélez�s government, andhe personally put all of his energy and charismainto promoting it, as well as millions of pesosfrom the national budget.

Initially it proposed reforms such as trans-formations to the national and local Ombuds-men�s Offices, affecting their budget, a propos-al that had not passed in Congress; thereduction of Congress to a single house, affect-ing participative democracy;18 freezing salariesand pensions immediately and in the future forpublic servants;19 eliminating the municipal anddepartment comptrollers� offices,20 which hasalso come up again before the legislature now;elimination of the municipal ombudsmen�s of-fices21 (originally all of them and then later onlythe biggest ones).

REELECTION

In another Legislative Act, that has passedfive out of the eight debates before Congressso far, the government and its supportersseek to reform the Constitution to allow thepresident to be reelected to a consecutive

term in office. The interior and justice minis-ter and the president himself are committedto this initiative.

The desire to remain in power is not newto the continent; one need but recall the his-tory of Alberto Fujimori in the neighboringcountry of Peru. As well as the authoritarianovertones of reelection, the bill itself castsdoubts on the intention to govern in favor ofthe country�s interests, because it implies us-ing the exercise of power to change the rulesset out in the Constitution that define demo-cratic access to the presidency. Both the pres-ident and his ministers are flagrantly contra-vening the criminal prohibition that forbidspublic servants from intervening in politics,because they are practically campaigning, evenbefore securing the constitutional reform thatthey plan to push through with their majority.

In the country�s history, during the 19th cen-tury reelection was successful during the dicta-torships and the civic-military governments: thethree governments of General Mosquera and thetwo governments of Rafael Núñez. In the 20th

century it took place once with the progressiveLiberal government of López Pumarejo. Militarygovernments have attempted reelection, suchas that of General Reyes in 1910 and during theRojas Pinilla dictatorship in 1953. Let us statethat President Alvaro Uribe represents a returnto the ideals of the 1886 centralist Constitutionand earlier versions, embracing a proposal thatis contrary to the postulates of the 1991 Con-stitution that in all regards is more inclined to-ward democracy and development.

17 The referendum was approved in Law 796 of 2003. When it wasreviewed by the Constitutional Court, the court declared sections10, 16, 17 and 19 of article 1 unconstitutional in a sentence issuedon 9 July 2003.

18 Point 5 in the original version of the referendum.19 Law 796 of 2003, by means of which referendum article 1, question

8 is convoked.20 Law 796 of 2003, by means of which referendum article 1, question

9 is convoked.21 Law 796 of 2003, by means of which referendum article 1, question

10 is convoked, which the Constitutional Court subsequently decla-red unconstitutional.

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BILLS THAT FAVOR IMPUNITY

Before the international community, the Colom-bian State has made the commitment to dis-mantle the paramilitary groups, as has been re-ported in innumerable United Nations,22

Organization of American States23 and even USState Department reports. Equally prestigiousinternational human rights NGOs have unani-mously upheld this recommendation, amongother priorities such as a purge of the public forc-es troops, to resolve the human rights and hu-manitarian crises that have cost thousands ofColombians their lives.

With Decree 128 of 2003, President AlvaroUribemade it possible for paramilitaries and guer-rillas to �surrender� or legalize their situation,not as part of a peace process but rather to getthem to demobilize as deserters and even as in-formers.24 They would be given de facto par-don,25 thus offering demobilized combatants amechanism that guarantees impunity and eco-nomic benefits for collaborating with justice.26

According to official figures, by means of theDefense Ministry that is managing the program,the government has already reincorporated atleast 5,000 people into civilian life, who have in-dividually withdrawn from combat. This is not apeace process but rather a war strategy that usesthese former combatants to continue in the waras informers for the public forces troops or theProsecutor General�s Office. This does not countthe number of people who have accepted theseoffers for economic motives, the impoverishedinterlopers who pretend to be guerrillas or para-militaries in order to get the benefits. There havealready been protests in the streets and run-insbetween thedemobilized combatants and theRiotPolice because the government has not providedthe benefits that it offered.

Although Decree 128 of 2003 is conduciveto impunity, it has not been sufficient to bringabout the demobilization of all of the paramili-taries because the law only serves to reincorpo-rate low-ranking members who do not facecharges. This does not mean that they have not

committed heinous crimes, only that they havenot been convicted of any, nor have they con-fessed their crimes or appeared in public as com-manders.

At the same time the discussion of the lawon alternative sentencing continues. At first itpurported to apply alternative, practically laugh-able sentences, with no prison time, and sus-pended sentences. As the result of the debateand criticism from different social sectors, nowit has been proposed that their sentences shouldbe served under house arrest, in their ruralhomes or in the cities. The possibility has alsobeen suggested of an alternative sentence suchas making a payment to a fund that pays repa-rations to the victims, or ceding them some ofthe ill-gotten goods, which would suit the drugtraffickers who, in the process, are attemptingto legalize their status and their assets. If thingscontinue along these lines, the law shall becomea mockery of justice and an affront to the vic-tims of thousands of human rights violations.

This is nothing other than the continuationof what has already been going on. To be reinte-grated, the paramilitaries are not required toconfess their crimes, nor give any informationabout missing people, nor describe their ties tocivil and military authorities, nor to return prop-erties to displaced persons guaranteeing them asafe return, and much less is there any possibil-ity of undertaking impartial investigations or tri-als. This is about the reign of impunity and ab-solute pardon. Self-forgiveness has been grantedbetween those who created, supported, armed,covered up and financed paramilitary groups.

22 Among others we have the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions, UN E/CN.4/1990/22/Add. 1, Pa-ragraphs 64-67: UN Commission on Human Rights. Declaration ofthe Presidency, 1998 paragraphs 12,16: United Nations High Com-missioner for Human Rights. E/CN.4/2000/11, paragraph 187.

23 Among other: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. OEA/SER.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9 Rev.1, Chapter IV,I, paragraphs 6 and 7.

24 Decree 128 of 22 January 2003. See articles 1, 9 and 10.25 Decree 128 of 22 January 2003. See article 13: Legal benefits of

pardon, conditional suspended sentence, cessation of prosecution,preclusion of investigation or resolution to desist depending on thestage of the case.

26 Decree 128 of 22 January 2003. See article 9: Economic benefits forcollaboration with justice.

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Although, allegedly, the alternative sentenc-ing bill that is currently being discussed takes intoaccount the recommendations by the Office ofthe United Nations High Commissioner for Hu-man Rights, in the end the same mechanism forimpunity, or the law for bringing the situation toan end, operates: the definition of victims is im-proved, the concept of comprehensive repara-tions is expanded, the parole period is extendedto 10 years, detention is considered as a geo-graphic restriction on movement (symbolic de-tention?), and the aspects that have to do withthe commitmentsmade by the demobilized com-batants and the victims� right to the truth havebeen improved, among other details that give thelaw more respectability, but the government�schosen path toward impunity cannot be hidden.

Many of us consider this process as it is pro-posed, doomed to fail. There cannot be peace orreconciliation without responsibility and withouttruth, and in this process there are many truthsthat have not yet come out. Furthermore, theUnited States plays a definitive role in the pro-cess because of the issue of extradition: the para-militaries have been declared a terrorist organiza-tion and their commanders are wanted inextradition. At the same time, that country�spolicy is focussedon its antiterrorismcrusade andthe fight against drug trafficking. It would there-fore bedifficult to fulfil the paramilitary command-ers� pretension to not spend a single day in pris-on, given the current world geopolitical reality.

At heart we are witnessing the exhaustionof a counterinsurgencymodel that remains root-ed at the local and regional level. Although now-adays it pays to reinforce the public forces troopsin the fight against terrorism, the problem is howto keep the paramilitaries from talking and re-vealing their ties to the echelons of power. Ev-erything indicates that at this time in history thereare but two paths and both lead to failure, andthis government is largely politically responsible.One scenario is impunity, which is becomingimpossible, the other path is to attack them sothat they do not talk, as took place with the LaTerraza gang and as is taking place today withtheMetro Bloc, among others. This will only cre-

ate more scenes of violence until the countrycomes to rest in peace.

Another question that arises is why the gov-ernment, that has managed to neutralize theFARC in terms of raiding towns, blowing up oilpipelines, controlling highways and military ac-tions, without being engaged in talks or a ceasein hostilities, has not been able to achieve thesame thing with the paramilitaries, with whom ithas sat down to dialogue, and to whom it hasgranted pardon through Decree 128 of 2003,and to whom it gave a concentration zone wherethe commanders are located.

Another mechanism that could lead to im-punity is the new Penal Procedures Code thatthe Chamber and the Senate passed in June2004, and that was sent back for some adjust-ments before getting the president�s signature.It is made up of 533 articles and is in accor-dance with the constitutional reform to the Pros-ecutor General�s Office, approved in the above-mentioned constitutional reform Legislative ActNo. 3 of 2002.

The most questionable aspect from a hu-man rights point of view is that these penal pro-cedures do not allow for a civil party27 to repre-sent the victims in a criminal case, with a legalattorney to help pursue the criminal investiga-tion, a regulation that overtly disregards the vic-tims� rights and the possibility of arriving at thetruth and justice in criminal investigations. Thereis an enormous step backwards that goes againstthe Constitution and international treaties. Theend, without a doubt, is to facilitate impunity.

OTHER BILLS THAT AFFECT HUMANRIGHTS

The government has other bills on deck that,for the sake of space, we shall just mention. Werepeat, these are only bills and they have not

27 In the new Penal Procedures Code approved by Congress in June2004, which is currently awaiting presidential signature, in Title IV onthe intervening parties chapter IV reduces the concept of the party tothe victim, and although article 101 and following discuss the con-cept of comprehensive reparations, there is no civil party to seektruth and justice.

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yet been passed but they denote a tendency onwhat to expect in future legislation:

Bill No. 22 of 2003 on the national securitylaw. This bill seeks to involve the civilian popula-tion in the conflict as is already being done with5 million informers that the current governmenthas already recruited. It would involve privatewatchmen and security services. It seeks to havebusinessmen loan their workers who, voluntari-ly, would want to participate in the security sys-tem for up to nine months. And it proposes toask the Army and Police reserves for professionalvolunteers in security and defense.

Bill 79 of 2002 seeks to allow civilians touse weapons and munitions of war. Althoughthis is not one of the government�s bills, it wasagreed with Congress, the Defense Ministry andthe military supply industry, to provide privatesecurity agencies, in the manner of the Convivirgroups, with weapons of war, once again put-ting security in the hands of civilians and onceagain giving up exclusive control over the weap-ons of war that have brought so many prob-lems to the country.

Bill 19 of 2003 modifies the regulations onobligatory military service. The most serious as-pect of this bill is that it eliminates the distinc-tions on race and sex for providing military ser-vice, leading to the obligatory recruitment ofwomen, in accordance with the dictates of thenational government. It would also affect theindigenous people who are increasingly obligedto provide military service. It would establishregulations concerning displaced persons andobligatory military service, which would aggra-vate the situation of the victims who would thenbecome part of the conflict that has done themso much harm.

Finally the government insists on disparag-ing and controlling the NGOs. As well as a poli-cy of making different statements about them,comes an attempt at legislation: Bill 105 of 2003endeavors to create a national system for inter-national cooperation. This would affect the au-tonomy of the NGOs, adjusting their activitiesto state policies on the subject of internationalcooperation.

In conclusion, the reforms to the 1991 Con-stitution, the laws and other initiatives demon-strate the current government�s regressive andauthoritarian spirit. If the reelection bill passesand if the president is reelected, without a doubtwe shall lose not only one four-year term forpeace and effective human rights but two lostterms. As well as major changes in the institu-tions and the structure of the state, this wouldtake us back to the centralist government of the19th century with the state at the service of thesovereign (president) and not at the service ofthe people. This means, we are ever further fromthe social rule of law.

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T

Ricardo Bonilla González*

Public Spending andSocial Rights

he social rights may be satisfiedthrough operations of the market orstate intervention. Public action pro-vides non-mercantile goods to allpersons whose limited purchasingpower prevents them from having

access to the goods supplied on themarket. Pri-vate initiative, to the contrary, stocks saleablegoods meant for those who have purchasingpower and as such these are not goods of freeaccess for all citizens. Universal and equitablecoverage implies combining the twomechanismsin such a way that private initiative provides onepart and public action guarantees access forthose who cannot pay. Nonetheless, not all ofthe social rights may be satisfied by public ac-tion; some depend on the market�s capacity toexpand and to offer opportunities to a greaternumber of Colombians. (Stiglitz 1988, Albi etal. 1997).

Basic needs such as healthcare, social se-curity, education, a clean environment, drink-ing water, housing, culture, recreation, sports,

and other social services are satisfied by a com-bination of the two aforementionedmechanisms.The role of public action is crucial for guaran-teeing access for the dispossessed. Other needs,such as that of food and access to other kindsof market goods, are satisfied by means of somesort of mechanism, for income generation orpublic assistance in the case of extreme pover-ty. The generation of income is upheld by theright to dignified work. In this field public actionis limited to creating conditions that are condu-cive to having the citizens employed, using itsinitiative to create enterprises and to generateopportunities for employment or for the pro-ductive use of time. Public intervention for jobcreation is very limited; the greater role is thatof fomenting policies for productive develop-ment and income redistribution. (Kliksberg 1996,Hoang-Ngoc 2000).

An analysis of the General Budget of theNation should be framed in a perspective of the

* Associate professor, National University of Colombia

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construction of social equity and in the satisfac-tion of the aforementioned needs. The budgetmanifests the directives for the redistribution ofthe resources administered by the nation, thepriorities and scope in terms of coverage andequity. The budget is fed with resources provid-ed by the citizens of the state, as taxes or otherforms of fiscal and para-fiscal contributions. Assuch, foremost it depends on the country�s tax-ation capacity and the efficiency of collection.The distribution of the budget or public spend-ing reveals the different objectives and priori-ties. One of these is social spending, with theresulting budget lines of healthcare, education,and other needs. Other budget lines that com-pete and reveal the complexity of the relationswithin the state are military spending and ser-vicing the public debt.

Public action in benefit of the social rightstherefore has three major budgetary limitations:a) the amount of income, b) the requirementsof military spending, and c) the gaps in financ-ing that give rise to servicing the public debt.Restrictions on income affect all state initiativesand force it to establish priorities that are notalways in accordance with needs, in such a waythat limited capacity for collection limits thecapacity for response in the face of growingsocial needs. The opposite should take placewhen tax income increases and the state hasgreater capacity to resolve the problems thatderive from poverty and exclusion from thesocial rights. Military spending is the main com-petitor for the limited resources potentiallymeant to resolve social problems. Some coun-tries with clear arms race strategies prefer tobuy tanks and plane rather than medicines andschool supplies. (Samuelson 1973, Renner1997). In Colombia the argument of war ex-ists. The �democratic security� strategy has theeffect of spending on soldiers over doctors orteachers. (Estrada 2001, DNP, 2002). Servic-ing the public debt is another big competitorfor resources. This derives from the lack of or-ganization in past financing and the snowballeffect that means acquiring one debt to payanother debt.

For the year 2004, the Colombian budgetis 77.6 trillion pesos,1 of which 27.8 trillion aremeant to service the domestic and foreign pub-lic debt, and 8.5 trillion are meant to cover ac-tivities for defense and national security. Thismeans that 46.8 percent of the budget is com-mitted to variables that contribute little or noth-ing to resolving social problems and strength-ening human rights. The distribution of theremaining 41.3 trillion pesos covers the wholegamut of the state�s obligations and activities,from those related to the functioning of publicadministration, to development programs andsocial policy. The former accounts for 8.3 tril-lion pesos, equal to military spending. The re-maining 33 trillion pesos correspond to a broadversion of what is known as social policy.

This budgetary distribution is consistentwith that of the two previous years (see table).For 2004, the budget increased by 10 trillionreal value pesos compared with 2003 and 12trillion real value pesos compared with 2002. Atfirst sight, the budget increase in 2004 (14.5percent) is an effort to improve the transfer pay-ments (23.9 percent) and investment (13.3 per-cent). Nothing could be further from the truth.The argument about the transfer payments is acircumstantial event referring to cash flow thatarose because in 2003 only 11 monthly pay-ments were transferred, those corresponding tothe months January through November, where-as in the budget for the current year there shouldbe transfers during the 12 months of the year,corresponding to December 2003 through No-vember 2004. Investment, on the other hand,continues to be below 2002, in such a way thatthe great sacrifice in the fiscal adjustment pro-gram, brought about by the increase in debtservicing, is the creation of capital.

Debt servicing was also the most importantand inflexible budget line during the two pre-ceding years: 22.9 trillion pesos in 2002 and 25.6trillion pesos in 2003. Both years this surpassedthe transfer payments and represented triple the

1 Finance Ministry, National Directorate for the Public Budget. See:www.minhacienda.gov.co.

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amount for investment. Interest payments, do-mestic and foreign, were and continue to bemore important than spending on personnel inthe non-financial public sector. The cost of creditis a non-flexible budget line that leads to draco-nianmeasures in terms of remuneration for pub-lic servants who during the past three years havehad their salaries adjusted below the rate of in-flation whereas interest has gone up 10.7 per-cent to 27.1 percent from year to year. The in-terest rate for the most recently acquiredgovernment loans is above the average commer-cial interest rate. This is very burdensome andevery peso spent represents less allocation forthe social rights. There is no evidence that thistrend will change in the short-term, especiallywhen the government has taken on 30 trillionpesos in public debt during the fist 16 monthsin office.2

Social policy is not homogenous and it in-cludes different budget lines: the most impor-

tant of which are disbursements to cover pen-sions and termination payments (12 trillion pe-sos), education (9 trillion pesos), and healthcare(6.7 trillion pesos) which total 27.7 trillion pe-sos, somewhat less than servicing the public debt.Other priority programs have smaller budgetaryallocations such as care for families, children andyouths (2.07 trillion pesos); care of the vulnera-ble population (1.08 trillion pesos); housing (0.9trillion pesos), and culture recreation and sports(0.6 trillion pesos), for a total of 4.7 trillion pe-sos. This is just slightly more than half of whatgoes to military spending. Social spending hasbeen on the rise and its distribution is increas-ingly concentrated in pensions and terminationpayments, which sheds a mantle of doubt as towhether it is truly of a universal, equitable, andprogressive social nature. Healthcare and edu-cation are the most important social rights andthese require the state�s presence to guaranteegreater access and equity. Even though we are

2 Bank of the Republic, State of the public debt December 2003. See:www.banrep.gov.co.

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far from having universal coverage, these arebetter guaranteed through the General Partici-pation System. The other programs refer to ba-sic rights for the least protected and most vul-nerable sectors of the population. To whatdegree are these rights protected?

Social spending on pensions and termina-tion payments is not universal, equitable, or so-cial. Termination payments (1.4 trillion) are a la-bor benefit deriving from the provision andtransfer of funds to cover the obligations to pub-lic employees in accordance with the conditionsestablished in 1968 when the National SavingsFund was created. From this perspective, thisbudget line is merely an obligation to the work-ers, equivalent to what the private sector mustprovide to its workers. The only social aspect ofthis payment is that it is made to individuals.Pensions (10.6 trillion pesos) are of a similar na-ture: these represent the commitment made bythe state to the workers of the right to an oldage pension at the end of their days. It is a grow-ing expense given the number of people thathave been hired and the size of the monthlypayments. This budget line covers 1 million ac-tive public employees, which requires monthlycounterpart contributions to the pension funds,plus half a million retired public employees towhom the state pays a monthly pension.

On the subject of care for the elderly onefinds the greatest inequity and lowest coveragein the country for any right. In the country thereare 4.5 million people who are over the retire-ment age �55-years-old for women and 60-years-old for men� of whom 900,000 receivesome kind of pension, meaning barely 20 per-cent of the target population. As such there are3.6million retired elderly people without incomewho depend on family resources or public char-ity. The total number of pensioners in the coun-try is 1.2 million, of whom 300,000 are belowthe retirement age. Many of these are civil ser-vants who retired at age 45 or active servicemilitary personnel who retired at 40 and whohave two incomes because they work at anoth-er job. This latter group, was well as being belowthe legal retirement age and being in full use of

their productive capacities, receive retirementbenefits for 40 years or more, for 20 years ofactive service.

Approximately half of the pensioners areformer public servants who are paid out of thenational budget. The other half are paid throughthe Social Security Institute and a small portion,some 15,000, are paid from pension funds. Pri-vate sector workers make contributions to theSocial Security Institute (ISS) or the pensionfunds and their pensions are paid out of the re-serves there in such a way that they do not re-quire public resources and the 2004 budgetdoes not make any allocation for them. Whenthe reserves at the ISS run out, in the last quar-ter of 2004, the government will have to allo-cate additional budget to make up for the short-fall and honor the commitments to those personsregistered with the ISS. At that time the abys-mal and shocking lack of proportion in the bud-get will become evident: 10.6 trillion pesos willbe needed to cover the public sector pensionscompared with 1.8 trillion for those at the ISS,each with similar sized groups.

Social spending on pensions is not equita-ble and less so in the case of a significant num-ber of people who are paid out of the publiccoffers. The Colombian State covers the pen-sions for close to 600,000 people, including asmall group of 1,312 people whose pensionssurpass 20 minimum wages, the maximum per-mitted by Law 100 of 1993. This group doesnot include a single labor union or social leaderwho has fought for social justice. The beneficia-ries are: 602 from the Congress Fund, meaningformer members of congress or legislators, 315high-ranking state officials and former magis-trates, 292 retired high-ranking members of themilitary, 83 former officials from the Bank of theRepublic, and 20 more from different public ar-eas such as former presidents, widows and heirsof former presidents, several of whom receivemonthly payments of 45 minimum wages. Thisgroup costs 209 billion pesos and their benefitsgo on for more time given that they retire earlierand their life expectancy is longer. They receive2.1 percent of the budget assigned for public

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pensions, much more than the 79.9 billion pe-sos allocated to take care of 3.6 million vulnera-ble old people without supplemental pensioncoverage. (Finance Ministry 2004). This expenseis a direct subsidy for the rich and has no socialcomponent.

Social spending on education is the secondbiggest expense. TheColombianConstitution andits laws define 10 years of obligatory schooling, aperiod that runs from preschool or grade zerountil the end of basic high school in ninth grade.For boys and girls between 5 and 17 who enterschool either earlier or later, middle school andhigher education are outside of the constitution-al commitment. Non-attendance and early drop-out are major problems that need to be resolvedand the state should contribute more resourcesto fight these problems because they affect thepoorest, those who cannot afford to register orto keep their children in the education system.According to the 2003 quality of life survey,3 inColombia school non-attendance is estimated tobe 1.6 million Colombian children in the 5 to 17age range, coming from the half of the popula-tion with the lowest income and with differentincidences depending on the region. In rural ar-eas few children go to preschool which has directimpact on primary school and the children usu-ally drop out early during basic secondary edu-cation. In urban areas it is harder to stay in schooland dropping out is observed among low-incomeadolescents without direction.

Social spending on education to cover thesegrades of education is the most representative(6.6 trillion pesos) which has made it possible toimprove coverage and tomeet some of the grow-ing demand for places in public schools for chil-dren who transfer in from private schools. Ac-cording to the same survey 10.9 million childrenand adolescents are registered for school in Co-lombia: 82.2 percent in public schools and theremaining 17.2 percent at private educationcenters. As such, basic education is treated as apublic asset and those with greater purchasingpower may procure it from private institutions.

The recent increase in poverty has had adouble impact on the education system. Fami-

lies seek to ensure a place in public schools froman early age, prior to 5-years-old, and there hasbeen amassive exodus from the private schools.During the past five years 1.8 million new placeshave been opened up in the public schools ofwhich 1.1 million were for new students and700,000 were for transfer students. This newpressure has resulted in differences in educa-tion between middle school and higher educa-tion where the highest subsidies are found, andwhere students from higher income groups at-tend and the opportunities for poor families con-tinue to be limited.

Social spending on healthcare is the thirdcomponent of the budget. Law 100 of 1993 pro-moted the idea of universal coverage based onbuilding a social security system financed withcontributions fromworkers and employers, calledthe contribution regime, and that operates witha subsidy system for those with limited ability topay. Ten years later universal coverage remainsdistant: 16.7 million Colombians are not in thesystem and public budget is spent on the con-tribution regime as part of the state�s commit-ment to its officials and public employees, aswell as the resources needed to sustain the publichospitals that serve those who are not registeredin the system. With an economy that destroysjobs constantly and leads to new forms of laborcontracting, the contribution regime is slow tospread and the demand for subsidized service isgrowing. This gives rise to two problems: errorsof exclusion, which affect a significant numberof the 16.7 million people who are outside ofthe system; and errors of inclusion in whichColombians who are able to pay benefit fromthe subsidy. (Rodríguez et al 2002).

In the end, increased servicing of the publicdebt and greater military presence absorb heftyand growing portions of the budget. There is lit-tle room to maneuver for social spending andsatisfying the social rights and this is increasing-ly limited. Spending on healthcare and educa-tion have been shored up thanks to the fact that

3 Dane, Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2003. Tallied by the Center forDevelopment Research at the National University of Colombia.

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these are supported in the legislation throughthe General Participation System and there areclear directives concerning their use. Otherwisethese social rights would be endangered. Mostof the elderly do not receive pensions; they de-pend on their families or public charity. None-theless, this line has the largest budget assigna-tion within so-called public spending and a smallminority enjoys extraordinary benefits above thelegal limit. Building a road to equity implies cut-ting the extravagant pensions and transferringthese resources to vulnerable old people.

It is also necessary to examine the evolu-tion of the indicators for each of the rights. It isimportant to determine the level of coverage,broken down by sex, age, ethnic group, incomelevel, etc., meaning indicators that reveal theapplication or lack of application of the charac-teristics and principles of the economic, socialand cultural rights such as: universality, free ofcharge, equity, equality, accessibility, interdepen-dence and indivisibility, individual and social na-ture, progressiveness, irreversibility, and that theycannot be renounced, among others.

Albi, Emilio, González-Páramo, José Manuel y López Casasnovas,Guillem, �Gestión Pública: fundamentos, técnicas y ca-sos�, Ariel Economía, Barcelona, España, 1997.

Banco de la República, Estado de la deuda pública diciembre de2003. Ver: www.banrep.gov.co.

Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística DANE, En-cuesta de Calidad de Vida 2003, cálculos del CID-UN.

Estrada Alvarez, Jairo, �Plan Colombia: ensayos críticos�, Universi-dad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, 2001.

Hoang-Ngoc, Liem, �Les politiques de l�emploi�, Editions du Seuil¨,Paris, 2000.

Kliksberg, Bernardo, �El rediseño del Estado: una perspectiva inter-nacional�, Fondo de Cultura Económica e Instituto Nacionalde Administración Pública de México, 1996.

Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Presupuesto nacional2004. Ver www.minhacienda.gov.co.

Renner, Michael, �La transformación de la seguridad�, en �La situa-ción del mundo, un informe del Worldwatch Institute�, Bar-celona, Icaria editorial, 1997.

Rodríguez, Oscar, Arévalo Decsi y Martínez, Félix, �Ha mejorado elacceso en salud?: evaluación de los procesos del régimensubsidiado�, Ministerio de Salud y Centro de Investigacio-nes para el Desarrollo CID de la Universidad Nacional deColombia, Bogotá, 2002.

Samuelson, Paul A., �Exposición diagramática de una teoría del gas-to público�, en �Microeconomía� de Breit, Wiliam y Hoch-man, Harold, Interamericana, México, 1973.

Stiglitz, Joseph E., �La economía del sector público�, Antoni Boscheditor, Barcelona, España, 1988.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Jean Ziegler, UN Special Represen-tative of the Secretary General forthe Right to Food States �Without acritical examination of the macro-economic conditions which deter-mine the insufficient development

of the societies of the south of our hemisphere,the debate over what measures ought to betaken to guarantee the right to food will be apurely academic exercise� (Ziegler 2001: 26). Ishare this view. Macroeconomics has a directinfluence on the right to alimentation and ingeneral on Economic, Social and CulturalRights. (ESCR). Without a perspective of struc-tural change, short term policies aiming at rem-edies do not constitute a sustainable dynamic.A variety of evidence demonstrates clearly thatthe economic policies pushed forward by theUribe administration do not combat poverty,and as such, clash with Economic Social andCultural Rights.

Inequality and Poverty

Jorge Iván González*

GROWTH AND POVERTY

Between 1997 and 2003 the percentage of thepoor living below the poverty line rose from 55%to 66%1 . These years correspond to two verydifferent moments in the Colombian economy:GDP per capita reached its highest level in 1997and then started to fall; in the last three years ithas stabilized , but at a considerably lower levelthan in 1997 (CID 2003). We still do not see arecovery, and the level of income remains at thelevel to which it fell in 1998. Poverty, measuredby the poverty line, is very sensitive to econom-ic cycles, and particularly to unemployment andloss of income. From the perspective of the wellbeing of the population, it is a bad sign for theincidences of poverty measured below the pov-

* Teacher National University of Colombia1 These values have been estimated based on quality of life surveys

carried out by the DANE in 1997 and 2003.

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erty line to grow, but it is perhaps more scandal-ous that they not drop below 55% in momentswhen the economy achieves high indicators ofgrowth. It would seem that half of Colombiansociety has been condemned to live in condi-tions of poverty, even in the ascending phase ofthe economic cycle. It is unacceptable that pov-erty should not be significantly reduced whenthe economy reaches its maximum level. Thisunfortunate reality, however, demonstrates thatthere exists a poverty trap which cannot be over-come solely with growth. The growth of GDP isa necessary condition for the reduction of pov-erty, but it is by no means a sufficient one.

The reduction of product per capita after1997 was related to the drop in employmentand wages: it is only logical for a drop in GDPper capita to reflect itself in a greater incidenceof poverty. But the inverse relation is not of thesame intensity: when GDP increases povertydoes not decrease proportionately. The move-ments are not symmetrical. Salama (2002) em-phasizes the histéresis of poverty. The responseof poverty to changes in GDP is extremely asym-metric2 . In times of economic contraction thepercentage of poor by income increases sharp-ly, while in the expansionary phase of the cyclethe reduction of poverty is sluggish. In otherwords it is easier for poverty to increase than todecrease.

Adherence to ESCR is possible if economicpolicy advances in the battle against poverty.People below the poverty line have unfulfilledbasic needs that do not allow them to broadenthe space of their capabilities and achievements.The government has sought to fight povertythrough growth, but, as observed in 1997, thehighest point of economic growth did not man-age to reduce poverty below 55%. It would beunacceptable to therefore conclude that soci-ety must accept such elevated levels of poverty.In order to escape the poverty trap two condi-tions must be met: firstly, that growth be sustain-able; secondly, that it be equitable. The economicpolicy of the Uribe administration moves half-way forward in the former direction, and movesbackward in the latter.

SUSTAINABLEGROWTH

In order for actual growth to be sustainable threeconditionsmust bemet: 1) sufficient importancemust be given to the internal market, 2) an un-abashedly keynesian policy must be put into ef-fect, and 3) the explosion of reserves must betaken advantage of.

Stimulating the Internal Market

The Government�s development plan doesnot consider internal markets to be relevant. Itis curious that the plan also does not value eco-nomic integration, which it barely mentions. Theimprovisation evident in the economic policy canbe seen, for instance, in how the Free TradeAgreement (FTA) runs counter to all agendas.The importance which has been granted it inrecent months is disproportionate given themarginal place it occupied in the DevelopmentPlan. It leaves the impression that the adminis-tration is playing this by ear.

The negotiation processes accompanyingthe Free Trade Area of the Americas and the FTAhave evidenced the dichotomy between exportpolicy and the stimulus of domestic demand.The atmosphere which pervades these interna-tional negotiations leads to the conclusion thatit is enough to export, and that the sustainabil-ity of growth depends exclusively on export ca-pacity. This focus makes entirely academic theinteraction between external and internal mar-kets. Efforts to enhance the competitiveness offirms in the international arena ought to be ac-companied by a growing consolidation of theinternal market, thanks to the gains achieved inproductivity.

2 Moreover, GDP is increasingly ever more volatile. In the 1980�s thevariance of the rate of annual growth of GDP was 2.2. In the 1990�sit was 8.7. The respective variations of GDP per capita were 2.3 and8.3. The volatility of both grew considerably. GDP is more erraticthan GDP per capita. Supposedly the adjustments as conceived bythe IMF should lead to the stability of the economy. In practice suchstability has not been achieved. This fact should be sufficient to putin doubt the usefulness of the sacrifices imposed by the IMF.

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The current levels of growth have not gen-erated employment, and because of this pover-ty has not diminished. There are indications thatthe current dynamic of GDP contains undesir-able speculative elements. The factors whichcontribute to the speculative logic are: the erro-neous management of the internal public debt3 ,the freemovement of capital, and the abundanceof reserves. In addition to strengthening the in-ternal market, economic policy ought to dein-centivize speculative pressures.

Towards an Unabashed Keynesianism

The Government applies Keynesian policiesdespite considering them inadequate in its dis-course. The expansion of liquidity and lower in-terest rates have favored economic growth. Inthe last three years means of payment havegrown and interest rates have dropped. Thesemeasures have contributed to accelerating theeconomy. Restrictive polices were abandonedfollowing the recession at the end of the lastdecade. Monetary policy began to be more pro-active, and to have growth as a goal. The roomfor maneuver has broadened and the growth ofmonetary aggregates has not been inflationary.The assessment made among orthodox circlesturned out to be false, and the use of monetaryinstruments with expansionary aims did not bringthe troubles of which we had been warned.

An active monetary policy of a Keynesiannature has been positive, and has permitted thecountering of recessive tendencies. In additionto the beneficial impact it has had on economicactivity, the expansion has not been inflationary.

These achievements notwithstanding, Co-lombian monetary authorities are reluctant toadmit that these dynamics are clearly Keynesian,and that they represent an important departurefrom the contractionary principles which guid-ed monetary policy during much of the 1990´s.Growth is sustainable if the Government doesnot feel ashamed to engage in Keynesian poli-cies and continues applying them without re-morse. The Monetary authorities and the Gov-ernment have been surprised because they have

always considered expansionary policies of Key-nesian nature to be flawed. Now, forced byevents to resort to Keynesian instruments, theyhave discovered, against all their predictions,that the results are positive.

Taking Advantage of the Bonanza of Reserves

The management of exchange rates has adirect influence on the variations of the stock ofreserves. In January 1990 the volume of reserveswas aroundUS$3.8 billion (mil millones). Towardsthe middle of 1997 the nation had US$10.3 bil-lion. And according to the latest figures of theBanco de la República (2004: 6), current reservesoscillate around US$11.8 billion. This unprece-dented wealth is being very poorly used.

Prior to the 1990�s the control of the ex-change rate was an effective mechanism that al-lowed the regulation of the entrance and exit ofdivisas in support of the country�s needs. Today,a regulation of movement of capital in the shortterm should be contemplated. The fluctuation ofinternational capital creates profound destabili-zations in the financial sector and in real economicactivity. The revaluation of the Peso was un-thinkable six months ago, while the abundanceof divisas also had not been foreseen. The cur-rent level of reserves is significant, and they con-tinue to grow despite the recession experiencedby the economy at the end of the 1990�s. Theexplosion of reserves has not been adequatelyused. This enormouswealth has not been reflect-ed in better levels of development, nor has it con-tributed to creating the necessary conditions forsustainable economic growth.

There is reason to believe that the appro-priate sum of reserves should be US$7 billion(mil millones). The remaining funds could beused, among other alternatives, to prepay for-eign debt. The freed resources could stimu-late aggregate demand. The Banco de la

3 Internal public debt continues to grow at an exponential rate. Themovements of debt in the financial market stimulate volatility. Al-most half of internal debt is in the hands of financial institutions.Instead of offering credit to individuals, banks prefer to lend to thegovernment.

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República (2004 b: 6) has argued against thisnotion that Colombia needs some US$10.1billion in reserves. The technical reasons thathave been used to justify this figure are ex-tremely ambiguous. In the Bank�s opinion, ahigher level of reserves gives internationalbanks peace of mind and improves Colombia�sposition in capital markets. In its analysis ofthe cost benefit relation it is of greater benefitto maintain a high level of reserves. This logiccould be accepted if in effect the costs ofmaintaining these reserves were less than thebenefits, butt his does not seem to be the case.The exaggerated volume of reserves incentiv-izes speculative dynamics, while that wealthdoes not contribute to galvanizing the realsector of the economy.

In order to calculate the opportunity costof these reserves, the Bank uses definite data,while to estimate the benefit of maintainingthe reserves it uses probable data derived fromuncertain future scenarios. The opportunitycost of these reserves is negative. In 2003,the average annual financial yield of the re-serves was 3.4%. The cost of debt owing tobonds of public debt was 7.4% (BR 2004 b:15). This means that in 2003 the negative dif-ference of interest rates was 4%4 . In otherwords, the cost of the debt was greater thanthe funds obtained from the investment ofreserves. This point, which is true and whichleads to a legitimate questioning of the man-agement of the reserves, is countered by anestimate based on uncertain scenarios. Froma methodological perspective, the probabilis-tic exercise carried out by the Banco de laRepública is questionable, given that the na-ture of the components of the expected costbenefit relation is qualitatively different fromthe estimation of actual value of the differencebetween the yield of reserves and the cost ofdebt. The Bank imagines various costs of thecrisis and concludes that they might disposeof US$500 million. This conclusion is disheart-ening because the available resources cannotbe used to improve the living conditions of thepopulation.

PEACE AND EQUITY

In addition to sustainable growth, the fightagainst poverty would be successful if it wasaccompanied by a better distribution of wealth.Peace favors inclusion and governance. And inthis process the acreements made with thearmed groups occupy a privileged place. The ne-gotiations should take the opportunity to placein the first tier the distributive agenda of Colom-bian society. The Government assessment of thecauses of violence centers its attention exclu-sively on narcotics. Other explanations for thearmed conflict have been tossed aside, expla-nations relative to the objective causes of theviolence. Among these it behooves us to high-light the importance of inequality. Narcotics traf-ficking fuels the war, but its roots can be foundin the exclusion and marginalization prevalentin Colombian society.

Indicators of distribution tend to be pro-duced based on income data. But such infor-mation is incomplete, because they sdo notmention on the income of the richest families.The inequality of income is calculated with a flatdistribution. In the last survey of the quality oflife, carried out by the DANE in 2003, the aver-age monthly income of the richest householdswas $4.5 million. The households with higherincome are not included and, obviously this re-flects itself in a distribution of income far betterthan that which would be reflected if the wealth-iest households were in fact included.

The true levels of concentration are evi-denced by analyzing what takes place with thedistribution of wealth and property. In particu-lar, the concentration of land has been aggra-vated by the violence and displacement endemicin Colombia. The redistribution of property thatresults from the armed conflict ignores the prop-

4 The loss in prior years was: 1.6 (2002); 4.3 (2001); 6 (2000); 9.7(1999); 2.2 (1998); 6.1 (1997). See, Banco de la República (2004 b:15). In other words, the contracting of exteral debt, when one has alarge amount of reserves is bad business given that the interests paidfor credits are greater than the funds obtained by the central Bankwhen it places its reserves in international markets.

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5 In 1996 there were 11,570 land owners (0.4% of the total) with farmsgreater than 500 ha. They possessed 22.6 million ha. (45% of thetotal being exploited). The resulting average is of two thousandhectares per person. On the other hand, there were 2.2 millionsmall landowners (69%) with farms less than 5 hectares. In total theypossessed 2.2 million hectares (4.3%). This means that on averageeach family owned about one hectare (UNDP 2003: 350). This baddistribution of land has been aggravated by the purchases of narco-traffickers. The UN report shows that the coastal cattleraising areawhich in the 1970�s kicked out the peasants, �today is under seige bythe guerrillas and protected by the paramilitaries� (UNDP 2003: 348).According to Fajardo (2002, 2002 b), in 2002 0.4% of landowners(15,273) owned 61.2% of rural land equivalent to 47,147,680 hec-tares, which corresponded to parcels larger than 500 ha. At the sametime, 24.2% of rural land (18,646,473 ha) is in hands of 97% oflandowners most with parcels of less than 3 hectares.

erty rights of those peasants who find themselvesforced to abandon their homes and lands. Al-though in Colombia regular information thatwould allow transparency regarding the inequal-ity (income, shares, lands, etc.) is unavailable,there exist clear indications that the distributionhas grown more uneven. As regards land, theassessment of the UN Human Development Re-port is worrisome. The accumulation of land asa source of power is one of the motivations un-derlying territorial conflicts5 .

The concentration of land goes against themost elemental principles of a liberal society.Neither does it favor efficiency. According to thefigures of the UN Report grasses occupy 41.7million hectares, which is the equivalent of 37%of the total land of the country. �Their expan-sion has overflowed the areas whose naturalvocation is cattle raising, estimated in 19millionhectares at the cost of lands for agriculture andconservation.� (UNDP 2003: 348). Agricultureoccupies 5.8 million Hectares; and according tothe characteristics of the soil, it could occupy 9million. Owing to the poor distribution of land,crops are often raised in lands that are not opti-mal for agriculture.

The urgency of Military issues has relegatedto a second tier the issues of distribution. Evenif the Government does not acknowledge it, theso-called objective causes of violence continueto play a central role in the Colombian armedconflict. Equity favors inclusion, contributes todiminishing poverty, does not clash with efficien-cy, facilitates adherence to Economic, Social andCultural Rights, and would reduce the intensityof the war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Banco de la República, 2004. Informe de la Junta Directiva al Congre-so de la República, mar., Banco de la República, Bogotá.

Banco de la República, 2004. b. Análisis del Nivel Adecuado deReservas Internacionales, Banco de la República, Bogotá.

Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo, CID, 2003. Bien-Estary Macroeconomía. Informe de Coyuntura, CID, UniversidadNacional, CGR, Bogotá.

Fajardo Darío, 2002. Para Sembrar la Paz Hay que Aflojar la Tierra,Universidad Nacional, Idea, Bogotá.

Fajardo Darío, 2002. b. Tierra, Poder Político y Reformas Agraria yRural, Cuadernos Tierra y Justicia, no. 1, Ilsa, Bogotá.

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, PNUD, 2003.El Conflicto, Callejón con Salida. Informe Nacional de Desa-rrollo Humano para Colombia 2003, PNUD, Bogotá.

Salama Pierre, 2002. Pauvreté: La Lutte contre les Deux �V�, Volati-lité et Vulnérabilité, Paris 13, mimeo.

Ziegler Jean, 2001. El Derecho a la Alimentación, Informe Preparadopor el Relator Especial sobre el Derecho a la Alimentación,Naciones Unidas, Consejo Económico y Social, feb., Was-hington.

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Judicial independence

O

Latinamerican Institute forAlternative Legal Service, �Ilsa�

José Burgos*

* Member of �Ilsa� University Professor National University of Colombia.1 Translator�s note: the General Prosecutor differs from the Attorney

General�s office (fiscalia) in its internal government oversight func-tions, forming part of the Public Ministry.

2 Statements taken from the daily El Colombiano of 2 November,2002. Online version.

3 Extracted from a communiqué produced by he International Com-mission of Jurists, directed towards the Colombian Government on12 March 2004, online version. http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=3289&lang=es&print=true

n 2 November, 2002, Pedro SuárezVaca, then a Criminal Judge in Tun-ja, was publicly accused by the Min-ister of the interior and Justice,Fernando Londoño, of being a law-yer of the Cali Cartel. Such grave

media accusation was part of the official re-sponse to the legal ruling granting conditionalliberty to the brothers Miguel and Gilberto Ro-driguez. Later on, the same Minister recognizedthe existence of a judicial categorical order notto fulfill that sentence until such a time as theAttorney General and the Public Prosecutor1 in-tervened, and announced that an investigationwould be opened against the judge that hadordered the release of those men.2

Months later, on 6 June, 2003, PresidentÁlvaro Uribe categorically affirmed that �As longas I am President, fumigation will not be sus-pended�. In this way, he fixed the position of hisadministration regarding the ruling of the Supe-rior Tribunal of Cundinamarca, which ordered the

suspension of fumigation of coca leaves andpoppy with glifosate (Cajpe, 2004).

On November 9, 2003, the Minister of De-fense, Marta Lucía Ramírez, thoroughly disre-specting a judicial ruling, announced the recap-ture of 128 persons freed by a delegated districtattorney before the Sincelejo Tribunal, OrlandoPacheco. Almost simultaneously, the AttorneyGeneral, Luis CamiloOsorio, announced the des-titution of said District Attorney, and requested,a disciplinary investigation against Mr. Pacheco3 .

These cases constitute improper interven-tions by the executive power into instances of

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judicial action. In effect, owing to reasons ofpolitical disposition, theGovernment has, direct-ly or indirectly, ignored judicial decisions soundlybased in law, and, as evidenced in the abovementioned cases, has promoted legal retaliationagainst judges and prosecutors through disci-plinary or criminal investigations.

What�s more, in addition to the worrisomeand growing cases of intervention in judicial rul-ings and retaliation against judges and prosecu-tors, judicial independence in Colombia is un-der assault as a result of the initiatives seekingjudicial reform proposed and promulgated by theGovernment of President Uribe.

JUDICIAL REFORM: TOWARDS AN AUTHORITYWITHOUT POWER

The projects of judicial reform extra-officiallypromoted by the administration of PresidentUribe Vélez include a complex of institutionalarrangements which put in doubt the founda-tions of judicial independence, both on the levelof the entire judicial edifice, in public actions,and in terms of its personal dimension.4 Theprincipal reforms and their potential effects onjudicial independence can be identified in thefollowing manner:5

The limitation of the powers of judicial control

Judicial independence is a mean towardsguaranteeing the respect for human rightsthrough the impartial application of the Consti-tution and the body of law.

In as much as it is a mean towards that end,its success depends in good part upon the ex-istence of mechanisms and relevant competen-cies and powers within the judiciary to controlthe political power, and in this way defend con-stitutional human rights in the face of potentiallegal or administrative excesses.

To this end, the Constitution introduced aseries of institutional arrangements, including theautomatic review of the constitutionality of de-crees of State of Internal Commotion, including

the reasons for the said declarations, control overdecrees with the force of law, expressly estab-lished in the Constitution, in addition to the tra-ditional powersof judicial control of laws (Art. 241).

In this context, the proposals for judicial re-form that have been expressed to date seek tomarginalize the powers of judicial control, or atleast to limit them to the point of making themirrelevant. Along these lines, the elimination ofthe judicial control of the constitutionality of thereasons stated for the Executive to declare a Stateof Internal Commotion has been proposed. Like-wise, there have been proposals to limit the Con-stitutional Court�s ability to establish restrictionson the tributary faculties of Congress, differentfrom those expressly established in the Constitu-tion. Other reform proposals include one whichwould ruee that where a ruling on an action of�tutela� impli the disbursement of funds not fors-een by the relevant legal mechanisms, the judgein question would have to provide the necessaryfunds, or in some way obtain a source of fundingfor the fulfillment of that sentence.

Measures such as these not only tend toweaken the exercise of judicial independence,but also could potentially place in doubt theguarantees of basic rights for the citizensy. Ineffect, in a political context where the Presi-dent�s power is omnipresent, the limitation ofthe powers of judicial control could lead to theinstrumentalization or limitation of fundamen-tal rights in the interests of democratic securityor the immediate objectives of economic poli-

4 Judicial independence has been understood on at least two distinctlevels. On the one hand lies the independence of the judicial edificeas an organ or institution. This is possible in as much as mechanismsare in place for judicial self-administration in terms of funding,personnel and organizational structure. On the other hand lies theindependence of judges as individuals, which is guaranteed throughtheir capacity to retain office in the face of executive pressure, thecareer track, etc. Both levels of judicial independence are interde-pendent, however distinct. In this case, threats against the personalindependence of judges ay originate either within or without thejudicial edifice, while in its more holistic dimension judicial indepen-dence can only be threatened from without.

5 This text bases itself fundamentally on an analysis of the preliminarylegislative proposals which the government promulgates extra-offi-cially as drawing boards for its reform initiatives. Up until the time ofthis writing, and despite reiterated interest in judicial reform, theexecutive has yet to submit to the chambers of Congress a projectfor the reform of the judicial system.

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cies, regarding whose effects generally nobodyis to be held accountable.

To limit constitutionally established checksand balances in order to neutralize judicial con-trol or other aspects of the judiciary makes thepopulation more vulnerable to the abuse of po-litical power.

Weakening of the judicial self-rule

Judicial self-rule allows for the independenceof the judiciary as an organ of the State, in asmuch as it allows for the autonomous manage-ment of economic resources, personnel, and or-ganizational structure on certain levels of the ju-diciary. In this way, the work of the judges cannotbe affected by a direct action from political ac-tors, which in the past had tended to dominatethem through the political management of bud-gets or the assignation or transfer of personnel.

In the various unofficial projects madeknownmore or less publicly by the Government,the need to modify or eliminate, totally or par-tially, the Superior Council of the Judiciary hasbeen reiterated, in as much as it represents anorgan of judicial self-rule. This proposal has beenbased upon arguments of a financial character,questioning also the effectiveness and legitima-cy of the Council�s actions, particularly in termsof improving global indicators of judicial activi-ties. Unfortunately for the validity of such argu-ments, the solutions proposed by the Govern-ment to replace the council not only do notattend to generate greater effectiveness and le-gitimacy within the judicial branch, but ques-tion the possibility of having organic indepen-dence of the judicial power.

In effect, the reform project made knownin March 2003 proposed the creation of a non-permanent Council composed of representativesof the high judicial bodies, the Executive, majoracademic legal institutions and lawyers. Thescope of representation contrasted with the lim-itation of the powers of said Council, which, notbeing permanent, would only set forth policyguidelines which would have to be executed byan administrative director of the judiciary. In

this way, although theoretically strengthening thecapacity for the execution of policy, any form ofjudicial self rule that genuinely encompassed theinterests and expectations of the judiciary wouldbe, sharplyneutralized.

Similarly, the reform project divulged towardsthe beginning of 2004 included the creation of anAdministrative Commission of the Judiciary Coun-cil, tobe comprisedby representativesof the threeHigh Courts. While this Commissionwould be per-manent, the proposed arrangement deepens thevertical character of the Council, in as much as itrepresents only the highest level of the judiciary. Inthis manner, the legitimacy of the Commission�smembership in relation to its ability to representthe expectations and needs of the diferent mem-bers of the judicialzy would continue to be weak,and the arrangement would reproduce one of thevery reasons that the current Council has not per-formed as expected. At the same time, said pro-posal would establish the presence of the Minin-ster of the Interior and Justice and the Minister ofHacienda in the heart of the Administrative Com-missionof the Judical Branch,with a voicebutwith-out a vote.

The impact of a potential weakening andfundamental restructuring of the judicial organof self-rule on judicial independence is greater ifone takes into account the executive�s inten-tions of reforming article 201 of the Constitu-tion. This article establishes the government�sobligations regarding the judicial branch, whichamount essentially to an obligation to respectjudicial rulings. That said, the Government�s pro-posal is to include a paragraph that would allowthe Executive to coordinate with the judicialbranch the determination of �public policy oncriminal and judicial matters, and coordinate itsimplementation with the organs of the judicialbranch�. In this way the constitutionalization ofa permanent intervention by the Government issought, not only in the fixing of public policies,but in its execution by the organs and entitiesof the judiciary, affecting one of the key elementsin judicial self-rule.

As if the above were not worrisome enough,the proto-project discussed in 2004 includes the

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possibility that the Executive declare a JudicialEmergency, thereby acquiring unlimited powers torestructure the organization, the powers and theresources of that branch of government.

It seems clear that, through such proposedmeasures as the restructuring of the JudiciaryCouncil, the establishing of new powers for theExecutive in matters of the organization and ad-ministration of justice, the inclussion of the pos-sibility of a Judicial Emergency, the necessary con-ditions for judicial self-rule that allow for judicialindependence are being heavilymined. If to thesereforms one adds the perpetuation of current ar-rangements which institute broad powers for theExecutive andLegislative branches in the approvaland disbursement of funds, the overall picturethat emerges is one of greater intervention by theGovernment in the organization and administra-tion of the Judicial branch.

Limitation of the personal independence ofjudges

The Constitutional constituents of 1991reformed the mechanism for the selection ofmembers of the Supreme Court and the StateCouncil, as the situation direct selection) hadlead to clientelism and the selection of judgesbased on considerations other than merit andjudicial professionalism. In order to rectify theundesired effects of the previous system, knownas �plenary cooptation�, the Constitution estab-lished that themembers of existing bodies wouldbe elected by those courts from candidates se-lected by the Judiciary Council.

One key element that is repeated again andagain in the reform projects brought to publiclight is the reinstatement of plenary cooptationas the formula for selecting the membership ofthe high judicial bodies with the exception ofthe Constitutional Court. While this formula guar-antees, in principle, a high degree of autonomyin the election of judicial personnel, the lack oftransparency and a clear system of merit opensthe door for a resurgence of the clientelismwhichhistorically ended up taking over theHigh Courts.The dynamics of such networks of clients, based

on loyalties of various types, negatively affectedthe personal independence of judges; and if thereforms proposed by the Uribe administrationare instituted, the personal independence ofjudges would be gravely affected.

In addition to this device, the Governmenthas expressed repleatedly interest in giving backto of hierarchical superiors disciplinary controlover their subordinates. This mechanism, activebefore the Constitution of 1991, puts in jeopar-dy the personal independence of judges, in asmuch as there could be retaliations from theirsuperiors should they depart form certain linesof legal interpretation. Likewise, thismechanism�sintroduction is not good for the efficiency andeffectiveness of the judiciary, as it would implyonce again overburdening judicial officials withadministrative tasks.

BYWAYOF CONCLUSION

Colombian institutions have realized important, ifonly partial gains in the realm of judicial indepen-dence. These gains have come under fire in the lastyear, particularly as a product of the initiatives forjudicial reformwhich theGovernment hasbeenpro-moting.

This situation is framed within the still un-resolved problem of the lack of independenceoriginating from the actions of the armed groups,which on a regional level exert significant pres-sure on the decisions of judges and prosecu-tors. To this problem it should be added the im-pact of corruption, the internal and externalclientelist networks and the pressures exertedby themass-media, among others. Unfortunate-ly, there exist very few investigations and docu-mentation of such problems which might allowone to view the magnitude of the phenomenain question, phenomena which, while repeated-ly affirmed and observed, have not always beenadequately assessed.

REFERENCES

Cajpe. Network of Judicial Information, online at www.cajpe.org.pe

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Negotiation with the United States:

Isolation andunconditionalacceptance

Like the FTAA [Free Trade Area ofthe Americas], the most recent pro-posal for a bilateral free trade agree-ment with the United States wouldundoubtedly lead to violation of allhuman rights, especially the eco-

nomic, social and cultural rights. All this wouldbe within the framework of a clear denial ofthe right to development, given the implica-tions of the legal/political and constitutionalcommitments that would result from thisagreement1 .

These foreseeable Human Rights violations,which this agreement would undoubtedly causeare not idle speculation but the result of a thor-ough analysis of the nature of these proposals.Examination of the drafts of the FTAA, the con-tent of the FTAs [free trade agreements] alreadysigned with Chile and Central America and therequirements that the United States has alreadypublicly put forward for the Andean FTA is suf-ficient to confirm this. As far as the economic,

Colombian Action Network onFree Trade and FTAA, �Recalca�

social and cultural rights are concerned, let ushighlight the immediate effects of this agreement,such as the effective elimination of the State�scapacity to develop public policies to guaranteehuman rights in the areas of services (includingsocial services), protection and guarantees forforeign investors, dispute settlement mecha-nisms, intellectual property, government pur-chasing, and policies on competition, amongothers.

Colombia has already had experience withthe North American Free Trade Agreement andan overall assessment of the situation 10 yearsafter it was signed is quite clearly a grievousrecord of human rights violations. As if this werenot enough, and solely apropos of the damag-

1 See the declaration of the National People�s Assembly of December2003, a document of great political significance, because it expres-sed the opinion of over 500 social, academic, non-governmental andpolitical organizations that signed it. See also, the pamphlet 14razones para decir no al TLC published in July 2004 by Recalca.

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ing effects of trade liberalization and movementof capital, Colombia implemented the famous�economic opening� policy in the early 1990s.However, as the intention of this brief article isto evaluate the current government�s policy, weshall concentrate on the way it has been justify-ing and pursuing the international trade negoti-ations which are of course inseparable from thefamiliar political and military aspects.

The Uribe government�s strategy, that au-gurs harmful effects for Colombia in its negotia-tion of the FTA, has been to over-estimate thebenefits of the American Trade Preference Agree-ment (ATPA), engaging in negotiations behindthe Andean Community�s back and even againstit, passively accepting every U.S. demand andpromoting the agreement behind the back notonly of the people but also of the productivesectors directly affected, as well as the immedi-ate policy of making unilateral, gratuitous con-cessions to ensure rapid negotiations. If viewedfrom the point of view of human rights, this strat-egy violates the political and civil rights, espe-cially that of participation. In particular, it ignoresthe constitutional principles that theoreticallyshould guide foreign policy, such as that of pri-oritizing Latin American integration.

BACKGROUND

Up to the beginning of this year, discussions in Co-lombia, as well as in the rest of the continent, con-cerneda jointFTAAproposal.Nevertheless,assoonas theenormousdifficulties inmaking thisproposala realitybecameevident, thepossibilityofabilateraltreaty with the United States was given priority inforeign relations. The Colombian Government hasexplicitly stated that this had always been its trueinterest, which does not fail to cause concern as tothe existence of secret agendas.

In fact, even though in August 2000 theColombian Ambassador in Washington, Luis Al-berto Moreno, had proposed �citing reasonsof national security� that the United Statesnegotiate a free trade agreement with Colom-bia, it got no response. Until the first half of 2002,

towards the end of the Pastrana government,the subject had not been given much priority.Military aid and the extension of ATPA or An-dean trade preferences that had expired in De-cember 2001, were the primary interest to theUnited States.

These issues played no part in the presiden-tial elections won by Alvaro Uribe Vélez, nor didthe Democratic Manifesto refer to them. In his in-augural speech, Uribe did not refer to the FTAAor to Colombia�s relationship with the UnitedStates, but rather referred to the need tostrengthen the Andean agreements, to adopt acommon stance before third parties, to harmo-nize the exchange rate, to promote low inflationand to take on debt cautiously. He even spokeof a single currency. FTAA and later the bilateraltreaty with the United States were consideredessential for growth and job creation, thus fol-lowing the previous government�s line, repeat-ing the same disputable arguments and offeringgreater concessions in the name of that single-minded objective.

HIGH HOPES FOR THE ATPA-ATPDEA

When the ATPA expired, a campaign was start-ed to extend it. However, one of the UnitedStates� interests in the renewal of these tradepreferences was because the Colombian Gov-ernment had not complied with the arbitrationrulings in the Nortel and Termorío cases. How-ever, the results of the ATPA were not encour-aging. Jorge Alberto Velasquez, who was soonto be president of ACOPI in Antioquia, statedthat �The ATPA cannot be considered a success-ful trade agreement� and he cited a figure thathas since been corroborated by all the subse-quent studies, according to which only 14 per-cent of exports to the United States benefitedfrom these preferences.

Finally, at the beginning of August 2002,Bush sanctioned the preferences, approving theextension under strict conditions, such as pro-hibiting expropriation, taxes and other requisiteson U.S. companies, as well as making the com-

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mitment to act in good faith in accordance witharbitration rulings that favor U.S. companies orcitizens. Colombia would also lose ATPA bene-fits if it were to receive any preference from thirdparty countries that would affect United Statesinterests, if it violated intellectual property rightsand if it did not take measures to recognize la-bor rights, among others. Moreover, the degreeof commitment by the country �eligible� for theWTO, and its active participation in the FTAAnegotiations would be examined, the level ofprotection for intellectual property rights shouldbe equal to or greater than those set out by theWTO, plus it would be necessary to be open tofree trade for public sector purchasing. This isthe backdrop for the government�s policies inColombia.

In fact, the ATPA�s potential benefits hadbeen greatly over-estimated and the prospectsfor the proposed new phase, ATPDEA [AndeanTrade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act], didnot amount to much. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned negotiating was pursued. There wasprofound questioning of the expected benefitsthroughout 2003. On 22 October 2003, theColombian Farmers� Association published astudy that concluded that the United States wasmaking demands but offered no counterpartbenefits and that the effects would be so acutethat they would have more costs than benefits.2

In spite of the limited impact of ATPDEA,which only benefited 7 percent of total exportsand created around 13,000 jobs per year (whilethere were almost 3 million unemployed), thegovernment has stated that most of these tradepreferences should be continued as its argu-ment to justify FTA negotiation. This meant,from the start, either prolonging the measures,or making them permanent, as well as grantingnew concessions in all aspects of the FTA ne-gotiation.

BILATERAL TRADE: FROMPLAN�B� TOPLAN �A�

In early September 2002 Ambassador Luis Al-berto Moreno made public the government�s

decision to propose again a free trade agree-ment to the United States. He announced thatthis possibility was the Plan B in case the FTAAnegotiations bogged down. TradeMinister Hum-berto Botero subsequently revealed that nego-tiations were underway with the United Stateson the subject of generic pharmaceuticals and,on the eve of Uribe�s second trip to Washington,the government accepted the foreign pharma-ceutical companies� demands that the deadlinefor the exclusive licensing agreement be extend-ed, and this was consecrated with Decree 2085.

During 2003, the Colombian Govern-ment�s attitude continued to follow the scriptwritten by the United States. However, theATPA proposal had already begun to breakdown and therefore, after some insistence,requestis and cajoling, on 18 November 2003Secretary of Trade Robert Zoellick asked Con-gress to authorize the negotiation of an FTAwith the Andean countries. A paradoxical sit-uation thus formally arose: Colombia, whichhad worked hard to access the United Statesmarket first, was obliged to negotiate jointlywith Ecuador and Peru. Venezuela did not par-ticipate and there were doubts as to Bolivia�sparticipation. Zoellick�s letter made more de-mands concerning the resolution of disputeswith U.S. investors. During the year, the Uribegovernment responded by granting new con-cessions, such as the elimination of tax reim-bursement certificates (CERTs), the promotionof a new law on investment, amendments tooil legislation, a proposal to amend Law 80 onpublic contracting, more freedom for telecom-munications, an effort to sell Banco Cafetero,the announcement of the privatization of Ec-ogas and ISA, the �dismemberment� of ECO-PETROL and the partition of the Social Secu-rity Institute within its plan to dispose of anumber of state assets.

2 Mitos y leyendas sobre el ATPDEA y su relación con el Alca. RafaelMejía-López, President of the Colombian Farmers� Association. ATPAPanel- ATPDEA. Fundación Buen Gobierno, Bogota, 19 June, 2003.

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THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY DIVIDED ANDUNDERESTIMATED

In recent years, the Andean Community hasbeen in a state of paralysis and without def-inition because, although the presidents ofthe member countries had decided in Novem-ber 2001 to negotiate a Common ForeignTariff system and a joint position on FTAA andthe WTO by May 2002, this deadline passedwithout progress in either of these intentions.With the FTAA negotiations, each one beganto present its position on tariffs individually,to serve as a starting point for free trade. Thisled expert Manuel José Cárdenas to com-ment, �If the CAN doesn�t manage to con-solidate its Common Foreign Tariff system, itwill be condemned to absorption by FTAA�(3 June 2002).

Efforts to define the tariff system contin-ued fruitlessly for several months. In the mean-while, the Andean countries decided to an-nounce, as a baseline, the tariffs agreed withthe WTO. This unleashed U.S. anger that, alongwith pressure by the National Association ofIndustrialists (ANDI), led the government tomake its famous �about face,� in which Co-lombia changed its mind and announced thatthe tariffs to actually be applied would be lower.This move broke the fragile agreementsreached in the Andean Community. Discus-sion of the Common Foreign Tariff Systemtherefore continued in a vacuum. It has re-cently been decided that this issue will be ex-amined in 2005 after the negotiations of thebilateral treaty with the United States are com-plete. The tariff negotiations with the AndeanCommunity as a bloc was thus suspended andits pursuance is secondary to free trade withthe United States.

As a result, Colombia started negotia-tions from a position of docility, with a frag-mented Andean Community, no commonpurpose and making unilateral concessionsin order to sign, an any cost, a FTA thatwould imply the country�s re-colonization.

FROM BAD TOWORSE

With the collapse of the FTAA negotiations, dur-ing the abrupt interruption of the Trade Negoti-ation Committee meeting in Puebla in Februarythis year, the Andean countries made progresson bilateral treaties. The Colombian Govern-ment continued to pursue its own policy al-though it had to resign itself to negotiating withother countries simultaneously, losing its exclu-sivity, all with a criterion of �urgency.� This waswhy it agreed to �record time� negotiations �amere eight rounds� that should be completedby the beginning of 2005.

In spite of mass protests all over the coun-try, the process got underway in Cartagena deIndias on 18 May. The United States presenteda draft agreement that the Andean countriesrejected as a basis for discussions. In reality theyonly appeared to reject it because, in practice,these are the same imperial proposals that theyuse as a reference. Some weeks earlier the Co-lombian Government had finally revealed anoutline of over 400 issues in which it laid out its�defensive� and �offensive� interests in the nego-tiations. However, in spite of its length, it con-tains no real specifications and the strategy ap-pears to be limited to extending the tradepreferences gained under the ATPDEA and pre-serving the legal status quo.

The second round of negotiations in At-lanta confirmed these impressions. A few daysearlier, Secretary of Trade Zoellick had said thatthe Andean Community was a paper tiger andthat it was necessary to eliminate the Andeansystem of price bands, give up the crop auc-tion mechanisms that at the beginning of theyear had replaced the absorption agreements,and eliminate all agricultural protection mech-anisms, such as exchange insurance and priorlicenses. In contrast, the U.S. exemption fordomestic agricultural aid, the industry protec-tion policy, and the demand to extend thedeadline for patent protection once again showthat the United States is not willing to liberalizeits economy.

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These diametrically opposed positions wereforeseeable, but the weakness of the Colombi-an Government�s position should be empha-sized. It not only revealed that it had put every-thing it had on the negotiating table, but onseveral different occasions it agreed to eliminatethe price bands and to take measures to removeprotection from national farmers, such rice grow-ers. In the case of cotton, the government�seminence grise Rudolf Hommes recently weighedin with the affirmation that cotton growersshould be sacrificed in order to guarantee thecompetitiveness of textile exports.

In the third round, held last July in Lima,the Andean countries presented separately theiroffer of products to be freed and the correspond-ing deadlines. They also announced that theFTAA tariff system would be used as the basis tostart the bargaining, which is what led to theembarrassing �reversal.� The U.S. negotiators de-layed presenting their offer and instead madetheir demands more radical. It was evident thatthey refused to acknowledge the ATPDEA as astep already taken. All of this put the ColombianGovernment, according to its own declarations,in the position of a pendulum swinging betweensurprise and disappointment.

The detail most commented on in the presswas United States� veto on the expert that theAndean governments had hired to negotiate in-tellectual property. The veto was explainable.Renowned international expert Carlos Correa isknown for his critical stance against the demandsof large multinational corporations. Shamefullythe ColombianGovernment gave way and agreedthat from then on Mr. Correa would not be sit-ting at the negotiating table but would act as anadviser from a �technical� room. This tells us thata number of concessions will likely bemade that,as many researchers throughout the world haveconcluded, will have negative impact on the rightto health as the result of the poor population�slimited access to medications.

It should be noted that the follow-up to theevents of these rounds has been hindered be-cause of a debatable principle of confidentiality.The negotiations are related to civil and political

rights, in particular the right of participation. Asan issue of public and national interest, it is notacceptable that only the executive branch shouldnegotiate an agreement of such importance,excluding not only civil society but also the leg-islative and judicial branches that will only beallowed tomake their pronouncements after theratification. A draft bill that was brought beforeCongress to provide a framework for the execu-tive branch in the negotiations was immediatelyimpugned by the government with the argumentthat it would be unconstitutional. The govern-ment�s discussions with civil society are nothingmore than a limited exercise in information, pro-paganda or publicity in favor of the agreement.The famous �side room� proposed as a mecha-nism for participation has been absolutely use-less during these rounds, as thosewho have beenpresent have admitted.

Finally, a comment on labor-related issues,although these have not yet been formallyplaced on the negotiating table. The U.S. Gov-ernment has given itself the satisfaction of pos-ing as the defender of Colombian labor rights,when in fact what it is doing is defending busi-ness owners. The Colombian Government is inthe difficult situation of having to acknowledgethat it is incapable of guaranteeing compliancewith its own labor legislation. To the contrary itis aspiring to implement more flexibilization,allegedly to defend the regulatory autonomythat it has disgracefully already ceded in otherareas, such as oil. The radical U.S. position isalso relative. It has been leaked that the UnitedStates considers it sufficient to provide someaid for compliance with labor law �providing itcan gain concessions in other aspects of inter-est in the FTA.�

This illustrates some of the aspects thatmost interest us from the point of view of risksto human rights. Along with the effects of ru-ined production, with the only offer of foreigninvestment being for the exploitation of naturalresources and some manufacturing, it is easy toforesee the irrefutably harmful agreements thatwill be made on matters of services such ashealthcare and education and the protection of

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foreign investment, as was mentioned at thebeginning of this article.

What is most serious of all �as we haverepeatedly pointed out in this article� is thatthe current government is already preparing touse legislation to grant concessions that wereto have been, in principle, the subject of negoti-ations. In this regard, many of the things thatwill surely be discussed in the other analyses ofthe violation of economic, social and culturalrights in Colombia, are perfectly consistent withwhat we have drawn attention to here in thecase of the free trade deals.

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I

No �spell� can lastfour years...

Democratic Security,Communications and

Public Opinion

Center for Investigation andPopular Education, Cinep -

Luis Fernando Barón Porras*

n different academic circles and so-cial organizations one hears that thecountry has shifted to the right, andthat there is widespread public sup-port for President Alvaro Uribe�s au-thoritarian policies and his military

alternative for resolving the country�s conflicts.There is also talk that an unstoppable counter-reform to the 1991 Constitution and the socialrule of law is underway. Public opinion surveysshow that since he took office Uribe has sus-tained the highest levels of popularity for anyleader during the past 50 years.1

This article examines the current govern-ment�s communications policies, its relationswith the media and reporters, as well as withpublic opinion. From this perspective we consid-er the above statements, two years into theUribe government. In doing so we put forth thefollowing questions: One, what are the centralelements of the National Development Plan�scommunications policy? Two, What communi-

cations policies may be deduced from the gov-ernment�s public communications practices?Three, how do these policies affect its relationswith the media and reporters? And four, what ishappening with the changeable and ambiguouspublic opinion on these policies?

COMMUNICATIONS IN THEDEVELOPMENT PLAN

Mention of communications and informationactivities in the National Development Plan 2002-2060: Toward a Community State2 is concentrat-ed in the first of the plan�s four objectives: to

* CINEP researcher, BA in communications, MA in anthropology.1 See, for example, the August 2004 survey by the National Polling

Center in which 85 percent of respondents said that things are on theright track, 79 percent approved of the government�s performance,and 68 percent agreed with reelection for the current head of state.See also El Tiempo, 8 August 2004.

2 See the document at: http://www.dnp.gov.co/01_CONT/POLITICA/PLAN.HTM.

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provide democratic security,3 within which thereis a line of action called Territorial Control and thedefense of national sovereignty. Under this appeartwo issues denominated the promotion of citizencooperation and communications for peace.4

In the Plan, information represents an im-portant issue for controlling the territory anddefending sovereignty. As such, there is a pro-posal to promote and encourage the �voluntaryand patriotic cooperation of the citizens with thepublic forces to provide information related tothe illegal armed organizations and crime.�5 Todo so the government proposes involving 1 mil-lion citizens in the rural and urban areas to par-ticipate voluntarily in cooperation networks thatare made up of members of local security frontsand guards from businesses, the Civil Defenseleague, private guard agencies, and taxi andtruck drivers� associations, among others. Thecooperants� networks would be under the con-trol, supervision, and evaluation of the militaryand police commander, and the state securityagencies located in each of the areas.6

The government also proposes to call uponthe media �so that in a concerted manner theywill establish accords for self-regulation meantto attenuate the impact that terrorist actionshave on public opinion. These accords will ad-dress subjects such as the live broadcast of ter-rorist acts, communiqués and interviews withorganizations and individuals that perpetratethese acts, and the protection of the identity ofthe people who witness them.�7

Communications for peace refers to a pro-gram within Communications for Democratic Secu-rity that purports to expand the coverage of thecommunications networks in the country, espe-cially on the main roads, to support the strate-gies for reducing terrorism, kidnapping and high-way robbery. It also proposes to establish andput into operation a national emergency tele-phone number.8

The grotesque public events to present re-wards to masked persons, broadcast by themedia, along with the public debate that themedia have fomented concerning solidarity andcivil duty for citizen protection; the shortcom-

ings in the information provided by informers;9

the irregularities that have arisen in connectionwith them;10 the recurrent corruption scandalsand dubious behavior by the military forces in-volving civilians;11 and the alleged and proventies between these groups and illegal organiza-tions12 are important points of reference for ask-ing serious questions about the policies set outin the Plan:

Is the information that the privileged coop-erant organizations provides the best tool forwinning the war against terrorism and the illegaland criminal groups, and for providing securityto all citizens? Based on the principles of thesame information, it is fitting to ask: Is this infor-mation true, objective and transparent, to makeit the basis of citizen security and the war onterror and crime? Are the commanders of themilitary, the police and the state security agen-cies the right persons to control, supervise and

3 The plan�s other three objectives are: to foment sustainable econo-mic growth and job creation; to build social equity; and to increasethe transparency and efficiency of the state. In the objective refe-rring to policies for sustainable economic growth, within the linecalled Competitiveness and Development there is a reference tocommunications issues. Section D of this line talks about the conti-nuation �with adjustments� of the Connectivity Agenda as a poli-cy for encouraging the widespread use of technology for economic,social, and political development �seeking to position Colombia inthe knowledge society by means of the democratization of access toinformation, increasing the competitiveness of the production sec-tor, and leading the process of modernizing the state.� See page 138of the Plan.

4 See pages 45, 46, and 49 of the Plan.5 The citizens are the ones who best know their terrain. This makes

them �an indispensable and strategic actor in the definition of secu-rity and for support, backing, and collaboration with the authorities.��It also encourages their participation by means of a system forrewards, and by having the support of the media.� See p. 45 of thePlan.

6 See page 36 of the Plan.7 See page 46 of the Plan.8 See page 49 of the Plan.9 These shortcomings may be seen in the contrast between the large

number of people taken into custody in mass detentions versus thelow numbers actually charged, or between the mass detentions andthe increase in the prison population. On this subject, see thearticles in this publication by Colectivo de Abogados �José AlvearRestrepo�; Fundación Comité de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos(FCSPP), and the CINEP database.

10 For example, see �Informante millonario por gastos reservados,� inEl Espectador, 1 August 2004, p. 8.

11 Such as the Santo Domingo, Guaitarilla, or Cajamarca incidents, orthe harassment and persecution of social and union leaders in Arauca.

12 See the ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights versusthe State concerning the murder of 19 merchants at the hands of theMiddle Magdalena region self-defense groups.

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evaluate the cooperants� networks and the in-formation that they provide?

GOVERNMENT PRACTICES THAT REVEAL ITSCOMMUNICATIONSPOLICIES

The communications practices related to thearmed conflict and the government peace over-tures reveal a policy based on four interrelatedfacets:

a. Through the person of Alvaro Uribe Velez,to create and sustain a new image of thepresident and politics in the country.

b. For the government to hold the stage andcontrol reports and news about terrorism13

and peace.c. To make the government the central pro-

tagonist in the media in the fight againstterrorism and the overtures for peace.

d. To make direct contact with the people tolisten to their complaints, needs and pro-posals, and to provide solutions.

This proposal centers on the image, the voice,the presence, and the actions of President Alva-ro Uribe.

Creating and Sustaining a New Image of thePresident and his Policies

We have built a nation with 100 percent toler-ance for diversity, to contrast and with zero tolerancefor violence, corruption, and political chicanery� Ioffer a government that is serious, honest, not miracu-lous� I�ll run myself down to fulfil my promise toColombia.14

Since his campaign for the presidency, it hasbeen clear that the image that Uribe wants topresent is based on a being radically opposite tothe personal and governmental characteristicsof Andrés Pastrana.15 This same strategy of play-ing-off-against has apparently been used whendebating the other presidential candidates,whose positions did or did not resemble Pastra-na�s presidential proposals.

Seeing as the main criticisms of PresidentPastrana and his government were based on hisindecisive and absent character, his govern-ment�s corruption scandals, the failure of hispeace policy that made concessions to the guer-rillas, and for having compromised the sover-eignty and dignity of Colombians; Uribe�s imageconcentrates on showing him as an unflaggingworker, an executive and a man of his word, withfirm resolve, and as someone who is close tothe municipalities and the country�s people.

Uribe�s strategy also puts the military initia-tive on the table again, as a security strategy forall Colombians and as a mechanism to pressureand dissuade the violent groups, without rulingout dignified and productive talks to build peace,and not to hand over territory or to strengthenthe terrorists, the armed actors, or the illegalgroups. Furthermore, it concentrates on uphold-ing the idea of overtly fighting corruption andpolitical chicanery, and against the social debt:poverty, education, healthcare, and employ-ment.

This has been the image that the govern-ment has sought to present to regain a voice inthe face of acts of violence and peace, and tosustain a public profile that ensures strong back-ing for bringing about political and economicdecisions. This is a strategy that furthermore hassought to ensure that the president�s image doesnot wear down or become tarnished. In connec-tion with some matters and subjects, membersof his team are the ones who face the publicspotlight with strong and controversial positions,and depending on the public�s reaction, the pres-ident then steps in to soften or reinforce thearguments, as took place with cabinet ministerFernando Londoño over the referendum, SabasPretelt on reelection, and Peace CommissionerLuis Carlos Restrepo on issues related to the talks

13 The Plan makes it clear that the government does not talk aboutarmed conflict or war but rather terrorism by illegal, armed criminalgroups.

14 Selections of Points 97, 98 and 100 of the document Uribe�s 100Points. See: (http://www.dnp.gov.co/03_PROD/CONPES/Manifiesto_Democratico.htm#5).

15 Pastrana, his government and policies, wound up with very low popu-larity ratings according to the surveys of the time.

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with the paramilitaries. On other occasions, whenthe president has committed a gaffe because ofthe subjectmatter or the tone of his public state-ments, there has always been someone to stepin and put out the flames or else shoulder theblame, as took place with Vice President Fran-cisco Santos and the human rights groups, orwith Foreign Minister Carolina Barco after themistakes that the president made during his tripto Europe in February 2004.16

Government Control Over News and ReportsConcerning Terrorism and Peace

As soon as Uribe took office, the first thinghe did in the field of communications was totake control of the news and reports on issuesrelated to the conflict and peace. This had beendone by the Armed Forces �as the representa-tives of the institutions and the official sources,as well as the Office of the High Commissionerfor Peace, and the FARC, until prior to the endof the Pastrana government�s negotiations withthat group.17

The following aspects have been central tothe government�s endeavor to control the dis-course over these past two years: in the firstplace, to demonstrate that in Colombia neitherconflict nor war exist, but rather terrorism withdeep ties to drug trafficking, factors that implythe loss of their political nature for the illegalarmed groups and their actions, and their sub-sequent characterization as terrorists and ene-mies of the state and humanity.18

Second, the strategy has purported to showprogress in the democratic security policy, mean-ing, a return of peace in different regions andsocial sectors as the product of the effectiveaction of the Armed Forces against the illegalarmed groups and their supporters, and the re-integration policy. These facts are demonstrat-ed with the government�s figures showing a re-duction in murders, kidnappings, anddisplacement, the return of the Police to doz-ens of municipalities, and the restoration ofpeace in different sectors and regions of thecountry, as manifested by the recovery of the

roads and the campaign �Live Colombia, travelthe country.� Third, the proposal has sought topresent the government as hardworking andgenerous on the subject of talks and negotia-tion, with the requisites of ending terrorism anda cease in hostilities, without the state losingauthority and sovereignty, and without allowingitself to be blackmailed by the illegal organiza-tions.19

In doing so the government, representedalmost single-handedly by President Uribe, hasnot only managed tomaintain a high public pro-file in themedia as a protagonist on issues relat-ed to violence and terrorism (which is discussedbelow), but it has also undertaken a campaignthat combines news production bymeans of thepresidential news agency (SNE), the productionand publicizing of its own information sourceson subjects such as human rights, the dissemi-nation of information through electronic media(the Internet and e-mail), presidential speeches,by hosting government community councilmeetings, public accountability, and public cab-inet ministers� meetings.

Making the Government the Protagonist in theMedia

In the field of media communications, it isnot enough to simply report or recount, is neces-sary to appear as the protagonist. This is where

16 See Carlo Nasi and Arlene B. Tickner, Falta de Estrategia, PoliticalScience Department, Los Andes University.

17 See Barón, Luis Fernando, Internet, guerra y paz. Cinep, IDRC:Bogotá 2003; and Estado de alerta continua: noticieros y guerra enColombia, http://www.epigrafe.com/Contenido/lib_detalle.asp?lib_id=54.

18 Ibid.19 This is evident in the presentations and trips by both the president and

vice president to European countries and agencies, by their constantappearances in the media to present the figures on the drop in kidna-ppings, murders, etc., and in the frequent speeches by High Commis-sioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo who has insisted that the nego-tiation process with the paramilitaries is different from what happenedin Caguan during the Pastrana government. On the subject see, speechby the high commissioner for peace to Congress on 3 August 2004:�Dialogue was confused with getting cozy with the violent ones. Herethe (peace) commissioners went to drink whisky with the guerrillas, andthe ambassadors were deliriously enthusiastic about having a picturetaken with a man wearing camouflage and with a rifle.� See: �DuraCrítica del Gobierno a la comunidad internacional por no apoyar elproceso con paramilitares,� El Tiempo, 4 August 2004.

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the government has invested a good part of itscontemporary public visibility, credibility, and le-gitimacy. Uribe not only has his own team of re-porters and broadcasters following his every stepand producing reports, but he also ensures thathemaintains a permanent presence andhigh pro-file in the national and international media.20

The return to a media-based communica-tions strategy that articulates the story and theprotagonists in the news, and the reports on vi-olence and peace�as has taken place since thebeginnings of ethnography� is one of the mostwidely used formats of modern times, both interms of war reporting �as can be seen by thecoverage of the Iranian conflict by internationalnews channels such as Fox or CNN� as well asin the programs and political opinion shows, ei-ther documentary or as entertainment.21

Whether this is the result of advising on thesubject of communications, or the president�sstyle and personality, or a decision by the mediathemselves, and in contrast topreviouspresidentsand other political leaders, Uribe appears to havebeen able to use this approach with widespreadpublic acceptance. The strategy includes not onlythe news about the government and the presi-dent, but also the community council meetings,the public sessions for accountability and thecabinet minister meetings, as well as the interac-tive features on the website.

Uribe�s media-centric public persona is notonly the result of a skillful government strategy,it has also been fed by the pro-institutional atti-tude of the media and the reporters, as well asby the role to which he has delegated his criticsand detractors by making this a central elementin his analyses and counterproposals.

Direct Contact with the People

My Antioquia spirit and my peasant back-ground have filled me with infinite love for all ofColombia�s regions.22

Closeness to the people, the municipalities,and the regions of the country is an importantissue for the presidential image and that of thegovernment�s policy. This has translated into a

strategy that uses three types of communicativepractices: the first is speaking and being present inthe places where terrorist acts have taken place.23 Thepresident visits to show his face, the take chargeof assuming responsibility for the case, and tocomfort the victims. Of course, he also makesaccusations and condemns theorganizations thatdid the harm, justifies the security policy, and callsfor solidarity, cooperation and support for thegovernment and the Military Forces.

The second is represented by the Army pres-ence in the municipalities that have been taken backfrom the armed groups. This is a demonstrationthat there is no territory that is off-limits to thepresident and the government. It is a gesture ofsupport for the institutions and the people, andit is an opportunity to show off the presencethat the state has won back.

Third are the community meetings and minis-ters meetings that are broadcast live on televisionand radio. These are an opportunity for munic-ipal and regional authorities to participate bypresenting their needs and problems, askingabout the national government�s plans and theirexecution, and by making suggestions for solv-ing their problems. It is an opportunity meantto foment the people�s participation and the govern-ment�s capacity to listen. These opportunities arealso used to demonstrate the capacity to work,the president�s executive and managerial ap-proach, Uribe�s authority, and the subornationof his team. The meetings make evident a pres-ident who questions and calls for accountabilityby his staff, who demands results, who suggestsworking jointly with the mayors and governors,

20 For more information see Bonilla Jorge Iván, Medios de Comunica-ción, opinión pública y conflicto armado. El consenso por otras vías,Bogotá, 2004. IEPRI and FESCOL (to be published).

21 Examples of the above include the recent film Fahrenheit 9/11 byMichael Moore that presents a harsh critique of US President Geor-ge. W. Bush and the US invasion of Iraq, or the documentaries onanimals seen on Discovery Channel, and the different national andinternational reality shows.

22 See Point 96 of Uribe�s 100 Points.23 Examples of this practice: The presidential visits after the murder of

former Antioquia Governor Guillermo Gaviria and Antioquia PeaceCommissioner Gilberto Echeverri after a failed rescue attempt by theArmy; after the guerrilla attack on the municipality of Chita in Sept-ember 2003; and after the bomb at the El Nogal club in Bogotá.

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and who proposes solutions without making prom-ises or raising expectations, so as not to appearpopulist.

URIBE, THEMEDIA, AND REPORTERS

President Uribe�s government appears to havespared no effort in getting the media and re-porters to cooperate with his security policy asit is set out in the National Development Plan.These may be the result of empathy with thegovernment, by pressure and cajoling by thepolitical powerbrokers,24 by autonomous deci-sion, or because of the way that the media andreporters understand the sociopolitical processesin the country, which appears to coincide withthe government�s policy.

According to an analysis by Jorge Ivan Bon-illa,25 during the past two years four trends havebeen consolidating in the production of infor-mation about the armed conflict. Here we shalldiscuss three of them: The first can be summedup in the question, Do you know which side you areon? The second is represented with the slogan,No more airtime for the violent ones! And the thirdhas to do with the wave of good news reports andsegments.

According to this author, the democraticsecurity policy has given rise to an official dis-course that not only purports to oblige report-ers to take the side of the state and the valuesof democracy, but also to get them on board.This as seen as the need to build consensus andsocial backing against terrorism. Although themedia and reporters have different positions re-garding this endeavor by the government, astudy by the Antonio Nariño Project thatscanned the information from 12 daily newspa-pers and one weekly publication between Octo-ber 2002 and October 2003, found that cover-age of the armed conflict not only concentratedon official sources (government, Army, Police,state agencies), representing nearly 50 percentof the sources, but also that military/combatreporting made up nearly 42 percent of the in-formation presented in the newspapers.

These findings are complemented by theresults of a survey of news directors, heads ofreporting departments, and columnists, under-taken by the El Tiempo reader�s ombudsman,concerning the five mortal sins of Colombianjournalism.26 The first sin is the dependence on powerthat grants toomuch credibility to official sourc-es and private sources such as large companiesand business associations. In contrast, reportsmade by ordinary citizens are shunned.

Second, Bonilla demonstrates that histori-cally giving coverage to the armed actors hasbeen equated with the idea of being an apolo-gist for crime or serving as useful idiots and be-coming a soapbox for spreading their propagan-da. �According to this position, there must be arelation between responsible journalism and thedefense of democracy, understood as the de-fense of the institutions and legality. As such,any attempt to make visible those who are out-side the law, in their own words and images, rep-resents a serious danger to the stability of de-mocracy.�27

Finally the author demonstrates how a con-sensus has been built to underplay the humanconsequences of war, by means of zero coverageof horror, because of saturation with negativecoverage of the conflict. According to differentsectors, negative reporting undermines nation-al support for the government�s effort to winthe war or secure peace, and it generates feel-ings of pessimism or impotence. This is shoredup with the good news segments that are stra-tegically placed in the media.28

Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider andcontrast the abidance tendencies outlined byBonilla and to bear in mind the complexity of

24 According to a May 2004 survey of 20 media directors done by theMedia Observatory at the Faculty of Social Communications andJournalism at the La Sabana University in Bogotá, President Uribe hasexerted pressure on the media to present or omit information. Fur-thermore, representatives of the president have exerted pressure onthe directors.

25 See Bonilla Jorge Iván, Medios de Comunicación�26 �Confesión de culpas,� Reader�s ombudsman�s op-ed column, El

Tiempo, 17 July 2004.27 Bonilla, p. 15.28 Inclusive, the Presidency website has a section called �Colombia,

un país positivo� (Colombia, a positive country).

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journalism and its relation to the political, eco-nomic and cultural fields. In this sense it is worth-while drawing attention to the permanent man-ifestations of opposition or rejection of PresidentUribe�s policies, actions and style of working,which have not disappeared from themedia andother social fields during these past two years.At different times these manifestations havemade it possible to publicize objections and op-position to Uribe and his performance, as tookplace when The Authoritarian Spell was launched,when the presidential referendum was defeat-ed, and with the election of mayors and gover-nors who are opposed to the presidential poli-cies and style. These manifestations aredemonstrations of incomplete consensus, of theexistence of an opposition, expressions of resis-tance, and the search for and strengthening ofa different way.

In the same sociopolitical context in whichthis article is being written, the debate aboutreelection and the review of the government�stwo years in office, for example, have resultedin a convergence of diverse voices and actionsfrom the control agencies, the political parties,grassroots organizations, the media and report-ers,29 that reject and refute the government�spolicies and performance. All of this is takingplace while under fire from the sudden andstormy declarations by the deputy prosecutorof the nation and the presidential secretary, aswell as the multiple critiques of the governmentconcerning the negotiation process with theparamilitaries, with criticism even coming fromthe US Embassy.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO PUBLIC OPINION

It is important to start by saying that althoughopinion polls do not lie, as some people think,they are quite limited. Polls are very useful foridentifying trends but they are not enough toexplain them and analyze them. They are time-limited, and as such ephemeral and circumstan-tial. They do not always ask about subjects thatinterest the respondents. And they are interpret-

ed and presented in accordance with the inter-ests of the sponsors and the analysts. As such itis necessary for both his opponents and back-ers to regard with caution President Uribe�s highlevel of popularity, the admiration and the indif-ference toward him and his government.

Based on Cinep�s ethnographic studies onthe receptionofmessages,30 it is possible to statethat the president�s high popularity rating cor-responds to the high degree of frustration andexhaustion produced by, in part, over-optimismand the desire for a quick fix to both the armedconflict, as well as to the structural elements thatwere on the agenda in the negotiation processwith the FARC: political and economic inclusion,equity and justice, and freedom (of expression,of mobilization). The other factor is the sensa-tion of exhaustion in the face of ongoing andpainful violence that produces fear, uncertaintyand impotence.

According to this research,31 more than adesire for sociopolitical change, President Uribe�sperson and proposals represent a dramatic char-acter, meaning a character in a story. Rather thanpolitical support for an authoritarian or rightiststance, Uribe represents the rejection of the pre-vious government and the FARC�s discoursesand political and military actions, and the em-bracing of other formulas that could bring aboutthe quick changes mentioned above, althoughthis implies the sacrifice and self-denial of one�sown and others� rights, desires and dreams.

Uribe also represents the desire and clamorfor another way of acting and a different style inthe field of politics, in terms of the military andpeace. This desire and clamor is related to is-

29 See interview with former President Pastrana �Prefiero quedarme soloque tener que comprar conciencias,� in El Espectador, 18 July 2004;interview with Pedro Juan Moreno, El Tiempo, 18 July 2004; UNDP,Controller General�s Office Human Development and Poverty Report;and the study on people�s rights by Fundación Social and Fescolcoordinated by former Foreign Minister Augusto Ramírez Ocampo(See El Tiempo, 26 July 2004).

30 See Internet, guerra y paz en Colombia, Cinep-IDRC, Bogotá 2003,and Estado de Alerta continua: noticieros y guerra en Colombia, http://www.epigrafe.com/Contenido/lib_detalle.asp?lib_id=54

31 See also Barón, Luis Fernando. Historias No oficiales de guerra y pazen Colombia. Master�s thesis in anthropology, Los Andes University,June 2004.

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sues that are very important to the people: firm-ness and decision, consistency between wordsand actions, keeping promises, and that publicfigures take responsibility. These issues are deeplyrelated to the mistrust of politics and politiciansand the disgust over corruption. Uribe has madegood use of all of the above and he has knownhow to present himself in contrast not only tothe government of President Pastrana, but alsoto the characteristics and public positions of theFARC guerrillas, and of other politicians.

Cinep studies, recent media surveys,32 andthe country�s sociopolitical and military historyshow that most Colombians are fed up with war,are against imposition by force (physical forceand bymeans of weapons), authoritarianism, andcoercion, and they idealize democracy, humanrights, negotiated political solutions with well-argued debate, the value of one�s word, and aprocess of discussion for decision-making.

The above points illustrate the mainstrengths and weaknesses of Uribe�s proposal.Why? Because the short-term ideals and emo-tions and quick results are what the public see,because the people continue to call for firmness,consistency, and responsibility, and because de-votion to democracy and the ideal of politicshas not changed in recent years.

Because of the above, the Uribe govern-ment�s absence of results in the fields of themilitary and peace; the gradual discovery of thepresident�s character, his constant face-offs andgaffes with internal and external sectors, and theneglect with which he has pursued the fightagainst the social debt, could become the mainweaknesses and obstacles for the exercise ofgovernance and his continuity.

Across many sectors of society the presi-dent�s image has declined in recent months:his paused and paternal tone has on severaloccasions lacked composure and been irasci-ble and disdainful. His commitment to listenis being questioned because he does not evenlisten to those who are closest to him. Hisworkalholism seems to be affecting his agility,his good memory, and his humor. His acts andgestures toward all of the actors involved in

war and peace do not express firmness, con-sistency, and balance.

During these two years four issues havebeen outstanding in the changes in perceptionand the consolidation of a contrary and nega-tive image of the president and his government:the social debt (poverty, employment, health-care, and social security), the bid for reelection,the negotiations with the paramilitaries, and theaccord for a humanitarian prisoner exchange.

Although Uribe is not completely to blamefor the country�s situation of poverty, misery,unemployment, and public debt, his governmenthas not done enough nor has it presented ef-fective plans, as it has done in other fields, torectify the social debt. In contrast to the previ-ous government, it is clear that unemploymenthas risen, the healthcare situation is disastrous,taxes have gone up, and large sums of moneyhave been spent on things like the war and thepresidential plane.

Despite the fact that the president�s aus-terity and his great capacity to work are ac-knowledged, which distances him from the im-age of the raditional politicians, the decision tomake a bid for immediate reelection has pro-foundly affected his image and backing. In part,this is seen as an opportunistic gesture that hasrepercussions in the neglect of important na-tional affairs and goes against the Constitution.It is also an act of political chicanery that hasgiven rise to traditional payoffs, with rewards ofpublic sector jobs and committing national funds.

In turn, the negotiations with the paramili-taries hasmade evident the imbalances betweenthe big heart and firm hand that Uribe hadadopted with the illegal armed groups and ter-rorists. In practice, the experience of Santafé deRalito has resulted in a loosely disguised replicaof the demilitarized zone (both in terms of hand-ing over territories, and because of the improvi-sation and lack of commitment on the part of

32 See RCN survey on the left and the right from the week of 12 July2004, according to which 37.7 percent of respondents say they areon the right, 7.7 percent profess to be on the left, and 43.2 percentsay that they are neither on the right nor the left.

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the paramilitaries), and it has made evident na-tional and international repudiation for impuni-ty and drug trafficking.

The public debate on the humanitarian ac-cords have revealed a president who is stubbornand who has little ability to listen when facedwith a critical national situation. They havemadeevident his disagreement with respected sectorsand political figures, and they have shown himto be insensitive to the human drama of thou-sands of Colombians.33

FINALREFLECTIONS

The government�s National Development Planproposes using information as a tool to win thewar against terrorism and the illegal organiza-tions. It calls upon the media for patriotic self-regulation to reduce the harmful effects that in-formation about terrorism has on society. Andit seeks, by means of developing infrastructure,to guarantee coverage and timeliness in com-munications to guarantee security for the citi-zens throughout the national territory. It alsoseeks to build conditions that favor social accessto information for business development.

The policies that may be understood fromthe government�s communications and informa-tion practices in the public sphere demonstratethe combination of the construction of a publicimage that seeks to win trust and communica-tive and political legitimacy, associated with amonopoly and the homogenization of the lan-guage and the recounting of the conflict andpeace. All of the above, along with a line of con-tact and listening to the people, constitute astrategy for building closeness, social recogni-tion and legitimacy.

The government�s relations with the mediaand reporters have exhibited tendencies towardtacit and explicit support for his policies, whichin any case have wavered and changed. A lookfrom the public opinion perspective makes evi-dent that presidential popularity is fragile andstarting to decline, revealing periodic transfor-mations and profound qualitative differences.

Having completed this review makes it pos-sible to see that the Uribe government�s com-munications policy, although it is skillful and ontarget because it concentrates on having strongimpact in the battle for social significance, is alsofocussed on the limited notion of information asan instrument and the media as apparatus, bothused with the intention of control and manipula-tion as the basis for controlling the citizens andbacking for the socioeconomic, military, andcultural policies. This perspective reveals thecommunications process as unidirectional andpre-determined, disregarding the changeability,the gaps, and the creativity in all communica-tive processes.

The government�s policy endeavors to con-centrate and control information and its dissem-ination to society, attempting to produce cer-tain effects and reactions, without taking intoaccount the complexity of the processes of pro-duction and circulation of information, andmuchless the richness and the changeabilty of theprocesses for its cultural appropriation and re-creation. The policy returns to the basic princi-ples of the Cold War, and the war on terrorism,and the doctrine of national security from the1970s and 1980s. It is not far removed fromthe psychological counterinformation strategiesused by the Socialist and Western blocs duringthese and earlier periods.

It is an approach that reduces communica-tions to information, and it makes apparent notonly resistance to dialogue, the possibility of dif-fering accounts, and the collective constructionof significance, proposals, and social alternatives,but rather it acts as a broadcaster called upon toconstruct the true and most fitting version forsociety, which by the way needs to be madeaware, as the one who fills the empty recepta-cles with information, and that uses or seducesto obtain its ends.

33 The above statements are the result of CINEP ethnographic studieson the reception of communications, as well as a series of articles,editorials, and analyses that appeared in the media between late Julyand August 2004, evaluating, reporting on, and analyzing govern-ment and President Uribe�s performance.

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This overview not only demonstrates theweaknesses of this policy, but also the breaksand the movements that have arisen as it un-folds. It shows the richness of daily life and cul-ture, and the way that information that is insti-tutional and from the media are appropriated,re-created and contrasted, making evident thepower of re-signification, the social appropriation ofinformation and the way that this is linked toother practices and movements (political andcultural) for rejection, resistance, opposition, andthe construction of alternatives. Unanimity, thefear of differences, and the lack of dialogue withsociety are also reasons for the fractures in thepolicy that has been adopted.

This demonstrates that the postulate fromone of the 100 points of Uribe�s campaign, �Ifear demagoguery and populism because thefrustration of electoral promises affects demo-cratic credibility��34 is becoming a self-fulfill-ing prophecy. Despite his skillful communicationsstrategy, with tacit or explicit backing from themedia and reporters, what is known as publicopinion is shifting another direction and distanc-ing itself from the president�s political propos-als, his performance, and his style. All of theabove is taking place in an international atmo-sphere of growing rejection toward and reevalu-ation of the postulates and the political andmil-itary methods of the war against terrorism.

In the same way, the demand to addressthe social debt makes evident that public sup-port for the dismantling of the 1991 Constitu-tion does not come easily and although themeaning of social rule of law is not well under-stood, in the minds and in the social practicesthere is appropriation and defense if its philoso-phy and principles. Time shall tell what will hap-pen with the so-called authoritarian spell andthe political right in Colombia.

34 Fragment from point 97 of the document Uribe�s 100 Points.S e e ( h t t p : / / w w w . d n p . g o v . c o / 0 3 _ P R O D / C O N P E S /Manifiesto_Democratico.htm#5).

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The government of Alvaro Uribe Vélezhas maintained the position that inorder to initiate talks with irregulararmed groups these groups mustdecree a unilateral cessation of hos-tilities and abandon their terrorist

practices. At this time, talks are in progress withmost of the paramilitary groups, a rapproche-ment is underway with the National LiberationArmy (ELN), and the government has not de-cided on the negotiation of a humanitarian ac-cord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC).

A significant part of Uribe�s defense anddem-ocratic security policy is aimed at gaining a polit-ical and military advantage over the guerrillas. Toachieve its objectives, several aspects must bestrengthened, which are discussed below.

Militarism beforedialogue

Permanent Assembly ofCivil Society for Peace

LEGITIMIZING THE ARMED FORCES, BETTERCOORDINATION AMONG THE BRANCHES, ANDINCREASED FIGHTING FORCE

This strategy is based on the control that the ex-ecutive branch can exert over the success or fail-ure of the Armed Forces on the field of battle andon the state�s recovery of a monopoly over theuse of force. That is why the president and hisdefenseminister are seen celebrating the success-es and lamenting the setbacks. The president hassaid, �When we make a mistake, when we face adifficult situation, when we are handed a bad re-sult, we are taking the initiative to communicateit and we are doing it immediately.�1 This is an

1 El Tiempo, 7 May 2004.

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attitude that boosts troopmorale, seeks to legit-imate the military, and fascinates broad sectorsof the population.

There has been a persistent call for greatercoordination between the executive branch andthe military.2 This has led to a situation in whichthe legislative and judicial branches and the con-trol agencies are lax in the face of violations ofhuman rights or international humanitarian lawcommitted by members of the Armed Forces.Evidence of this is found in the granting of judi-cial police powers to the military, in the call toavoid a return to the �Attorney General syn-drome,� and in the complicity of the Prosecu-tor�s Office by failing to prosecute high-rankingofficers or exonerating them in the investigationsthat are underway.

The restructuring of the Armed Forces isprogressing, a restructuring that includes an in-crease in manpower of 70,000 professional sol-diers, 20,000 peasant soldiers, 10,000 policepatrolmen, and 10,000 police assistants3 for atotal of 357,000 members of the public force atthe end of 2004.4 The proposal also includesthe creation of a Joint Intelligence Board andimprovements to equipment, technology, weap-ons and troop mobilization capacity.

Looking at the official statistics, duringUribe�s first two years in office, the military andpolice have increased the number of captures,kills, and desertions of combatants from thearmed groups. In the first four months of 2004alone, the Ministry of National Defense reportsthe following results against the �narco-terror-ist� groups, as they are termed in the report:5,058 fighters captured, an increase of 49 per-cent and 1,130 killed (up 34 percent).5 Deser-tions have increased, reaching 4,929 since thecurrent government took office.6 One must re-member that figures on captures include peo-ple who have proven to prosecutors and judgesthat they do not belong to any armed group.

The guerrillas have taken hits but their mil-itary structure continues to be strong and hasimmense power to create disturbances in thelife of the country. Proof of this is seen in thearmed strikes in Arauca and eastern Antioquia

Departments, the 25 attacks on the oil pipeline,and 26 on electricity pylons,7 to mention onlysome actions. However, it is true that the num-ber of attacks dropped in the first quarter of 2004compared with 2003. As such, even though it isnot feasible in the current conditions, the possi-bility of dealing serious blows to the insurgentforces through intelligence work and large mili-tary operations cannot be ruled out. If that wereto happen, it would create a military break pointin the Colombian armed conflict, although thiswould not necessarily mean that we would pro-ceed to a stable and lasting peace process.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FROM THE BUSINESSSECTOR AND INCREASEDMILITARY SPENDING

The government and its allies recognize that thesolution to the armed conflict is not easy norwill it come cheap. Although they are prone tobraggadocio in public statements, they are pre-paring for a medium or long-term effort.

The wealth tax yielded 2.4 trillion pesos in2003, which reflects the fact that businessmenare more disposed now, under this government,to put their hands in their pockets and contrib-ute. In exchange, the government has passedlegislation on labor reform that has saved them8 trillion pesos.8 In other words, they have notcontributed a single peso of hard cash to thewar effort. Moreover, military spending is expect-ed to hit 11 trillion pesos in 2004. If the tenden-cy continues, defense spending in 2005 wouldbe equivalent to 4.19 percent of gross domestic

2 President Alvaro Uribe Vélez referred to this coordination in a Natio-nal Police officers� promotion on 7 May 2004. Text of speech publis-hed on the Presidency of the Republic website: http://www.presidencia.gov.co/

3 El Tiempo, 3 January 2003.4 Interview on Caracol with the Deputy Defense Minister Andrés Peña-

te, June 2004.5 Ministry of National Defense, Results of the Defense and Democratic

Security Police, January-May 2004 (in Spanish). Data compared withthe same period of 2003.

6 Data published on the Presidency of the Republic website, 3 August2004.

7 Security and Democracy Foundation, Biannual Security Evaluation2001-2004 (in Spanish).

8 Figures from the United Workers Federation (CUT) database.

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product (GDP),9 which would imply less socialinvestment and increased poverty. The ones whowill continue to pay for this useless war, in livesand in cash, are the poor and the middle class.

INVOLVING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THECONFLICT

For the democratic security policy to be suc-cessful, the �active, voluntary and patriotic co-operation of citizens�10 is needed, in otherwords, the involvement of civil society in thearmed conflict. This is clearly expressed in theconsolidation of the informers� network, whichis hoped will reach 3 million members; in thecitizen security fronts; the reward programs; andin the legalization of private security agencies.We are facing a militarization of society.

Those who resist or denounce this strategyare subjected tomass detentions or intimidation.The objective is to strike at what the governmentconsiders to be �guerrilla supports,� and somassdetentions of social leaders, peasants, and peaceactivists have increased. The raids and searcheswithout a judge�s order, the wiretapping, and thejudicial police powers that the military have beengranted under the Antiterrorist Statue, will surelyincrease the number of innocent people in Co-lombian jails and the number of raids on non-governmental organizations.

It remains to be seen if this will produce re-sults for the government in its struggle to weak-en the guerrillas. What is clear though is that thearbitrary arrests are destroying the social fabricthat organizations such as the Arauca PeasantAssociation, the Arauca Department UnitedWorkers Federation, CUT, and the Joel SierraFoundation for Human Rights (all from Arauca)have worked for decades to put together. Themajority of the leaders of these organizationshave been imprisoned, displaced, or are in exile.This state action has a tendency to debilitatethe progress that has been made with differentparts of the society to encourage them to sup-port a negotiated political solution. Even so, thecommunities most strongly affected by this pol-

icy are resisting, coming up with new ways toorganize themselves. The friends and relativesof those who are the victims of these injusticesadd their voices of dissent. The protests againstthese arbitrary detentions in municipalities suchas Ibagué, Quinchía, Saravena, Neiva, and Cal-oto reveal a part of this opposition.

DIALOGUE AND TERRORISM

The inclusion of political armed conflict, such asthe Colombian case, in the realm of internation-al terrorism has allowed the government to ar-gue that there is no political conflict in our coun-try as such; what we are seeing is a war involvingthe whole society against gangs of criminals andterrorists. �This is not a conflict. This is a de-mocracy ... challenged by some rich terror-ists.�11 This position has been reinforced by theanti-terrorist propaganda emanating from theUnited States Government which has been cop-ied chapter and verse by the Colombian Gov-ernment. It is true that the Colombian guerrillashave carried out terrorist actions and have vio-lated some of the norms of international human-itarian law, but they continue to be, at heart,insurgent movements with a political characteror �armed opposition groups� as Amnesty In-ternational calls them.12

This conception is utilized by the govern-ment, according to its convenience, to refuseto dialogue with the armed insurgency and tobe totally willing to do so when the paramilitar-ies are concerned, or to talk with one of theguerrilla groups, trying to make the negotiationprocess with the self-defense groups more ac-ceptable �a process that does not have suffi-cient national or international support. This wasdemonstrated by the arrogant appearance be-

9 Luis Jorge Garay S., Colombia entre la exclusión y el desarrollo, editedby the Comptroller General�s Office of the Republic, 2002.

10 From the text of the Defense and Democratic Security Policy, issuedby the National Government on 16 June 2003.

11 Speech by Colombian president Alvaro Uribe Vélez during the swea-ring-in of the new commander of the Colombian Air Force in Bogota,8 September 2003.

12 Amnesty International, Annual Report on Colombia 2002.

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fore the Congress of the Republic of three lead-ers from the Colombian United Self-DefenseGroups (AUC) at the end of July 2004.

TALKSWITH THE PARAMILITARYGROUPS

What this government has been able to achievewithin its conception of peace is dialogue withthe paramilitary groups. The AUC, the CentralBolivar Bloc (BCB), and the Eastern Alliance stat-ed their willingness to accept the government�soffer to engage in talks and declared a unilateralcease-fire in December 2002, the date on whichthe exploratory phase began. In July 2003, theSantafé de Ralito Accord was signed in whichthe AUC ratified its commitment to a cessationof hostilities. In May 2004, the �location zone�was agreed to and established in Tierralta mu-nicipality, in Cordoba Department, to �contrib-ute to the perfecting and verification of the ces-sation of hostilities.�13 The groups were expectedto be demobilized by the end of 2005.

On 1 July the Unified Negotiation Table wasinaugurated. The government has insisted on�perfecting the cessation of hostilities andstrengthening the mechanisms for its verifica-tion.�14 In turn the AUC proposed a five-pointagenda which includes the �redefinition and ver-ification of the cessation of hostilities.�15 It canbe observed that the cessation of hostilities con-tinues to be a point on which the parties havedifferent interpretations.

The fact that the paramilitary groups havebeen declared to be terrorists by the UnitedStates and the European Union did not poseany difficulty to setting up these talks, nor didthe fact that they continue to be involved inthe business of trafficking drugs (they them-selves have acknowledged that 70 percent oftheir income �comes from taxes levied on drugtraffickers�16 ); and, more serious yet, that theone indispensable requirement that the gov-ernment set for holding these conversations,which is the cessation of hostilities, has notbeen met by the paramilitaries. Proof of this isthat 70 percent of the 1,440 victims of massa-

cres in 2003 were killed by these groups. Theyalso perpetrated 80 percent of the 3,313 polit-ically-motivated murders.17

It is a good thing to remove from combatthe armed groups that have done the mostdamage to the civilian population, particularlyto social movements and the political opposi-tion. But there can be no negotiation so longas impunity reigns, denying the truth, and re-fusing to serve sentences for the crimes com-mitted and to make reparations to the victims.For that reason what the paramilitary chiefshave said on this point worries us, �not aminute, not a second of jail time, neither insidenor outside the national borders.�18 This trans-lates as total impunity.

Today it is more evident that the talks withthe AUC are serving to help several of the druglords to legalize their wealth and get the threatof criminal proceedings and extradition requestsoff their backs. In addition, they would consoli-date their local and department-level power,gained in the October 2003 elections, throughterror and the elimination of their political op-position. This, for example, was what happenedto the Norte de Santander candidate for gover-nor, Tirso Vélez, who was murdered at the be-ginning of June 2003. In Magdalena and CesarDepartments, only one gubernatorial candidateran for office, someone vetted by these groups.

A bill now before Congress, called the Alter-native Sentencing, Justice and Reparations Act,still fails to clarify the doubts that have beenraised about opening the road to impunity, lackof a fact-finding mechanism, no reparations tosurvivors, and the legal laundering of moneyderived from drug trafficking. Concretely, theywill resort to all the legal tricks in the book to

13 Santafé de Ralito Accord, Cordoba, May 2004.14 Remarks by High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo,

Santafé de Ralito, 1 July 2004.15 Remarks by Salvatore Mancuso of the AUC, Santafé de Ralito, 1 July

2004.16 Interview by journalist Alvaro Garcia from RCN, special broadcast on

29 April 2004.17 Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, Colombia:

Informe Estadístico de Derechos Humanos, 2003.18 Interview with several paramilitary chiefs published on 15 May 2004

in El Tiempo.

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avoid penalties and if this continues it is proba-ble that the paramilitaries will receive title to landexpropriated from thousands of displaced peas-ants. What a poor example for the constructionof stable and lasting peace; peace is not buildon such tortuous foundations.

HUMANITARIAN AGREEMENTWITH THE FARC

It is true that it is not the same thing to signhumanitarian agreements as to restart a peaceprocess with the guerrillas, but we believe thatthese can be the down payment on a new rap-prochement. Together with the families of thekidnap victims and the imprisoned guerrillas, wehave concentrated our efforts on trying to con-vince the Colombian Government and the FARCto sign this agreement.

The harsh reality is that in this case the mil-itary strategy counts for more than strictly hu-manitarian concerns. For the government, anagreement would �lower themorale of the coun-try�s police officers and soldiers, weaken thepolicy on public order,�19 and provide a politicalopportunity for the guerrillas to gain legitimacy.For the FARC, a unilateral liberation would showweakness. With these arguments the possibili-ties of a humanitarian exchange are remote.

The calls by the former presidents have notbeen enough. They believe that the legal basesexist to come to a release accord and that onlythe political will of the parties is required to doso. Nor has the proposal of the Colombian Cath-olic Church that guerrillas exchanged for kidnapvictims be taken in by a friendly country beensufficient, nor the �Sirirí Operation� protests heldby the families of kidnap victims every Thursdayin Bogota�s main square, the Plaza de Bolivar,calling on the national government and the FARCto sign a humanitarian agreement.

RAPPROCHEMENTWITH THE ELN

The current government has tried to start talkswith the ELN. The last attempt was in May 2004,

on the condition that they agree to a unilateralcessation of hostilities. The ELN responded pro-posing a bilateral and time-limited cease-fire, ageneral amnesty for political prisoners and pris-oners of war, and an agreement on the use ofantipersonnel mines.

Each of the parties tried to position itselfpolitically, in its own fashion. The Mexican Gov-ernment has named a facilitator mutually agreedupon between the parties. An exchange of let-ters has taken place, which shows that althoughthe positions continue to be rather far apart,possibilities of dialogue can open up.

These events in themselves are positive andmust be supported by civil society. However,how do we understand the fact that, after near-ly two years during which the Colombian Gov-ernment refused to talk to �terrorists,� it nowproposes to do so? We think that the explana-tion is that the Colombian president needs tolegitimize the talks with the paramilitaries andto gain support for a possible reelection, becausein an opinion poll done in June of this year, 56percent of those surveyed opted for a negotiat-ed solution with the guerrillas.20

IF YOUWANT PEACE, PREPARE FORWAR

We think that the Uribe government has chosento try a preponderantly military solution to theColombian armed conflict, which has the aim ofweakening the guerrilla movement in order to getthem back to the negotiating table when theyhave been brought low, but it can be foreseenthat first there will be a clash of power.21

For the government this military tryout ispart of its peace policy. For us, this is a newact of aggression, the consequences of whichwill be an increase in the number of victims,especially of non-combatants from the civil-

19 In President Alvaro Uribe�s speech of 5 May 2003, inaugurating theCali High Mountain Brigade. Indepaz document 19.

20 Semana, 6 June 2004.21 Cecilia Orozco, ¿Y ahora qué? El Ancora Editores, 2002. Interview

with Fernando Tapias S., former commander of the Colombian Ar-med Forces, p. 49.

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ian population, a reduction in social spend-ing, and slowed economic development. Forthese reasons we say that the governmentdoes not have a peace policy but rather a mil-itaristic approach.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The important role that the group of friendlycountries had in the peace processes with theELN and the FARC became blurred with the anti-terrorist policy of the US Government and theEuropean Union�s inclusion of these organiza-tions in its list of terrorist groups. Despite this,Mexico�s offer to serve as a facilitator in possi-ble talks with the ELN shows that, in the Colom-bian case, the label terrorist is a political ploy bythe states.

The president has insisted on the use of thegood offices of the United Nations for the peaceprocess in Colombia. This facilitation centers onachieving a cessation of hostilities, the abandon-ment of terrorism, disarmament, and demobili-zation. The FARC have requested that troops bewithdrawn from two departments to talk aboutthe proposal for a humanitarian exchange ofhostages, and the ELN has urged that a Nation-al Convention be convened and that humani-tarian agreements be signed in order to restartthe talks. Both organizations insist that they begiven political status. Neither the governmentnor the guerrillas have budged from their posi-tions, and therefore the work of the United Na-tions has moved into the background, discreteand low profile.

In the face of the impasse between the UNSecretary General�s delegate for the Colombianpeace process and the Colombian Government,the government has turned to the OAS for thefacilitation of the paramilitary talks, which couldextend to the insurgent groups. We hope thatthe verification of the cessation of hostilities iscarried out with the diligence and security thatis required in the circumstances, and that theOAS Inter-American Commission on HumanRights takes a more active role.

WHATMAY LIE DOWN THE ROAD

If the trends of the first quarter of 2004 contin-ue, in which there were 542 clashes initiated bythe military and police forces and during whichthe guerrillas have carried out 185 attacks (a 10percent increase over the first quarter of2003),22 the most likely scenario is an escala-tion in the armed conflict. Although in the sec-ond quarter of 2004, the number of attacksshowed a declining tendency, it is interesting thatbetween June and July of this year, the FARCcarried out attacks of greater magnitude, suchas the one in Paz de Ariporo in Casanare and onthe road between Pitalito and Mocoa.

A sign of this intensification is Plan Patriota,which began in the month of April, deploying17,000 soldiers in the southern part of the coun-try. This action will increase the number of vic-tims of this war and one main group is the loser:the unarmed population. It is probable that themilitary actions of the Armed Forces will forcethe guerrillas out of their temporary withdrawaland oblige them to conduct armed incursionsin different parts of the country in order to dis-perse the troops. That is to say, they will resumethe military maneuvers of guerrilla warfare.

Negotiation with the paramilitaries will al-low them to consolidate and legitimize their po-litical, economic, and military power on the At-lantic Coast, in part of the Middle Magdalenaregion, and in Norte de Santander Department.Before moving to the location zone, they aresecuring territory and routes to continue to con-trol the drug trade and gunrunning. This explainsthe ruthless persecution of the indigenous com-munities that live in these regions, which hascost the lives of 92 Kankuamo Indians in theSierra Nevada of Santa Marta area since thecurrent government came to power, and thedisappearance of 37 Wayuu in the upper Guajiraregion.23

22 Security and Democracy Foundation, report on the armed conflict inColombia, first quarter 2004.

23 Sst by the Office in Colombia of the UN High Commissioner forHuman Rights, in El Tiempo, 9 August 2004.

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If the agreements of the national govern-ment with the paramilitaries are fulfilled by bothparties and end successfully, it is likely that vio-lations directly related to the armed conflictwould drop. In other words, this is clear so longas all of the groups enter the talks and if mem-bers of the military forces do not contribute orcover up their criminal activities. This would alsotest the capacity of the state to ensure that ter-ritories vacated by the �paras� are not occupiedby the guerrillas, and that, in the zones controlledby the AUC, the application of norms governinga social and democratic state under the rule oflaw is ensured.

In this reality, returning to the road of ne-gotiations is not around the corner, but it is inthese circumstances that those who stand stead-fastly for peace must insist that the lost coursebe resumed. We must resist any involvementwith a military solution and continue to pin ourhopes on a political and negotiated solution tothe armed conflict.

RECOMMENDATIONS

� Reinforce the initiatives and campaigns fora humanitarian agreement. The best knownat this time is the proposal to exchange kid-nap victims held by the FARC for capturedguerrillas.We can also propose �partial agree-ments of immediate application� to preventdisplaced people, indigenous people, wom-en, and boys and girls from being involvedin the armed conflict. Other possibilities areagreements on the use of antipersonnelmines and explosive devices, respect formedical missions, and the lifting of block-ades barring food shipments in regionswhere they have been in place for close tothree years.

� That the delegates of social sectors, peaceinitiatives and non-governmental organiza-tions convoke the National Peace Coun-cil,24 and the municipal, district and de-partmental peace councils. If the

government does not listen, these couldserve as the institutional base from whichcitizens can resist the entrenchment of thearmed conflict in Colombia and promote astate peace policy.

� That the United Nations, the countries ofthe European Union, Canada, and LatinAmerica insist to the Government of Co-lombia and the guerrillas that they returnto dialogue and negotiation; and that forthis initiative a new group of countries sup-porting the peace process in Colombia (theso-called �friendly countries�) be estab-lished.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Asamblea Permanente de la Sociedad Civil Por la Paz. Parar la GuerraPactar la Paz: Conclusiones de la IV Plenaria. October 2003.

Downes, Richard. Poder militar y guerra ambigua: el reto de Colombiaen el Siglo XXI. Bogota: IEPRI, Fica, 2004.

Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, Colombia: Perspectivas de Se-guridad 2004, January 2004.

Indepaz, Document No. 18, Así va el diálogo con los �paras�, 2004.Indepaz, Document No. 19, Acuerdos Humanitarios y Diálogos, 2004.Orozco, Cecilia. ¿Y ahora qué? El Áncora Editores, 2003.Presidency of the Republic � Ministry of National Defense. Política

de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática, 2003.Sierra, Luz María and Sierra Álvaro. �Un día en el corazón de las

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia,� El Tiempo, 15 May2004.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Office inColombia. Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights inColombia. February 2004. E/CN.4/2004/13.

24 We can make use of the June 2004 ruling by the Council of State thatobliges the National Government to convoke the National PeaceCouncil and put it into operation.

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¿Agricultural growth orrural development?

T

Carlos Salgado*

The Minister of Agriculture and Ru-ral Development has been impress-ing the country with extraordinaryfigures describing the behavior ofthe agricultural and livestock indus-tries, figures which make one think

that the old problems of the Colombian coun-tryside are a thing of the past1 . From the gov-ernment�s perspective, there is no reason foralarm: cotton has been sown again, more palmis being planted, sugar cane is an emporium andthere are greater yields of bananas, flowers andcacao. The government�s optimism rests on sev-en or eight crops, on the basis of which the glo-bal figures coincide, as always, with peasantcrops of yucca, traditional corn and fruits. Interms of livestock, the strength lies in chickensand eggs,� the most protected goods that de-rive the greatest benefit from subsidies�, theslaughter of hogs, and the production of milk.In terms of security, the figures speak of a re-duction in the displaced population, of a drop

in kidnappings of cattle ranchers, in killings andin cattle theft. According to the SAC, lack of se-curity fell from being the second concern of pro-ducers to being the fifth2 . If things are so, can itbe expected that the current policies will solvethe structural problems of the Colombian coun-tryside? Why do rural areas continue to be un-stable?

FIGURES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL ANDLIVESTOCK INDUSTRIES

The combined data from the Memory of theMinister Carlos Gustavo Cano for the period of2002-2003 and of the newspaper El Tiempo3 ,show that the GDP for the Agricultural and Live-

* Economist and Researcher.1 See Annexes2 �The role of security�, in: El Tiempo, 27 April of 2004, p. 2-3.3 �The Countyside�, in: El Tiempo, Special Subjects, 27 April, 2004.

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stock industries without including coffee grewby 4.3% in 2003, pulled up by the agriculturalGDP, which reached an index of 5.2%. The fig-ure is relevant if one bears in mind that in theyear 2002 the index of GDP for the Agriculturaland Livestock industries was .63%.

If in 2002, permanent crops such as ba-nana, sugar cane, flowers and coffee were rele-vant, in 2003 the more dynamic indexes seemto have been in transitory crops. In fact, thenumber of cultivated hectares grew by 4%, mov-ing from 3,859,881 in 2002 to 4,019,382 inthe last year, with a growth of 28% in cotton,39% in genetically modified corn, 40% in indus-trial Yucca, and 12% in palm. When comparedwith these figures, traditional corn had a mod-est growth of 3%. But it is the crop with thegreatest area of cultivation, at 426,110 hectares,compared to cotton�s 53,600 and the 153,000planted with genetically modified corn.

In the livestock industry, the most dynamicproduct was the egg, with an index of 9.6%, fol-lowed by pork with 5.6%, milk, 5.2%, poultry at4.47, and a reduction of 1.5% in the productionof cattle. The industry�s exports grew from US$2,113 million in 2002 to US $2,885 million in2003, while imports grew from US$ 1,676 toUS$ 1,720, so that the industry�s net commer-cial balance moved from US$ 437million to US$1,165 million.

Other gains manifested in the above citedreports relate to the development of marketchains, the growth of credit in the agriculturaland livestock industries by 48%, with benefitsfor 53% more producers, the stimulation of as-sociative projects in production chains throughthe ICR, and the cultivation of ten thousandhectares of genetically modified cotton on thecoast and the authorization for the planting of4,500 hectares in the interior.

THE SLOPE OF THIS POLICY

In the Memory of the Minister for the period2002-2003, it is stated that �The policies relat-ing to the agricultural, livestock and fishing in-

dustries has sought and is on the path to pro-mote, encourage and stimulate rural develop-ment and food security in the country, observ-ing the principles of equality, sustainability,competitiveness and decentralization, all withinthe framework of the commitment to the de-fense of rural labor� (Ministry of Agriculture: 7).

In order to meet these objectives, the fol-lowing initiatives were drafted: growth of cultiva-tion of modified corn, banks of machinery, thereactivation of cotton industry, bovine repopula-tion, coffee, provincial centers, modified organ-isms, rural housing, social business projects, ad-aptationof lands, rural financing, programs in favorof rural women, attention to the displaced, andthe promotion of agricultural institutions.

In the diagnostic which was undertaken, theproblems of poverty, food4 and institutional in-security were noted. As regards to institutionalinsecurity, the dispersion of resources and thelack of flexibility in the offer of agricultural andlivestock services have not allowed for the gen-eration of the desired impact of improving thewellbeing of the rural population.

The Memories clearly show that the Minis-try�s policy is framed within a conception ac-cording to which the stimulus for growth is suf-ficient to resolve the countryside�s problems, astimulus that focuses on a minimum basket ofproducts towards which the policy�s benefits areoriented, under the assumption that these arethe products which have comparative advan-tages in the international market.

The report of theWorld Bank (Balcázar, 2003)on sources and foundations for rural competi-tion indicates that the agricultural policy of thelast decade has centered on 11 products ( cot-ton, wheat, barley, white rice, white sugar, cacao,milk, corn, sorghum, soy and palm) for which

4 �The country has seen its levels of poverty rise, moving from 54% in1991 to 60% in 2000. For its part, the rural sector witnessed anincreased in the number of poor from 68% to 82% in the same timeperiod. By the year 2000, close to 10 million Colombians were livingin abject poverty, more or less one in every four people. Thegreatest concentration was registered in rural areas, where the num-ber of indigents exceeded 5 million, representing 43.4% of the totalrural population�. (Ministry of Agriculture, 9).

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protection has been granted throughpriceswhichmoved from US$ 171 million in 1991 to US$1,457 million in 2001. The levels of protectionmoved from 7% to 39% in those same years. Inthe period between 1999 and 2001, 83% of as-sistance was concentrated on only 5 products:palm oil, corn, white rice, sugar and milk.

Protection was also intense for chickenparts, whose tariffs reached 166% and for pork,where they reached 70%. If one bears in mind,according to this report, that the tariffs for cornand soy are 15%, given that these products rep-resent 60% of the costs of the production ofpoultry and pork, the effective protection wouldbe of 393% for poultry and 153% for pork. Judg-ing by the results in terms of production, thesources and foundations of rural competitionhave not shown changes in the policies of thecurrent Government, as the incentives lead toconcentration on a very few products.

A RESTRICTED VISION OF RURALDEVELOPMENT

This conception is consistent with the govern-ment�s vision of rural development. Accordingto the Memories of the Minister, rural develop-ment should be understood as a complex ofactions tending to favor the peasantry throughagrarian reform, the adaptation of lands, the DRIprogram, themodernization of the peasant econ-omy, programs to assist the internally displaced,livelihoods, and the compensation fund.

But it has been some time since the agrariandebate overcame this restricted conceptionwhich the Government uses. Even within thecamp of conventional economists, and more ex-actly the second generation of economists,among which Meier and Stiglitz stand out, devel-opment agendas include such goals as the miti-gation of poverty and capacity building, especial-ly among the poorest sectors, in order to attainhigher levels of freedom and sustainable devel-opment. In addition, they propose moving to-wards the accumulation of physical capital, hu-man capital, knowledge and social capital. From

the perspective of state action, conventional eco-nomics places emphasis on the new market fail-ures and institutional failures, such that govern-ment action ought to be complementary todefining and creating correct policies and institu-tions5 .

From this renewed perspective of the sec-ond generation, it is clear that the sources ofgrowth can be found in good governance throughthe achievement of greater civil liberties, the stim-ulation of political participation and the exten-sion of democracy, paying attention to the con-flicts of distribution and political processes. Thisapproach can be sharply contrasted with the vi-sion of the Ministry, which restricts the compre-hensionof structural problems in the rural sphere,centering instead on the problem of growth onthe agricultural and livestock industries.

The rural world in Colombia debates theseproblems: (1) the high concentration of landownership, to which the State apparently willrespond only with lands seized from drug traf-fickers, without touching the property structure.(With this mechanism the government seems tothink it can clear its conscience). (2) problemsof judicial insecurity, with policies designed with-out any regard to the realities of the conflict; (3)the growth of poverty and hunger, with no de-fined, specific action designed to counteract thistrend, in terms of the stability of the rural popu-lation and its access to productive resources,and indeed with out any no response to pro-grams such as �Bogota without Hunger�; and(4) the inefficient use of thepsoil and environ-mental degradation owing to extensive cattleraising, while from the government�s perspec-tive environmental policy is confused with theuse of genetically modified crops.

5 See, Meier, Gerald (2002). �Introduction: ideas for development�. InMeir and Stiglitz (editors), �Fronteras de la economía del desarrollo.El futuro en perspectiva�, Banco Mundial y Alfaomega, Bogotá.4"El país ha visto incrementar sus niveles de pobreza pasando del 54%en 1991 a 60% en el 2000. Por su parte, el sector rural aumentó elnúmero de pobres de 68% a 82% en el mismo período. Para el año2000, cerca de 10 millones de colombianos se encontraban en totalmiseria, o sea una de cada cuatro personas. La mayor concentraciónse registró en la zona rural, donde el número de indigentes superólos cinco millones, representando el 43,4% del total de la poblaciónrural". (Ministerio de Agricultura, 9).

82 Context

Balcázar�s report (2003), prepared for theWorld Bank, highlights other problems in the tra-dition of agricultural policy: the degree of eco-nomic opening is inversely proportional to theinstitutional power of the businesses, as demon-strated by the management of subsidies and tar-iffs; the management of commercial policy with-out a strategy; the lack of a consistent effort todevelop a market for lands; scarce developmentof capital markets; the reinforcement of the ex-clusion of small producers in finance policies; in-sufficient development of programs for associa-tional credit, throughmarket chain arrangementsand agreements; subsidies for capital, which re-inforces the tendency to save on labor; transferswhich are conditioned on the ability to transportproducts and their scale, resulting in protectivemeasures not applying to small producers, in ad-dition to the fact that direct subsidies are medi-ated by credit, which excludes small producersas well. None of these problems are addressed inthe current government�s policies.

The current Government�s policies follow atraditional model for economic growth whichconsolidates subsidies andprotectionof interestsof few. Its results seem attractive because of pos-itive changes in the conventional variables, such

as yields, productivity, prices and employment.The failure of these policies to address and miti-gate the structural problems of the rural sphere,however, are hidden behind the smokescreen ofa numbers of statistics. What is more, there is nopolicy for the countryside; there is only a policyfor anspecific perspective on the economics ofthe agricultural and livestock industries.

Facing demands to resolve rural social andpolitical problems, theMinistry has raised at thelast moment the banner of defense for the in-terests of the rural sector in bilateral commer-cial negotiations. But it would be useful to ask,whose interests are being defended?Whatmodelof rural development is being promoted? If theanswer is essentially to defend competition, pric-es and profits for a few privileged producers, onewould have to respond, in a very North Ameri-can way, in order to be fashionable, that, �Itsnot just the economy it�s the people�!�

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Balcázar, A., Orozco, M. y Samacá, H. (2003). �Fuentes y funda-mentos de la competitividad agrorural en Colombia�. Infor-me de consultoría para el Banco Mundial y la FAO, Bogotá.

Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, �Memorias 2002-2003�.Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Bogotá.

1 9 9 51 9 9 51 9 9 51 9 9 51 9 9 5 1 9 9 61 9 9 61 9 9 61 9 9 61 9 9 6 1 9 9 71 9 9 71 9 9 71 9 9 71 9 9 7 1 9 9 81 9 9 81 9 9 81 9 9 81 9 9 8 1 9 9 91 9 9 91 9 9 91 9 9 91 9 9 9 2 0 0 02 0 0 02 0 0 02 0 0 02 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 0 0 12 0 0 12 0 0 12 0 0 1 2 0 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 2

Transitory crops * 0,42 -3,26 -1,16 -9,21 10,36 4,56 1,83 -0,58

Permanent crops * 2,75 1,53 -0,80 -0,88 4,65 3,99 3,48 2,50

Coffee 7,41 -8,90 -2,15 7,21 -12,50 7,98 0,23 6,11

Illicit crops 3,50 22,14 14,47 -3,69 11,98 1,23 -11,19 -29,50

Agricultural total with illicit crops 1,89 3,10 0,96 -2,45 4,64 3,27 0,75 -1,95

Agricultural total without illicit crops 1,16 0,15 -2,17 -2,71 3,87 3,77 4,09 4,57

Total Livestock 4,88 -2,43 1,18 0,85 -1,75 3,29 0,08 1,94

Total Agriculture and Livestock with illicit crops 3,73 -1,24 0,65 0,04 -0,05 3,85 0,68 0,63

Total Agriculture and Livestock without illicit crops 3,58 -2,73 -0,65 0,21 -0,84 4,12 2,02 3,58

Note: Constant preliminary values from 1994. Totals make reference to aggregate value

* Value of production, Evaluaciones Agropecuarias - Ministerio de Agricultura

TTTTTable No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1Behavior of the IndustryBehavior of the IndustryBehavior of the IndustryBehavior of the IndustryBehavior of the Industry

Indexes of growth in the value of production of the agricultural and livestock industriesIndexes of growth in the value of production of the agricultural and livestock industriesIndexes of growth in the value of production of the agricultural and livestock industriesIndexes of growth in the value of production of the agricultural and livestock industriesIndexes of growth in the value of production of the agricultural and livestock industries

SourSourSourSourSource:ce:ce:ce:ce: DANE� Cuentas Nacionales. Taken from Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural (no date). �Memorias 2002-2003�. Ministeriode Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural, Bogotá. p.148.

ANNEXES

83Context

Subsectors/yearsSubsectors/yearsSubsectors/yearsSubsectors/yearsSubsectors/years 2 0 0 12 0 0 12 0 0 12 0 0 12 0 0 1 2 0 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 *2 0 0 3 *2 0 0 3 *2 0 0 3 *2 0 0 3 * Var ia t ionVar i a t ionVar i a t ionVar i a t ionVar i a t ion% 03/02% 03/02% 03/02% 03/02% 03/02

Poultry (tons) 531.677 649.037 678.050 4.5

Eggs, (thousands of units) 7.097.874 6.827.123 7.482.782 9.6

Cattle (Tons) 1.480.128 1.404.642 1.383.572 -1.5

Pork (Tons) 98.141 109.508 115.685 5.6

Milk (millions of liters) 4.721 4.896 5.153 5.2

TTTTTable No. 3able No. 3able No. 3able No. 3able No. 3Production of Livestock IndustryProduction of Livestock IndustryProduction of Livestock IndustryProduction of Livestock IndustryProduction of Livestock Industry

SourSourSourSourSource:ce:ce:ce:ce: Fenavi, Dane, Fedegán, Acp y Analac. Taken from El Tiempo, Tuesday 27 April of 2004. pp.3-11

Crops/ yearsCrops/ yearsCrops/ yearsCrops/ yearsCrops/ years 2 0 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 22 0 0 2 2 0 0 32 0 0 32 0 0 32 0 0 32 0 0 3 Var ia t ionVar i a t ionVar i a t ionVar i a t ionVar i a t ion Var i a t ionVar i a t ionVar i a t ionVar i a t ionVar i a t ionhecta reshecta reshecta reshecta reshecta res %%%%%

Cotton 41.900 53.600 11.700 28

Yellow modified Corn 110.000 153.000 43.000 39

Cacao 99.002 103.215 4.213 4

African Palm 184.000 205.218 21.218 12

Industrial Yucca 11.800 16.500 4.700 40

Traditional corn 413.699 426.110 12.411 3

Fruits 170.042 175.052 5.010 3

Subtotal 1.030.443 1.132.695 102.252 10

Subtotal other crops 2.829.438 2.886.687 57.249 2

Total crops year 3.859.881 4.019.382 159.501 4

TTTTTable No. 2able No. 2able No. 2able No. 2able No. 2Cultivated Agricultural AreaCultivated Agricultural AreaCultivated Agricultural AreaCultivated Agricultural AreaCultivated Agricultural Area

Comparative 2002 � 2003 (hectares)Comparative 2002 � 2003 (hectares)Comparative 2002 � 2003 (hectares)Comparative 2002 � 2003 (hectares)Comparative 2002 � 2003 (hectares)

SourSourSourSourSource:ce:ce:ce:ce: Evaluaciones agropecuarias Dane, Sisac y gremios. Taken from El Tiempo, Tuesday 27 April 2004. pp. 3-11

Needs and Rights 2

86 Needs and Rights

87Needs and Rights

Social malady andpublic policy

CSOCIAL PROTECTION, A NEWPARADIGM INGOVERNMENTPOLICY

ompared with other Latin Americancountries, the Colombian State as-sumed its social responsibilities rel-atively late. Although the radical lib-erals that governed Colombiabetween 1868 and 1878 defended

universal and free education, until the middleof the twentieth century vulnerable, disadvan-taged populations in conditions of poverty wereattended to by entities of a private character,or by civic or religious organizations, operatingunder principles of charity and assistance.

Beginning in the 1940�s, the State, central-ist and interventionist in character at the time,began the institutional construction of the so-cial sectors of education, health, social security,housing, public services, and family welfare. Dur-ing the 1980�s, the processes of decentraliza-

Corporation �Viva la Ciudadanía�Libardo Sarmiento Anzola*

tion transformed the management of social pol-icy and in the 1990�s social policies centered onspecific populations began to take hold, (popu-lations defined by age, gender, and ethnics).Against the backdrop of two simultaneous pro-cesses, namely, on the one hand the adjustment,restructuring and opening of the economy, andon the other, the promulgation of the Constitu-tion of 1991, social policy has been character-ized by a complex amalgam of approaches whichhave sought to combine Social, Economic andCultural Rights, public assistance, privatizationand mercantilism.

Towards the end of the 1990�s, the domi-nant elites unleashed a strong criticism of pop-ulation based and rights centered approachesto social policy. These objectors, which includ-ed the Cepal and the World Bank, pointed to

* Economist, philosopher, master of economic theory. Independentwriter and social researcher. Analyisis developed for the CorporaciónViva la Ciudadanía.

88 Needs and Rights

the slight gains made with regard to the fightagainst poverty and social integration in LatinAmerica. Among other reasons they cited thelack of resources, the fiscal crisis, the sectoralapproach, the lack of political will, the exces-sive growth of state bureaucracy, the little at-tention paid to development and a general lackof knowledge regarding the laws of the marketand private incentives.

Antagonistic to policies based on socialrights, the World Bank affirmed that Colombiaundertook a financially unsustainable expan-sion of social services, primarily in the areas ofhealth, education and pensions. Consequent-ly, beginning in 2001, a new phase of adjust-ment for the social sector was undertaken, ori-ented towards developing a social protectionnetwork1 . According to the National Develop-ment Plan, the three principal challenges un-dertaken by the Uribe administration (2002-2006), in the social sphere are: 1) to enhancethe efficiency of social spending, 2) to improvethe of focusing spending, and 3) to consolidatea social protection system so that economiccrises do not completely compromise the op-portunities of vulnerable populations in future(Law 812 of 2003, chapter II C). At the end of2002, as a result of the fusion of the Ministriesof Health and Labor, the Uribe administrationcreated the Ministry of Social Protection, anentity that manages also the Sena, the Icbf, andthe ISS.

This approach adds to the complex of so-cial programs the experience of the Social Sup-port Network (RAS), introduced in 2000 withinternational funding, which is comprised of threeprograms: community works (Employment inaction), transfer of funds conditioned to schoolattendance, (Families in action) and the trainingof unemployed youth (Youth in action). The ideawhich motivates this approach is the �manage-ment of social risk�, that is, the numerous natu-ral and social uncertainties which individuals,heads of households and communities face. Theapproach considers that the poor are more ex-posed to risk, and have less access to alterna-tives for managing and effectively resolving that

risk than do people of higher socioeconomicstanding. It is a restatement of the project ofemergency social funds promoted by the multi-lateral credit organizations throughout LatinAmerica in the last decades of the twentiethcentury in order tomitigated the social crisis un-leashed by neoliberalism.

The development of the social protectionnetwork implies five strategies: 1) redistributingpublic social spending, 2) adjusting the systemthat selects beneficiaries (Sisben) with the aimof reducing their number, 3) cutting costs, 4)merging programs, and 5) the decentralization,restructuring and privatizing of the Sena, the Icbfand the ISS. This approach seeks to manage thesocial effects of macroeconomic instability, thefiscal deficit, the public debt and both chronicand transitory elements of social vulnerability.Instead of a focus on universality, (social andeconomic rights for all) and social justice (themore wealthy sectors financing the system), thesocial protection network combines universalfiduciary responsibility (everyone pays taxes andcovers costs through differentiated tariffs) withthe targeting of social services at the poorest ofthe poor.

The social protection network is orientedtowards the Colombians with lowest income,classified within chronically, structurally and tem-porarily vulnerable groups, together with groupsin special circumstances. Based on income lev-els, all social programs are to apply sliding-scaletariffs, and/or varying subsidies in order to cutcosts. It also incorporates delegated administra-tive authority in the management of social poli-cy, broadly involving the private sector andNGO�s as another means of reducing costs andexpanding the coverage of these programs.

1 The initial study �Colombia, Evaluation of the Social ProtectionNetwork,� was financed and carried out by the World Bank, the DNP,the BID, the government of Japan and Fedesarrollo, under thecoordination of Laura B. Rawlings.

89Needs and Rights

POVERTY AND INEQUALITY2

Historically, the Colombian ruling class has con-sidered economic growth to be the only factor inthe solutionof problemsof exclusion, poverty andsocial injustice. According to this pseudo-argu-ment, economic growth generates employment,and as such, income for families; a causal rela-tionship reinterpreted by the Uribe administra-tion. This argument also affirms that economicgrowth is achieved through security, fiscal adjust-ment, and private, primarily foreign investment.Repression and discipline of markets are the pre-ferred regulatory mechanisms for social controland the promotionof development. However, thislinear relationship between economic growth andwellbeing is shown to be false when measuredagainst the empirical evidence of the last quarterof the 20thcentury, (see graphic No.1371)

2 In order to undertake the analyisis of poverty and the concentration ofincome, the average of the first trimesters of 2001 to 2004 of theDane�s continuous survey of homes were processed. Householdsand individuals without income were excluded (10% of the total). Noadjustment of income was undertaken. The variables selected forclassification were tax collectors, the members of household, urbanand rural categories, men and women. Poverty and income lines weretaken individually for each city and year, according to the valuesestablished by the Dane. The total population was estimated basedon the Dane�s projections, together with the survey�s distribution ofhead of household to the rest. Owing to changes in the survey ofhomes begining in the year 2000, it is not possible to make directcomparisons with previous years; the year 2000 was discarded becau-se of the insconsistencey of the data. The analyisis and statisticalprocessing was undertaken under the direction of Emperatriz BecerraAponte. The analytic design of the study and the calculation ofindicators was carried out by Libardo Sarmiento Anzola.

� The economy�s growth is cyclical and un-stable. That said, the problem of povertyby income is structural, as even in times ofeconomic boom, the poverty index doesnot drop below 54%.

S o u r c e :S o u r c e :S o u r c e :S o u r c e :S o u r c e : Dane: growth of GDP 1980�2004 (April) and unemployment Continuous Survey of homes (ECH); social spending, Ministry of Hacieda,National Budget; Poverty by income 1980�2000, DNP, SISD; 2001-2004 table 1. Calculations made by Libardo Sarmiento Anzola

Graphic No. 1Graphic No. 1Graphic No. 1Graphic No. 1Graphic No. 1Economic GrEconomic GrEconomic GrEconomic GrEconomic Growth, Unemployment, Social Spending/GDPowth, Unemployment, Social Spending/GDPowth, Unemployment, Social Spending/GDPowth, Unemployment, Social Spending/GDPowth, Unemployment, Social Spending/GDP, and pover, and pover, and pover, and pover, and pover ty by income, 1980-2004ty by income, 1980-2004ty by income, 1980-2004ty by income, 1980-2004ty by income, 1980-2004

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90 Needs and Rights

� Coinciding with the processes of adjust-ment, restructuring and economic opening,the asymmetry between the economy andpoverty widens. In the recessive phase pov-erty by income increases rapidly, and in therecovery phase, social ills continue to grow,as evidenced by the data between 2001and 2004. According to the Dane�s figures,the GDP in the first trimester of 2004 grewby 4.3% and the level of poverty by incomerose to 77.3%. The current developmentstyle is based on the overexploitation andexclusion of the working population, and onthe concentration of income and wealth inthe ruling class.

� As a result of the consolidation of a specula-tive economy, without the generation of pro-ductive quality employment opportunities,together with labor reforms which broadenand intensify the exploitation of labor, theproblems of unemployment and underem-ployment are now systemic. The instabilityof employment, together with structural un-

employment explain to a large degree theexplosive growth of poverty by income. Thissituation is aggravated by the rapid growthof the working age population; because ofthis single factor, approximately 400,000persons enter the job market every year.

� Over the course of the last decade, the un-employment rate never dropped below 10%.Under the current economic model andagainst the judicial backdrop of prevailing la-bor-capital relations, labor dynamics are notdirectly associated with the evolution of theeconomy. The percentage of the economi-cally active population which finds itself inconditions of unemployment, underemploy-ment and informal employment is of the or-der of 75%, while 80% of workers earn in-come lower than two minimum wages.

� Poverty is caused primarily by the low edu-cational level of the workforce, the lack ofjob opportunities, the precariousness andinstability of employment, the broadening

Graphic No. 2Graphic No. 2Graphic No. 2Graphic No. 2Graphic No. 2GrGrGrGrGrowth of GDPowth of GDPowth of GDPowth of GDPowth of GDP, % P, % P, % P, % P, % Public Debt to GDPublic Debt to GDPublic Debt to GDPublic Debt to GDPublic Debt to GDP, Spending on Social Pr, Spending on Social Pr, Spending on Social Pr, Spending on Social Pr, Spending on Social Programs Military and Social Contrograms Military and Social Contrograms Military and Social Contrograms Military and Social Contrograms Military and Social Control 1979-2004ol 1979-2004ol 1979-2004ol 1979-2004ol 1979-2004

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: GDP growth: Dane; Military spending, social control, social spending and public debt : MinHacienda, Presupuesto General de la Nación. CálculosLibardo Sarmiento Anzola.

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91Needs and Rights

and intensification of the exploitation of la-bor, the high taxes imposed by the Stateon goods for consumption, the acceleratedrise in prices of goods and basic services,and the concentration of income andwealth.

� Social spending partially compensates theeffects of the Colombian approach to de-velopment, which generates exclusion andpolarization, but does not resolve the struc-tural issues of poverty and inequity. Pover-ty by income shows slight improvementduring periods of increased social spending,coupled with economic growth and the gen-eration of employment. Nevertheless, so-cial spending is an adjustment variable, re-sidual and cyclical, dependent on theeconomic cycle, budgetary constraints andthe priorities assigned to hegemonic publicpolicies, which also include: economic ap-erture and capital subsidies, the prosecu-tion of the war, the maintenance of socialcontrol, markets, privatization, fiscal adjust-ment and the payment of debt, (see illus-tration 2).

� In the year 2004, Colombia has 45.3 mil-lion inhabitants. It is a highly polarized soci-ety. While three out of every four citizensare marginalized and live in conditions ofpoverty, another 25% enjoys an opulent lif-estyle and reaps the benefits of the devel-opment approach. This situation explainsthe perennial sociopolitical conflict. Themiddle class tends to disappear in all this.The situation is constant, as evidenced bythe conditions of poverty and inequality inthe period of 2001-2004, according to thedata produced by the Continuous surveyof Homes undertaken by the Dane (illustra-tions 1 and 2).

� The monthly value of the poverty line perindividual, equivalent to the minimum costof a basket of goods and basic services, grewfrom $219,017 in 2001 to $282,486 in

2004, that is, by 29%. On a national level,during the last four years the number ofpersons with income below the value of thepoverty line grew by 10.5% moving from30.5 million to 33.7 million. The incidenceof poverty (the number of people living con-ditions of poverty as related to the overallpopulation) in 2001 was 74.6%. By 2002, ithad grown to 77.9% (under the Pastranaadministration), it dropped in 2003 to76.8%, and in 2004 it rises once again to77.3% (under the Uribe administration).

� The monthly value of the line of indigence,equivalent to the value of a basket of food-stuffs of minimum cost that meets basic nu-tritional requirements, grew from $81,957in 2001 to $105,909 in 2004. During thistime, the number of individuals that can-not provide for their basic nutrition grewby 13.7%; in absolute figures the numberof people going hungry grew from 16.6 mil-lion to 18.9 million. The incidence of indi-gence, as related to the total populationgrew from 40.7% to 43.4% between 2001and 2002. (Pastrana administration); it roseto 44.5% in 2003 and once again estab-lished itself at 43.4% during the first trimes-ter of 2004 (Uribe administration).

� The accelerated growth of indigents (a sub-group of the poor) means that the middleclass and the poor are growing poorer, andthat the rate of population growth is higherin populations that live in conditions of in-digence. Nevertheless, the lowering levelsof unemployment and assistance programstargeted at the poorest segments of thepopulation have managed to slightly breakin 2004 the trend of increasing indigenceregistered from 2001-2003.

� Even the total all income was equally dis-tributed among the entire population, theindividual share would not surpass the pov-erty line; on average it reaches 90% of thisindicator. This implies that, while redistri-bution of income is necessary, it is not a

92 Needs and Rights

sufficient measure, and it would be neces-sary to increase the average income in Co-lombia, particularly that of those who suf-fer in conditions of poverty and indigence.It is important to bear in mind that theDane�s Continuous Survey of Homes doesnot capture the income of wealthy capital-ists. The maximum level of income regis-tered does not exceed $20 million monthly,and as such, redistribution schemes havebroad room for maneuver within strategiesfor the reduction of poverty.

� The relationship between the average in-come of those who are not poor with theaverage income of the poor is 6.2 times.With respect to indigents it is 11.6 times ashigh. Inequality grew significantly during2002, when the former relation grew to 7.1and the latter to 13.6 times.

� While the monthly values of the lines of in-digence and poverty grew by 29% in thefirst quarter of 2001-2004, in the same pe-riod the average income per capita of thepoor grew by 24.7%, (from $88,148 to$109,904). The average income per capitaof indigents rose by 27.5% (from $46,402to $59,177).

� Consequently, the inadequacy of the incomeof the poor with respect to the value of abasket of basic consumption moved from59.8% to 61.1% from 2001 to 2004. Theinadequacy of the income of indigents re-garding the value of a basket of foodstuffsalso rose from 43.4% to 44.1%. The impactof poverty and indigence is growing, and assuch the living conditions of the poor andindigent have deteriorated.

� The simultaneous effect of the growth ofpoverty and indigence, on the one hand,and the widening of the gap between theincome of the poor and indigent as relatedto the values of the poverty and indigencelines on the other, during the period from

2001-2004 implies an increase in the inten-sity of both poverty and indigence. The in-tensity of poverty is the relation betweenthe number of poor and indigent with re-spect to the total population, multiplied bythe level of insufficiency. In this period theintensity of poverty grew from 44.6% to47.2%, and the intensity of indigence from17.7% to 19.1%.

� In 2001, 74.6% of Colombians found them-selves in conditions of poverty, and their in-come was the equivalent of 43.4% of theaverage income of the total population; in2004, the incidence of poverty grows to77.3% and the average income of the poorcomes to 46.3% of that of the total popula-tion. The average income, its distributionand poverty exhibit structural behavior; thegap between the income of the poor andindigent and the general average grows, giv-en that in values absolute and relative thedegree of incidence grows equally.

� In 2004, the insufficient income of the poorwith respect to the total income of the pop-ulation is 54.1%; in the case of indigence it is8.2%. Consequently, in the absence of poli-cies of redistribution, the income of Colom-bian households would have to grow in theseproportions in order to overcome the socialills of poverty and indigence.

� With regard to the average income of thosewho are not poor, the insufficiency of thepoor and indigent is equivalent in 2004 to82.5% and 9.2%, respectively. As such, apolicy of redistribution aiming at overcom-ing the problem of indigence is more feasi-ble in the short term; overcoming povertywould require a greater period of time andimply combining redistribution with eco-nomic growth and effective social policies.

� The fourfold rural crisis � war, poverty, re-cession and massive imports of food � hasresulted in the intensification of migration

93Needs and Rights

to urban areas over the course of the lasttwo decades. 3.5 million people have beendisplaced by the violence up to the year2004. The urban population has grown atan annual rate of 2.45%; the rural rate at0.51%. Currently, 73.3% of the populationinhabits municipal centers. As such, pover-ty and indigence, in both absolute and rela-tive terms, are becoming growing and pri-marily urban phenomena.

� The concentration of income is another faceof poverty. The levels of concentration inColombia are among the highest in LatinAmerica. The inequality is present both atthe level of the individual wage earner aswell ason the level of a household (on aver-age, the poor have more children). On a na-tional level, the index measuring the con-centration of income, (Gini) of householdsgrew from 0.524 (The range of the indexgoes from zero to one, and the closer toone the greater the concentration) to 0.545between 2001 and 2002 (Pastrana admin-istration); between 2003 and 2004 the sit-uation of inequality improved slightly, regis-tering indices of 0.518 and 0.516respectively. This mild improvement in dis-tribution is the result of the impoverishmentof the middle class, the growth of (low qual-ity) employment and the targeting of socialspending towards indigent sectors.

� In rural areas, the degree of inequality isgreater than in urban spheres. In 2004 theindex measuring inequality among house-holds is 0.495, in municipal centers and0.532 in the rest of the areas.

� The levels of incidences of poverty and in-digence are slightly higher in women thanin men, from 2001 to 2004. During this pe-riod, the incidence of poverty among wom-en showed sustained growth, from 75.1%to 78.1%; the incidence of indigence grewfrom 41.3% to 43.6%. Among men, the in-cidence of poverty was 74% in 2001 and

76.5% in 2004; indigence rose from 40.1%y 43.1%. During this period the incidenceof poverty among women worsens at amore accelerated pace than that amongmen. (3 points of growth for the former, 2.5points for the latter). Conversely, the situa-tion inverts itself with regards to indigence,which grows with greater speed amongmenthan women. (3 points compared with 2.5).This trend is due to the broken homes gen-erated by social ills, together with the great-er cultural and economic difficulties facedby men in the generation of income.

� The gap between the income of women andmen broadens during the 2001-2004 time-frame. The relation between the average in-come of women to the average income ofmen improved between 2001 and 2003,moving from 71.7% in 2001 to 76.1% in2002 and 80.8% in 2003. In 2004, the rela-tion once again worsens, as the ratio dropsto 69.7%. The notably inferior remunerationobtained by women when compared to menis the product of a triple inequality: they tendto hold jobs with lower qualifications, theyplay a stronger role in the informal employ-ment sector, and they are subject to discrim-ination. The reigning economicmodel,more-over, generates greater demand for theemployment of women, but under precari-ous and unstable conditions.

� The inequality in the distribution of incomeamong women is less than that of men. Inthe former, the inequality index �Gini� reg-isters a value of 0.498 in 2004; in the latter,0.525. Bearing in mind the similar levels ofpoverty among men and women, the great-er inequality among men can be explainedby significantly higher incomes in the high-er socioeconomic strata. The greater equi-ty among women is the result of a structur-al condition characterized by lower income.

� In summary, the public policies undertakenduring the years 2001-2004 have not tack-

94 Needs and Rights

led the social malady that generates thegrave problems of poverty, indigence, andinequality. Public policies operate as simplepalliatives of the structural effects of exclu-sion and injustice which are generated bythe system and the style of Colombian de-velopment. Following tradition, the focus ofsocial policy has returned to providing as-sistance to the poorest of the poor, whilethe ruling class continues to believe thatonly economic growth will resolve societiesvarious ailments.

UNIVERSALIZING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL ANDCULTURAL RIGHTS

Two distinct paradigms of social public policyare facing Colombia today. On the one handthere is a conception based on protection andtargeting the poorest of the poor, while on theother hand there is a constitutional perspectivethat seeks to promote economic, social andcultural rights and their universalization. Is it fea-sible to attempt to universalize economic, so-cial and cultural rights in the current Colombiancontext? What follows is a calculation of the val-ue of universalizing basic economic social andcultural rights, taking into account the currentdeficits in six priority areas, in terms of increasein social spending (illustration 3).

Social spending as related to GDP can bedivided into three phases in Colombian history:1) before the Constitution of 1991 it oscillatedbetween 6% and 8% of GDP; 2) with the consti-tutional commitments acquired by the state re-garding social rights, social spending rose in the1990�s to reach 16%; 3) beginning with the eco-nomic recession of 1998, together with the pri-ority given to fiscal adjustments, the paymentof public debt and the financing of the war, so-cial spending drops repeatedly until it reaches10.4% of GDP in 2004.

The universalization of Economic Social andCultural rights in six priority areas implies increas-ing social spending by 13.6% of 2004�s GDP. Insum, it would require a social investment of 24%

of GDP, a percentage similar to that spent byother Latin American countries, such as Brazil,Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Pan-amá. With institutional reforms that improve theefficiency and effectiveness of social spending,these figures could be substantially reduced.Gradual universalization, the selection and tar-geting of populations and the reduction of prior-ity areas are other alternatives.

The State appropriates a third of the wealthgenerated by the Colombian population. Thegeneral budget for state expenditures grew from$62.9 billion in 2002 to $76.7 billion in 2004.According to the objectives of expenditures, in2004 the Colombian State oriented 60% of itsresources towards: the payment of public debt,(37%), defense and social control (16%) andadministration, economic regulation and insti-tutional control (7%). The remaining 40% areallocated to meeting the obligations of the So-cial and democratic rule of law, to the repro-duction of the workforce and to assistance forthe accumulation of capital. The redistributionof public spending, prioritizing the fulfillment ofthe requirements of the Social and democraticrule of law, and the reproduction of the work-force is viable, and would not generate signifi-cant fiscal pressure. Everything depends on theperspective taken on society, on the availabilityof political will and on the social forces thatmight transform the development style, thenature and the functions undertaken by theColombian Government.

95Needs and Rights

96 Needs and Rights

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: Continued survey of homes, average January-March of 2001-2004. Statistical process: Emperatriz Becerra Aponte. Design and Calculation:Libardo Sarmiento Anzola

Poverty, Indigence and Inequality Indicators Symbol Formula Population Poor Indigents

National Total

Total Population (thousands) n 43.071Average Montly Income of the population ($) m* Total Income/n 203.144Monthly Value of the Poverty and Indigence Lines ($) z 219.017 81.957

Relation between the average income of the population and the value of the poverty and indigence lines K m*/z 0,9 2,5Number of persons living in poverty and indigence conditions (thousands) q 30.501 16.641Average monthly Income of the poor and indigents ($) m 88.148 46.402Average monthly income of the non-poor ($) m** 540.568

Relation between the average monthly income of the non-poor and the average income of the poor and the indigent R* m**/m 6,1 11,6Incidence of poverty H q/n 74,6% 40,7%Income insufficiency of the poor and the indigent I q(z-m)/qz 59,8% 43,4%Intensity of Poverty P HI 44,6% 17,7%Average Income of the poor in relation to the average income of the population R m/m* 43,4% 22,8%Insufficienty of Income of the poor in relation to the average income of the population M q(z-m)/nm* 45,6% 6,8%Insufficienty of Income of the poor in relation to the income of the non-poor F q(z-m)/(nm*-qm) 65,9% 7,4%

Urban Population

Total population (thousands) n 31.010Average monthly income of the population m* Ingreso total/n 175.560Monthly Value of the Poverty and Indigence Lines z 219.017,4 81.957,0

Relation between the averge income of the population and the value of the poverty and indigence lines K m*/z 0,8 2,1Number of persons living in poverty and indigence conditions (thousands) q 23.550 12.393Average monthly income of the poor and the indigent m 90.500 47.659Average monthly income of the non-poor m** 516.270

Relation between the average income of the non-poor and the average income of the poor and the indigent R* m**/m 5,7 10,8Incidence of porverty H q/n 80,0% 42,1%Insufficient Income of the poor and the indigent person I q(z-m)/qz 58,7% 41,8%Intensity of poverty P HI 46,9% 17,6%Average Income of the poor in relation to the average income of the population R m/m* 51,5% 27,1%Insufficient Income of the poor in relation to the total income M q(z-m)/nm* 55,6% 7,8%Insufficient Income of the poor in relation to the income of the non-poor F q(z-m)/(nm*-qm) 91,4% 8,8%

Rural Population

Total Population n 12.061

Average monthly income of the population m* Ingreso total/n 274.891

Monthly value of the poverty and indigence lines z 219.017,4 81.957,0

Relation between the average income of the population and the value of the poverty and indigence lines K m*/zNumber of persons living in conditions of poverty and indigence (thousands) q 6.938 4.225Average monthly income of the poor and the indigent m 81.025 42.767Average monthly income of the non-poor m** 573.488

Relarion between the average income of the non-poor and the average income or the poor and the indigent R* m**/m 7,1 13,4Incidence of porverty H q/n 60,6% 36,9%Insufficient income by poor or indigent person I q(z-m)/qz 63,0% 47,8%Intensity of poverty P HI 38,2% 17,6%Average Income of the poor in relation to the average income of the population R m/m* 29,5% 15,6%Income Insufficiency of the poor in relation to the total income M q(z-m)/nm* 28,9% 5,0%Insufficiency income of the poor in relation to the income of the non-poor F q(z-m)/(nm*-qm) 34,8% 5,3%

2001

TTTTTable No 1able No 1able No 1able No 1able No 1PPPPPoveroveroveroverover tytytytyty, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004

97Needs and Rights

Population Poor Indigents Population Poor Indigents Population Poor Indigents

43.834 44.584 45.320

217.988 224.461 237.330

236.384 88.521 262.671 98.241 282.486 105.909

0,9 2,5 0,9 2,3 0,8 2,2

34.155 19.011 32.917 19.073 33.696 18.918

92.540 48.603 101.272 55.219 109.904 59.177

660.685 631.418 671.794

7,1 13,6 6,2 11,4 6,1 11,4

77,9% 43,4% 76,8% 44,5% 77,3% 43,4%

60,9% 45,1% 61,4% 43,8% 61,1% 44,1%

47,4% 19,6% 47,2% 19,5% 47,2% 19,1%

42,5% 22,3% 45,1% 24,6% 46,3% 24,9%

51,4% 7,9% 53,1% 8,2% 54,1% 8,2%

76,8% 8,8% 79,6% 9,2% 82,5% 9,2%

31.875 32.546 33.209

194.704 197.973 213.990

236.384,4 88.521,3 262.671,3 98.240,8 282.486,3 105.908,8

0,8 2,2 0,8 2,0 0,8 2,0

25.691 14.025 25.437 14.705 26.033 14.534

93.795 49.422 101.994 55.832 111.046 59.866

614.027 616.221 667.485

6,5 12,4 6,0 11,0 6,0 11,1

80,6% 44,0% 81,3% 47,0% 81,5% 45,5%

60,3% 44,2% 61,2% 43,2% 60,7% 43,5%

48,6% 19,4% 49,7% 20,3% 49,5% 19,8%

48,2% 25,4% 51,5% 28,2% 51,9% 28,0%

59,0% 8,8% 63,4% 9,7% 62,8% 9,4%

96,5% 9,9% 106,2% 11,1% 105,9% 10,7%

11.959 12.038 12.111

280.145 294.643 297.307

236.384,4 88.521,3 262.671,3 98.240,8 282.486,3 105.908,8

8.462 4.985 7.603 4.375 7.758 4.438

88.723 46.294 98.866 53.203 106.312 57.067

743.305 652.677 677.924

8,4 16,1 6,6 12,3 6,4 11,9

70,8% 41,7% 65,7% 37,8% 66,6% 38,1%

62,5% 47,7% 62,4% 45,8% 62,4% 46,1%

44,2% 19,9% 41,0% 17,3% 41,5% 17,6%

31,7% 16,5% 33,6% 18,1% 35,8% 19,2%

37,3% 6,3% 35,1% 5,6% 38,0% 6,0%48,1% 6,7% 44,6% 5,9% 49,2% 6,5%

2002 2003 2004

TTTTTable No 1able No 1able No 1able No 1able No 1PPPPPoveroveroveroverover tytytytyty, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004, Indigence and Insuficcient Income: Colombia 2001-2004

98 Needs and Rights

TTTTTable No. 2able No. 2able No. 2able No. 2able No. 2PPPPPoveroveroveroverover tytytytyty, Inequality, Inequality, Inequality, Inequality, Inequality, National and accor, National and accor, National and accor, National and accor, National and according to sex.Colombia, 2001-2004ding to sex.Colombia, 2001-2004ding to sex.Colombia, 2001-2004ding to sex.Colombia, 2001-2004ding to sex.Colombia, 2001-2004

Country Total Urban Rural Country Total Urban Rural Country Total Urban Rural Country Total Urban Rural

Country Total

Number of poor P.L % 25,4 20,0 39,4 22,1 19,4 29,2 23,2 18,7 35,3 22,7 18,5 33,4

Poor P.L. % 74,6 80,0 60,6 77,9 80,6 70,8 76,8 81,3 65,7 77,3 81,5 66,6

Indigents P.L. % 40,7 42,1 36,9 43,4 44,0 41,7 44,5 47,0 37,8 43,4 45,5 38,1

Average Monthly Income ($) percipient 546.625 444.058 807.961 576.699 488.015 821.631 589.698 495.732 837.129 609.804 525.447 819.284

Concentration (Gini) percipient 0,529 0,478 0,560 0,549 0,510 0,603 0,517 0,482 0,554 0,517 0,480 0,556

Domestic concentration index (Gini) 0,524 0,487 0,541 0,545 0,516 0,587 0,518 0,489 0,548 0,516 0,495 0,532

Female

Non-poor % 24,9 20,1 38,3 21,8 19,6 28,1 22,7 18,9 33,6 21,9 18,5 31,8

Poor PL % 75,1 79,9 61,7 78,2 80,4 71,9 77,3 81,1 66,4 78,1 81,5 68,2

Indigent % 41,3 42,4 37,5 43,8 44,1 43,1 44,8 46,7 39,2 43,6 45,4 38,5

Average monthly income ($) percipient 441.641 406.478 595.373 485.229 438.784 693.429 476.659 438.782 624.917 484.303 455.363 603.218

Concentration Index(Gini) 0,503 0,483 0,539 0,535 0,510 0,579 0,498 0,478 0,540 0,498 0,478 0,540

Male

Non- poor % 26,0 19,8 40,3 22,4 19,2 30,3 23,8 18,4 37,1 23,5 18,5 34,9

Poor P.L. % 74,0 80,2 59,7 77,6 80,8 69,7 76,2 81,6 62,9 76,5 81,5 65,1

Indigent % 40,1 41,6 36,4 42,9 43,9 40,4 44,1 47,2 36,4 43,1 45,5 37,7

Average Monthly income ($) percipient 615.887 474.863 883.640 637.617 527.518 870.085 589.698 543.159 930.552 695.194 584.381 901.673

Concetration Index (Gini) 0,541 0,479 0,557 0,553 0,503 0,610 0,525 0,484 0,553 0,525 0,484 0,554

% average income female/ average

income male 71,7% 85,6% 67,4% 76,1% 83,2% 79,7% 80,8% 80,8% 67,2% 69,7% 77,9% 66,9%

2001 2002 2003 2004

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: Continued home survey, average January - March 2001-2004. Stadistical process: Emperatriz Becerra Aponte; Calculation: Libardo SarmientoAnzola

Priority Area ESCR Population in Deficif Annual Cost per unity ($)Total Cost $

millions

% in Relation to GDP

2.004 (estimated in

$250.281.000 millions)

Education

1.123.034children and young

between 5 and 18 years of age

that do not attend any school,

June -2004

$1.100.000 Annual per capita cost paid to

schools under concession.1.235.338 0,5

Health15.019.622 persons not covered

by any regime. April - 2004

$191.821 Annual payment per unit for training

on the subsidy regime.2.881.079 1,2

Housing469.547 with too many

inhabitants ( june 2004)

Subsidy 33% of value of a social interest home

minimal cost ($22,6 million), that is $7,5

million

3.521.603 1,4

Citizen Income

unemployement Subsidy or

employment program

2.762.000 unemployed. May

2004

60% of the value of the present minimum

salary, including overheads (1.503): $322.780

per month $3.873.360 per annum.

10.698.220 4,3

Nutrition18.918.000 persons living in

indigency. April 2004

Monthly value of the indigent line $105.909.

Indigents insufficient income 44,1%. Monthly

income required to reach the value of the food

basket $46.706. Annual income required per

indigent person $560.470.

10.602.972 4,2

Public home facilities2.481.227 homes lacking basic

facilities. March 2004

Cost of connection per home $2,1 million does

not include net extension)5.210.568 2,1

Total 26.506.499 13,6

TTTTTable No. 3able No. 3able No. 3able No. 3able No. 3Colombia: Cost estimate of the univezalization of the ESCR in dix priority areas in 2004Colombia: Cost estimate of the univezalization of the ESCR in dix priority areas in 2004Colombia: Cost estimate of the univezalization of the ESCR in dix priority areas in 2004Colombia: Cost estimate of the univezalization of the ESCR in dix priority areas in 2004Colombia: Cost estimate of the univezalization of the ESCR in dix priority areas in 2004

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source:Deficit estimated in the quality of life survey 2003. DANE, adjusted in base of the execution of the National Development Plan. May2004. Reports of NPD, except unemployment rate: DANE, Conitnued home survey: and indigence according to calculations of TableNo. 1 Cost per unit according to expected results for 2004

99Needs and Rights

Education: Equity Is Notthe Priority*

T

INTRODUCTION

�Education is a fundamental human right,inherent to human dignity, necessary to thefree development of the personality. It deter-mines the possibilities to access and realizeother human rights. Education is necessaryto join and engage in collective cultural andsocial activities and to obtain dignified work.Social division and poverty are closely rela-ted to problems in ensuring the right to edu-cation and the conditions for its fulfill-ment.�1

his report analyzes some aspects ofcompliance with and the status ofthe right to education in Colombiatwo years after the implementationof the Education Revolution out-lined in Alvaro Uribe Vélez govern-

ment�s National Development Plan.

Corporation �Región�Lina Correa, Ramón Moncada

y Jaime Saldarriaga

Three methodological instruments wereused to assemble the information for the report:a compilation and analysis of articles from thenational print media on educational issues (July2003 to April 2004); an inventory and analysisof jurisprudence from the Constitutional Court(January 2003 to April 2004); and an analysis ofthe education legislation (laws, decrees, resolu-tions andministerial directives) issued during thisperiod.

The analysis uses the framework of rightsand obligations known as the 4As that was de-veloped by Katarina Tomasevski, the UN SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Education. The sche-ma examines education in light of the obliga-

* This document incorporates information collected by Oscar Gallo,Jaime Agudelo, and Alejandra García. June 2004.

1 Colombian Platform for Human Rights, Democracy, and Develop-ment, �National Campaign for the Right to Education: Presentation ofthe Campaign� (in Spanish), Bogotá, 2004. See website: http://www.plataforma-colombiana.org/.

100 Needs and Rights

tions enshrined in the International Covenanton Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:2

1) Available: the system has an adequate bud-get, the necessary schools and teachers, andthe pertinent infrastructure and equipment;

2) Accessible: education should be free ofcharge, economically and materially withinthe means of families, and schools shouldbe geographically accessible;

3) Adaptable: the curriculum and the educa-tion on offer should be relevant to the spe-cific context and populations served; and

4) Acceptable: the quality of education impart-ed should be related to the needs, interestsand expectations of the different commu-nities and populations served.

Given the need for brevity in the report, wewill emphasize those aspects that we considerto be most relevanct.

Key resources for the study include the Na-tional Development Plan Hacia un Estado Comu-nitario [Toward a Community State]; the reportby the UN Special Rapporteur The Right to Educa-tion in Colombia (February 2004); and the reportEl Disfrute del Derecho a la Educación en Colombia(Enjoyment of the Right to Education), preparedby the Colombian Platform for Human Rights,Democracy, and Development as part of theNational Campaign for the Right to Educationthat has been underway since September 2003.

AVAILABLE EDUCATION

Educational Expansion Insufficient ToMeetDemand

There are more than 100 million boys andgirls in the world who are not attending school.According to data from the Ministry of Educa-tion, in February 2004 there were still around1.8 million girls and boys who were not in schoolin Colombia.3 Figures from the Project Edu-cación Compromiso de Todos [Education: Ev-eryone�s Responsibility] point out that there is a

shortfall of approximately 1.9 million places inthe system needed to accommodate Colombi-an boys, girls, and young people in the levelspre-school to middle school.4

Government is under the obligation to en-sure that the number of places is equal to thenumber of school-age children at the level ofbasic education; therefore, the government�sgoals for coverage must treat this as a priority.The Ministry of Education points out that477,598 new places were added in 2003. It isparadoxical then that in February 2004, thenumber of out-of-school children had not di-minished, and the same figure laid out in theNational Development Plan continues to be cit-ed. One of the explanations could be the issueof school dropout �no adequate strategy hasyet been devised to confront the problem. De-spite their obligations and the assessment men-tioned above, the goals proposed by the Edu-cation Revolution are unchanged: 1.5 millionnew places added over the four-year term.

The main strategy used to create new plac-es has been the rationalization of existing re-sources. While there may have been some justi-fication for some of the actions undertaken, wethink that the strategy reached the limits of itsusefulness some time ago. To continue to insiston it jeopardizes the quality of education due tothe overcrowding in many educational institu-tions. Therefore, it is necessary to accept therecommendations of UNESCO and the UN Spe-cial Rapporteur to increase the investment ineducation from 4 percent to 6 percent of theGross Domestic Product (GDP). The policy forfinancing this required coverage over the medi-um term has been unclear. The resources aresubject to the fiscal constraints of the state andto a prioritization of spending and investmentthat leaves less and less margin for spending onthe social sectors.

2 The covenant was adopted in Colombia by means of Law 74 of 1968.3 �This year 370,000 places will be added,� El Colombiano, 18 January

2004, p. 6A.4 Sources include DANE, Population Projections; Ministry of Educa-

tion, data on enrollment by level, Forms C-600.

101Needs and Rights

On the other hand, the limit established inBill 01 of 2001 (increasing transfer payments by2 percent) was a disadvantage because it pre-cluded the possibility of obtaining additional re-sources in proportion with economic growth andrecovery (the economy grew 3.7 percent in2003)5. In addition, the system adopted to ef-fect the transfer payments to territorial entities�a per capita payment based on enrollment�has led to misunderstandings. Some municipal-ities have seen their resources cut back, or theydo not understand the basis on which the re-sources are assigned relative to other munici-palities in the same category with similar char-acteristics. The continuous governmentinsistence on revising the current transfer pay-ment scheme increases the uncertainty6.

The availability of education turns out tobe more inequitable in the rural sector. Accord-ing to the Quality of Life Survey conducted in2003, people who live in the countryside con-tinue to be at a disadvantage compared to citydwellers. Nine out of 10 urban children andyoung people between the ages 5 and 15 at-tend school. In rural areas barely eight of 10 doso. The differences are still more pronounced inthe youth population: in the cities seven of 10youths aged 16-17 attend school, but in the ruralareas only four have that opportunity.5

An example of the situation for rural youngpeople and children is found in a report thatreached the National Campaign for the Right toEducation in May 2004. Inhabitants of the ham-lets of El Venado, Murmullo Medio and Quebra-da Linda, in Tierralta municipality, Cordoba De-partment, described the situation of educationin this forgotten part of the country. For the pasttwo years no teachers have been appointed toserve their schools, and there are no education-al provisions for more than 200 boys and girls.

Schools in the Crossfire

The availability of places and schools hasalso been affected by the armed conflict and itsconsequences, the actions taken by the differ-ent armed actors and the forced displacement

of millions of Colombians. The education reportby the Colombian Platform on Human Rights,Democracy and Development points out thatbetween July 1996 and June 2003 at least 71educational establishments were affected by thearmed conflict.7

The situation in Antioquia Department is oneexample:

Some years ago Granada had 5,600 stu-dents, now there are about 2,593 as a result ofpopulation displacement. Teacher placementsfor the area dropped from 186 to 111. In SanCarlos, five rural schools opened but 20 are notoperating, basically due to public order prob-lems. In Dabeiba there are 12 schools closedtoday, due to insecurity or lack of students.�8

We want to highlight the investment priorityestablished in Resolution 277 of 17 February2003, which was adopted in order to earmarkthe resources established by Law 21 of 1982 forthe reconstruction of schools affected by thearmed conflict. However, the co-financing re-quired of municipalities (the majority have fewresources), and the obligation to participate in acompetitive process to obtain them, has becomean obstacle to the stated aim of the resolution.

ACCESSIBLE EDUCATION

Equity, Investment and the Principle of FreeEducation

The socioeconomic conditions of the ma-jority of Colombian families pose significant chal-lenges to enrolling and keeping their children inthe educational system. Enrollment fees, theabsence of subsidies for the poorest groups, and

5 Figures taken from DANE, Quality of Life Survey 2003.6 Ibid.7 �El Disfrute del Derecho a la Educación en Colombia (October 2003en

) p. 43. Internet publication http://www.plataforma-colombiana.org/biblioteca%20pag/045.pdf.

8 �Paola A. Cardona Tobón, �Hay áreas rurales donde la alegría se fuehace mucho,� El Colombiano, Docencia y Educación section, Martes6 April 2004.

102 Needs and Rights

the limited programs designed to alleviate theburden of educational expenses on the familybudget explain in great part the only partial gainsachieved through policies on educational cov-erage and the persistent dropout problem.

Colombia�s lack of compliance with its in-ternational obligations with respect to free ba-sic education has been pointed out by the UNSpecial Rapporteur on the Right to Education.The report highlights the fact that Colombia,according to the World Bank, is the only coun-try of the region where primary education is notfree, and it also states that �if access to educa-tion is dependent on the payment of fees, theneducation as a human right does not exist.� TheUNHCR�s Report on the Human Rights Situation inColombia of 17 February 2004 points out that�During 2003 ... the educational system contin-ued to be inequitable and did not ensure theright to free basic primary education.�9

The annual enrollment fees range between22,000 and 205,000 pesos for pre-school andprimary levels in Antioquia Department; middleschool charges vary from 66,500 to 267,000pesos per year.10 In ChocóDepartment, the headof the technical-pedagogical unit of the Officeof the Secretary of Education states that �in therural area they charge the minimum amountbecause the people cannot pay.� A thick bluefolder holds the reports on those who did notpay for school registration in 2003.11 The Min-ister of Education said that that �in her opinion,education is free. Really what the children pay isvery little.�12

There are municipal initiatives that recog-nize that to access and remain in the educa-tional system depends on education being freeof charge. These initiatives include the subsidi-zation of a number of different elements of theeducation budget. Such initiatives have beentried in cities like Bucaramanga and in the mu-nicipalities of Támesis, Sabaneta, and Tarso, inAntioquia Department. These efforts are beingpunished and restricted by Ministerial DirectiveNo. 4 of 27 March 2003, which states that theresources that the official state educational es-tablishments cease to receive in enrollment fees

�because the territorial entities have decreedthat education is free� cannot be replaced withthose coming from the system of general allo-cations.

Experiences in other parts of Latin Americasuggest alternatives to promote accessibility.These include the Bolsa Escola [School BursariesFund] in Brazil, or the programs developed bythe National Council for the Promotion of Edu-cation (Conafe) in Mexico, among others, whichtry to stimulate access to education for low-in-come families and groups that face high levelsof social exclusion, by providing financial incen-tives, school textbooks, and other educationalexpenses. These are reducing the dropout rate,illiteracy, and child labor.13

ACCEPTABLE EDUCATION

Colombia�s Education for All report (2000) pointsout that the quality of education must be ex-amined from three angles:

1) The conditions in which learning takes place,reflected in school buildings, the availabilityof materials and texts, the continuous andtimely presence of qualified instructionalstaff, and the existence of support servicesfor the student body according to theirneeds;

2) Learning outcomes, or the satisfaction ofbasic knowledge needs as they are definedin the educational context of the country;

9 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rightson the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, February 2004. E/CN.4/2004/13. UN Commission on Human Rights. The Right to Education,Report Submitted by Katarina Tomasevski, Special Rapporteur, Adden-dum Mission to Colombia (1-10 October 2003). E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.2. 17 February 2004.

10 Paola A. Cardona Tobón, �Educación gratuita no es un sueño imposi-ble,� El Colombiano, Sunday 7 December 2003.

11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 To learn more about these experiences see Ana Maria. de Andraca,

Buenas Prácticas para mejorar la educación en América Latina (Preal,2003).

103Needs and Rights

3) The distribution of these outcomes in thepopulation, that is the degree to whichchildren and young people, independent oftheir social or cultural background, achievethe objectives of education for all.14

A central strategy of the Education Revolu-tion is to stimulate quality in education throughthe implementation of competency testing andthe development of standards for these compe-tencies. This has been quite controversial. Thoseopposing the policy argue that it tends to es-tablish a single, centralized definition of stan-dards that does not take into account legitimateissues of cultural variance or appropriation ofthe curriculum and that quality must be linkedto particularities, expectations, cultures, andactivities in the regions, communities, and learn-ers. So, it is argued, quality is not just a demandfactor or something that can be measured ex-ternally. Nor is it the outcome of national or tran-snational unified standards. This transnationalstandard-setting has been linked to the futuredemands of trade agreements that the UnitedStates is promoting with the Free Trade Area ofthe Americas (FTAA) and other bilateral tradeagreements, in which education is conceived ofas a service and a good that can be exchangedin the marketplace.

On this point, and from the perspective ofthe right to education, we think it is necessaryfor the educational system to guarantee thedevelopment of the basic skills, knowledge, andtools needed for individual and collective devel-opment with equity, the full exercise of citizen-ship, and the means to take advantage of eco-nomic and cultural goods. But acceptabilitymustgo hand in hand with adaptability; that is, it mustinclude diversity, and individual, local, and com-munity interests and activities.

Given that the current emphasis is on eval-uation, we believe that what is lacking is a com-prehensive policy on quality. Such a policy wouldincorporate teacher training, a strengthened in-stitutional educational plan in local context, theexistence of sufficient and relevant teachingmaterials and texts, the development of an ade-

quate infrastructure, connections to comple-mentary nutrition and health programs, and thelinkage of education plans to processes for localand regional development. Placing the empha-sis on instruments for measurement is an ap-proach that has its limitations; it cannot be ex-pected that in and of themselves these willimprove quality.

Working with the Bare Necessities

In the report collected from the media, weencountered schools that lack the basic toolsfor learning and others that have serious infra-structural deficiencies, as seen in the followingcases:

The community in the hamlet of Pance,close to Cali, has been struggling for 35 years tomake the San Francisco school a decent placefor their boys and girls to study. The construc-tion of the school began three years ago, andthe job has still not officially been finished anddelivered. But that is not all � there is now onlyone primary teacher for 48 children, whose gradelevels extend from transition year to fifth grade.All of the children have class at the same timeand in the same room. The teacher�s contracthas already expired, and the former teacher wastransferred along with the official posting. So,the chances for a good education for these littleones are becoming more and more remote.�15

The Bogota newspaper El Tiempo ran a se-ries of articles in July 2004 on improvisedschools; a water tank, the stands of a stadium,a dance floor, a wooden shelter, and outsideunder the trees are some of the locations ofclassrooms in cities like Medellín, Barranquilla,Santa Marta, Valledupar, and Armenia. Many ofColombia�s boys and girls are studying in a sim-ilar situation.16

14 Internet: www.reduc.cl. Documento RAE 08.506-00. Programa �Edu-cación para Todos�: Evaluación del año 2000 � Informe de Colombia

15 Report transcribed from a program aired on Telepacifico, 4 May2004.

16 Juan David Correa, �Galería de Colegios insólitos,� published in ElTiempo on Sunday 11 July 2004.

104 Needs and Rights

The World Week of Action for Education washeld 19-24 April 2004 as part of the ColombianCampaign for the Right to Education. During thatweek, Colombian boys and girls wrote to thepresident of the country, to the minister of edu-cation, and to the local secretaries of educationto express their views on specific problems thataffect the quality of education and the life of astudent. Here is an example of a letter composedin Puerto Wilches, Santander:

Mr. President. We are writing to you to askyou to ensure that we have the right to educa-tion, providing uswith the necessary tools to havean education that suits the times. We are askingyou to take care of our needs for teaching mate-rials, audiovisual aids, and computer rooms assoon as possible. Mr. President, we are hopingthat very soon therewill be no difference betweenthose who study in the big cities, in the public orin private schools, that all can have what theyneed for a good education. As children we havemany dreams, among them that all of us arestudying, that all of us arewell-nourished, healthy,and have a decent place to live.

Educational Quality, Evaluation and Teachers�DeterioratingWorking Conditions

The professional work of teachers is one ofthe factors associated with educational quality.The intention of the national government is toimprove quality by establishing procedures for themerit-based competition through which teach-ers enter the profession, for the pre-school, basicprimary, basic secondary, and middle secondarylevels. Decree 2582 of 2003 establishes rules andgeneral mechanisms for evaluating the work ofteachers and principals in state educational insti-tutions. Ministerial Resolution 2707 of 2003,adopted the manual and instruments for evalua-tion. The biggest criticism of these instruments isthat they are biased toward negative sanctions;there are no strategies in place to promote thosewho receive positive evaluations.

The labor conditions for teachers affects thequality of education. Meeting the educationalneeds of boys and girls depends, among other

factors, on having qualified teachers with decentcontracts and working conditions. A series ofreforms to the labor statutes for teachers andprincipals has caused working conditions to de-teriorate progressively in terms of salaries andother benefits. This is not commensurate withthe responsibility they bear for the education ofthe boys and girls entrusted to them. Law 812of 2003 not only establishes a later retirementage but also lowers the retirement benefits.17

Likewise, Decree 2341 of 2003 increased theemployee contributions to both pension andhealth plans. Decree 3621 of 2003 defined thepay raise for teachers and principals in the pub-lic sector at the pre-school, basic and middlelevels effective January 2003. For many, the per-centages were below the increase in the cost ofliving and, moreover, the raises were paid almostone year late, thus diminishing their value. Ra-tionalization of resources cannot be convertedinto a factor for teacher dissatisfaction with neg-ative consequences for educational quality.

ADAPTABLE EDUCATION

Allowing for Difference

The Ministry of Education issued DirectiveNo. 8 on 25 April 2003 with the purpose of en-acting the educational restructuring and insti-tutional mergers specified in Law 715 of 2001.The directive contained the guidelines for restruc-turing the teaching body and the school day. Itwarned that �special care must be taken to com-ply with current legislation on the participationof ethnic groups in decision-making on mattersdirectly affecting them.� This provision requiresterritorial bodies to consult indigenous commu-nities on the restructuring of the educationalsystem to anticipate any possible repercussions.However, Guzmán Caisamo, Director of the An-

17 The basis for calculating the pension was lowered to 75 percent ofthe base income, pursuant to the terms of Law 100 of 1994 and Law797 of 2003, compared to Article 15, number 2(b) of Law 91 of1989.

105Needs and Rights

tioquia Indigenous Organization�s Departmen-tal Institute for Indigenous Education (INDEI),states that generally this provision is not applied.It is not known to the majority of the mayorsand education secretaries; in other cases thereis little political will to consult, which places theautonomy and development of the indigenouseducational projects at risk.

Another difficulty arises in the guideline con-tained in Ministerial Directive 02 of 5 February2002, in which the Ministry of Education ac-knowledges the importance of religious educa-tion as a subject that should be taught to stu-dents according to Law 115 of 1994 and decidesthat the religion that state institutions shouldteach is the Roman Catholic faith, in accordancewith the Concordat and the Holy See. In addi-tion, religious instruction is regulated by theAgreement of Internal Law, promulgated throughDecree 354 of 1998. The directive establishesthat those who do not profess Catholicism areguaranteed religious freedom, giving them theoption of not attending religion classes.

This provision runs counter to the Interna-tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultur-al Rights and to the Political Constitution of 1991.The later document says that Colombia is a non-denominational state where freedom of religion isguaranteed and any type of discrimination what-soeveron religious grounds isprohibited. The1991Colombian Constitution gives equal status underthe law to all faith communities, independent ofthe number of members they have.18 On the sub-ject of religious education, the International Cove-nantonEconomic, Social, andCultural Rights con-templates the freedom to teach and GeneralComment Number 13 (paragraph 28) of the Cov-enant Committee recommends that religious edu-cation inpublic schools shouldbeoriented to sub-jects such as the history of religion and ethics, tobe imparted in an objective and impartial fashion,respecting freedom of thought, conscience andspeech. The allowance for thosewhoare not prac-ticing members of the Roman Catholic Church torefrain from attending classes does not guaranteefreedomof religiousbelief, but rather constitutes aform of discrimination.

CONCLUDINGCOMMENTS

The government has the task of demon-strating that it is making the maximum effort tomeet its obligations with respect to the right toeducation, complying immediately with theguidelines to this end and establishing goals tobe achieved progressively. Among others, someactions that, if taken, would contribute to im-proving equity in education are the following:

� Restructure the goals to cover the demandfor education and develop strategies to keepstudents in school and reintegrate thosewho have dropped out.

� Strengthen the system of transfer paymentsto the municipalities to cover the provisionof educational services.

� Insist on the negotiation of humanitarianagreements that exclude educational estab-lishments from the armed confrontation.

� Create incentives for municipalities to offerfree pre-school and basic education servic-es for their inhabitants.

� Implement a comprehensive policy for ed-ucational quality that goes much furtherthan the establishment of standards andevaluation mechanisms.

� Agree on a labor policy and contractual pro-cedures for teachers that are likely to im-prove their labor conditions and not wors-en them.

Education is a fundamental pillar of a na-tion�s development. It leads to greater equityand contributes to forging more aware and ac-tive citizens. Ambitious goals and serious effortin the field of education will be required to makeprogress toward the construction of a countrywith higher levels of human development. Em-barking on the road to equity in the educationalsystem for Colombia will require compliance withinternational commitments on human rights and

18 See the publication by the Ombudsman�s Office (Defensoría delPueblo) entitled. El Derecho a la Educación en la Constitución, Bogo-tá, 2003.

106 Needs and Rights

technical support and exchange with interna-tional entities such as UNESCO and the UN Spe-cial Rapporteur for the Right to Education.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dane, National Administrative Department of Statistics, 2003. http:/www.dane.gov.coDe Andraca, Ana Maria. Buenas Prácticas para mejorar la educación

en América Latina, 2003.Defensoría del Pueblo (National Ombudman�s Office), El derecho a la

educación en la Constitución, la jurisprudencia y los instru-mentos internacionales, Bogotá, Imprenta Nacional, Progra-ma de Seguimiento de Políticas Públicas en Derechos Hu-manos, Serie DESC, 2003.

Ministerio de Educación Nacional 2004. www.mineducacion.gov.coPlataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desa-

rrollo, Informe sobre el derecho a la educación en Colombia,Bogotá, October 2003.

Proyecto Educación Compromiso de Todos: Página de Internet direc-ción URL: http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/PROYECTOS/REL-COM/RESEDU/COMTOD/noticias/

United Nations, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights,General Comment No. 13.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Office inColombia. Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rightsin Colombia. February 2004. E/CN.4/2004/13.

United Nations. The Right to Education. Report Submitted by KatarinaTomasevski, Special Rapporteur. E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.2.February 2004.

United Nations. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Right toEducation. Report presented by Katarina Tomasevski, Spe-cial Rapporteur on the Right to Education. E/CN4/2004/45. 25 January 2004.

107Needs and Rights

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORRECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORRECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORRECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORRECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHTTEUR ON THE RIGHTTEUR ON THE RIGHTTEUR ON THE RIGHTTEUR ON THE RIGHTTO EDUCATION IN COLTO EDUCATION IN COLTO EDUCATION IN COLTO EDUCATION IN COLTO EDUCATION IN COLOMBIA.OMBIA.OMBIA.OMBIA.OMBIA.

February 2004.February 2004.February 2004.February 2004.February 2004.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government make an immediate and explicit commitment to defend and protect humanrights advocates.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Colombian State confirm, immediately and explicitly, that its international humanrights obligations are fully observed, and that it commit itself to strengthening the tutela (writ of protection) as concerns economic,social and cultural rights.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that government policy should be analyzed and appraised in the light of the criteria ofinternational human rights law with a view to incorporating this right into all government strategies and policies.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that a study be undertaken of the impact of the Education Revolution on the right to education.The Special Rapporteur calls for an early indication of what impact the policies to extend private education as contained in theEducation Revolution will have on the right to education, and what measures will be taken to eliminate (or at least minimize) anynegative impact. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Colombian State should immediately and explicitly reaffirm itsinternational obligation to ensure free education for all children of compulsory school age. The implementation of education at nocharge requires a detailed breakdown of the costs incurred by pupils for education that ought to be free but is not. The SpecialRapporteur further recommends that a study be undertaken of the actual costs involved with a view to abolishing them.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government make an immediate commitment to free education and to subsidizing thefull range of educational services for all displaced boys and girls of school age.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that an up-to-date profile of educational exclusion be prepared immediately with a view toadopting all necessary measures to ensure full inclusion as soon as possible.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that a study bemade forthwith of the nature and extent of discrimination in education, with inputfrom victims, so as to adopt policies and practices to eliminate discrimination and ensure public scrutiny of these policies andpractices.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends an increase of 30 per cent in budget allocations for education, from 4 to 6 percent of grossdomestic product (GDP).

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government make an immediate commitment to free education, subsidizing the fullrange of educational services for all child workers of school age and, moreover, adapting education to the needs of these boys andgirls, having sought their input in the design and assessment of such programs.

� The State�s international human rights obligations commit all State agencies to incorporate human rights into their strategies, policiesand actions and require all branches of the public authorities to cooperate in that regard. The Special Rapporteur reemphasizes herrecommendations regarding the formulation of a development plan in which human rights are a cross-cutting theme.

� The Special Rapporteur welcomes the scheme for an educational assembly proposed by local people in Chocó themselves to drawup an educational curriculum, with the involvement of all education stakeholders, whether individual or collective.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Colombian Government take immediate steps to clarify the circumstances surroundingmurders of teaching staff.

� The right to education cannot be imagined without the protection of the human, professional, trade union, and academic rights ofteachers. The Special Rapporteur recommends that immediate measures be taken to remedy this situation of neglect in Colombia.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government emphatically affirm the legitimacy and necessity of studying, teachingand defending human rights.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that a clear separation should bemaintained between schools and the conflict, and that schoolsshould be identified and protected as a �zone of peace� in order to rebuild the lives of children and young people who are prey toviolence and forced displacement.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends the adoption of a gender-based education strategy with a view to studying educationalprocesses from the viewpoint of both sexes and developing a style of education opposed to conflict and violence, one that promotesthe concept of a peaceful society based on equal human rights for all.

� The Special Rapporteur underlines her recommendation to the Government that it should clarify the legitimacy of human rights anddevelop its education system with the full involvement of human rights defenders, teaching personnel, and students to adapt theeducation process to the Colombian context.

� The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government immediately develop mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness of effortsto eliminate all discrimination against pregnant girls and child-mothers, as called for by the Constitutional Court.

108 Needs and Rights

109Needs and Rights

Public Health:

Definite Burial

After two years since the Uribe Gov-ernment took office an analysis ofthe right to health confirms the cri-sis that has been recently acknowl-edged by various political and so-cial sectors. This is evident in the

difficult access1 to and the bad quality of thehealth services2 , hospital closures3 and the re-strictions imposed on the patients by the pri-vate and public Health Promotion Companies(EPSs in Spanish) countrywide4 . Thus, this piecewill center on the main public policy measures,the draft bills proposed and the decisions thatthe government intends to make regarding thehealth sector. These can be grouped into threemain results: 1) reinforce the guarantees as theonly way for access; 2) reduce state responsi-bility for public health and definitive privatiza-tion of the public hospitals network; and 3) in-ternational dependency in access to medicines.

As a result of the evident crisis in the sec-tor caused by Law 100 � which has come topublic light after ten years since its enactment� in the present legislative session there are sev-eral reform bills (Bills 33, 31, 52 and 19). Bill

Center for Investigation andPopular Education, Cinep -

Natalia Paredes Hernández*

52, presented by the government, does not ad-dress the main causes of the crisis and, instead,

* Ms. Paredes is an Economist with a Masters Degree in Public Studies.CINEP Researcher, member of the National Movement for the Rightto Health and Social Security.

1 �Before the enactment of Law 100 and when the public hospitalsnetwork was operating coverage reached 52% of the population.Currently, with various public hospitals closed, coverage does notreach 56%�. Editorial in daily El Tiempo, December 27, 2003, page1 � 20.

2 A Human Rights Ombudsman�s Office survey conducted from Sep-tember 21, 2002 until February 4, 2003 indicates that the globalqualification of the system obtained 6.09 points out of 10, thusregistering the minimum acceptability rate for the current healthcare system. Human Rights Ombudsman�s Office, Evaluation of theHealth Services Provided by the Health Promotion Companies (EPSs),Bogotá, 2003, page 25.

3 A report of the Colombian Association of Clinics and Hospitals indi-cates that the health insurance companies owe 950 billion Colom-bian Pesos (approximately 2,350 pesos per 1 US dollar) to 94 publicand private hospitals, of which 53% are notes due. This sum shouldreach 1.5 billion pesos in relation to the total hospital network. ElColombiano newspaper �The Country�s Hospital Crisis is Not ShowingSigns of Recovery (�Crisis Hospitalaria en el país no muestra mejoría�),January 4, 2004, page 10 A.

4 The study of the Human Rights Ombudsman�s Office concluded,�Who knows what would have happened to the 87,300 people, whowere arbitrarily denied by the insurance companies their legitimaterights to health care, were it not for the legal protection submitted�.The institution advised that 95% of the cases resulted from thenegligence of the EPSs because the requests were covered by thePOS (Obligatory Health Plan). Daily El Tiempo, August 2, 2004.www.eltiempo.terra.com.co

110 Needs and Rights

it aggravates them by proposing a reorganiza-tion of the subsidized system through a central-ized financial scheme that ignores the role of thestate in all its levels: local, departmental andmunicipal. The proposed transformation of theoffer and demand subsidy will weaken publichospitals. Furthermore, the bill establishes adeadline for hospital reorganization or closureand, in general, it will intensify the health guar-antee model and its mercantilist treatment.

REORGANIZATION OF THE SUBSIDIZEDSYSTEM: INCREASED EPSMONOPOLY IN THEHEALTHBUSINESS

The government recently presented Bill 52 of2004, which proposes to reduce the authorityof the departments, municipalities and districts.Thus, a new national financial fund (Colombia�sTerritorial Health Fund � Fondo Territorial Colom-bia para la Salud [FOCOS]) will be created thatwill hire the Health Promotion Companies (EPSs)directly for the administration of the subsidizedsystem, including promotion and preventionactivities.

The territorial entities will practically becomeinformation centers since the function of thedepartments will be limited to �organize andadminister the special register of services net-works�, that is, manage the information associ-ated to the institutions under its jurisdiction andto provide it to the interested parties.

The municipalities and districts will be incharge of �budgeting and implementing, with-out actual payment� their resources insuring thepopulation under their jurisdiction into the newsubsidized system, selecting them, publishing theinformation and submitting the lists of benefi-ciaries to the new national financial fund (Fo-cos). Thus, the municipalities and districts� willbecome centers of public information because�implementing, without actual payment� is a playof words because not having a minimum con-trol over the resources is the same a leavingimplementation in the hands of those who do,which in this case is the Focos.

This reform strengthens the large interme-diary companies that have survived competitionbecause, by eliminating the Subsidized System�sAdministrators (ARS in Spanish [Administradorasdel Régimen Subsidiado]) and handing over theadministration to non-profit EPSs, the ARSs areput out of the market. Undoubtedly, many ofthe ARSs are inefficient but others are examplesof good management and they provide overallservices. Such is the case of the IndigenousARSs5 , which provide care to those communi-ties by adapting their services to rural needs andto traditional/cultural practices. Consequently,the large insurance companies will also get a holdof the business of providing health care to thepoor.

The arguments presented in the bill indicatethat small ARSs prevent an appropriate use ofscale economies and establish that they are notintelligent buyers. Therefore the bill proposesto �increase the size of the contracts for eachindemnity company� and to �reduce the num-ber of indemnity contracts for the population�through the creation of the Fund and the newsubsidized system. Anyone who understandsthe concept of monopoly will conclude that itwill increase as a result of the government�s pur-poses. This practice is always harmful for theusers, who are left in the hands of a few compa-nies that are free to establish prices, conditions,quality standards and various kinds of discrimi-nation.

The Bill does not establish minimum healthspending percentages from the resources ob-tained from the subsidized system�s per capita-tion payment unit. Neither does it establish theoverhead limitations that are currently in place.This allows for the EPSs to freely allocate the

5 According to the study of the Human Rights Ombudsman�s Office,at the ARS level, the Dusakawi and Pijaos Health EPSs � bothIndigenous EPSs � obtained the best scores among the institutionsevaluated with 7,78 and 7,12 points out of 10, respectively. This isway above the scores obtained by the Employees and Families SocialBenefit Funds (Cajas de Compensación Familiar). Human RightsOmbudsman�s Office, Evaluation of the Health Services provided bythe Health Promotion Companies (Evaluación de los Servicios deSalud Brindados por las Empresas de Promoción de Salud), Bogotá,2003, pages 26�28.

111Needs and Rights

resources thus giving them the possibility of in-creasing their profits in detriment of the man-datory destination of funds for health.

These intentions reinforce the tendency tocontinue consolidating the large health monop-olies. The most illustrative example is that ofSaludcoop that became one of the largest com-panies in the country6 because it acts simulta-neously as an EPS and an IPS (Institutions theProvide Services). This results in Saludcoopcollecting the resources and subcontracting itsown services. This is not an exception sincemostof the EPSs do the same.

With FOCOS, which will manage the resourc-es aimed at financing the new subsidized systemthrough a fiduciary, an additional fund differentto the current Solidarity and Guarantee (Fosygain Spanish) will be created. Neither the NationalCouncil for Social Security and Health (ConsejoNacional de Seguridad Social en Salud), which is thebody that provides orientation to the system, northe territorial institutions will interfere in the FO-COS. This will result in an absolute separationregarding resourcesmanagement and public pol-icies definition. The purposes and the funds willgo separate ways and, in practice, this will resultin weakening of public policies. FOCOS will col-lect the resources aimed at the subsidized sys-tem, it will make the contracts with the EPSs andit will make the payments.

By depriving the municipalities from theirduty to manage the resources of the subsidizedsystem the State is taken away its primary re-sponsibility of providing services to the poorestand most vulnerable sectors of the populationleaving this responsibility in the hands of a fi-nancial fund, a fiduciary and the large insurancecompanies. This would negatively affect theState�s capacity to effectively carry out its basicfunction of planning, implementing, regulatingand controlling public policies and programs.Furthermore, the State would be prevented fromfulfilling its commitment to guarantee the rightto health through the absolute and definitivedebilitation of the institutional precedents thatcannot be recovered in the future, such as ithas been demonstrated.

Just as when Law 100 was formulated, thebill intends to insure all the Colombian popula-tion but it does not indicate what will happenwith non-eligible persons. This small detail �which, at least, was considered in 1993 with theallotment of resources to provide services tonon-affiliated populationwhen necessary�nowseems to have lost its direction and there are nooptions because themunicipalities will not havethe resources for this end.

In addition to all this, the proposal to re-store to the EPSs the responsibility for promo-tion and prevention7 of the Mandatory Subsi-dized Health Plan (Plan Obligatorio de SaludSubsidiado) and its resources, we can concludethat the State � at all levels, but especially at amunicipal level � will left no space for the im-plementation of public health policies.

PUBLIC HEALTH:MARGINAL AND PRIVATIZED

The Bill proposes to replace the current BasicServices Plan (PAB in Spanish) for a CollectivePublic Health Plan, whose regulations will beestablished later on and will be complementaryto the individual plans and other area interven-tions. Therefore, this will not become a regulat-ing policy on this matter because the Ministry

6 In a recent editorial in El Tiempo entitled �Health: the PendingAgenda� (�Salud: la agenda pendiente�), the daily affirms thatSaludcoop�s capital gains increased �from 2.5 billion pesos in 1994to 287 billion pesos this year (a few years ago the spokesmen of theinsurance associations anticipated that �social security would beco-me one of the largest businesses for the Colombian insurance com-panies�). Therefore, the disparity of forces between the promotingcompanies and the health services businesses continues to takeplace thus generating a market that lacks control and is deficient; theoligopoly of the prior, which expands vertical integration with increa-sing aggressiveness and the obliteration of the medical professiondue to the imposition of the EPSs� corporate interests�. El Tiempo,May 16, 2004, page 1 - 30

7 This decision is not consistent with the evidence presented in severalstudies that demonstrate that the EPSs do not comply with thepromotion and prevention programs and they do not allot the appro-priate funds for this end. The survey carried out by the Human RightsOmbudsman�s Office indicates that both the EPSs and the ARSsobtained scores of 3.67 and 3.18 over 10 in the item �invitations topromotion and prevention programs�. The same study points out thatthis component is very low for all the EPSs and the ARSs, exceptDusakawi and Barrios Unidos in Quibdó. Human Rights Ombudsman�sOffice, Evaluation of the Health Services Provided by the HealthPromotion Companies, Bogotá 2003, pages 33 - 40

112 Needs and Rights

of Social Protection will establish the prioritiesfor the Plan with the technical support of theNational Health Institute (Instituto Nacional deSalud). This is a serious step back because thegreatest accomplishments associated to publichealth are found when policies are: decentral-ized and multi-sector oriented; headed by pub-lic institutions; widely participative; and whenthey provide decision making capacity to thelevel that is closest to the community, the mu-nicipality.

The municipalities� leeway to develop pub-lic policies that are appropriate for their localreality and for the needs of their population �these are multiple and wide-ranging due to Co-lombia�s diversity � will be totally restricted thuspreventing them from organizing and control-ling the services providers under their jurisdic-tion. This would leave the market forces incharge of the sector�s general coordination likeif this was suitable for health in terms of a hu-man right and a universal public benefit that isinherent to human dignity. This will be the sameas the State initiative regarding public healthbecause everything that is not included in thebenefit planswill not be carried out becausemostof the resources will be directed at financing in-demnity by the EPSs.

Bill 52 will continue to limit public health.This process was originated by Law 100 of 1993,whose authors include the current President.This deterioration results from the system�smercantilist �healing conception. It was creat-ed based on the idea of indemnity. Later on itwas developed and implemented based on fi-nancial and administrative concerns and, sub-sequently, a number of adjustments were made.These, instead of simply and clearly adapting theresponsibilities and the regulations to protect theright to health, have resulted in a number of reg-ulatory decrees that have increasingly fragment-ed the responsibilities of the stakeholders, theprocedures, the programs and the results ex-pected. Fragmentation is becoming deeper.Now it does not only affect the different publicand private stakeholders, but has also reachedthe large companies. The public sector will have

a hard time controlling them because it will notmanage the resources directly. Therefore, theFOCOS and the trustee that gets the multimil-lion businesses will have more power.

In the current health system: �Investment isdirected at the incorrect concepts. Several wellsubstantiated studies have demonstrated that90% of the nation�s total spending on health isinvested on medical services that only have an11% impact on the mortality of the population.Only 1.5% is invested in promoting life styles thatwould have an impact on 43% of prevalent mor-tality; 1.6% is invested on the environment, whichwould have a 19% impact on mortality; and only7% is invested on biomedical research, whichwould reduce mortality by 27%�8

Such as the bill is currently designed, it isvery likely that the actions identified as �publichealth� will continue to be divided into individu-al ones implemented by the EPSs within the POS(Obligatory Health Plan � Plan Obligatorio de Sa-lud) and collective ones executed by a stakehold-er that is not clearly established in the proposal.The same as in the design of Law 100 of 1993,public health is reduced to a statement because,in practice, it does not include all the systemand neither does it mainstream it throughoutthem as it should. That is to say, as a massivepublic policy, with universal access and reallyaddressing the living conditions and the wellbe-ing of the population.

PROGRESSIVE DISMANTLEMENTOF THEPUBLIC HOSPITALSNETWORK

Shortly after the implementation of Law 100 of1993 the public hospitals started experiencingbudget deficits. At the time this was considered

8 Ramón Granados and María Gómez, �The Health System Reforms inChile and Colombia: Results and Balance� (�La reforma de los siste-mas de salud en Chile y Colombia: resultados y balance�), in Revistade Salud Pública, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, vol. 2, No. 2,pages 106�107. Excerpt taken from Miguel Cortés, Health and FreeTrade: a Contradiction (Salud y libre comercio: Un contrasentido).Alcatemas Collection, Colombian Platform for Human Rights, De-mocracy and Development (Plataforma Colombiana de DD.HH., De-mocracia y Desarrollo), 2004.

113Needs and Rights

to be part of the transition period meanwhilethey became competitive and efficient. Afterthe successive setbacks the authorities indicat-ed that this was due to their labor burden. Lat-er on, when the EPSs� �trickeries� to avoid pay-ment of outstanding balances became difficultto conceal they recognized that there were�some obstacles� for competitiveness; current-ly, during the present government, they are giv-en an ultimatum for restructuring and self-sus-tainability. It has beenmarginally recognized thatthese hospitals do not have their own EPSs tohire them; that they have always competed withthe private sector in inferior conditions; that theyhave fulfilled their public function to providehealth care to the population that is not insuredand that still they continue to be demanded tobe financially self-sustainable. What has neverbeen recognized is that there has always beenthe intention to close them and that little bylittle the society has stopped �hurting� over theirclosure. The public opinion has practically for-gotten what happenedwith the San Juan deDios,the Lorencita Villegas and the Cartagena Univer-sity hospitals.

When this article was being written theRamón González Valencia University Hospital inBucaramanga was in line for closeout. The com-munity of Santander, including its Governor,mobilized and the CM& Newscast launched acampaign to save the hospital from its immi-nent closure which seemed to be working. TheUniversity Hospital in Caldas, however, was notthat lucky. It closed on June 18, 2004 and theGovernor of that Department instead of defend-ing the public patrimony he affirmed that thecloseout was inevitable9 . The explanation giv-en by the Office of the Mayor was conclusive:�The health care services will be suspended dueto the lack of resources and supplies despitethe actions taken.� The San Jorge Hospital inPereira is in a similar situation, with an accu-mulated deficit during the first semester in2004 of 20 billion pesos, despite the fact thatduring 2003 it billed more than 29 billion pe-sos and the State only recognized it 14.5 bil-lion pesos. The hospital network in Valle has a

deficit of over 100 billion pesos. These are onlya few cases10 .

The current government�s restructuring planis aimed at reaching the public hospital�s self-sustainability with the same �recipe�: adjustmentof the labor system, reduction of human re-sources costs and a reorganization of the insti-tutional and information systems. In addition,the plan seeks to implement various departmen-tal services networks and debt forgiveness forthe process. It is amazing, however, that thelabor system is being blamed for the hospitalcrisis because, according to Anthoc (HealthWorkers Union), to date hospital workers areowed and average of 16 to 40 months salaries.Furthermore, if the hospitals do not providehealth care to the population that needs it theyviolate the National Constitution and, if theyprovide the services, they are increasing theirfinancial deficits. This vicious circle will not besolved through restructuring processes and, in-stead, an adjustment of the conception of thehealth system that is not based on indemnity isnecessary, where the resources are used in pro-viding public, universal and quality health care.

The situation of public hospitals will deteri-orate even further if the Congress passes Bill 52of 2004 because it not only includes restructur-ing as a last resource previous to closeout11 , butit also bans financial support from the State tothose institutions that do not comply with fi-nancial adjustment and sustainability regula-tions. The Bill explicitly points out that therewill be no loans, co-financing or any other kindof transfer of resources. There will be no publicresources to finance the hospitals therefore themajority of the subsidies to the offer will be trans-formed into subsidies to the demand, which issomething that the health businesses and thegovernments have been hoping for since thecreation of Law 100.

9 Daily La República, �Hospital Closeout was Inevitable� (�Cierre delhospital era inevitable�), July 3, 2004, page 6.

10 Daily El Tiempo, �The Agony of the Caldas Hospital� (�La agonía delhospital de Caldas�), pages 1 - 3

11 Article 29 says: �When by the end of the adjustment program aPublic Health Services Institutions is not sustainable, it is assumedthat it is not feasible and should be liquidated�, Draft Bill 52 of 2004.

114 Needs and Rights

By allocating the majority of the resourcesaimed at providing health care to the poorestsectors of the population to the new financialfund and hiring the EPSs directly, the allotmentof State funds is reduced to a minimum and thepossibilities of public hospitals surviving aremeager. This is the final thrust of the privatiza-tion model and it completes the cycle: liquida-tion or partial rental of the public institutionsthat later on enter a phase of appropriation orsale at unreal prices to the large financial capi-tals, which subsequently will control the coun-try�s health services and infrastructure.

The Bill establishes that the EPSs should hireat least 50% of the subsidized system with Pub-lic Health Services Institutions that are organizedinto services networks. This measure, however,will most surely become inadequate becauseeven if the full installed capacity of the IPSs ishired they are never paid the services that theyactually provide12 , the more so when in the fu-ture the EPSs will be more powerful.

Since the rescue formula continues to bethe same, the results will be identical, with theaggravating circumstance of the definitive close-out of the public hospitals, which currently ab-sorb two thirds of the country�s total hospital-izations13 . If the real problem, which is theindemnity scheme, is not addressed the crisiswill continue because the public hospitals arenever paid for all the services they provide sincethis is the part of the businesses� profitability.

The State owes 120 billion pesos14 to theValle University Hospital for the year 2003, onlyfor the health services provided to internally dis-placed population. Furthermore, the State didnot pay 6 billion of the 42 billion that the hospi-tal billed for services it actually provided. Anexample of the daily and common hardships inall the hospitals of the country is the San PabloHospital in Cartagena. Its annual deficit reach-es 3 billion pesos and its pending restructuringwill result in 78 of its 168 employees being fired.The process will cost 6.3 billion pesos and theemployees are owed 24 months of salaries15 .

Regardless of the number of restructuringprocesses carried out with World Bank loans, the

public health sector crisis will not be solved aslong as the system does not become a publicand universal system where the resources aredirected at its fundamental purpose and not toenrich theHealth Promotion Companies instead.These are the intermediaries of the majority ofthe health spending, which is estimated at ap-proximately 20 trillion pesos annually. This isequivalent to 10% of Colombia�s GDP.

In line with the privatization logic, in Octo-ber 2003 the Social Security Institute (Institutode Seguros Sociales � ISS) was restructured.Newspaper El Tiempo carried a special reportentitled �This is how the health colossus fell� (�Asícayó el coloso de la salud�)16 where it shows theinstitution�s deterioration process and the totallack of political willingness to save it. The reor-ganization process consists of dividing the enti-ty into an indemnity institution and seven re-gional offices to provide the services. These arethe State Social Companies (Empresas Sociales delEstado � ESE) under the Ministry for Social Pro-tection. The 15,000 employees are no longerofficial workers and are now public employees.The indemnity company will have to hire servic-es with these ESEs of the ISS. The measure in-cludes the possibility of the workers operatingthe companies directly through an associativeformula. After this restructuring process theywill enter full competition.

Although the Government may not recog-nize it, the ISS is practically undergoing a priva-tization process: many of its functions are sub-

12 In the forum �Where are the health funds?� (�Dónde están los dinerosde la salud?�), held on May 2004: �the President of the ColombianAssociation of Clinics and Hospitals Juan Carlos Giraldo, recalled thatthe hospital sector�s notes due amounts to 2.5 trillion pesos of which1.3 trillion are difficult to collect. This is an average of 10 billion pesosper hospital.� El Colombiano newspaper, May 22, 2004, page 2C.

13 Mentioned in the Inter-American Development Bank report �Reorga-nization, Redesign and Modernization of the Health Services Networ-ks Program�: Loan Proposal, 2003 (Programa de reorganización, redi-seño y modernización de las Redes de prestación de servicios desalud Propuesta de préstamo, 2003)

14 El Colombiano, �The Hospital Crisis does not Show Signs of Impro-vement� (�Crisis hospitalaria en el país no muestra mejoría�), January4, 2004, page 10A.

15 El Tiempo, �There is a Mess in all of Colombia�s Hospitals� (�Líos conhospitales en todo Colombia�), January 9, 2004, pages 1-2.

16 El Tiempo, 22, 23 and 24 June, pages 1-6, 1-2, 1-2.

115Needs and Rights

contracted with different companies thereforethe duty manager cannot control the quality ofthe services nor the personnel in its servicescenter; the massive exit of affiliates continue;and the Ministry for Social Protection, createdunder this Government and assigned the respon-sibility for two critical matters such as health andlabor, has very little time to improve the ESEs orthe IPSs of the ISS, which now it is in charge of.This is a total institutional chaos that will end upjustifying its definitive closure or privatization inthe short term.

Another example of the health sector�s ac-celerated privatization process is the increase inthe �pocket spending� of the Colombian peo-ple. The resources that the families are spend-ing on medicines are increasing (and average of40% of prescription drugs because they are notavailable or are not included in the POS) and soare co-payments andmoderating quotas. In Feb-ruary 4, 2004 the cost of the �vouchers� thatthe users pay for each time they need to usethe health services or to request medicines in-creased by 15%. This is way above annual infla-tion and the minimum wage increase. Compar-ing the increase authorized for the vouchers ofprepaid medicine, which amounted to a maxi-mum of 5.5% for 2004, there is a contrast inthe conception of equity of the system, wherethe affiliates to the contributive system (11 to13 million according to the different estimates)experience an increase three times higher thanwhat was authorized for the 850,000 pre-paidmedicine users.

Where to are the resources going in a countrywith one of the highest health spending in LatinAmerica? The answer may be summarized withthe following comparisonwith the Colombian sys-tem�s model country: �The United States, thecountry of free indemnity that is alwaysmentionedas an example, has a record spending on health.In 2001 it spent 13.9%of itsGDPonhealth against10.7% in Germany, 9.5% in France and 7.5% inFinland, where gratuity is the rule� 17 .

Currently, the Senate is debating Draft Bill19 of 2004, headed by Senator Luis Carlos Avel-laneda, which proposes a Social Security Sys-

tem for overall health. Although it does notchange the essence of the mechanism, accessis more progressive. It proposes application andoperation under the principles of universality,integrality, solidarity, equity, unity, quality, par-ticipation, integration, non-renouncing, acces-sibility and gratuity, all of which are basic in guar-anteeing the human right to health. This projectestablishes: a clear definition of the responsibil-ities of the different stakeholders; the limitationson the profitability of the health promotion com-panies; the responsibilities of the State regard-ing public health matters; overall attention to allthe population by unifying the health care plans(Overall Services Plan) (Plan de Atención Integral �PAIS), which must be at least equal to the cur-rent POS-C and it complements it to make itmore integral; it is explicit in eliminating paymentof moderating quotas and co-payments thatcurrently limit the access of a great percentageof the population; it proposes the creation of anIntegrated National Health Information System;and it develops a number of public policy relat-ed guidelines for the mother-child, disabilities,mental health and oral health components,among others. Likewise, it: establishes guide-lines for the design of the Public Health Plan andits coordination with the Overall Services Plan;outlines its operation and the responsibilities ofthe stakeholders; and strengthens the role of theState, through the Ministry of Social Protection,and in coordination with the National HealthInstitute (INS) and the municipalities.

INCREASE OF INTERNATIONAL DEPENDENCE ANOF ESSENTIALMEDICINES

With the signing of the Free Trade Agreement(FTA) with the United States and the Free TradeAgreement for the Americas (FTAA) the healthscenario will become even more troublesome inthe next few years. This will be especially so for

17 �Health Data� 2003, second edition, OCDE, Julio 2003. www.oecd.org,quoted in Martín Bulard, �Programmed Social Insecurity�, (�Insegu-ridad Social Programada�), Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2003,page 6.

116 Needs and Rights

the most vulnerable sectors of the population,which have the worse living conditions, there-fore it requires more health protection. Themeasures proposed in the free trade agreementswill seriously affect the access of the populationto medicines. Other serious issues are: the lossof food sovereignty that is closely related withthe health of the population; and the increasedlabor flexibility that will jeopardize the indemni-ty model by dismantling the social security ofthe formal sector workers.

The United States expects Colombia to in-crease the protection of the intellectual proper-ty rights of the pharmaceutical multinationalseven beyond the international regulations includ-ed in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agree-ment on Trade-Related Aspects of IntellectualProperty Rights (TRIPS), which already favorsthem. This will result in an increase of the rightsassociated with the patents (registration aimedat protecting discoveries and inventions) suchas: extending the deadline for the duration ofthe patents (more than 20 years); further pat-entable matters (i.e. plants and animals); andallowing patenting secondary uses. These issuesend up increasing the monopoly on drugs ofcompanies such as Pfizer, Aventis and Bayer.This constitutes the adoption of additional bar-riers for the national production of generic med-icines at lower costs via an FTA.

By extending the deadline for the expira-tion of patents and recognizing patents for sec-ondary uses or for minor changes to knownmedicines is the same as extending the pro-tection to the pharmaceutical companies be-yond reasonable parameters and away from thecountry�s public health requirements. �Uponexpiration of a patent the price of the productfalls by up to 70% depending on the numberof generics that enter the market. From thenon, each time a new competitor enters themarket the average price drops by 10%. Thisis why in Colombia 80% of the generics cost25% less than the innovator drugs18 . Thisexplains much of the success of the genericsthat currently supply 67% of the national mar-ket (in units)�19 .

Another barrier included in the agenda ofthe negotiations with the United States consistson the �protection of the information of the testsfor the sanitary making as an exclusive right�.This provides exclusive information on the testsof innocuousness and effectiveness of the drugfor an additional period of five years to the own-ers of the patents of drugs that have not yetbeen commercialized or registered in the coun-try. In this manner non-dissemination of publichealth information and limitations to the sub-mission of sanitary registration is authorized.This barrier increases the protection timeframefor the patents and delays the national produc-tion of generics even further. In Colombia thisbarrier is already being implemented throughDecree 2085 of September 2002. Under thisdecree the National Drug and Food SurveillanceInstitute (Instituto Nacional de Vigilancia de Medi-camentos y Alimentos � INVIMA) protects substanc-es that have been known worldwide for 49 years,and more recent ones that have been knownfor 14 years, by regarding them as �new chem-ical materials�. In this way the INVIMA has beenblocking low cost competition products that,through time, will reach hundreds of medicinesthat will be protected for five more years as aresult of their registration. This Decree was putforward under pressures for the negotiation oftrade agreements and it more damaging that theregulations previously established by WTO.

According to a Higher Education and De-velopment Foundation (Fundación para la Edu-cación Superior y el Desarrollo � Fedesarrollo) studyprotection to confidential information and drugpatents allegedly costs Colombia 777 milliondollars a year, way higher than the �assistance�received from the Plan Colombia. According tothe North American pharmaceutical industry, ifColombia accepts the the free trade agreementbarriers their laboratories would increase theirannual profits by US$ 750 million. This means

18 Innovators: drugs that have a commercial name, even if �innovation�is minimal or practically inexistent. Note by Natalia Paredes.

19 Germán Holguín Zamorano, �The FTA is a Deadly Threat for Health�(�TLC: amenaza de muerte a la salud�). Daily El Siglo, June 7, 2004.

117Needs and Rights

that Colombian consumers would supply the�poor� North American laboratories this addi-tional figure, which is almost equal to 1% of thecountry�s GDP and higher than what the Gov-ernment expect to collect through its last taxreform20 .

In addition, Colombia�s use of parallel im-port mechanisms � which is the possibility ofimporting generic medicines from another coun-try at lower prices � is expected to be prohibit-ed, even in situations of sanitary or public healthemergency situations. Also, limitations are ex-pected on the criteria for the use of obligatorylicenses as a legitimate instrument of the Stateto produce patentedmedicines without the con-sent of the owner of the right. All this is againstthe Doha Declaration in 2001, in the frameworkof the WTO Assembly, which recognizes certainlimitations to free trade associated with healthissues and confirms the flexibilities included inthe TRIPS (i.e. obligatory licenses and parallelimports) regarding the formulation of health re-lated policies by the State.

The sole threat of obligatory licenses in Braziland its effective use by South Africa reducedthe cost of HIV/AIDS treatment fromUS$ 10,439to US$ 201 per person per year. Currently, Bra-zil produces and distributes the treatment forfree. Likewise, upon the threats of using thissame mechanism, 10 Latin American countries,including Colombia, were able to sign an agree-ment that makes it possible to reduce antiretro-viral treatment costs from US$ 5,000 to US$365, or a 73% reduction.

The United States argument to defend thesebarriers is that the resources obtained from theprotection of patents are directed at promotingresearch and development. For our countriesthis is an accessory and false argument becauseof the 1,223 new drugs introduced from 1975to 1997, only 13 are for tropical diseases be-cause only 20% of the world medicine market isin Asia, Africa and Latin America, therefore �in-vestments are not justifiable�21 . Colombia�sparticipation in the world�s drugmarket is 0.32%.Evidently, this figure will not affect new researchprograms at all and, instead, it may result in se-

rious restrictions to access to medicines for themajority of the population. If the medicine pro-ducers are really concerned over the access tomedicines in poor countries it is incomprehen-sible that they let 10.3 million children underfive years old die in 2000. Of this total, 8.3 mil-lion deaths could have been prevented by ac-cess to essential medicines.

The arguments on research and the inevi-tability of reaching free trade agreements be-cause Colombia will invade the North Americanmarket with �borojo� or with excellent qualitytextiles produced by Cotton U.S.A. are beingused to negotiate the health of the Colombianpeople. They are making the Colombian peoplebelieve that it is necessary to accept the condi-tions as the only option. They have been doingfor the same for the last 10 years with an ineffi-cient health model that has continued to wors-en under the same logic of privatization. This isall a lie that is not a simple as it is expressed inthe articles criticizing the situation. Instead, thisinvolves the right to health and to life of themostvulnerable sectors of the society; of the 60%whoare included in that cold poverty statistics andwho day by day have to suffer the absurd deci-sions of the current dominating interests.

The proposals of the Government will nottransform the predominant conception of healthasmerchandise and of indemnity as amodel thatguarantees the sustainability and profitability ofthe businesses. This is why the assistentialistand curative view � this is, the responses to thedisease based on a fewmedical or dental quotesand a few drugs and, when the situation becomesserious, a specialized treatment � is predomi-nant. This is against the basic notion of publichealth established in the 2003 Report of theWorld Health Organization (WHO) as the onlymeans to overcome the world�s health problems,especially in less developed countries with highpoverty rates such as Colombia.

20 Germán Holguín Zamorano, La propiedad intelectual en el TLC: im-pacto sobre el derecho de acceso a los medicamentos y la saludpública, Bogotá, 7 de junio de 2004.

21 Miguel Cortés. Salud y Libre comercio. Un contrasentido. ColecciónAlcatemas, Plataforma Colombiana de DD.HH., democracia y desa-rrollo, 2004. pág. 55.

118 Needs and Rights

The WHO report �emphasizes that thehealth systems must be strengthened to meetthe formidable challenges�. Colombia insists onstrengthening the general social security system(SGSS), but in its private and financial compo-nent which, at the same time, weakens the pub-lic sector. In Colombia this results in a systemthat gives priority to the interests of the privatehealth stakeholders, which usually do not matchthe existing and large public health needs suchas: inter-sectoral and multidisciplinary actionsto improve the population�s living conditions;community�s environment and wellbeing; con-trol diseases that are preventable and easy tocontrol at an individual and collective level; anddetection and follow-upof epidemic and endemicdiseases. These are themain responses that theColombian system should provide to its popu-lation.

The WHO report says: �The Chapter pro-poses and approach to scaling up health sys-tems based on the core principles of primaryhealth care formulated in the 1978 Declarationof Alma-Ata: universal access and coverage onthe basis of need; health equity as part of thedevelopment oriented to social justice; commu-nity participation in defining and implementinghealth agendas; and intersectoral approaches tohealth�22 .

22 Organización Mundial de la Salud, Informe sobre la salud en elMundo 2003 Forjemos el futuro, octubre de 2003.

119Needs and Rights

I

�Although we have not been able to reduceunemployment to the desired degree, the pri-vate economy has recommenced the processof job creation. In effect, 1.2 million new jobshave been created.�

Alvaro Uribe Vélez*

t is widely known that since the pre-vious administration the countryhas been experiencing serious laborproblems, reflected by the shortageof good1 jobs, high unemployment,and the overrepresentation of low-

paying jobs with poor working conditions. Thesephenomena are putting constant pressure onpublic policies. The Uribe administration, withthe slogan �employment for all,� has raised thebanner of doing away with the labor contract,because it considers that labor protection takea toll on the final product that is sold on the

The precariousnessof employment

National Labor Union School- Research Center

global market. To stay competitive the obses-sion is to cut all costs.

In effect, with the objective of showing re-sults on labor, the current government sets outits strategies for employment policy in the Na-tional Development Plan �Toward a Communi-ty State 2002-2006.� It proposes ambitionsgoals such as the creation of 2 million new jobsover four years, to be achieved by means oflabor flexibilization and polices for economicgrowth.

* Presidential speech at the inauguration of the congressional session20 July 2004.

1 Job quality is a concept that has been used in different ways to referto individual and social wellbeing in terms of the labor activitiesundertaken to satisfy needs. The existing studies coincide that con-ditions such as income, job stability, working hours, social security,access to recreation, as well as the particular characteristics of thejob in question contribute to job quality. For more on the subject seethe work of Infante Ricardo (1999) and Farne Stefano (2002) amongothers.

120 Needs and Rights

RESULTSON EMPLOYMENT AFTER TWOYEARSIN OFFICE

After two years in office, the Uribe governmentupholds the resultsdisplayedby themaineconom-ic indicators as important achievements for eco-nomic and social reactivation that serve to defendpolitical interests (reelection) and some ideologicalinterests (the continuity and further pursuance ofthe economic model). Effectively, the executivebranch and the economic authorities have trium-phantly pointed to the reduction inunemploymentand the increase in the number of employed per-sons and they refer to the creation of over 1 mil-lion jobs throughout the country.2

Although it is true that the Dane [NationalAdministrative Department of Statistics] showsa reduction in the unemployment rate andmorepeople working, the kinds of jobs that have beencreated and their quality are worrisome.

New Jobs: Optimistic Figures About UnstableJobs

Despite different concerns about the re-form�s lack of effectiveness in terms of jobcreation, the optimistic figures magnify thepoor results. A technical study on the labormarket in 20033 says that the number ofpeople with jobs increased by 1,027,100,which is reflected in an increase in the em-ployment rate.

Now, comparing figures from the first quar-ter of 2004 with those from the first quarter of2003 one sees that this increase barely keepspace with population growth4 (Graphic 1). Dur-ing the period in question, an increase of336,800 people was recorded, which means arate of 2 percent during the past year. This in-crease �is natural, vegetative growth; it is thatwhich is expected even if the government doesnothing.�5

Graph No. 1Graph No. 1Graph No. 1Graph No. 1Graph No. 1TTTTTotal National Employment Rateotal National Employment Rateotal National Employment Rateotal National Employment Rateotal National Employment Rate

(Jan-Dec. 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)(Jan-Dec. 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)(Jan-Dec. 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)(Jan-Dec. 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)(Jan-Dec. 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)

Law 789

Labor reform

Uribe

Goverment

January February March April May June July August September October November December

SourSourSourSourSource:ce:ce:ce:ce: Dane, Household Survey. Total national monthly figures, January-December 2002-2003, January-June 2004.

2 Follow-up to the employment policy. National Department of Planning, 7 June 2004. Document found at www.dnp.gov.co.3 Pérez Torres, Francisco José. Balance de la evolución del mercado laboral colombiano en el cuarto trimestre de 2003. DANE. Document may

be found at: www.dane.gov.co.4 Montenegro Álvaro. �¿Dónde está el nuevo empleo?� El Tiempo, 1 August 2004. P. 1-11.5 Ibid.

121Needs and Rights

During the periods being compared (firstquarter of 2003 and first quarter of 2004) em-ployment for domestic workers fell 6.1 percent,which shows the real crisis in the householdsthat provide this kind of employment. In turn,unpaid family employment fell by 0.5 percentand government jobs dropped 0.3 percent. Incontrast, there was an increase in the least pro-ductive jobs (Graphic 2). Effectively, it may beseen that the national increase in employmentlies mainly with self-employed workers, whichduring the period in question grew by 325,971jobs, ratifying the inability to absorb the grow-ing labor force into the production apparatus.This situation forced people to create their ownjobs, oftentimes in the informal sector, with no

job benefits or social security. Jobs were not cre-ated in industry, despite the changes in laborlegislation.

The evidence demonstrates that the newjobs are concentrated in the service sector,strengthening the trend toward the tertiariza-tion6 of the economy. This demonstrates thatin Colombia employment is not being created,but to the contrary it is being destroyed andreplaced by independent occupations with pre-carious income, no social security coverage andno taxation.

What is certain is that as the result of thechanges in labor law, good jobs7 have been re-placed by precarious jobs,8 strengthening thetrend toward the precariousness of work, in

Graph No. 2Graph No. 2Graph No. 2Graph No. 2Graph No. 2TTTTTotal National Employment by Occupation.otal National Employment by Occupation.otal National Employment by Occupation.otal National Employment by Occupation.otal National Employment by Occupation.

11111ststststst quarter 2003 vs 1quarter 2003 vs 1quarter 2003 vs 1quarter 2003 vs 1quarter 2003 vs 1ststststst quarter 2004quarter 2004quarter 2004quarter 2004quarter 2004

SourSourSourSourSource:ce:ce:ce:ce: Dane, Household Survey. Total national monthly figures, first quarter 2003 vs. first quarter 2004.

6 Tertiarization refers to precarious expansion in the service sector, not in modern services but rather those associated with informal activities orsubsistence.

7 Those that are part of the evolutionary dynamics of constantly improving the working conditions for the lives of the workers in terms of socialsecurity, remuneration, working hours, social protection, and social recognition.

8 Labor precariousness has the following four characteristics: The discontinuity of work (short-term work with a high risk of job loss, arbitrariness anduncertainty, temporary work as a norm, etc.). Lack of control over the work, inadequate or non-existent opportunities to negotiate in the labor market(either individually or collectively), dependence, self-exploitation, constant and exhaustive availability, submission, etc. Lack of protection for theworker (substandard labor conditions, no right to social benefits, no medical coverage, discrimination, high turnover, exploitation, segregation, etc.).Low remuneration for the worker (low salaries, no promotion or professional development, little to no training, etc.). (Agullo, 1997)

122 Needs and Rights

which standard labor practices include short-term jobs, frequent job changes and periodswithout work, easy hiring and firing, no perma-nence, high turnover, legalized lack of job secu-rity, and other flexible measures that in the endare an insult to the worker.

With the expressed intention of facilitatingaccess to employment for all, the elimination ofthe labor contract has been promoted, with se-rious consequences that are becoming appar-ent: the resulting precariousness of employmentand forcing millions of Colombians to work out-side of the legal framework. The deregulation oflabor exerts great pressure on millions of unem-ployed people, forcing them to take any kind ofjob and at any cost, leading to jobs that lackdignity and are disliked but that the workersmustaccept as their only alternative.

Unemployment and Reduced Income

The unemployment rate, which is an impre-cise concept given that it only reports the pro-portion of Colombians who have not been hiredwith new contracts, disguising the precariousconditions of these contracts,9 has not fallenby much, as had been predicted with the chang-es to labor legislation, andmuch less because ofeconomic growth. Although it is true that inDecember national unemployment fell to 12.3percent, the result of seasonal business, it hascome back as can be seen by Graphic No. 3.

By comparing the period of analysis (firstquarter 2003 vs. first quarter 2004) one seesthat overall unemployment in the country grewby 88,850 people, which in real terms is an in-crease of 2.9 percent. This increase in the num-

Graph No. 3Graph No. 3Graph No. 3Graph No. 3Graph No. 3Unemployment RateUnemployment RateUnemployment RateUnemployment RateUnemployment Rate

National total (Jan-Dec 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)National total (Jan-Dec 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)National total (Jan-Dec 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)National total (Jan-Dec 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)National total (Jan-Dec 2002-2003, Jan-Jun 2004)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

T.D 2002 T.D 2003 T.D 2004

Uribe VélezGoberment

Law 789

Labor

Laboral

FebruaryJanuary March April May Jane July August September October November December

SourSourSourSourSource:ce:ce:ce:ce: Dane, Household Survey. Total national monthly figures, January-December 2002-2003, January-June 2004.

9 �Bien-estar y macroeconomía.� Development Research Center, National University of Colombia. Office of the Comptroller General of theRepublic, Bogotá, 2003, p. 26.

123Needs and Rights

ber of unemployed led to a slight increase of 0.1percent in the national unemployment rate forthe period in question, going from 15.2 percentto 15.3 percent.

Unemployment has not diminished in thecountry, despite the fact that actions were tak-en to dismantle some labor protectionmeasuresin order to encourage hiring, which proves thatflexibilization does not guarantee employmentbecause the causality10 : (↑flexibility→↑employ-ment) is subordinate to the more relevant cau-sality (↑aggregate demand→↑production→↑growth→↑employment).11

Income has fallen as the result of the lack oflabor protection, without this being reflected withsignificant reductions in the ratesofunemployment,underemployment and informal employment. Tothe contrary: the fact that little attention is beingpaid to the redistributive policies could translateinto greater deterioration of employment.12

Reduced income and increased poverty isthe consequence for a considerable part of thepopulation. In effect, since unemployment wors-ened, the correlative has been a reduction inincome for the great majority of Colombians,given that for every point of unemploymentthere are many families living in uncertainty be-cause of a lack of income.13 Income has fallenfor a considerable number of workers that hadsteady jobs with the public service and, as theresult of job cutbacks in this sector, the vulner-ability of thousands of families has increased bytaking their steady jobs away. As well as the im-pact of the labor reform, which although it hasreduced labor costs for business owners, it hashit the workers hard by increasing the length ofthe workday, taking away overtime payments forSundays and holidays, as well as eliminatingcompensation for unjustified dismissal, amongother measures.

For over a decade, labor reform measureshave been worsening the constant violation ofthe right to work, taking away job protection,the inalienable nature of the rights acquired bythe workers, and by introducing the interven-tion of the state as guarantor for labor relations,to mention but a few aspects.

The changes to labor legislation were madewith the objective of creating jobs but this pur-pose was not achieved because the reformmea-sures were insufficient. When unemployment ismuch higher than its normal rate, it becomesinsensitive to changes in the labor regime be-cause depressed demand is not conducive tohiring more workers.14 In other words, �themeasures that reduce real salaries and labor costsimpact the degree of labor demand and its com-position,�15 as shown by the results on the sub-ject of employment, product of a reform inwhich the big winners were the business ownerswho were left with reduced costs, considerablyincreasing their profits,16 without creating thejobs17 that the government had projected, ex-actly as the magazine Portafolio had predictedwould happen.

From beyond the grave, [Social Protection] Min-ister Juan Luis Londoño must be lamenting the trickthat the bosses played: they got lower costs, reducedpay to the workers for overtime and night shifts, andincreased their production without creating new jobs.The truth is that except for some honorable philan-thropic exceptions, one cannot expect business ownersto act any differently because the logic of the system isimplacable: profits must be maximized. The govern-ment goofed out of credulousness and now it needs torectify its mistake.18

10 The law of the production of effects designates a cause and effectrelationship.

11 Uribe López Mauricio, �Más deuda y menos empleo: notas sobre ladeuda pública y el derecho al trabajo en Colombia.� in En deuda conlos derechos. Asociación de Trabajo Interdisciplinario, January 2003,p. 112

12 Op.Cit. Bien-estar y macroeconomía. p. 2313 Ibid.14 Evaluation of the bill for the National Development Plan: Toward a

Community State. Office of the Comptroller General of the Repu-blic, August 2002, p. 48.

15 Ibid, p. 48.16 A report by the Business Superintendency that analyzes the results

of 9,049 businesses showed that in 2003 performance for thesebusinesses was excellent: their sales grew by 16 percent that year,their assets increased by 9 percent, and their net profits were 7.6trillion pesos, over double (138 percent) the performance of theprevious year. �Crecimiento sin suficiente empleo,� editorial in Por-tafolio, 25 May 2004.

17 The same Business Superintendency report says that the results ofthe 9,049 businesses was disappointing in terms of job creation inthat only 5,923 new jobs were created, a negligible increase of 0.7percent.

18 Ibid.

124 Needs and Rights

In all unemployment, underemploymentand informal employment have become deter-mining factors for social exclusion and the lossof thematerial conditions for exercising the rightrelated to the right to work. One of the factorsthat most contributed to the loss of opportuni-ties for rights related to the right to work (suchas healthcare, social security, the right to hous-ing, etc. has been the increase in the durationof unemployment.19

Unemployment continues to be a seriousproblem for the country�s economy and for mil-lions of families that suffer from uncertainty aris-ing from the reduction or loss of income. Thelabor reform, whose intention was to stimulatethe private sector to create jobs, wound up in-creasing production without creating new jobs,with a reduction in costs and a considerable in-crease in profits for the companies.

Despite the above, the government keeptrying. It hopes that 840,000 jobs will be creat-ed this year, only 190,000 of them created withofficial funds by means of public housing pro-grams (construction of 74,000 units of hous-ing), which will create 160,000 jobs plus 30,000jobs coming fromprograms for road repairs (pav-ing 2,500 km of roads), infrastructure (Trans-milenio mass transit systems to be built in Perei-ra and Cali), and courses offered by the SENA[National Learning Service] top retrain demobi-lized fighters, displaced persons, and the hand-icapped. The remaining 650,000 jobs will haveto come from the business community.20 Weshall see.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agulló, Esteban, 2001. De la precariedad laboral a la exclusión social.Madrid: photocopy, 25 pp.

Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo, Nacional de Colombia.Contraloría General de la República, 2003. Bien-estar ymacroeconomía, Bogotá, p. 26.

Cabrera, Mauricio. �Mercado interno y pobreza,� El País, Cali, 18 deJuly 2004.

Contraloría General de la República. Revista Economía Colombiana,No. 296, may-june, 2003.

Contraloría General de la República. Evaluación del proyecto de Leypor el cual se expide el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo: �Haciaun Estado Comunitario�, Bogotá, august, 2002, p. 48.

Contraloría General de la República. �Evaluación del proyecto de leypor el cual se expide el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo �Hacíaun Estado Comunitario�, en: Revista Economía Colombiana,Bogotá, march 2003.

�Crecimiento sin suficiente empleo,� Portafolio, 25 may, 2004.DANE. Documentos técnicos sobre mercado laboral. Balance de la

evolución del mercado laboral colombiano, en el cuartotrimestre de 2003 y primer trimestre de 2004. Bogotá.

Departamento Nacional de Planeación. �Seguimiento a la política deempleo�. 7 de junio de 2004. Document available on thewebsite at: www.dnp.gov.co

�El Gobierno sólo generaría 190,000 puestos de trabajo,� El Tiempo,10 june, 2004.

Farne, Stefano. �Estudio sobre la calidad del empleo en Colombia,�Boletín del Observatorio del Mercado de Trabajo y la Seguri-dad Social. Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá,november, 2002.

Farne, Stefano. �Ley 789 de 2002. Reforma laboral colombiana,�Boletín del Observatorio del Mercado de Trabajo y la Seguri-dad Social, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá,december, 2003.

Infante, Ricardo. La calidad de empleo, OIT, 1999.�La degradación del Trabajo,� Sistema, Nos. 168-169, Madrid, july,

2002.Montenegro, Álvaro. �¿Dónde está el nuevo empleo?� El Tiempo, 1

august, 2004, p. 1-11.PNUD. �Un análisis de supervivencia: ¿Cuánto duran los colombia-

nos en el desempleo y el empleo?� Cuadernos del PNUD,2003.

Uribe López, Mauricio. �Más deuda y menos empleo: notas sobre ladeuda pública y el derecho al trabajo en Colombia,� in: Endeuda con los derechos. Asociación de Trabajo Interdiscipli-nario, january, 2003, p. 112.

Uribe Vélez, Álvaro. Palabras del Presidente en la instalación de lassesiones ordinarias del Congreso de la Republica para elperíodo 2004-2005, 20 july, 2004.

19 Op. Cit. Uribe López Mauricio, p. 101.20 �El Gobierno sólo generaría 190 mil puestos de trabajo,� El

Tiempo (online edition), 10 June 2004.

125Needs and Rights

A

The right to food

The Hard Face ofPoverty

Interdisciplinary Work AssociationAurora Project

Corporation �Viva la Ciudadanía�

ccording to Mr. Jean Zielger, UN spe-cial rapporteur on the right to food,this right is related to regular, per-manent and unobstructed access,either directly or by means of finan-cial purchases, to quantitatively and

qualitatively adequate and sufficient food cor-responding to the cultural traditions of the peo-ple to which the consumer belongs, and ensur-ing a physical and mental, individual andcollective, fulfilling and dignified life.1 This defi-nition is divided into three essential components:food security, quality, and food sovereignty. Thisarticle analyzes the impact of some of the pub-lic policies adopted during the period 2002-2004in terms of the fulfillment of the right to foodwith reference to the mentioned components.

In terms of food security, the document re-fers to the situation of impoverishment that asignificant proportion of the population has ex-perienced during the past two years and howreduced income limits effective access to food.

The potential impact that free trade deals mayhave on productivity and job creation in thefarming sector is the second aspect that is ana-lyzed in the area of food security, followed by ananalysis of the potential impact of adopting taxpolices that favor the farm export industry, incontrast with the weakness of the strategies tostimulate production for human consumption.On the topic of food quality, it analyzes theshortcomings in the public policies meant toprotect Colombians from the harmful effects thatimported foods and genetically modified seedsmay have on the domestic market, as well asthe failure to abide by the principle of precau-tion. Finally, food sovereignty is addressed fromthe point of view of the consequences resultingfrom the introduction of transgenic products andthe impact on autonomy for food protection inthe country.

1 UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/53 of 27 August 2002.

126 Needs and Rights

FOOD SECURITY

Food security is related to the availability, ac-cessibility and cultural acceptability of food forconsumers. Availability includes conditions thatallow the permanent offer of foods in terms ofquantity and quality, sufficient to meet the indi-viduals� food needs.2 Access refers to the peo-ple�s possibility to obtain food in a permanentmanner and in a way that does not interfere withthe enjoyment of other human rights.3

Impoverishment and Hunger

The Living Conditions Indicator (LCI),4

shows that in 1997 74.7 percent of Colombianhouseholds were living in poverty. According tothe 2003 National Quality of Life Survey, thatyear the poverty level rose to 77.4 percent. Thegrowing number of households living in povertyhas increased the violation of the right to food,

especially in terms of the people�s ability to se-cure access to food of adequate quantity andquality. No comprehensive public policy existsto address the problem�s relevance and com-plexity.

The reduction in the quantity and quality offood, as well as outright hunger, are situationsthat families experience when their income de-creases. According to the 2003 National Qualityof Life Survey, spending less on food is the sec-ond most popular strategy used by Colombianhouseholds that face a reduction in their incomes(20.3 percent of households did this). Restrictingfood consumption compromises children�s phys-ical and psychological development and threat-ens the health of all the members of the family,including elderly adults. The number of house-holds in which a family member did not get toconsume three meals a day because of a lack ofmoney reached 8.3 percent of all families sur-veyed, with the largest number of respondentscoming from rural areas. (See chart No. 1)

SourceSourceSourceSourceSource: 2003 National Quality of Life Survey.

Graph No. 1Graph No. 1Graph No. 1Graph No. 1Graph No. 1

127Needs and Rights

According to the same survey, impoverish-ment affects a larger percentage of low-incomegroups. In the decile5 of the population with thelowest income 69.5 percent of households reportthat their income does not cover basic expenses,whereas in the top decile income group 8 percentreport this experience. In response to the ques-tion, �Does your income cover more than basicexpenses?� only 0.7 percent of the lowest decilesaid yes,whereas 38percent of the topdecile havemoney left over after paying for basic needs. Thisallows one to conclude that low-income house-holds are not able to cover their basic expensesbythemselves and consequently require effectivepublic policies to protect them from hunger.

If more homes lack food then let�s tax thefoodstuff

The right to food was violated not only be-cause of the weakness of redistributive policiesto improve the situation for poor households inthe country, but also because of the inequitabletax policies that were adopted. The policies givetax breaks on capital assets andmake up for thedifference by increasing taxes that indiscriminate-ly affect the lowest income households by re-ducing their capacity to pay for basic goods andservices. The current government has stated thatit �will revive the VAT on basic household goodsat a rate of 4 percent (excluding healthcare, ed-ucation and public utilities) and it will tax pen-sions that exceed four minimum wages at a ratesimilar to the taxation level that applies to work-ers.� In other words, it will not touch incometax. The reasons given to justify this proposalare, according to President Uribe, that �businesspeople have already made sufficient effort onthis subject and they have shouldered taxes andthe special democratic security tax.�6 The VATon basic household goods has once again beenproposed despite the ruling by the ConstitutionalCourt that said that this tax violates the princi-ples of equity and progressiveness that guide thetax system.7 This is a tax that in all lights is re-gressive because making food more expensiveaffects low-income households to a greater ex-

tent. Furthermore, as Bonilla writes (2004), theVAT reduces the purchasing power of low-in-come households and forces them to sacrificespending on healthcare, education and recre-ation in order tomaintain their level of food con-sumption. This means that this tax not onlythreatens the right to food but it also reducesthe availability of income for fulfilling other fun-damental rights.

Agriculture, markets and food

Havinganalyzedhow reduced incomeviolatesthe right to food, it is important to move toward adeeper understanding of the impact that may re-

2 Mention of this component is made in the second part of Article 11of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, which underlines the importance of adopting polices thatencourage increased food production, including the implementationof agrarian reform programs to promote the adequate use of the land.

3 On this subject the UN ESCR Committee has stated that accessentails both economic as well as physical access. Economic accessis possible when the costs of acquiring the food needed for adequatenutrition are at a level that does not endanger the satisfaction of otherbasic needs. Physical access is related to the effective possibility thatall of the individuals have guaranteed access to the satisfaction oftheir needs. On this point it is crucial that access be guaranteed forpopulation groups with food vulnerability, especially for breast-fedbabies and small children, the elderly, the handicapped, people withchronic medical conditions, as well as populations living in high riskareas for natural disasters and native peoples in danger of losing theirancestral lands.

4 This indicator developed by the National Administrative Departmentof Statistics measures poverty by combining the traditional basicneeds measures and income level, incorporating variables that as-sess physical capital, human capital, and family structure. The LCIindicates the obstacles to fulfilling potential, not just unfulfilledbasic needs.

5 The decile is a measure that divides households into 10 equal groups,in which decile 1 is the group with the lowest monthly income anddecile 10 is the group with the highest monthly income.

6 El Tiempo, 8 July 2004.7 When VAT is extended to goods and services that previously were

exempt to promote real and effective equality (Article 13 of theConstitution) in a state under the social rule of law (Article 1 of theConstitution), the tax legislator violates the principles of progressive-ness and equity that guide the tax system (Articles 363 and 95-9 ofthe Constitution), interpreted jointly with the fundamental right tominimum vital sustenance (Articles 1 and 13 of the Constitution inconcordance with Article 334), if (i) in an indiscriminate manner,without the minimum public deliberation in Congress as required byrespect for the principle of no taxation without representation, a taxsystem is modified, (ii) with grave fallacies both in terms of theincome from progressively designed taxes as well as (iii) in terms ofthe spending meant for redistributive ends, (iv) by means of theapplication of the VAT tax to all primary need goods and services (v)upon which the effective right to minimum sustenance inalienablydepends for a broad swath of the country�s population, given theinadequacies of the social protection network.

128 Needs and Rights

sult from completely opening the domestic mar-ket to international competition. According to theFAO (2003), it is unlikely that in themselves tradedeals will give rise to favorable changes. In termsof theaccesscomponentof foodsecurity, free tradeagreements imply significant potential costs forColombia because of competition from importedfood and the effect on employment and incomefor agriculture workers.

Labor intensive crops have less elasticity ofsupply, meaning the producers have less adapt-ability to variations in international prices. Accord-ing to an Agriculture Ministry study (Garay, Es-pinoza, 2004) the cropswith the greatest potentialfor adaptability to changes in import prices aresoy, cotton and wheat. Products that are slowand weak in their reaction are plantains, exportbananas, potatoes and sugarcane. Table 3 showsthat themore elastic crops (soy, cotton andwheat)requires less labor per hectarewhereas thosewithgreater difficulty reacting to price variations arethose that are more labor intensive. This impliesthat a signification proportion of farm laborerswould see their incomes reduced, thus creating asituation that threatens the food security for closeto 3.8 million peasants.

Disponibility distribution and use of land

A fundamental element of food security isrelated to food availability. The concept includes

conditions that allow the sustained offer of suf-ficient good quality food to satisfy the individu-als� food needs. Along this line, it is of primaryimportance to evaluate the production condi-tions that make it possible for food to be avail-able. This component analyzes land use, as wellas the dynamics of food production that derivefrom this use.

Despite the fact that it is commonly said thatColombia is a country suited to agriculture, thedistribution of rural land is based on a patternthat does not favor agriculture. One factor thatleads to this tendency is related to the evidentconcentration of farm property, which has meantthat a significant portion of suitable farmland isunderused or not used for this purpose. Accord-ing to Darío Fajardo (2002, p. 28) 45 percent ofland is not used according to its suitability.

In terms of the availability of food, which isconditioned by the quality and extent of the landdedicated to its production, one observes thepromotion of policies that encourage the produc-tion of industrial crops and not food crops. In2002 for every hectare of fruit trees there were

Decile 1Decile 1Decile 1Decile 1Decile 1 Decile 2Decile 2Decile 2Decile 2Decile 2 Decile 3Decile 3Decile 3Decile 3Decile 3 Decile 4Decile 4Decile 4Decile 4Decile 4 Decile 5Decile 5Decile 5Decile 5Decile 5

Does not cover basic expenses 69,5% 65,4% 60,2% 50,4% 8,1%

Only covers basic expenses 29,8% 34,2% 39,0% 47,9% 53,9%

Covers more than basic expenses 0,7% 0,4% 0,9% 1,7% 38,0%

TTTTTable No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1Head of household or spouse reports that household incomeHead of household or spouse reports that household incomeHead of household or spouse reports that household incomeHead of household or spouse reports that household incomeHead of household or spouse reports that household income

Source.Source.Source.Source.Source. 2003 National Quality of Life Survey

Decile 1 2 3 5 7 10

Food 36,4 37,8 37,6 38,6 36,3 22,2

TTTTTable 2able 2able 2able 2able 2VAT impact by decile and consumer groupVAT impact by decile and consumer groupVAT impact by decile and consumer groupVAT impact by decile and consumer groupVAT impact by decile and consumer group

Source.Source.Source.Source.Source. CID-UN

8 The first exemptions that Alvaro Uribe�s government orchestratedwere consecrated in Law 818 of 2003 that the Constitutional Courtdeclared unconstitutional in ruling C-776 of 2003. Despite this, thenational government intends to insist on these tax exemptions. Cfr.State News Service (SNE), �Gobierno busca revivir exenciones acultivos de tardío rendimiento,� (Government seeks to revive exemptio-ns for late harvest crops), Bogotá, 30 April 2004.

129Needs and Rights

over 10 hectares of African palm growing in thecountry. This discrepancy continues to grow be-cause the current government has insisted onhaving the Agriculture Ministry offer different in-centives to palm-growers, such as significant taxexemptions.8 In contrast, the food crops grownby smalltime farmers are not given the same gov-ernmental encouragement and support.

In terms of promoting equitable access toarable land for the production of food for directconsumption and/or for sale, it is evident thatthis objective has two important obstacles: 1. Itis worrisome that the policy set down in theDevelopment Plan demands more requisites forthe beneficiaries of agrarian reform programs,specifying that this condition will only be grant-ed for the �development of production projectsin production systems of a business nature, withprinciples of competitiveness, equity and sus-tainability,�9 and 2. The government agenciesworking in this field have been liquidated andmerged, making it difficult to implement poli-

cies that are consistent with guaranteeing rights.These measures represent major impedimentsfor the development of the peasant economyand for small family farm production.

For the above reasons, we consider thatAlvaro Uribe�s government has implementedmeasures that rather than advancing the pro-gressive fulfillment of the right to food, have stip-ulated different policies that make difficult theredistribution of land and correct land use, whichimplies apparent backsliding in the guarantee ofthis right.

FOODQUALITY

Food quality refers to the consumption of ahealthy and balanced diet that meets nutrition-al needs. Being exposed to foods that containtoxic substances or that are produced to the

PRODUCTPRODUCTPRODUCTPRODUCTPRODUCT DAYS OF LABOR /HECTÁR*DAYS OF LABOR /HECTÁR*DAYS OF LABOR /HECTÁR*DAYS OF LABOR /HECTÁR*DAYS OF LABOR /HECTÁR* ELASTICITY OF SUPPLELASTICITY OF SUPPLELASTICITY OF SUPPLELASTICITY OF SUPPLELASTICITY OF SUPPLY**Y**Y**Y**Y**

Bananas 144 N/A

Potatoes 110 0.14

Export plantains 108 0.13

Fruit trees 108 N/A

African palm 98 N/A

Yucca 90 N/A

Cacao 88 N/A

Sugarcane 72 0.20

Cotton 62 0.59

Maize 37 N/A

Soy 32 1.41

Rice 74 N/A

Wheat 14 0.43

TTTTTable No. 3able No. 3able No. 3able No. 3able No. 3Farm employment in Colombia vs. Elasticity of supplyFarm employment in Colombia vs. Elasticity of supplyFarm employment in Colombia vs. Elasticity of supplyFarm employment in Colombia vs. Elasticity of supplyFarm employment in Colombia vs. Elasticity of supply

S o u r c e :S o u r c e :S o u r c e :S o u r c e :S o u r c e : *CECA, Calculations by CCA (Farming Advising Committee);**Garay and Espinoza, 2004.

9 Cf. Article 24, Law 812 of 2003.

130 Needs and Rights

detriment of the environment are consideredviolations of the right to food.

Transgenic Foods Threaten Food Quality

At present one of the biggest threats to foodsecurity for Colombians is the import and culti-vation of genetically modified foods.

Economicopeninghas led to large-scale foodimports. In the year 2002 alone 8 million tons ofbasic foodstuffs were imported. In the case ofmaize, in the early 1990s Colombia produced 95percent of its domestic consumption but by 2002it was importing over 2 tons, representing 75percent of the maize consumed. The situation issimilar for soy, with 80 percent of national con-sumption imported (Vélez, 2003b). It is very likelythat much of the imported maize and soy is ge-netically modified because a high proportion ofthe soy that is grown in the United States andArgentina is produced in this way.10

Furthermore, bearing in mind that Colom-bia is the sixth biggest importer of USmaize, it isvery likely that much of it has been contaminat-ed with Star Link, a transgenic variety that hasbeen outlawed in the European Union, Japan andCorrea because of the allergies it causes whenconsumed. It is worth mentioning that its do-mestic consumption of this maize has been for-bidden in the United States but not its saleabroad. (Vélez 2003a)

The different government agencies haveremained in dangerously silent complicity on thesubject and there is no known monitoring oftransgenic foods despite the clear evidence thatthey are widely consumed in Colombians� dailydiets, either directly or via the animals that havebeen fed with these foods.11 This silence is veryworrisome when bearing in mind that a numberof studies document the immense potential risksthat these crops represent to human health andthe environment.12

Genetically Manipulated Crops and the Lack ofPrecaution

The national government�s insistence on the

promotion of transgenic crops13 has not beenaccompanied by a policy to evaluate the poten-tial risks of growing them. Prior to planting ge-netically modified seeds no impact studies weredone to evaluate the potential risk that growingthese crops might have on human health, theenvironment and the stability of farm ecosys-tems. The current government has failed to ap-ply the �principle of precaution� according towhich these kinds of technologies should notbe implemented until certainty of their completeinnocuousness has been ascertained.14

In this way the government has flagrantly ig-nored the warnings of agencies like the Environ-ment Ministry and the Ombudsman�s Office thathave expressed negative views concerning the im-plementation of transgenic crops.15 The govern-ment has not kept in mind the sentence by the

10 It is estimated that transgenic soy represents 40 percent of the totalof genetically modified crops in the United States. Vandana Shiva(2003).

11 As a telling example, recall that in 2000 it was corroborated, thanksto pressure from a number of civil society organizations, that a highpercentage of the food provided to children by the Colombian Fami-ly Welfare Institute (ICBF) contained transgenic soy.

12 Some of the outstanding potential risks are the appearance of newallergies, loss of efficacy for some medications, the appearance ofnew weed crops and the loss of stability in the ecosystems. On thesubject see Riechmann (2004) and Altieri (2001).

13 See, among others, �Llegan 150 toneladas de semillas de algodóntransgénico� (150 tons of seeds for transgenic cotton arrive) at:http://www.presidencia.gov.co/cne/2003/agosto/01/08012003.htm,�Transgénicos un tema inaplazable: Minagricultura� (Transgenic crops,an issue that cannot be delayed: Agriculture Ministry), (17 August2002) �Aprueban comercialización de algodón genéticamente mo-dificado� (Sale of genetically modified cotton approved) (10 May2003), at www.minagricultura.gov.co/noticias.htm. It is worth men-tioning that so far this year the Agriculture Ministry has insisted onthe profitability of transgenic cotton as being responsible for thegood cotton harvest, which it upholds as an argument for using morevarieties of genetically modified crops. On this subject see, �Resul-tados de la cosecha de algodón son espectaculares� (Results ofcotton harvest are spectacular) (2 February 2004), atwww.minagricultura.gov.co/noticias.htm

14 On the subject see Riechmann and Tickner (2001).15 On the ministry�s views see: �Concepto Técnico. Estudio de la soli-

citud de introducción, producción y comercialización en Colombiade la variedad de algodón genéticamente modificada Nucotn 33B,�(Technical Concept: Study of the request for the introduction, pro-duction and commercialization in Colombia of the Nucotn 33B varie-ty of genetically modified cotton), 2002, cited by Germán Velez,�Los cultivos y alimentos�.� On the negative views from theOmbudsman�s Office, see �Defensoría pide moratoria para introducirtransgénicos a Colombia,� (Ombudsman�s Office asks for morato-rium on introducing transgenic crops into Colombia) Press release,Bogotá, 19 February 2003.

16 See �Primer fallo judicial en contra de la introducción de cultivostransgénicos en Colombia,� (First judicial ruling against introductionof transgenic crops in Colombia) in Semillas en la economía campe-sina, No. 21, April 2004.

131Needs and Rights

Cundinamarca Administrative Court that issued aruling on 17 October 2003, ordering the protec-tion of the collective right to a healthy environ-ment, public health, freedom of consumption,community participation in decisions that affect itand theadministrativemorality,whichordered thatthe principle of precaution be applied.16

FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

From a food rights perspective, food sovereign-ty is the people�s right to define their own farmand food policies and to autonomously protectand regulate national farm production and thedomestic market.17

Seed Control: More Than a Potential Risk

One of the Agriculture Ministry�s bannerprograms under the current administration is thepromotion of genetically modified crops. Afterimplementing varieties based on Cotton Bt, it ispursuing the cultivation of crops such as Yiel-gard corn that also has Bt technology in its genesand Roundup Ready cotton.18

The widespread use of transgenic seeds isquite dangerous for the sustainability of farmpro-duction because this position puts control of theseeds and a monopoly on the supplies used by asignificant sector of the nation�s farming industryinto the hands of a few corporations. It is danger-ous for two reasons: First, the use of seeds thathave been genetically modified by a transnation-al corporationbringswith it the need to use chem-icals that the same company provides in order togrow the seeds, which usually leads to an overtmonopoly on the farming market, to the detri-ment of food sovereignty.

Two, genetically modified seeds break theseed-plant-seed cycle because, in contrast to�traditional� plants, the plants of these varietiesdo not produce seeds. Thismeans that the peas-ants cannot harvest the seeds or swap themwithother producers; so they must buy them. Thisput national farm production at risk.19

By using these crops the national govern-ment is promoting seed monopoly and foodcontrol by the transnational Monsanto, ratherthan food security for Colombians, which goesagainst a broad interpretation of the public goodbecause it promotes farm technologies and pol-icies that favor the private interests of transna-tional companies rather than promoting qualityof life for the citizens.20

RECOMMENDATIONSANDCONCLUSIONS

The Internal Market: An Opportunity

� While the US economy is trying to break intothe Colombian internal market, it is worri-some that the current farm policies disre-gard the internal market�s potential andimportance. In an economy such as Colom-bia�s, the seventh largest in the Americanhemisphere, surpassing Chile in terms of thesize of its GDP; the fifth largest in terms ofper capita income; and the fourth largest interms of population, the development of theinternal market is fundamental to stimulate

17 The International Covenant on the ESC rights states the need toreview the dynamics of the world food trade in a way that reduces theinequity that harms the countries that suffer from extreme compara-tive trade disadvantages and that, in most cases, despite their voca-tion for farming, suffer from serious food problems caused by thetrends in the world food trade.

18 Cf., �Crecerá el área de transgénicos� (Transgenics field to grow),Eltiempo.com, 10 January 2004.

19 For how biotechnology contributes to a monopoly on the seed andfood markets, see Shiva, (2001) and Riechmann (2004).

20 In a telling statement, ICA (Colombian Farming Institute) managerÁlvaro Abisambra said on the subject of the use of Bt cotton in thecountry that, �While this is taking place in Colombia, in other coun-tries of the world Monsanto is already selling a third cotton thatcombines Bt and R.R. technologies, meaning that its plants areresistant to insects and herbicides... We are behind on this andshould already be evaluating them.� See �Crecerá el área de trans-génicos� (Transgenics field to grow), Eltiempo.com, 10 January 2004.

21 A March 2004 study by the Agriculture Ministry questions the posi-tion that the best strategy to bring about development in the coun-tryside is by fomenting export agriculture while opening up to impor-ts. According to the study, �world tendencies in production areoriented mainly at serving the internal markets.� (Martínez and Ba-rrios, 2004, p. 1).

132 Needs and Rights

growth and demand for sufficient farmproducts that are accessible in terms ofprice, nutritious and of good quality. Thiswould have implications for the growth ofthe national farm sector in terms of job cre-ation and income for the rural population.These kind of policies would furthermorefavor national finances at the macro level,and protect food security and sovereigntyin the country.21

� The process of negotiating trade dealsshould keep in mind the conditions neededto ensure that in the short term labor in-tensive crops react in a more favorablemanner to the changes in international pric-es, reducing the negative consequences interms of rural unemployment and indirectaccess to food for this population group.

� The obligation to guarantee the right to foodmeans that the state must adopt policiesthat acknowledge the impact that decliningincome has on people�s access to food. Thisimplies creating sustainable income for thepeople and strengthening development pol-icies for food producing peasant house-holds.

� The impoverishment of households neces-sitates the creation of public policy that in-tegrates the spheres of food production andhousehold access for consumption, bymeans of developing a national strategy thatguarantees the people�s right to food.

� It is recommended that the principle of pre-caution should be adopted on the subjectof genetically modified organisms, with amoratorium on the planting of these cropsand serious scientific studies on the sub-jects, undertaken with the supervision ofcivil society.

� To ensure food availability, a policy meantto democratize access to the land and tocorrect land use in accordance with suit-ability, should be implemented. On this

point, it is suggested that the guidelines thatthe United Nations ESC Rights Committeemade in 2001 should be followed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Altieri, Miguel, 2001. Biotecnología agrícola: mitos, riesgos ambien-tales y alternativas, Universidad de California, Berkeley.

Bonilla, Ricardo, 2004. �¿Que los pobres paguen los errores delEstado?� in UNperiódico 11 de julio.

Dane, 2003. Balance de la Evolución del Mercado Laboral Colom-biano en el Cuarto Trimestre de 2003.

Dane, 2003. Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Vida, 2003.El Tiempo, 8 de julio de 2004.Fajardo, Darío, 2002. Para sembrar la paz hay que aflojar la tierra,

Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Idea Bogotá.FAO, 2003. The State of Food Insecurity in the World. Monitoring

Progress Towards the World Food Summit and MillenniumDevelopment Goals.

Garay, L. J. and Espinoza, A. �Borrador de avance preliminar sobrelos estudios preparatorios para la negociación del TLC conEstados Unidos.� Ministerio de Agricultura y DesarrolloRural. Bogotá. At http://www.minagricultura.gov.co

Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, Corpoica, 2002. Zonificaciónde los conflictos de uso de las tierras en Colombia, Bogotá.

Martínez, H. and Barrios C., 2004. �La competitividad de los pro-ductos de exportación y la relevancia del mercado interno,�inMemorando Agrocadenas, No. 9, Observatorio Agrocade-nas Colombia, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural,Bogotá. http://agrocadenas.gov.co

Observatorio Agrocadenas en Colombia, 2004. �Inteligencia deMercados: Análisis comparativo de productos,� at http://www . a g r o c a d e n a s . g o v . c o / i n t e l i g e n c i a / i n t _analisiscomparativo.htm

Riechmann, Jorge and Tickner, Joel (coords.), 2001. El principio deprecaución, Icaria, Barcelona.

Riechmann, Jorge, 2003.Cuidar la Tierra. Políticas agrarias y alimenta-rias sostenibles para entrar en el siglo XXI, Icaria, Barcelona.

Riechmann, Jorge, 2004.Cultivos y alimentos transgénicos. Una guíacrítica, Ediciones Pensamiento Crítico, Bogotá.

Shiva, Vandana, 2001. Biopiratería. El saqueo de la naturaleza y elconocimiento, Icaria, Barcelona.

Shiva, Vandana, 2003. Cosecha robada, Paidós, Barcelona.Sutcliffe, Bob, 1996 �La dieta desarrollada y sus consecuencias,� in

El incendio frío, Icaria, Barcelona.Uribe, Alirio, 2002. �La Tierra y el Derecho humano a la alimenta-

ción,� in Por el derecho a la tierra, Plataforma Colombianade Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo, Bogotá.

Vélez, Germán, 2003a. �Los cultivos y los alimentos transgénicosen Colombia,� at www.semillas.org.co, Bogotá, julio de2003.

Vélez, Germán, 2003b, �Los cultivos y alimentos transgénicos en-tran a Colombia por la puerta trasera,� atwww.semillas.org.co, Bogotá, 20 de octubre de 2003.

VVAA, 2004. �Políticas agrarias para Colombia,� Ilsa, Bogotá.

133Needs and Rights

TINTRODUCTION

his article seeks to provide a pointof reference toward meeting theneed for dignified housing. It de-scribes the social agreements oncontent and meaning, as well assome indicators on how much

progress has been made. In Colombia this is aconstitutionally enshrined right (article 51 of theConstitution), as well as being one of the com-mitments made by the Colombian State in theUnited Nations Covenant on the Economic, So-cial and Cultural Rights (Right to an adequatestandard of living, article 11 of the covenant).

It is noteworthy that General ObservationNo. 4 by the Committee on the ESC Rights high-lights the notion of an adequate standard of liv-ing, in which �adequate� is conceived of withina dynamic context of progressive aspirations inthe right to housing, in accordance with the

Housing: A Right or AProduct?

FedeviviendaAlejandro Florián Borbón*

complexity and diversity of factors that interre-late in different continents and cultures to makepossible or not, access to and enjoyment of ad-equate housing, particularly for low-income sec-tors of the population.

In our country we have not held public de-bate on the content and meaning of the consti-tutional right to dignified housing. For this rea-son the elements and categories of analysis inthe General Comment No. 4 by the Committeeon the ESC Rights concerning adequate hous-ing may serve as a point of reference to pursuethe necessary clarifications.

General Comment No. 8 identifies the char-acteristics of the right to housing as: a) Legalsecurity of tenure; b) Availability of services,materials, facilities and infrastructure; c) Afford-ability; d) Habitability; e) Accessibility; f) Loca-tion; g) Cultural adequacy.

* Executive Director, Fedevivienda.

134 Needs and Rights

Fedevivienda proposes a complementaryanalysis in the sense of distinguishing and em-phasizing the collective and public attributes:Those that are external to the housing but thatare required for adequacy and those that areattributes of the housing itself. These draw at-tention to the policies and actions that refer tothe collective, the public attributes, as they aremost explicitly manifested: the redistributiveimpact of public spending.

We feel that these elements provide a pointof reference for insisting on a broad and non-restrictive interpretation of the right to housing.This makes it possible to move from consideringhousing as a product to a more coherent visionof the social and urban phenomena expressedby the standard of living experienced by the low-est income groups.

THE SHORTAGE AS STARTING POINT

Of course, given as this is an effort to assess howthe government has progressed or not on the

issue of housing for the poor, it is necessary todefine the universe that we are addressing and todo so it is important to note that the ColombianState acknowledges that there is a housing short-age, according to figures from 2000.

We have always wondered just how muchthese figures reveal or hide when it is time tomake proposals of strategies for meeting thehousing needs of low-income Colombians.

When no significant effort is made to verify,break down andminutely understand the mean-ing of these figures, we continue thinking andworking with paradigms such as: a) housingequals households; b) the consequent spreadof the urban areas; c) private property as theanswer to rights of usufruct.

Doing so we fail to investigate the possibili-ties of densification of already consolidatedzones (vacant lots and yards), rental housing forfamilies already settled in the cities with infra-structure, legalization and property rights, as wellas the ample range of possibilities for renewingor rehabilitating run-down areas in many of ourmain cities.

2 0 0 02 0 0 02 0 0 02 0 0 02 0 0 0Housing shortageHousing shortageHousing shortageHousing shortageHousing shortage No. HouseholdsNo. HouseholdsNo. HouseholdsNo. HouseholdsNo. Households %%%%%

Households 7,104,262 100%

Households without deficits 5,223,733 73.5%

TTTTTotal shorotal shorotal shorotal shorotal shor tage (3)=(1)+(2)tage (3)=(1)+(2)tage (3)=(1)+(2)tage (3)=(1)+(2)tage (3)=(1)+(2) 1 , 880 , 5291 , 880 , 5291 , 880 , 5291 , 880 , 5291 , 880 , 529 26 . 5%26 . 5%26 . 5%26 . 5%26 . 5%

Quantitative shortage(1)Quantitative shortage(1)Quantitative shortage(1)Quantitative shortage(1)Quantitative shortage(1) 9 3 3 , 8 7933 , 8 7933 , 8 7933 , 8 7933 , 8 7 13 . 1%13 . 1%13 . 1%13 . 1%13 . 1%

Shared households 801,985 11.3%

Households without running water, without sewage lines and without adequate walls 29,197 0.4%

Households without running water, without sewage lines and with dirt floors 19,516 0.3%

Households without running water, without sewage lines, without adequate walls,

and with dirt floors 0 0%

Households without sewage lines and without adequate walls 34,825 0.5%

Households without sewage lines and with dirt floors 47,864 0.7%

Households without sewage lines, without adequate walls, and with dirt floors 0 0%

Qualitative shortage (2)Qualitative shortage (2)Qualitative shortage (2)Qualitative shortage (2)Qualitative shortage (2) 947 , 1 42947 , 1 42947 , 1 42947 , 1 42947 , 1 42 13 . 3%13 . 3%13 . 3%13 . 3%13 . 3%

TTTTTable No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1Housing shortage - departmental capitals 2000Housing shortage - departmental capitals 2000Housing shortage - departmental capitals 2000Housing shortage - departmental capitals 2000Housing shortage - departmental capitals 2000

SourSourSourSourSource:ce:ce:ce:ce: National Household Survey. Preliminary information. Calculations: DDUPRE-DNP-SV

135Needs and Rights

Any reflection on the subject of housingmust also address the extent and significance ofthe figures on poverty, which the national gov-ernment (National Department of Planning) andthe Comptroller General�s Office have recentlybeen disputing. This is the population that ex-periences need.

According to the report in El Tiempo on 8August 2004 (pages 1-8), whereas National Plan-ning says that 52 percent of the population livein poverty, approximately 23 million Colombi-ans, the Comptroller General�s Office says that28 million inhabitants live in poverty, 64 percentof the total, and of these the estimate for thoseliving in abject poverty (lacking the resources tomeet their food needs) ranges between 8 and 9million Colombians.

PREVALENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF HOUSINGOWNERSHIP AND THE IMPLICIT PARADIGMOFURBAN EXPANSION IN PUBLIC POLICY ONHOUSING

Housing policy contributes to the country�s eco-nomic growth and job creation as business criteria withsocial responsibility to efficiently confront the growingquantitative and qualitative shortages. (2003-266Development Plan)

It is inevitable that if the government�s mot-to on housing is �Colombia, land of owners� thengovernment actions will be oriented toward al-lowing low-income Colombians to acquire (buy)housing (a product) produced by different �sup-pliers� on the market; but:

a) The population is experiencing increasingimpoverishment, as has been noted.

b) There are no efficient controls on the factorsand elements that are susceptible to specu-lation and that increase the cost of housing�products� (land, cement, iron, etc.).

c) There are no measures to foment or encour-age technological investigation and the pro-ductionof local alternative buildingmaterials.

d) Marketed �new housing� solutions are over-favored; neglecting actions and instruments

for improving neighborhoods and housing,construction on owned land, urban renew-al and rental housing.

e) The �subsidies� in response to demand andin terms of the �shortage� that the govern-ment acknowledges are minimal and theyimply increasingly complex and costly ap-plication procedures, documents, and stepsto acquire them.

The opportunities to aspire to dignifiedhousing for all Colombians, or even a percent-age of the government�s motto, are increasinglyremote, although some Colombians, and notnecessarily the poorest or the most needy interms of housing, manage to buy a house onthe market.

The construction industry and even somesocial groups have increasingly consolidated andreinforced this logic. As such we have been for-getting that the notion of the right to housingmust be interpreted from a human rights per-spective1 in which the essence that the rightconsecrates should guide and focus state ac-tions for protection for persons affected by theabsence, access difficulties, or usufruct of ade-quate housing, or for those persons whose rightis affected by an act of external aggression suchas forced displacement.

Although nowadays nobody doubts themultiple benefits (employment, taxes, mobiliza-tion of resources in general) of public spendingon housing, what is odd is that we continue tobelieve that this only takes place when publicresources are spent on new housing built by theconstruction industry.

PROGRESS AFTER TWO YEARS INGOVERNMENT

Let us examine the government�s results as pre-sented in a report to Congress on 20 July 2004:

1 General Observation No. 4 by the UN Committee on the Economic,Social and Cultural Rights.

136 Needs and Rights

So far during this government 99,352 subsi-dies have been granted and 9,541 loanshave been made for a total of 108,893housing solutions of the 400,000 program-med for the government�s four years in offi-ce, offering housing subsidies to over half amillion Colombians. Of the total of subsidiesand loads for low-cost housing, 700.898 bi-llion pesos have been paid, benefiting 88,282families.These payments include previously acquiredcommitments that are no longer covered butthat this government has honored from itscoffers. These include 5,467 subsidies thatwere approved and 21,049 paid by the Inur-be during the transition period, covered with145 billion pesos out of this government�scoffers2.

It is evident that the government�s mainconcern continues to be the assignation of sub-sidies, second only during this government tothe complementary concern for the figures ondisbursements, the prerequisite for securing ac-cess to credit when the cost of the housing tobe acquired exceeds the family�s savings plusthe subsidy, a very common situation.

Nowhere is there any reference to the defi-cit or to the amount of the fiscal resources al-lotted for this purpose, aside from a mention inthe next paragraph in the report that alludes to�minor budgetary appropriations.� As such, wehave become accustomed to each government�sallotments that, as can be seen in the paragraphfrom the government�s report to Congress, are�mixed in � with the leftovers and pending busi-ness from previous governments.

In the 2004 report to Congress, the gov-ernment also states:

The result of the assignation of subsidies du-ring this government�s term corresponds to27 percent of the target that was set. Thismoney has been affected by the slow reco-very of credit for low-cost housing, the insti-tutional adjustment processes2 in the sector

in 2003 (liquidation of Inurbe, creation ofFonvivienda, and the merger of ministries),that fewer resources were available forhousing from the worker�s compensationfunds because they directed over 66 billionpesos (2003-2004) to the unemploymentfund, and because the budgetary appropria-tions for Fonvivienda and the Agrarian Bankthat were smaller than was originally fore-seen.

With the opening of Fonvivienda during the first quar-ter and the legislative changes that have been made, it ishoped that this tendency will be reversed in 2004. Inparticular, the adjustments have been oriented to exten-ding the availability of credit and improving the proce-dures for the assignation of subsidies, as well as for streng-thening institutionalism in the sector.

In terms of extending the offer of credit, the actionshave resulted in the creation and implementation of theFindeter guaranteed loan for low-income housing. Agree-ments have been signed with the financial and cooperati-ve sector with the promise to allot 5 percent of theirloans for low-income housing. A line of credit for low-income urban housing has also been established at theAgrarian Bank, as well as the expansion of coverage ofthe National Guarantees Fund for this kind of creditas a complement to the family housing subsidy.

Outstanding because of its impact, the �in-stitutional adjustment� resulting in the reduc-tion of the amount of the subsidies and the in-troduction of a new step in the applicationprocedure, consisted of granting pre-approvalstatus that meant that the �pre-approved� sub-sidy beneficiary had to secure, within a periodof two months, a loan in order to receive thesubsidy.

It is worth questioning, in light of Decree 975of 31 March 2004, whether by means of few sub-sidies, of lower value, with more requisites andprocedures, and �obliging� the beneficiary to take

2 Our emphasis.

137Needs and Rights

a loan in order to receive the subsidy, whetherthe government is really focussing on the per-sons affected by the lack of adequate housingand the difficulties in gaining access to it.

There is no doubt that credit is an essentialelement for coherent and democratic housingpolicy. In this field progress has beenmade, slowand tortuous but in the end progress, in thisstructural element that had even affected thegovernment�s ability to fulfill its commitmentson subsidies.

The Findeter guaranteed loan,3 as well asaccess to the National Guarantees Fund, andthe appearance of new �sources� for housingcredit, are without a doubt a step forward. Whatis more, it is a serious step by this governmentin terms of housing and hopefully the potentialthat this represents will be recognized both bythe government and by civil society and thatthe actors can shore up this mechanism that ismuchmore versatile, adaptable, and sustainablethan the limited subsidy.

Nonetheless, one seesacertainhesitanceandvery few public spending initiatives when it is timeto undertake an aggressive strategy for technicalassistance and recognition for the new agents inthe system. It is not enough that the mechanismexists and has funds, but it is also necessary tostrengthen the technical and operational capaci-ty and to provide the needed succor (more thanoversight) for these new creditors.

This arrangement should also be open appli-cable to co-funding from other local and socialresources for housing needs beyond new hous-ing, such as neighborhood improvements orhome renovations, urban renewal, the rehabilita-tion of lots for housing, even without ties to theexpectation of a subsidy or for the eventuality ofoperations that produce rental housing.

Putting this mechanism into operationwould take pressure off of the center and fo-ment regional and local synergies. Nonethelessa culture of savings needs to be reestablished ina coherent a decidedmanner along with the res-toration of trust in the institutions such as thecooperatives, workers compensation funds, andemployee funds. The job of regulating, control-

ling and overseeing their operations typically fallsto the public administration and effort and re-sources should not be spared in this task.

SMALL STEPS FORWARD IN URBAN REFORMAND TERRITORIAL PLANNING

The subject of access to low-cost urban landfor building, as an essential component for pur-suing the right to housing, has been one of themost difficult legal tasks for our society, havingtaken Congress nearly 50 years to discuss andpass Law 9 of 1989 and Law 388 of 1997.

It took the Environment, Housing and Ter-ritorial Development Ministry more than a yearafter the current government came into officeto resume the initiative to regulate the instru-ments for land management set out in Law 388of 1997. Better late than never, on this issue.

We must acknowledge that the ministry hasshown renewed interest in updating the regula-tions and adjustments needed to make the in-struments for urban land management feasibleand efficient, making it possible to pursue theconstitutional and legal principles such as thesocial and ecological role of the land, the publicaspects of urban planning, participation in landappraisals, the equitable distribution of costs andbenefits in urbanization, etc.

More aggressive and decided action is need-ed on the subject of technical assistance andinstitutional development for the municipalitiesand the users of Law 388 to call for more re-sources so that the ministry can duly carry outthis urgent task that would certainly alleviatepressure on the central government and wouldfoment the synergy of resources in the regionsandmunicipalities.

Also worth mentioning is the interest instarting to �plan� in terms of the new conceptu-alization of the urban public rights that Law 388

3 After a study, Findeter assigns an amount to cooperatives, employeefunds and workers compensation funds, to reimburse the housingloans that have been taken out with these organizations, under certainconditions that Findeter establishes.

138 Needs and Rights

introduces, impacting the issues of propertyappraisals, their regulations, the criteria used bythe government and private agents that engagein this delicate task, and their relevance as indi-cators of the proper use of public resources.

A country of owners, to which the presi-dent aspires in his motto, starts by correctingthe serious inequities that the country has putup with by allowing property taxes and publicspending to be used to increase the wealth oflandowners without equitable retribution for themunicipalities and society. This has had impacton housing costs and it has affected access tohousing for lower-income families.

SUBSTANDARDNEIGHBORHOODS ANDHOUSING. CONSTRUCTION, DENSIFICATIONAND RENEWAL. OPPORTUNITIES FORCOMPREHENSIVE HOUSING POLICY

Although they would appear to be mutually ex-clusive subjects of local importance, because oftheir magnitude, complexity and frequency inthe daily lives ofmillions of Colombians and theirmunicipalities, these issues cannot continue tobe sidelined as second-rate subjects in terms ofthe national public agenda on housing and so-cial policy.

The nation�s secondary responsibilities,such as coordination and complementing, areof vital importance for spurring the potential thatis wasted and caught up in the illusion of usinglaws or decrees to change decades worth of ac-cumulated informality into formality that is ide-alized, rigid, or expensive and impossible toachieve.

It is necessary to establish an exceptionalregime for locales, communes, zone planningunits, etc., where substandard conditions exist;to construct buildings of less than 200 metersfor example, in which the licenses and other re-quirements could be simplified and issued byuniversities and not for profit organizations thatare registered, qualified, and controlled by themunicipalities or departments depending on sizeor complexity of the projects.

A regime like this could be coordinated andco-financed by the nation, themunicipalities, andin conjunction with the owners, with simplifiedlocalmonitoring that randomly samples the qual-ity of the work, providing guidance and in ac-cordance with the social regulations based on aconcept of what the inhabitant should know andhis responsibilities, and delimiting and ensuringthe responsibilities of the advisors, who mustbe sufficiently knowledgeable, informed and au-thorized by the local or regional authority.

Construction on existing lots and improve-ments to housing continue to be an alternative,particularly when there is access to credit forthe final stages of construction, along with newmechanisms like the Findeter guaranteed loan.In most of our cities there are still many lots andareas available in zones that have already beenbuilt up and legalized.

However, to do so wemust foment, encour-age, and make use of what has already beendone informally, improving upon it rather thanrejecting it because that would only serve toworsen the problem and it would mean the lossof valuable opportunities to improve the qualityof life for millions of Colombians. The idea ex-tends to expanding the offer of rental housing,taking advantage of the private investment bythe settled population and the infrastructure thathas already been built with public resources.

These reflections refer to urban renewal pro-cesses. The nation should study of incentivesand encouragement to foment this kind of ur-ban action, to put a halt to deterioration and tooptimize the physical and symbolic use of thecity, not just within the country�s main urbancenters but also in medium-sizedmunicipalities.

TIME TO RECTIFY AND REDIRECT

We believe that the time has come to rectify andredirect the content and meaning of the right tohousing in Colombia, and in this way to system-atically and deliberately organize the substantialand priority elements of a housing policy that iscomprehensive and coherent among the differ-

139Needs and Rights

ent operational and territorial levels of the pub-lic administration. The current scheme is ex-hausted and has no where to go. This is an op-portunity for constructive dialogue between thenation and civil society to rebuild the High Coun-cil on Housing.

140 Needs and Rights

141Needs and Rights

Environment:a slice of history

I

Hildebrando Vélez*

URIBE: A LINK IN THIS STORY

t must be acknowledged that manyof the environmental problems thatthe government of Alvaro Uribe Vélezfaces are not new. They have theirhistory, framed in certain types ofsocial relations, the context, and the

theoretical conceptualizations that substantiatethem. The story has been one of concentratingpolitical power, wealth, and the benefits of theenvironment in the hands of a few. And in thishistory the president, to whom many refer to asa man of the land and a gentlemen, is also aprotagonist.

Some of the environmental problems thathistorically have arisen, for example world cli-mate change, the extinction of biodiversityaround the world, trafficking in living species andtoxic wastes, and access to genetic resources,are affected by the regional, national, and glo-bal dynamics of economics, politics, and theenvironment, which the government is absolute-ly unable to deal with on its own.

This part of the story also includes the bi-lateral and multilateral decisions on the envi-ronment that each government makes in differ-ent ways, although these decisions are almostalways minimized and they are tied to the inter-ests of certain national and foreign economicsectors that corral the public administration andthat provide continuity to political and theo-retical trends. There is no question that ourcountry has deep-seated roots of dependenceon US political and economic interests and thatthe government agencies that defend the inter-ests of the nation have little capacity for long-term prevention and planning. The followingexamples illustrate this:

In Colombia the environmental agenciesand legislation have not been enough to detainthe environmental damage that has resultedfrom causes rooted in the development mod-els and the social injustices that remain unre-solved throughout our history and in a contextof global relations of domination.

It is doubtful whether the Uribe govern-ment is resolved in the defense of the coun-

142 Needs and Rights

try�s environmental heritage. What can be seenis more like backsliding on environmental policy,on the environmental components of the poli-cies on different sectors, and in the govern-ment�s performance on the environment as theuser of the environmental heritage. Without adoubt, opportunities for participation have beenrestricted and scant information is provided tothe public about the issues and decisions on en-vironmental policy, which limits participation andcriticism.

Without purporting to be exhaustive, thisarticle presents examples of some incidents that,being but the tip of the iceberg, reveal the fragil-ity of the government�s environmental policy.

THEMIRACLE OF BT COTTON

In August 2002, at a community council meetinginMontería, Alvaro Abisamba, the director of ICA[Colombian Farming Institute], announced that150 tonsof Bt cotton (Bacillus thuringiensis) seedshadbeenunloaded in Buenaventura and that theywould be used to plant 7,500 hectares. Expertslike Charles Benbrook, former director of theboard on agriculture at the US National Academyof Sciences, who had demonstrated how insectsdevelop resistance to the use of insecticides, saidthat �There is no reason to think that resistanceamong insects will take place less quickly in re-gions where Bt crops cover significant area.�1

Despite this, our president highlighted the innoc-uousness and environmental sustainability of thisproject.

With the blessing of the Ministry of the En-vironment, Housing and Territorial Development(MEHTD), by means of ICA and the NationalTechnical Council on Biosecurity, resolution 1035of 2002 approved that 50,000 kg of Bt cottonseeds would be imported from Monsanto (thesame company that sells the glyphosate that isused to spray illegal crops in Colombia) to beplanted on approximately 2,000 hectares forcommercial trials.

No environmental license was issued to im-port this transgenic bio-insecticide. Environmen-

talists brought a lawsuit before the Cundinama-rca Administrative Court, which in October 2003ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against theMEHTD and Monsanto. ICA and Monsanto ap-pealed the ruling before the Council of Statewhich suspended the Cundinamarca court rul-ing, and so ICA proceeded to distribute trans-genic cotton throughout the country. This is howcome 7,000 hectares of Bt cotton were plantedthroughout the country in 2003.2

This proves that the country�s interests andlaws are secondary to the demands of transna-tional, particularly US, capital. Along with thelaissez-faire attitude of government institutions,come the short-term agricultural developmentstrategies that were evident during the first quar-ter of 2004 when the government had to forcetextile producers to buy the cotton harvest.3 Itwould not be unexpected that with the FTA thecotton-growers continue to be frustrated be-cause of the preferences within the United Statesfor domestic production and the export of pri-mary materials. This is illustrated in the Colom-bian Government�s Schematic for NegotiationInterests, under item 62 that notes that theUnited States shall �Favor the use of fibers,threads and textiles that are nationally pro-duced.�4

TOXIC AND TECHNOLOGICALWASTE

Another fact that proves the vulnerability ofnational institutions to the interests of capitalwas what happened on 30 January 2004 when,after a well-attended forum, the population ofNobsa, Boyacá rallied before the facilities of Ce-mentos Boyacá to protest the transportationand incineration of toxic agricultural residuesthat were stored in Caracolito, in the jurisdic-

1 Benbrook, Charles, Estados Unidos: ¿Cuándo es rentable sembrarmaíz Bt?, IATP/GE FOOD ALERT, 12-7-02

2 Semillas en la Economía Campesina, ISSN 0122-0985, April 2004,Bogotá.

3 Portafolio, Bogotá, 11 June 2004.4 Matriz de Intereses de Negociación, Ministry of Trade, Industry and

Tourism, 2 June 2004, p. 7.

143Needs and Rights

tion of the municipality of El Copey, Cesar De-partment.

The incineration had been taking place with-out the community�s knowledge. Now that theyknew, the people protested before the HolcimCompany and the MEHTD against the incinera-tion of another 160 tons ofmethyl-parathion andtoxaphene,5 insecticides abandoned by the cot-ton-growers of Cesar after the �white gold�6 boom.The participants at the forum demonstrated thethreat to environmental equilibrium and the peo-ple�s health caused by the emissions from theseovens loaded with waste and the danger fromcontact with the ashes.7 Nonetheless, the minis-try insisted that the operation was harmless withpseudo-scientific arguments that flew in the faceof common sense and made evident that it wasdefending the interests of the cotton-growers andthe Swiss company, at the expense of a unilateralsacrifice exacted from the region�s inhabitants.The transnational company justified its operationsbased on the ISO 14.000 certificates issued byIcontec. The company�s manager argued awk-wardly that the law does not forbid doing thisandwhat the lawdoes not forbid is allowed. Facedwith the vociferous protest, the Swiss cementcompanyHolcim desisted in its intention and thegovernment announced that the firm Tredywouldbe in charge of repackaging the toxins and trans-porting them to one of its 21 specialized inciner-ators in Europe.8

This dangerous incident is an indication thatirregular activities are taking place in the coun-try concerning the disposal of toxic waste andwe are threatened with becoming a global dump-ing ground, as is feared within the framework ofthe FTA negotiations with the United States. Thismay be deduced to the degree that in the pagesof the Colombian Government�s Schematic forNegotiation Interests, one sees the US interestin mounting a program to export used goods,which could equally be technological rubbish orindustrial waste. Given that the high productionof waste of this nature is one of this country�smain problems, it is to be expected that it wouldtry to get rid of them by means of trade agree-ments.9

DEBT SWAP: JUSTIFYING THE PLUNDER?

Will debt swap become fashionable? The Sche-matic for Negotiation Interests, presented on 2June 2004, is the document by the Ministry forTrade, Industry and Tourism that sets out theColombian Government�s position on the FTAnegotiations with the United States. Point 180on page 22 of the Schematic refers to alterna-tive financing mechanisms for strategic farmingmacroprojects. It says, �One of the alternativescould be debt swap.� Also, in a letter dated 13July 2004 that the World Bank sent to AcciónEcológica in Ecuador, in one paragraph the bankupholds its role in Colombia saying that it is sup-porting the country in �the search for possibledebt swaps for the protection of important ar-eas of the Colombian Amazon, the Orinoco ba-sin and the eastern plains region for future gen-erations.�10

As well there is the debt-for-nature swap be-tween the Colombian and USGovernments undertheTropical ForestConservationAct (TFCA).11 This

5 �¡Otra vez, ¡no a los tóxicos en Boyacá!� El Diario, Tunja 25 February2004.

6 Martínez, Joan, De la Economía Ecológica a la Ecología Política, p. 21,�The social movements of the poor are the fight to survive, and assuch they are ecological movements... in terms of their objectivesthese are the ecological necessities of life: energy (calories fromfood and for heating and cooking), clean water and air, a place toshelter. They are also ecological movements because they habitua-lly try to maintain or return natural resources to the ecologicaleconomy, outside of the widespread market system, monetary apprai-sal, the mercantile rationale, which contributes to the conservationof the natural resources given that the market undervalues them.�

7 See website: http://www.sobre-todo.com/noticias/noti/noti0202.htm8 Redondo, Bibian, El Tiempo, Valledupar, 1 March 2004.9 The Environmental Future: Emerging Challenges and Opportunities for

EPA, A report from the National Advisory Council for EnvironmentalPolicy and Technology (NACEPT), September 2002, p. 58: �In theUnited States, the amount of consumer waste, particularly in elec-tronic products, is growing astronomically. It is estimated that 31million personal computers will become trash next year, and thatnumber may double by 2007. All of these electronic goods containsmall amounts of toxic substances (including lead, mercury, andheavy metals) that collectively can become a national environmentalproblem. The increased implementation of producer take-back pro-grams, similar to those introduced in Europe, could help minimizethis pending problem. A few states are making modest steps in thedirection of product take-back programs, but much more needs tobe done.�

10 World Bank, letter dated 13 July 2004, signed by Marcelo M. Giuga-le, regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean.

144 Needs and Rights

endeavor includesparticipation and contributionsfromConservation International, The Nature Con-servancy andTheWorldWildlife Fund, heavyweightNGOs considered to be private transnational con-servation businesses, whose funds come from thetransnational corporations that are trying to �greenwash� their image by projecting a eco-friendly im-age of themselves.12

These resources will provide the basis tocreate the Fund for the Protection of Conserva-tion Areas of Colombia, with support also com-ing from the Dutch Government. It is expectedthat the Global Environment Facility (GEF) willalso contribute approximately US$15 million.The administrator will be the Environmental Ac-tion Fund whose main objective has been toadminister resources of the Americas Initiativecoming fromUSAID (US Agency for InternationalDevelopment).

Although thesemechanisms could counter-balance the problem of debt, it is a strategy tokeep the country subjugated. The foreign debthas been acquired in the name of policies thatparadoxically offer development while keepingit out of our reach it, as Hinkelammert has not-ed resoundingly.13 The projects that are fundedwould transfer functions of the state into thehands of individual actors, weakening the state.The recent acceptance of private investment inthe National Parks reinforces this tendency tothe degree that it leaves these strategic areas inthe voracious jaws of the private sector.

The resources that the government is at-tempting to swap appear to be oriented to coverup the impact of the economic activities of tran-snational corporations and the credit opera-tions that led to the debt, which is already quitehefty, or else they are in the hands of transna-tional conservation agencies, to ensure biolog-ical conservation to make available environ-mental services to the transnationalcorporations or their national subsidiaries, ascan be observed with water, the disposal ofcarbon dioxide, landscapes for ecotourism, andbioprospecting, etc.

The flow of financial resources, includingthese debt swaps with their conditions, lacks

autonomy because it is tied to the policies ofthe multilateral banks and the adjustment pro-grams or accords reached with the IMF. TheConpes document that approves a loan fromthe Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) forthe National Environmental system, is telling:

�The operation is in accordance with thenational government�s programming with mul-tilateral credit entities and there is sufficient bud-get ensured in the framework of the goals onthe fiscal deficit defined in the accord signedwiththe International Monetary Fund. Additionally,the project is part of the IDB credit programs inthe framework of the bank�s strategy for thecountry.�14

The announced financial resources createexcessive expectations at the local institutionsthat are weak and that need these at any price,especially if they are for conservation projects.Ecological organizations also aspire to executesome of the resources without asking questionsabout their finality and about the autonomy thatthey will have for their execution when the di-rectives are coming from the transnational cor-porations. They may become frustrated whenthe instructions come, as was forewarned, thatthese resources are for the Forest Ranger FamilyProgram,15 which many consider to be a coun-terinsurgency policy, conceptually based on pro-hibition and US antidrug policies. It is easy topredict. While making official the swap under theTropical Forest ConservationAct, Uribe expressed

11 Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial Development,Executive summary, Debt-for-nature swap between the Governmentof Colombia and the Government of the United States under theTropical Forest Conservation Act, with the participation and supportof Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy and The WorldWildlife Fund. Signed on 30 March 2003, for a total worth of US$10million, to be disbursed to the country between 2004 and 2016.

12 Choudry, Azis, �Conservation International: privatizando la naturalezay saqueando la biodiversidad,� Revista Biodiversidad, No. 40, April2004.

13 Hinkelammert, Franz, El retorno del sujeto reprimido, UN, Bogota,2002, p. 204.

14 Conpes Document 3274, March 2004.15 In the component on development for depressed regions and con-

flict zones, the Administrative Department of the Presidency of theRepublic of Colombia reports that since the start of the Uribegovernment�s term in office until the first quarter of 2004, 18,221forest ranger families have benefited from this program and it isexpected that 50,000 will benefit over the four years.

145Needs and Rights

concern for the harm done to �1.7 million hect-ares of forest destroyed by drugs� and he allud-ed to the �enthusiasm of the private sector, theNGOs, the international community, the coop-eration agencies, the United States Government,the World Bank, and our government to under-take this kind of program of debt swap for envi-ronmental protection.� He also said, �I dreamthat if we tie in the Forest Ranger program and ifwe reach the goal, that is still distant for bud-getary reasons, of having 50,000 forest rangerfamilies in Colombia, we shall advance alongprac-tical lines of great importance.� At the end ofhis speech he added casually, �It is not such astruggle to come to good agreements with theNGOs.�16

COLOMBIA AND TRANSNATIONALGLOBALIZATION

According to the Office of the Comptroller Gen-eral of the Republic, the National DevelopmentPlan (NDP) Toward a Community State �appearsto be framed within the concept that the mar-ket can do anything, without adequately con-sidering the market�s shortcomings that havetranslated into the deterioration of the ecosys-tems.�17 This argument appears to contradictthe view of those who promote free trade andwho believe that this along with investment willbring development and will guarantee sustain-ability by promoting high environmental stan-dards. Some states agree with this argument andit is also espoused by the United Nations. Onthis subject the Uribe government is pragmatic.Although it encourages the family forest rangerpolicy and stimulates debt-for-nature swaps withthe big NGOs, it did not contradict former Jus-tice Minister Fernando Londoño when in July2002 he came up with a homegrown version ofthe Cold War andMcCarthyism by declaring thatthe NGOs are something like the new Commu-nists. In summary, the government encouragesconservation. Plus the issue lies close to the heartof Colombian and US concerns for national se-curity, as can be seen by the Santafé documents

I to IV,18 and the political positions adopted bythe US Southern Command, with which thepoliticians and military leaders of our countryhave immersed and fed their imaginations. Butit does not allow for opposition and even less sothat environmental regulations should inhibit theexpansion of capital unless, to the contrary, thisfoments the disappearance of environmentalinstitutionalism and the flexibilization of the en-vironmental legal regulations in order to favorinternational trade.19 This may be seen in theNational Development Plan that states that �theenvironment shall not become a kind of disguisedprotectionism.�20 Neoliberal consistency is notdoctrinal but rather pragmatic.

According to this pragmatism, in contrastto what took place with governments subse-quent to Rio-92, the post-Johannesburg govern-ment is in favor of economic sustainability evenif it means having to sacrifice environmental sus-tainability. The pendulum has swung to the sideof economics, says the Comptroller General�sOffice referring to theNational Development Planbecause it is heading �toward the neoclassicalenvironmental economy. If one only seeks tomaximize profits under a system of incentivesand controls, which does not take into accountthe costs of reproduction for the ecosystems, itis much more profitable in the short-term tocontinue polluting and exploiting than to modi-fy the production systems.�21

The international trend in multilateral poli-cies and institutionalism on the environment is

16 Speech by President Uribe at the event to make official the debt-for-nature swap, Bogotá, 23 April 2004, SNE.

17 Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, Estado de losRecursos Naturales y del Ambiente, 2002-2003, p. 7.

18 �Documento Santa Fe IV: América Latina frente a los planes anexio-nistas de los Estados Unidos,� Latinoamérica hoy, edited by James P.Lucier in late 2000. Roger W. Fontaine, Lewis Arthur Tambs, GordonSumner, David C. Jordan, Francis Bouchez, General John K. Sin-glaub, Jeanne Kirkpatrick. �The major geostrategic elements thatremain important to the national security of the United States includethe following:� 5. Assurance that the countries of this hemisphereare not hostile to our national-security concerns. Further, that thenatural resources of this hemisphere are available to meet our natio-nal priorities. A �Monroe doctrine� if you will.� p. 9.

19 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Matriz de intereses de nego-ciación del TLC, 2 June 2004.

20 Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, Hacia un Estado Comunitario, p. 143.21 Economía Colombiana, No. 297, Jul-Aug. 2003.

146 Needs and Rights

consistent with those adopted by the Uribe gov-ernment. The MEHTD uses the declarations andconclusions of the 2003 Johannesburg UNWorldSummit on the Environment as the politicalframework for its 2002-2006 plan by sectors.22

Without a doubt multilateral environmental pol-icies have lost ground compared with theprogress that came out of the 1992 SustainableDevelopment Summit in Rio de Janeiro. In Jo-hannesburg the multilateral negotiations ap-peared dominated by the unilateral businessagenda, whereas environmental issues were side-stepped with cajolery and technicalities. Johan-nesburg �legitimized� the transnational corpora-tions and paved the way for the weakening ofthemultilateral environmental system that, iron-ically, had become an obstacle for the dynamicsof global capital, especially for the United States.

After Rio 92 the policies and the interna-tional legislation for protecting the environmentwere weakened and then they came under pres-sure from free trade agreements and negotia-tions by the transnational corporations with theWorld Trade Organization (WTO). This may beseen both in terms of multilateral affairs as wellas at the national level. This weakening has en-abled the United States to negligently foregoratifying several international environmental ac-cords, such as the well-known Kyoto Protocolon climate change.

In this context Colombia and other states,upon embracing the new guidelines, lose theirrole in the administration, regulation and con-trol of environmental affairs and in the nameof self-regulation and self-control they leave itup to the national and transnational corpora-tions to define policies and goals in which nei-ther the state nor the companies truly defendenvironmental affairs. Recently, to the degreethat the globalization of transnational capitalhas been imposed, new juridical mechanismshave arisen, fundamentally to enforce the tradedeals yet omitting the environmental regula-tions. These mechanisms, orchestrated withthe WTO and in the bilateral accords, protectthe rights of the transnational corporations tothe detriment of the rights of the indigenous

peoples and the weakest nations, as is the casewith Colombia.

THE SOPHISMOFSUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT

Nowadays the institutional policies of both stateentities and the big transnational corporationscome disguised under the concept of sustain-able development. The government has un-thinkingly embraced this even when the con-cept is corrupted by developmentism.23 Thesame thing happens in relations with other eco-nomic agents with the argument that it is possi-ble to reconcile the interests of enterprises withsustainable development, constituting, accord-ing to Johannesburg, type II partnerships (asso-ciations of states, transnational corporations andother actors). These accords have the blessingof the big conservationist and ecological organi-zations that out of weakness or complicity re-duce their demands to pragmatic bargaining toabide by or ratify the official treaties (on climatechange, biodiversity, etc.) regardless of whetherthese are weak and imperfect.24

The latest targets that sustainable develop-ment is going after are the territories, environ-mental heritage, and traditional knowledge.These have been preserved thanks to the factthat they were not considered a cause for con-cern, seeing as they were out of reach becauseof their remoteness, protected by legislation onareas for special considerations, or because theybelonged to ancestral cultures or traditional com-munities that have persistently resisted interfer-

22 Ministry of the Environment, Housing and Territorial Development(MEHTD), Plan Sectorial 2002-2006, Camino hacia un país de propie-tarios con Desarrollo Sostenible, March 2004.

23 Developmentism refers to, for example, the construction of infras-tructure without considering long-term impact, as the result of anunplanned rush. It refers to ways of using space, pressured by theidea of dismantling jungle areas, and the way that transnationalcapital has forced rural and urban communities into slavish laborconditions, and scientific and technological dependency, etc., all ofwhich have direct and indirect repercussions on the state and on thedeterioration of the ecosystems and the society�s strategies forsurvival.

24 Choudry, Azis, �Conservation International: privatizando la naturalezay saqueando la biodiversidad,� Revista Biodiversidad, No. 40, April2004.

147Needs and Rights

ence.25 There is a desire to inoculate the waysof life that have remained outside the reach ofdevelopmentism�s greed for capital with its hur-ry to get rich and concentrate wealth.

In the name of this kind of development, thegovernment has undertaken certain measures,many of which over the course of time haveshown either their non-feasibility or their inabilityto prevail over the political interests that feed onregional and national institutional resources.26 Atthe start of the Uribe government, the Ministryfor the Environment, now the MEHTD, took onadditional responsibilities. There was also an at-tempt�unsuccessful� to eliminate the Region-al Environmental Corporations (CARs) and putthem under the control of the departmental gov-ernments. The departmental governments werealso to take over the administration of the na-tional parks and these were also offered to tran-snational hotel companies, a proposal that is cur-rently underway. In accordance with the policyof the Agriculture Ministry the semi-commercialexperimentation with geneticallymodified organ-isms (GMOs) was authorized. It was also an-nounced that the Ideam (Institute for Environ-mental Studies) would disappear.

During this government the environmentalinstitutions and tax exemptions have been ori-ented to favor environmental deals27 with majorhousing developers, private public utility com-panies and environmental services, forestry in-vestors, the tourism sector, biotechnology, min-ing and energy, and even major transnationalplayers in conservation such as Genomics andConservation International. Meanwhile the lo-cal communities, when they are not completelyexcluded, are involved as laborers or in anothersecondary role in the economic arrangement,while the nation�s environmental heritage con-tinues to decline.

REFORMING LAW 99: PLAYING ALONG

In Colombia the 1991 Constitution and the influ-ence of the Rio 92 Summit auguredpositive thingsfor environmental legislation and the new institu-

tionalism for the sector, particularly with Law 99of 1993. Although this law has not been fully ex-plored, far-reaching counterreforms have beenproposed to bring it into line with the demandsof capital. These reforms have been enacted dur-ing the governments of Andrés Pastrana and Al-varoUribe. Someelements that illustrate theback-sliding are, for example, the gradual dismantlingof the mechanisms for hearings and public con-sultations and the reduction and elimination ofthe requisites for environmental licenses for thehydrocarbon companies, mining, and major in-frastructure projects, which is where transnationalcapital is mainly concentrated.28

Granting authorization for transnational in-terests to exploit the environmental heritage hasbeen a constant in this counterreform. A tellingcase is that of the US company Occidental thatwas allowed to undertake oil explorations onU�waancestral lands. Since Cecilia López was the cab-inet minister, there had been talk about grant-ing the exploration rights thatMinister JuanMayrfinalized. This evidences the opportunism, de-terioration, and restrictions on the applicationof the mechanisms for consultation that are laid

25 Andrade, Germán, �Selvas sin ley�, in Andrade, G., et al. GuerraSociedad y Medio Ambiente, Prisma Asociados, Bogotá, May 2004,p.115.

26 Ossa Escobar, Carlos, �Contraloría pide reformar el SINA, correspon-dencia con el Presidente de la República.� See website:www.contraloria.gov.co

27 Invest in Colombia Corporation, Coinvertir. Colombia panorama ypotencial de inversión, PowerPoint presentation, 2004.

28 According to Coinvertir, Colombia is the sixth most significant reci-pient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America with US$1.979billion, representing 4.2 percent of the total for the region. Duringthe first half of 2003, the oil business received 21 percent ofColombia�s FDI and mining received 27 percent, for a total of US$935million. During the 1980s, foreign investment in Colombia was con-centrated on the energy-mining sector. With the change in foreigninvestment policy that is part of the package of structural reforms andthe process of liberalizing the economy that began in the 1990s, theinvestment recipients began to diversify. Whereas in the 1980s nearlyeverything went to the oil sector, in the 1990s other sectors began toattract foreign capital, such as energy, communications, and finan-ces, all of these tied to the process of privatization and the develo-pment of new technologies. In December 2002 the sector with themost investment was mining and quarries (including coal) with US$562million, followed by transport, warehousing and communicationswith US$362 million, and finances with US$298 million. Overallforeign direct investment in 2002 came mainly from countries likethe United States, 26 percent; Spain, 13 percent; British VirginIslands, 10 percent; Caiman Islands, 9 percent, and the Netherlands,7 percent.

148 Needs and Rights

out in ILO Convention 161, which has been rat-ified in national legislation. TheMining Code thatthe Congress of the Republic passed in Law 685of 2001 not only does not require an analysis ofenvironmental alternatives, but it upholds thesekind of decisions.

Another ongoing issue has been the intensivespraying of the coca and poppy crops throughoutthe national territory, which none of the environ-ment (today MEHTD) ministers has halted.

It is clear, even to MEHTD officials,29 thatmuch of the two years that the Uribe govern-ment has been in office has been spent trying toreform Law 99 of 1993. The MEHTD has triedfruitlessly, among other issues, to modify finan-cial aspects of the law, to reduce the number ofCARs and to modify their boards of directors, tocreate Hydrographic Basin Councils, and tomodify the use fees and taxation in accordancewith their opportunities for collection and thedemands of businesses; to which end it present-ed the bill for Law 195 before the Congress ofthe Republic.30 The CARs were not reformeddespite the fact that, with rare exceptions, theyare plagued by the corruption and cronyism thattoday has invaded the state as a whole and thatemanates from the presidency of the republic.The government has scaled back its intentions,perhaps to not lose its influence over the re-gional politicians who enjoy the use of state re-sources and who will provide support during thepresidential campaign for reelection.

Although reforming theCARswould alsohavereduced the presence of the environmental NGOsto two per representative, the fact that they werenot reformed did not prevent the latter from tak-ing place. Not only in terms of the environmen-talists but the entire structure of their boards ofdirectors remain in the hands of unscrupulouspersons who drain the institutional budget andwho deal with front organizations or companiescreate directly by the enterprises to impose theirinterests concerning land zoning and use.

Another aspect of this counterreform, onwhich we shall dwell at length, concerns the cre-ation of the Hydrographic Basin Councils. Thismechanism that the government insisted on in

the bill on water law that is currently before Con-gress, is part of the strategy for privatizing waterthat has been surreptitiously and persistentlyunfolding.31 The councils take the responsibilityfor water regulation away from the state and putit into the hands of the users, who in the end arethe manufacturing industries, farming, and thepublic utility companies (that now are privatizedor are on their way to becoming so).

The IDB is also behind this strategy, havingemphasized the need to transform the paradigmthat defines the issue of water and its manage-ment, based on the protection of the watersource and its use, and oriented to service thesupply and demand for environmental services.This is consistent with the environmental strat-egy based on �acknowledging that the qualityof the environment and natural resources con-stitute the natural capital that provides long-term sustainability for economic growth andcompetitiveness� the environment is a goodbusiness in which initiative and private invest-ment contribute to quality and valuation.�32

The privatization of water threatens ournatural heritage. This has already happened inLatin America during the first wave of adjust-ments that took place until the late 1990s thatforced opening and privatization. Now a secondstage is underway for hemispheric integrationwith the Free Trade Area of the Americas andthe free trade agreement. The national govern-ment, speaking through the economic minister,has already announced that a new wave of priva-tizations will take place. President Uribe also saidso much during his speech to the Congress ofthe Republic on 20 July 2004, affirming the in-terest to privatize the Meta River, the transportline that is tied to the heavy investing in saw-mills that is expected for the region.

29 MEHTD. Specialists� Workshop on the Definition of EnvironmentalChallenges in Colombia, 22 April 2004. This workshop revealed theministry�s change in tactics, once the intention was known of presen-ting a bill before Congress on presidential reelection.

30 Consideraciones de las ONG ambientalistas de Colombia Frente alProyecto de Reforma a la Ley 99 de 1993.

31 Álvarez Roa, Paula, El agua ¿un negocio?, Censat Agua Viva, 2004,www.censat.org

32 IDB, Estrategia de ambiente, 28 Oct 2002, GN-2077-15.

149Needs and Rights

The privatization of water is an objectivethat the multinationals are pursuing. Water is abusiness worth US$400 billion per year, 40 per-cent of the worth of the oil business. In the late1990s the companies that were negotiating in-frastructure, and even the oil companies, redi-rected their capital to trade in thirst. Suez Lyon-naise de Eaux (a subsidiary of Ondeo) and VivendiS.A. (Generales de Eaux) hold shares in compa-nies in over 120 countries, and they regulatewater for 100 million people and 10,000 indus-trial clients. In 2000, these companies bottledand sold over 24 billion liters throughout theworld, 90 percent of them in non-recyclablepackaging. These companies are buying land toget at the wells and sources, and they plan toacquire complete hydrographic systems.33

The Colombian State is willing to facilitatethis process. According to Conpes DocumentNo. 325334 the UNDP has a �program for pro-moting the participation of the private sector,the workers, and the solidarity sector in domes-tic public utilities. Equally, it considers that it isnecessary to expand the coverage and the fo-ment investment by means of regional plans. Atthe same time, in accordance with article 6 ofthe National Development Plan, 36.8 percent($368 billion) of the resources for regional spend-ing by sector were assigned to projects for drink-ing water and sewage lines. Of this sum, 121.024billion will be used as complementary resourcesfor structuring plans to involve �special opera-tors.� Furthermore �article 104 of Law 788 of2002 contemplates a tax break for domesticpublic utility companies that provide water andsewage services, equivalent to 40 percent of theirspending on regional water and sewage compa-nies during the fiscal year.�35 The words speakfor themselves.

WHAT ARE ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTES GOODFOR?

Without a doubt the country�s history reveals atradition of appropriation of territory by violencewhich has brought landlessness, a shift to the

cities, and the concentration of the use of heri-tage and nature services in the hands of thenational elites in alliance with transnational cap-ital. In Colombia 1 percent of owners possess55 percent of the arable land.36 Governmentpolicies have not hindered this concentration,to the contrary they have consolidated and le-gitimized it.

This inequitable appropriation-distributionhas implied the loss of opportunities for survivaland it threatens the livelihood of the most im-poverished sectors of society. The inequity is suchthat whereas 10 percent of the richest Colom-bians receive 46 percent of all income, the poor-est 10 percent only receive 0.8 percent.37 Thatis why whereas the concentrating economyseeks to expand and the privileged sectors seethe environment as a quality-of-life concern, themajority see it as a survival issue related to theirlack of food, healthcare, housing, public utili-ties, education, etc. Without a doubt, from aperspective of environmental justice and therights of future generations, unequal access tothe use of services and natural resources is oneof the main environmental problems of thiscountry with too few owners and too many dis-possessed.

These economic and ecological inequalitieshave complex relations with the distribution ofpolitical and bureaucratic power. Spurious eco-nomic powers have arisen throughout our his-tory, some amassed clandestinely, others bru-tally and publicly acquired, and today they enjoythe veneer of legitimacy. This capital has engen-dered a symbiosis with the political powers togrant them legitimacy and legality. Corrupt pol-iticians have always served to legitimize illicit

33 Álvarez R., P., Ibid.34 DNP, Dupre, MEHTD, Importancia estratégica del programa de Mo-

dernización empresarial en el sector de agua potable y saneamientobásico, Bogotá, D.C., 10 November 2003, Conpes No. 3253.

35 DNP, Dupre, MEHTD, Importancia estratégica del programa de Moder-nización empresarial en el sector de agua potable y saneamientobásico, Bogotá, D.C., 10 November 2003, Conpes No. 3253

36 Christman, Daniel, et. al., Andes 2000: A New Strategy for the Cha-llenges of Colombia and the Region; Council on Foreign Relations,New York, 2004.

37 World Bank, Inequality Report, 2003.

150 Needs and Rights

capital: Aristotle Onassis and Al Capone knewit, as did Pablo Escobar, Carlos Castaño, andArdila Lule. The political and bureaucratic forc-es that incarnate these interests take hegemon-ic juridical and ideological structures that pro-fess to benefit these economic agents and theirallies and impose them on society�s subordinateclasses and sectors.38

In Colombia, in the endeavor to reorganizeeconomic and political power a new juridicalstructure and institutionalism is being developedto ensure the legality of ecological and econom-ic concentration. To secure this distribution-ex-clusion model in this era of globalization, tiesare being forged in our country between tran-snational capital powers and the traditional andemerging powerbrokers, both legal and in thedrug trade. This situation is keeping pace with aredistribution of political and bureaucratic pow-er. Perhaps this is why Salvatore Mancuso, cur-rent head of the United Self-Defense Groups ofColombia (AUC) said at the start of this govern-ment that the AUC had considerable represen-tation in the Congress of the Republic. It is thesefacilitators in Congress who must develop thelegislation to benefit the groups and economicinterests that they represent, as well as their tran-snational allies.

The juridical transformations seek to allowcapital to harmonize its movements with neolib-eral transnational dynamics that, as hasbeen said,are in line with the directives of the big corpora-tions and themultilateral financial institutions thatfollow the winds fromWashington. This has beenembraced as a panacea, telling countries how tomanage public debt, social spending, taxes, tar-iffs, foreign investment, privatization, and otheraspects that ensure the functioning of the econ-omy, the institutions, and the laws in terms of theglobal changes in capital. Even today, despitenearly two decades of losses in the regional econ-omy, officials39 and theoreticians of the multilat-eral bank40 suggest pursuing the measures thatwere not completed, among them the reforms tothe environmental sector.

It is in this context that one most clearlysees the counterreform to the 1991 Consti-

tution and its collateral impact on the coun-try�s institutionalism and environmental leg-islation. The environmental counterreform ledto the merger of physical planning, housingand the environment in a single ministry, ameasure that both environmentalists andformer environment ministers rejected. Thisweakening of environmental institutionalismreached a peak when ministers ignorant ofenvironmental issues were appointed. On topof this environmental deinstitutionalism camethe elimination of the Unit for EnvironmentalPolicy at the National Department of Planning,shifting responsibility for this subject to thedevelopment institutions. Daniel Samper iscorrect when he says, �The former ministrytoday is no more than a mere ingredient inthe bureaucratic soup called the Ministry ofthe Environment, Housing, and TerritorialDevelopment.�41

The weakening of the law in order to fa-vor foreign investment and the consolidationof the concentration of the ownership and dis-tribution of national heritage could go evenfurther with the FTA negotiations. The Colom-bian negotiators42 insist that the agreementshould limit the application of the country�senvironmental laws in order to minimize thechance that the counterpart, the UnitedStates, might break them.

38 This refers to the way that capitalism reproduces its ideology byinfluencing the cultural machinery, especially the media says TomásMoulian, �The operations that reinforce domination need belief,produced by the manipulators of symbolism. One of their mainobjectives is to value the status quo as normal and not just asfactual.� Socialismo del Siglo XXI, Ed. LOM, 2000, Santiago de Chile,p. 37

39 Alberto Carrasquilla Barrera, 29 March 2004, IDB, Assembly of go-vernors, Speech by the governor for Colombia during the secondplenary session: �During the period 2004-2005 the IDB will supportus with loans related to the adjustments to the regulatory frameworkfor public utilities, with reforms to improve our competitiveness inorder to shoulder the commitments that derive from the upcomingfree trade agreements, and with reforms that substantially improvethe state�s effectiveness in the fight against poverty.�

40 IDB-IIC, �After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Grow and Re-form in Latin America�, Abstract, Milan, Italy, 2003.

41 El Tiempo, 25 February 2004.42 Matriz de intereses de la negociación, pp. 11-13.

151Needs and Rights

DISPOSSESSION AND THE FAILURE OFWAR

Environmentalism is opposed to war becausewar depreciates and devalues life. But life doesnot make sense without freedom and as suchfreedom and life are the pillars of its ethics. Theenvironmentalists acknowledge that the war,being the cause of many of the current environ-mental problems, is also, and above all, its re-sult. The Colombian war, fundamentally rural,has roots. A recent UNDP report,43 although itsanalysis is not exhaustive, is an important con-tribution for revealing the motives of war; forexample, it makes it clear that the guerrillas arethe fruit of the unresolved situations resultingfrom the absence of the state in the so-calledcolonization zones, and the lack of social solu-tions to the causes of �La Violencia� during theNational Front�s tenure, and the refusal to un-dertake radical agrarian reform. According to thereport, the state has shown little ability to pro-pose structural and sufficiently democratic so-lutions. It maintains that �the state has failedbecause it has been incapable of preventing theuprisings and it has been incapable of resolvingthem in nearly 40 years.�44

No doubt this fact is tied to the heuristic lim-itations of official analysis and the role that theenvironmental dispute plays in the motives andeffects of war, coming on top of the lack of re-solve to break the ties with the interests that his-torically have hobbled the state. For example, thegovernment�s presentation at the Donor�s Tablein London discusses displacement as the resultof the heightening of violence that, in turn is theresult of �the growing association between theactivities of the illegal armed groups, the produc-tion and sale of illegal drugs, and common crim-inals, as well as the weakness of the state to pre-vent and control the impact of these actions.�45

This example shows how the failure of the statehas also resulted in limitations on representingthe interests of themajority, having been hijackedby minorities whose responsibility is veiled by ig-noring the fact that they are the sectors that ownproperty and that, by means of the legitimate

force of the state or the illegitimate force of pri-vate armies and paramilitary groups that servetheir interests, also control territory, ecosystems,and political and economic opportunities. Thedocument does not reveal the causes of the vio-lence to which the UNDP refers. The resultingdeduction on the role of the elites comes fromtheir denial to commit to a negotiated solutionto the war. Their limited and superficial analyseslook like a trick to avoid a commitment from theelites on the transformations and reforms thatare needed to end the war.

Although one could say that the war hasnot been an impediment to Colombia�s econom-ic performance when compared with countriesnot at war that have performed worse, the warhas contributed to the destruction of our envi-ronmental and cultural heritage. Thus, for ex-ample, the war has been destroying the jungles,aggravating the concentration of property, sub-mitting the inhabitants to the expropriation oftheir labor force, strongman relations that en-sure the political dominance of the landowners,or dispossession. The Colombian jungles havebeen stripped to clear 35 million hectares forcattle ranching, including on the soils best suit-ed for agriculture. Today, despite the fact thatconsiderable vegetation coverage still exists �over 60 million hectares, according to the Ide-am� our territory has been deforested andbereft of animal life, as well as the annihilationof the aboriginal cultures that made possible anexuberance of ways of life and strategies for ad-aptation that today are mere mementos.

The war has not stopped the economy butit has kept the country�s heritage from beingused under conditions of equity and sustainabil-ity. So long as there is war a small group of per-sons, civilians and military, legal and illegal, andin the interest of capital, shall enjoy the prerog-ative to sell off the country and pad their pock-

43 See Chapter I, Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano. Colombia,UNDP, Sep. 2003.

44 Ibid. p. 31.45 Document presented by the Colombian Government at the Donor�s

Table in London, June 2003.

152 Needs and Rights

etbooks. And so long as there is war, disposses-sion shall continue leaving a deep ecological scar.

We are becoming a nomadic society, withinternal displacement and relocation, in the cityand the countryside, between regions, and toother countries. These are phenomena that areleading to new configurations of the landscape,new demands for environmental goods and ser-vices, and new impact on the country and theregions�main ecological structure. Dispossession,migration and exodus are the most disastrousconsequences of this war. Dispossession under-lines the inhumanity and the failed paramilitarystrategy to defend institutionalism. Disposses-sion has left the insurgency like a fish out of water,without rural support and on the sidelines ofpolitics. Dispossession has allowed the long-standing landowners, cattle ranchers and drugtraffickers to accumulate land, to strip the jun-gles and prepare these regions for new strate-gies for tapping into the dynamics of capitalism,paving the way for megaprojects, for export ag-riculture and global forestry, for offering envi-ronmental services such as landscapes for inter-national tourism, jungles turned into carbon, andwater for major agricultural and hydroelectricundertakings.

The accumulation of up to three or fourgenerations of exiles will increase the demandfor environmental services (water, air, space, etc.)which will be impossible to satisfy under condi-tions of structural distributive inequity. The na-tive forests are falling to illicit crops or being re-placed with incalculably less diverse vegetation;soil erosion; the destruction of the high moun-tain páramos and upper Andean jungle; these inturn affect the ecosystem�s capacity to regulatewater cycles, and contribute to the decline ofthe bird and animal species. To these we mustadd unemployment, the lack of economic re-sources, food and education deficiencies, andthe domestic and daily violence that accompa-ny dispossession.

When this panorama is viewed from a per-spective of global climate change, and with con-siderations for the role that our country plays inthe international division of environmental func-

tions in the bioaccumulation model, articulatedin the Lirsa plan, the Andean Trade, Promotionand Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) within theFree Trade Area of the Americas, and the newbilateral and multilateral free trade deals, thesurvival prospects for the present and futuregenerations of compatriots are looking petty slim.

A serious crisis is not far off. Even the Penta-gon has predicted environmental crises in a doc-ument on climate change46 describing the im-pact that rising or falling temperatureswould haveon agricultural production, water resources,changes in the intensity, frequency and directionof the rain, winds, and ocean currents. It alsodescribes the destabilization of the geopoliticalenvironment that would result from these chang-es: the emergence of skirmishes, battles and evenwars over access and control of resources, foodsupplies, water sources, and energy stores, whichwould be needed to counteract flooding in someregions and warming in others. Paleontologicalevidence demonstrates that abrupt change hasrepercussions that last for centuries. The differ-ence betweenwhat the Pentagonwarns andwhatcan be observed here is that the environmental-ists endeavor to safeguard the planet and seek anew deal on social issues and peace whereas thePentagon endeavors to use the crisis to accentu-ate the domination and control it exercises andseeks to exercise.

Environmentalism does not expect that theinsurgents will preclude their cavalry of appro-priation and concentration of ecosystems andthe fruits of labor, or defend the country�s envi-ronmental heritage in the name of society as awhole, among other reasons because their in-

46 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, An Abrupt Climate ChangeScenario and Its Implications for United States National Security,October 2003: �Diplomatic action will be needed to minimize thelikelihood of conflict in the most impacted areas, especially inthe Caribbean and Asia. However, large population movements inthis scenario are inevitable. Learning how to manage those popu-lations, border tensions that arise and the resulting refugees willbe critical. New forms of security agreements dealing specifica-lly with energy, food and water will also be needed. In short,while the US itself will be relatively better off and with moreadaptive capacity, it will find itself in a world where Europe will bestruggling internally, large number so refugees washing up on itsshores and Asia in serious crisis over food and water. Disruptionand conflict will be endemic features of life.�

153Needs and Rights

tention is to pursue a development approach.They are directly or indirectly involved in theenvironmental destruction resulting from theproduction and eradication of illegal crops andbecause their strategies do not include a com-prehensive environmental perspective. But ba-sically they differ from the environmentalistsbecause environmentalism rejects armed meth-ods for gaining power. In contrast environmen-talism favors unarmed initiatives by the demo-cratic and leftist sectors that responsibly offersociety a daring political proposal that acknowl-edges the environmental facet of building peaceand justice, and that involves the democraticand grassroots sectors. As such, the insurgentshave the responsibility to overcome the strate-gy of prolonged war or armed insurrection andto enter a political negotiation process to joinand strengthen the current of social, economicand democratic alternatives and to seek morecivilized radical transformations.

Nor can the peace strategies be left in thehands of those who cover up the capitalist in-terests that are critiqued here, because they arethe ones responsible for the causes of war, theyhave benefited from it, and they are willing tomonopolize the benefits that it might bring. Inrefusing the strategies of war, the democraticsectors have the responsibility to endeavor togive the peace strategies liberating political con-tent that is radically transformative and demo-cratic: environmentalist content.

SOMECONCLUSIONS

The dominant powers endeavor to discredit thesocial groups and their philosophy that offersradical alternatives to the current situation. Thepowers hijack their ideology, as can be seen withthe concept of sustainable development andparticipation. And they declare the groups ob-solescent and associated with the fall of com-munism and the armed subversive groups.

One sees that the nation�s institutions, in-cluding the environmental ones, have increas-ingly less capacity to express national interests

in a way that is sovereign and independent ofthe interests of the large transnational corpora-tions and national conglomerates. The result ispolicies that are tied to the hegemonic US strat-egies for the region, in accordance with the in-terests of considerable multilateral capital, andguided by themultilateral financial agencies thatare also at their service.

The environmental relations of the commu-nities to their territory and between the com-munities themselves are being violently submit-ted to the rules and dynamics of the market,including the new facet of bio-trade that em-ploys the dogma of the existence of the invisiblehand that will provide protection and make useof the environment in a win-win arrangement.

The people�s demands for respect for theirspace, that they be allowed to benefit from thenation�s heritage, and that caution be exercisedare insistently bulldozed, violently repressed, orsilenced using legalisms, technocratic tricks, andby falsifying scientific fact.

This is consensual robbery and disposses-sion, carried out violently, transferring the heri-tage of the nation, the communities and thepeople into the hands of a small number of per-sons, and that marks the territory with economicactivity that is unsustainable, extractive, and il-legal in the case of drug trafficking.

The war is a failure. There is nothing betterfor democracy than political negotiation.

A more comprehensive and thorough strat-egy must be undertaken for an independentoverview of the government�s environmentalpolicies and performance, particularly of its im-pact on human rights.

154 Needs and Rights

Needs and Rights 155

Social Struggles in Colombia:

Yes, but No

The level of popularity which, accord-ing to the polls, President ÁlvaroUribe Vélez maintains two years af-ter taking office, demonstrates thatboth his personality and his demo-cratic security agenda respond to

certain expectations of the Colombian public.These expectations arise from the fact that,

�Under the weight of the crisis, a messianic yearningtends to incubate itself in the human spirit; a rushto find strongmen and saviors to impose upon thechaos the unquestioned authority of the patriarch�Colombia does not escape this authoritarian tempta-tion. In the midst of the bombs, the massacres, thetortures, the kidnapping, the economic missteps andthe uncertainty of life for the civilian population, the-re will arise from time to time a voice that calls for aclear and transparent order� Colombia is a coun-try fascinated with force.�Luis Carlos Restrepo, �El embrujo de la fuerza�,

Revista Número, 2,Octubre-diciembre, 1993, 37

Center for Investigation andPopular Education , Cinep -Social Movements Team

If this is the case, the Democratic Secu-rity policy arrived just in time. The iron fist ap-plied to subversion is broadly applauded, and theperception of a return to order is evidenced bythe fact that, despite the conditions of violencelived by people in some regions of the country,peace has ceased to be the rallying cry for broadmajorities, and the mobilizations that call for ithave diminished. The activities undertaken by thearmed forces in order to provide security for thecitizens (securing control of the roads, the es-cort of tourist caravans, the increase of deser-tions among the guerilla ranks, the diminishingof cases of kidnappings and attacks upon towns)respond more to the need for personal securitythan to the urgent need to find paths to an inte-gral peace. Add to this the Government�s insis-tent denial that there exists an armed conflict,substituting those words in its rhetoric with �afight against terrorism�, modifying the perceptionof the origin of the chaos and pushing the ap-proval of necessary tools to confront terror. One

156 Needs and Rights

such tool is the Antiterrorist Statute, whichmod-ified four articles of the Constitution of 1991 andgave free reign to the interception of telecom-munications and correspondence, to searchesand detentions without prior written order, to theintelligence surveys conducted by the military inrural areas, andwhich granted judicial police pow-ers to the armed forces1 .

Part of public opinion considers that thepolicy of pacification, together with the admin-istration�s style of directly managing local andregional issues instead of collectively discussingbroader national concerns2 has contributed to

galvanizing social discontent. If on one hand,President Uribe�s direct interaction with the pop-ulation through the communal councils engen-ders sympathy in certain social sectors whichhave never accepted the distance of nationalauthorities, on the other hand it contributes tothe process of deinstitutionalization and fails torespond to the urgent needs of the inhabitantsof many regions of the country, who continueto resort to public social actions to convey theirneeds to the authorities and demand satisfac-tion of them3 , as shown in the following graph:

During the second year of Uribe Velez�sGraph No. 1Graph No. 1Graph No. 1Graph No. 1Graph No. 1

Monthly Behavior of Social MovementsMonthly Behavior of Social MovementsMonthly Behavior of Social MovementsMonthly Behavior of Social MovementsMonthly Behavior of Social MovementsAugust 2002 - June 2004August 2002 - June 2004August 2002 - June 2004August 2002 - June 2004August 2002 - June 2004

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1 Legislative Act 02 of 18 December, 2003, through which articles 15, 24,28 and 250 of the Political Constitution were modified to confront terro-rism, www.mindefensa.gov.co: Política de defensa.

2 One Colombian political commentator referred to the head of state as a�micro-administrator� often seen in community councils, always hard-working and detail oriented, with the desire to maintain control, and towhom delegation does not come easily (Jorge Leyva Valenzuela, �Losversos del capitán�, El Espectador, 18-24 July 2004, pg 6 A).

3 And while the civilian population resorts to social mobilization, paramili-tary chiefs demand in the Congress Hall the presence of the state inareas that have been conquered as a condition for their demobilization(Héctor Abad Faciolince, �Paras en el Congreso�, Revista Semana, Nº1.161, 2 a 9 de agosto de 2004, págs 28 a 32, y �Obras son amores...�,Revista Cambio, Nº 579, 2 a 9 de agosto de 2004, págs 26 a 28.)

Needs and Rights 157

Government, social struggles4 have maintaineda monthly average of 30 actions, and have fo-cused mainly on urban street demonstrationsin which they demand a place to fully developtheir daily lives, the satisfaction of their collec-tive needs, and the protection of their right tolive in peace. Labor protests show a tendencytowards growth. The majority of labor disputes(69%) were presented, as in prior years, withinthe realm of public health. State employees con-tinued to be the primary economic sector car-rying out strikes in the country, with two impor-tant exceptions: that carried out by the workersof la Frontino Gold Mines and that of the Ba-nana plantations. The majority of strikes contin-ued to have the withholding of salaries as the

most relevantmotivation (58%of the total), whilethe disputes rejecting Government policies mo-bilized the greatest number of workers (76% ofthe total).

Social struggles in the countryside main-tained a decreasing tendency observed from thebeginning of this century. The drop in agrarianstruggles under the Uribe administration has al-most reached 50%, with respect to the annualaverage registered in the prior administration.The principal factors repressing the demands anddesires of the peasantry continue to be the in-ternal armed conflict, the dispute between ille-gal armed groups over vast swaths of territory,and the exoduses that, according to the press,have reached an average of three per month5 .

Graph No. 2Graph No. 2Graph No. 2Graph No. 2Graph No. 2PPPPPararararar ticipation of the Actors in Social Strugglesticipation of the Actors in Social Strugglesticipation of the Actors in Social Strugglesticipation of the Actors in Social Strugglesticipation of the Actors in Social Struggles

August 2003-June 2004August 2003-June 2004August 2003-June 2004August 2003-June 2004August 2003-June 2004

Urban Pop 37.3%

Salaried Workers 30.2%

Students 11.9%

Indep. Workers 7.9%

Peasants 4.5%

Convicts 2.6%

Businesses 2.4%

Women 2.4%Indians 0.8%

4 According to the records of the Human Rights and Social movementDatabase. Subsequent figures also come from this source.

5 By Exodus we mean the collective internal forcible displacement ofmore than ten families from a common area at the same time. Althoughin 2003 the number of displaces persons dropped 250,000 people weredisplaced from their lands, a fact which leads to Colombia being thelocation of 10% of all displacements that occur annually in the world,and the three million displaced people in Colombia give it the rank ofthird in the world, surpassed only by Sudan and Congo (Annual Report ofthe United States commission for Refugees, 2003, quoted in El Tiempo,25 May 2004, pgs. 1 y 10).

158 Needs and Rights

Social protest continues to be primarilymotivated � similar to nearly a decade ago � bythe violation of human rights and the rejectionof public policies. The failure to fulfill agreementsis the primary engine driving the struggles ofsalaried workers, but this factor has also mobi-lized displaced and reintegrated populations inthe last year. Public and social services, togeth-

er with environmental issues, occupy a signifi-cant place among the motivations underlyingurban protests, while demands for land and live-lihood reached the lowest point in this secondyear of the Uribe Administration, though notprecisely because of any advances in the areasof ameliorating the housing deficit and redistrib-uting lands.

Graph No. 3Graph No. 3Graph No. 3Graph No. 3Graph No. 3Motives for Social StrugglesMotives for Social StrugglesMotives for Social StrugglesMotives for Social StrugglesMotives for Social StrugglesAugust 2003 - June 2004August 2003 - June 2004August 2003 - June 2004August 2003 - June 2004August 2003 - June 2004

Defense and democratic security measuresresulting in massive, and in some cases arbitrarydetentions have added to the motives for pro-test over the violation of the right to life andliberty, as registered in December 2003 by theCommittee for Solidarity with Political Prison-ers: out of a total of 6,038 people detained, 80%corresponded to massive detentions, and 65%to arbitrary arrests6 .

All collective actions undertaken by womenand convicts in the last year were motivated bythe demand for rights. The former group con-tinues to realize weekly (Plantones) to insist upontheir petition to arrive at a humanitarian accordthat would allow for the liberation of the kid-napped. The international day against violenceagainst women was commemorated with a na-tional march towards Putumayo to express sol-idarity with the population, so gravely affectedby the fumigation of illicit crops and the violence,two causes of displacement, with women repre-senting about half of the displaced7 . On the in-

ternational women�s day, marches were orga-nized to demand that mayors and governorsexecute programs and projects aimed at reduc-ing inequality and to include their demands inmunicipal development plans. These demandsincluded: equality, peace, liberty and respect.Marches were also organized to demand of thenational government that it attend to the gravehumanitarian crisis of the displaced.

The Convicts in various prisons have resort-ed to protests to denounce the shameful prisonconditions in which they live: they lack healthservices, recreation, hygienic conditions in thedetention centers, and penal regulations restricttheir inalienable rights. Extraditable convicts inmaximum security prisons employ hunger strikesagainst the possibility of being sent to the Unit-ed States, and, together with their families, de-

6 www.prensarural.org, consulted on 20 June de 2004.7 Colombian residents of Barcelona and Madrid in Spain organized

solidarity marches.

Other 1.3%

Rights 21.8%Policies 21.2%

Breach of agreements 17.5%

Public Services 13.5% Social Services 9.0%

Labor 4.0%

Solidarity 3.7%

Authorities 3.4%

Emviromental 2.7%Land and housing 1.9%

Needs and Rights 159

manded respect for due process and the reviewof evidence by the Supreme Court of Justice.

55% of registered protests by female peas-ants and female indigenous during the secondyear of the current administration had roots inthe violation of human rights and internationalhumanitarian law, a figure which grew 13 pointswith regard to the first year of the current ad-ministration, when 42% of protests had thatmotive and already surpassed the number ofhuman rights protests undertaken during thefour years of Andrés Pastrana. In the areas ofrehabilitation and consolidation in Sucre, Bolí-var and Arauca, social organizations denouncedmassive and arbitrary detentions, and severalrural communities in Urabá, Cauca, the southof Bolívar, Arauca together with the native Amer-ican tribe of U´wa, appealing to a conscientiousobjection, declared themselves in resistanceagainst the Colombian judicial system in orderto reject the arbitrary arrest of citizens accusedof collaborating with rebel groups and createdin December 2003 the �Network of Communi-ties in Protest and Resistence�. Sixteen gover-nors of the tribal councils of Norte del Caucacomprised a tribunal which tried8 members of amilitary unit, whom they held responsible for thekilling of a commune member of the Olmedoreservation on December 31 in 2003 at a road-block in the Huellas de Caloto reservation. Withthis symbolic act they demanded the rights tolife and to have justice within their territories inaccord with their own traditions. Sibundoy, inPutumayo Department, was the site of vigils andreligious events to demand that the guerillas re-spect the civilian population; in Bajo Atrato(Chocó Department), peasant, African Americanand indigenous communities navigated the riv-er in order to exorcise the pain of the war andto demand that the armed groups cease theeconomic blockade to which they have subject-ed the communities since 1996. In Santa Rosadel Sur (Bolívar Department), amidst white andmulticolored flags the peasants undertook amarch in search of dialogue with the guerillas toliberate victims of kidnapping. In Quinchía (Risa-ralda Department), in the context of religious

events to bury the victims of one paramilitarygroup, the peasants demanded a cessation ofthe violence and denounced the curfew pro-claimed by the regional paramilitaries.

One can add to these events the phe-nomenon of the trapping of entire populationsby illegal armed groups, characterized by theAntioquian Committee for Human Rights as�concentration camps�9 , in the case of the lo-cality of Aquitania (municipality of San Francisco)where 20 thousand people were trapped by an-tipersonnel mines and threats from the FARC.Something similar takes places in areas of thevalley of the Cimitarra river, in Magdalena Me-dio, where populations are threatened by para-military groups. These events have resulted inhumanitarian aid caravans bringing assistanceto the sites, in order to offer solidarity to thethreatened population.

Internally displaced persons (IDP�s) havegained increasing visibility in the context of so-cial struggles since the second half of the 1990�s.The reasons underlying their protests are noneother than their having had to flee their lands,the loss of their goods, the call for the neces-sary humanitarian aid to face the exceptionalcircumstances into which they have been thrust,the demand for a clear recognition of their rights,and a return to their lands in conditions of se-curity, while those who would opt for staying inthe cities protested in two instances to demandeconomic support through viable projects andthe payment of subsidies, or rents, which fallunder the administrative scope of the SolidarityNet (Red de Solidaridad). The living conditionsof people who have been displaced may haveactually worsened during this administration,however, as the budget assigned to the Solidar-ity Net for the year 2003 dropped by 87% when

8 This is the third action registered by the press since 1996, when theindigenous communities of Jambaló protested over the killing of themayor of that municipality, condemned the guerillas of an ELNcolumn and forced this group to leave the reservation and alsoexpelled a number of Indians implicated in the violent events. Thesecond indigenous trial took place in Tóez in 2001, over the death ofa reservation community leader, and blamed the commanders of thesixth front of the FARC for the crime.

9 El Colombiano, 30 April 2004, pag. 2 A.

160 Needs and Rights

compared with the total budgeted for 200110 .With this level of funding, only about 22% of IDPsregistered by the Solidarity Net in the year 2004could be attended to11 . In one decade, only1,740 families have benefited from programs toacquire lands for the stabilization of displacedpopulations, a figure which does not even reach1% of the population of IDP�s. This is a situationwhich grows worse if one takes intro accountthat in the year 2003, 76% of displaced house-holds owned real property, of which 60% had ahouse and land12 .

For urban populations, the defense of fun-damental rights constituted the second motiva-tion for their protests ( 28% of urban regionalstruggles), although a rise of 4 percentage pointsis registered with regard to the year before.Through their mobilizations they have calledupon the warring parties to desist in their as-sault upon civilian populations, not to includechildren in the armed conflict, nor to harasswomen in order to intimidate and subdue thepopulation. They have protested against mas-sive detentions; against terrorist attacks in theheart of cities and towns; against disappearanc-es, kidnappings, and the assassination of localpolitical leaders (the former mayors of Buga andRiofrío, in Valle de Cauca Department; the may-ors of Soledad and Santo Tomás13 , AtlánticoDepartment).

In some regions of paramilitary influence,collective actions have taken place that haveescaped the control of the organizers, such as,for instance, those undertaken by inhabitantsof Casanare in Monterrey, protesting the clash-es between the United Autodefenses of Córdo-ba and Urabá and the Autodefenses of Casan-are, or the protest in San Pablo (Bolívar), sparkedby the murder of a merchant by paramilitaries,which devolved into public disturbances.

Other disturbances which have raised theflag of human rights and peace place in starkrelief the social and political polarization whichthe country suffers. This polarization is perceivedin some social sectors as a contest between twobands: those who seek peace on a foundationof truth, justice and reparation, and those who

support a state of war as a means to arriving atpeace. Such divisions were starkly evident in themarch organized in Barrancabermeja against in-ternational and national NGOs and against theMagdalenaMedio Peace and Development Plan.The divisions could also be plainly seen in thePlaza de Bolívar in the nation�s capital on 28 July,where demonstrators of different political ori-entations faced off while three paramilitary lead-ers addressed the Congress of the Republic.

The second motivation for social mobiliza-tion during the time period in question was con-stituted by protests against government policies.The battle against the referendum concentrat-ed the energies of various social and politicalsectors for several months, and active absten-tion from voting triumphed despite PresidentUribe�s characterization of the referendum as atool in the �fight against corruption and poli-ticking�. The tax reforms which the administra-tion has pushed have not managed to deacti-vate the ticking bomb of public debt,14 �concentrated in the Central Government� butthey have motivated mobilizations of citizens,together with the law of penal alternatives orthe antiterrorist statute proposed by Uribe Vélez.The processes of demobilization with the para-militaries and reintegrationwith the guerillas haveengendered different reactions: the former (re-lating to the demobilization of members of theCacique Nutibara Block of the AUC) resulted intwo youth marches in Medellín supporting thepolicy. In the latter case, ex-combatants orga-nized three protests over the failure of the stateto meet obligations agreed to in reintegrationplans, in response to which Minister of Govern-ment implied that the problems were a result ofthere beingmore demobilized guerillas than hadbeen expected.

10 Codhes, Informe anual 2003.11 El Colombiano, 20 June of 2004, pg. 11 A.12 Codhes, Informe anual 2003.13 Four days before the murder of mayor Nelson Mejía, perpetrated in

April 2004, the municipal inhabitants had undertaken a march pro-testing his removal from office, after having been accuse by thePenal Tribunal of Soledad (Atlántico) of prevarication by action.

14 According to the Subdirector of Public Credit, Javier Rendón, thepublic debt amounts to 52.5 % of the GDP (El Tiempo, 30 July 2004).

Needs and Rights 161

Thenegotiationof free tradeagreementshavegiven rise to protests in various social sectors,among which the most publicized was that leadby members of Congress in Cartagena during thefirst roundofnegotiationson theFreeTradeAgree-ment. In April 2004, the Vía Campesina network15

convened a period of continent-wide protest toreject the integration agreements � FTAA, and FTA� in which various social organizations in Colom-bia participated, under the rallying cry of �Lets glo-balize the struggle, lets globalize hope�.

Agrarian policy initiatives accounted for 20%of social protests in the countryside. The peas-ants from areas of illicit crop cultivation, partic-ularly from the Sierra Nevada de Santa Martaand La Gabarra (Norte de Santander Depart-ment) protested against fumigations of theseareas and of national parks. According to thecoca producing peasants, the fumigations hada detrimental impact upon food security, theenvironment and their health. Official statisticsmaintain that 2.2 million hectares of natural for-est have been destroyed in the last year in Co-lombia in order to make room for illicit crops �the cultivation of which has extended to newregions� and that the cultivations have beenreduced by 16%. The Government expects tofumigate 130 thousand hectares in 200416 , apractice which will negate the possibility of thesubstitution of crops and regional sustainabledevelopment projects, and will result in graveenvironmental consequences and new displace-ments of populations.

The various measures employed in June of2003 to restructure public enterprises with theobjective of downsizing personnel, making workcontracts more flexible and taking apart speciallabor protection regimes, were not in compli-ance with laws 50 of 1990 and 100 of 1993.Nevertheless, they have not been reversed bythe legal demands raised by the Unions, nor bythe collective actions organized by them, amongwhich the labor mobilizations of national scopein the major cities on 12 August of 2003 and 26February 2004 should be highlighted.

The strike in Ecopetrol which took place inApril of this year under the leadership of the

Union of Petrol workers (USO) demanded thatthe government review its decree 1760 whichrestructured that public entity and put an endto the special social security regime which exist-ed since the 1950�s. The strike lasted for 29working days and counted on the participationof some 4,000 employees. It was declared ille-gal by the Government, and made little impacton public opinion, save in Barrancabermeja andother centers of the Petrol industry. With the helpof the Catholic Church and some members ofthe Congress (which largely ignored the discus-sion of state petrol policy) the strikers were ableto secure in the final agreement concrete com-promises regarding Ecopetrol�s exploration andexploitation contracts, with the criteria of de-fending the firm from the voracious appetites offoreign capital.

The 248 strikers which were fired becauseof the conflict sought to resolve their situationthrough an arbitration committee which woulddecide on issues of retirement or return to theirposts for each of the individuals affected in thisway. The old workers of the petrol company con-tinue within the regime of the collective laborconvention, and the reforms apply exclusivelyto new employees hired after the decree 1760(June 2003).

For their part, the 16,000 banana workersof the Urabá region were forced to cease activi-ty for thirteen working days, in an effort to pre-vent the commercial fruit companies from pro-foundly revising the collective contracting regimewhich had been earned by the workers since the1970�s, and substitute it for temporary and pre-carious contracting for �certain services�. Theconfrontation, marked by the withdrawal fromthe plantations of Chiquita Brands and by theproblems of market advantages created by theprojects put forth in the Trade Agreements (ALCA

15 Vía Campesina is a global movement of rural women�s organizations,peasants, small farmers and farm workers, indigenous communitiesand afro-descended communities in Asia, Europe, Latin America andAfrica. This network proposes to reaffirm the defense of cultures andthe right to continue existing as peasants and communities with theirown identities.

16 El Tiempo, 25 June 2004.

162 Needs and Rights

and TLC) was unable to change the broad pat-terns, but demonstrated the capacity of the ag-riculture and livestock industry�s union tomounta fight of these proportions in territory that isfirmly controlled by Paramilitary groups.

Those government policies which havebeen perceived by the population as tending todeepen the processes of privatization of publicand social services were also engines that drovesocial mobilization. Such processes include ed-ucation, through the concession and fusion ofschools and systems of educational loans tend-ing towards self-financing; health, owing to thecrisis which has spread throughout the networkof public hospitals, particularly in Santander,Norte de Santander, Caldas and the Atlanticcoast, where various public hospitals have beenclosed and others are about to be shut down.The construction of public works and infrastruc-ture also drove protests, such as over the impo-sition of tolls to maintain the network of roadsor the construction of roads that are still beingdesigned, under the argument that the nationalgovernment does not have the resources, andmust call upon municipal funds and citizens tocover costs. The best but not sole example isthe �little social toll� against which a regional civicstrike and several mobilizations in four munici-palities of the north of the valley of Aburrá wereorganized.

Corruption and the misappropriation offunds have been the subject of protests by somesocial sectors. Despite the scandals of publicentities, social mobilization over the effects ofcorruption is manifest in local arenas (workersand students of the Sena that have denouncedthe misappropriation of funds by the entity thatdelivers to individuals in some campuses; stu-dents and heads of household denounced cli-entelist appointments of teachers before the elec-tion of mayors and governors, a time period inwhich manifestations were also held against thetransport of voters and irregularities in electorallists).

Another important motive behind socialstruggles brought about during the second yearof Uribe�s Government, and the most significant

for urban populations (representing 43% of theirprotests) is constituted by public housing ser-vices, which, in as much as they have been leftin private hands, have converted users into �cli-ents that demand efficient attention�. The pro-vision of collective means of consumption is in-creasingly no longer a state function, while itsrole as a source of fierce urban social conflictgrows17 . Demands for these services, togetherwith protests over environmental and sanitationissues topped 43% of protests waged by urbanpopulations.

The contamination of air and water due tothe poor management of residual waters andwaste left unburied was another source; take forinstance the Ministry of the Environment�sproject to eliminate 160 tons of chemicals fromEl Copey (Cesar Department), where the localinhabitants rejected the option of doing so intheir municipality, in Nobsa (Boyacá); or themacro-project designed to improve Bucaraman-ga�s water supply to the detriment of the watersupplies of the areas where this resource is drawnfrom; the fumigations of illicit crops in nationalparks; the contamination of the reservoir inMuña (Cundinamarca Department) which be-came the epicenter of respiratory illnesses andplagues; and the construction of urban projectsin areas considered to be natural reserves; all ofwhich have convened protests in which the rightto a clean environment and the protection ofnature is demanded.

The defense of the right to health has beenan important factor in various places around thecountry. It would seem that the lesson learnedby the capital following the closing of theHortúa18 and Lorencita Villegas de Santos19

hospitals has been heeded. Themobilizations of

17 As expressed by some local leaders in the face of growing protestsover rationing of electricity, suspension of aqueducts, dismantling ofsubsidies and the violation of agreements by lending firms, afterhaving restructured debts of illegal clients.

18 This hospital has the capacity to deal with all fourth level specialties,represented by direct care for hospitalized patients; emergencies;mental health; intensive care unit with 20 beds; rehabilitation; diag-nostic imaging; dialysis unit with 15 new machines, and a base of 504beds. For 436 years the Hospital offered services to millions of poorColombians at low cost, or in most cases, free of charge until

Needs and Rights 163

medical students and beneficiaries of publichealth services are an indication of the concernof the Colombian people for the future of thehospital network and the deaths from yellowfever helped set off alarms in the areas of vac-cine production and vaccination campaigns.

In this period, fights for housing and landwere lead by the displaced. The first of theseonly reached 3.5% of those undertaken in cit-ies, (in Medellín y Pereira) and the latter 10% ofthe total by peasants and Indians. In this year,through the expiration of ownership of 200thousand hectares of narco-traffickers� lands, theGovernment contemplates subsidies for accessto land by peasants without any20 . This process,together with the figure of Areas of Peasant Re-serve (ZRC) for the establishing of plantationsfor small producers in colonization areas, con-templated in the Law 160 of 1994, would con-tribute to neutralizing the concentration of prop-erty and strengthen peasant societies,recognizing their rights as citizens. The Peasant,Indian and Black Convergence coincides with thisprocess. It articulates diverse organizations inthe field, which are committed to defending theAgrarian Mandate, which was presented to theNational Government in 2003, and which de-mands the right to a dignified livelihood, to landand food security.

In conclusion, we have witnessed during thesecond year of Uribe�s administration a slightgrowth in the total of social protests, a trend similato that of other presidential terms: in the first year,certain retreat in mobilizations, either because ofexpectations generated by a government programthat announces reforms in some areas of socialconcern and in the political sphere, or out of fearof measures designed to repress protest. Begin-ning in the second year, the trend is one of growthof protests that demand the fulfillment of govern-mentpromises, the solution toolderproblems, thecessation of limitations on the liberties of citizens,and an end to the violence which in the preceed-ing year has been lavished on indigenous commu-nities, unions and local officials.

In the midst of all of these comings andgoings of social movements, it cannot be stated

with clarity which social actors have beenstrengthened and which have been weakened.Perhaps this is because, (as has not been wit-nessed since the sadly celebrated days of theadministration of Julio César Turbay Ayala), thesecurity policy of the President has generated acollective sensation among many social move-ments of being in the presence of a witch hunt,where prudence demands keeping a low profile.It also demands that we not question the state-ment made years ago by the current High Com-missioner for Peace: is it true that Colombiansare cynical, but are bewitched?21

December 2000, when the last patient was treated and the doorswere closed. A bad case of financial �anemia�, high costs of labor,political indecision on the part of relevant authorities, the absence ofa judicial intervention, the growth of hospitals in Bogotá, and thechange in healthcare scheme enacted by Law 100 of 1993, ended acycle nearly four centuries in the making (El Espectador, 30 August2004, online version). Nevertheless, after four years of closure andthe continued presence workers who do not accept their termination,a new proposal by the current administration of the district hasrenewed the debate on the hospital�s viability.

19 At the end of 1999, the threat of closure due to a growing budgetcrisis loomed over many hospitals that formed part of the network ofpublic and private hospitals. For many, the reason for this crisis wasnone other than the imposition of Law 100 of 1993, which introduceda new logic in the financing of public hospitals � that of self finan-cing- moving from subsidy for supply (monies went directly to thehospital for its annual operation ) to subsidy for demand (hospitalsonly received money for the payment of services rendered). In thisway hospitals were turned into businesses, and had to design andexecute strategies within the logic of markets, and place emphasison the financial and less on the health aspects of their work. TheHospital Lorencita Villegas de Santos was one of many that wasunable to overcome the budgetary crisis, and the national govern-ment issued on 28 July 1999, Decree 1369, through which permis-sion was granted for the closure of the hospital as a public servicebusiness, and to cancel all work contracts. The doors were closed inadherence to this order on 30 July of 1999, (Asociación Nacional deEnfermeras de Colombia, �Liquidación del Hospital Infantil LorencitaVillegas de Santos, un viacrucis para sus trabajadores�, Revista ANEC,Edición Nº 56, en www.anec.org.co).

20 www.ipsnoticias.net21 Luis Carlos Restrepo, �El embrujo de la fuerza�, Revista Número, 2,

October December 1993, 39.

164 Needs and Rights

165Needs and Rights

¡Like a Crab!Government response to forced

displacement

T

Consultancy for Human Rightsand Displacement

his article analyzes in broad termsthe current government approach topublic policy regarding forced dis-placement, together with the degreeto which it is meeting the Colombi-an State�s obligations in the areas of

human rights and international humanitarian law.Lastly, it points to the opportunity and challengeof a positive reconfiguration of said policies, asaffirmed in the Ruling T-025 of 2004 made bythe Constitutional Court.

The analyses of the governmental responseto the social, humanitarian and human rightscrises facing Colombia agree that one of themostworrisome indicators of the gravity of the situa-tion is the dichotomy between public policy onforcible displacement and the real dimensionsof the phenomenon (Ruling T-025 of 2004 ofthe Constitutional Court).

Over three million people have been dis-placed since 1985, and today thousands of per-sons are trapped in their towns or villages (Cod-

hes, 2004a). In this context, it is not admissiblefor the problem of forced displacement, whichqualifies as a humanitarian problem, a socialemergency and full-blown national tragedy1 , notto receive an adequate response on the part ofthe State and society.

If sit is true that the �state of unconstitu-tionality�2 with regard to the assistance of thedisplaced population (formally declared by theConstitutional Court in Ruling T-025 of 2004) isnot the product of the omission or action of anyone entity or institution, it is clear that in thetwo years of the administration of President Pres-idente Álvaro Uribe Vélez the distance betweennormative foresight and the government re-sponse to the problem has widened. In effect,

1 The three expressions were used in the Ruling SU-1150 of 2000.2 The Constitutional Court has defined the state of unconstitutionality

as the �repeated and constant violation of fundamental rights, whichaffect a multitude of people, and the solution to which requires theintervention of various entities to attend to the structural problems oforder�. Ruling T-025 of 2004.

166 Needs and Rights

this Government, both through action andthrough omission, has broadened a chasm that,in principle, is the result of structural factors.

Thus, the state of unconstitutionality is alsoa consequence of a governmental managementthat, as we shall see, has responded to forceddisplacement by tearing down and ignoring con-stitutional and legal norms closely linked withthe fulfillment of State obligations and commit-ments acquired through international humanrights and humanitarian law.

As such, the deepening of the humanitari-an crisis, together with the annulling, suspen-sion, restriction or postponing of conditions,guarantees and opportunities necessary for therealization of human rights is deeply worrisome,given that these rights are in the end a prerequi-site for a just, lasting and inclusive peace.

The Government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez has de-termined to ignore the various recommendations3

madeby intergovernmentalorganismschargedwithoverseeingthefulfillmentof internationalobligations,duties and commitments (United Nations, 2004a:Paragraphs 16, 34 -36), while at the same time pro-motingapolicyof cooperationwhichcallsupon theinternational community to contribute the neces-sary resources to overcome the humanitarian andhuman rights crisis (Codhes, 2004c).

This policy of cooperation is based on aperspective according to which the internation-al community must assume primary responsi-bility for a crisis that corresponds to the Colom-bian State. In this context it is revealing that theeffort of the State has historically been subsid-iary to the assistance provided by internationalcooperation, as shown by numerous sources4 .

Moreover, the Government trusts that theaffected populations will find the solutions totheir own problems through self management(Codhes, 2004 c). This perspective is limiting,and reinforces the perception that public policyis unclear and fragmented. It is symptomatic ofthe problem that two years into this administra-tion there still exists no public version of a Na-tional Plan of Assistance for the Displaced Pop-ulation, and that there has been no process ofaccountability on the returns promoted by the

national government, within which the condi-tions of security, dignity, sustainability and thevoluntary character of the returns can bebrought to public light. Moreover, strategies toguarantee that the events which gave rise to thedisplacement not be repeated have not been setforth5 . The non-existence of said process is in-excusable if one begins by considering that thepromotion of the return of displaced persons isone of the axes of the Government�s policy (Na-tional Development Plan � Law 812 of 2003).

Nevertheless, the national Government fre-quently refers to a reduction6 in the number of

3 It is clear that the Government led by Álvaro Uribe Vélez has notrespected, among many others, the following recommendation ofthe United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: �The HighCommission urges the Network of Social Solidarity, together withother instances of the government and the State, to put into effectas soon as possible actions and programs of prevention and concer-ted protection with communities at risk� (United Nations, 2004a:Para. 101). This is by no means the only recommendation the Co-lombian government has failed to meet, as can be seen from theletter written by Russell Feingold, Christopher Dodd, Edward Kenne-dy and another twenty United States Senators to President ÁlvaroUribe Vélez on 26 July of 2004. This letter, disseminated in Colom-bia by Codhes (http://www.codhes.org.co), engendered a nationaldebate, above all because one of its authors was John Kerry, Demo-cratic candidate for the White House, and another was his vicepresidential running mate, John Edwards; see, among others, �Kerryy Edwards urgen a Uribe cumplir recomendaciones de ONU�, ElTiempo, 28 July 2004.

4 Thus, �as far as the resources of international cooperation go, it is clearthat according to data compiled by the Colombian Agency for Interna-tional Cooperation, (ACCI) US $155.8 million have been invested inrecent years and the national counterpart has been US $36.5 million�(Red de Solidaridad Social, 2004). For his part, the UNHCR advisorEdgar Forero (2004: 343), indicates that: �The average cost to theState of holistically stabilizing a family for the first year is calculated atUS $9,500. Thus, to stabilize the 75,200 families displaced in 2002would cost US $714.4 million, and stabilizing the 170,000 familieswhich, according to the Indh�UNDP still need attention, would costUS $1,615 million. In contrast, the Government has only allotted US$61.8 in 2002 and a total of US $165.6 million from 1995 to 2002.International cooperation would reach US $261 million, with the Uni-ted States in the lead (US $167 million)�.

5 According to the United Nations (2004a: Para. 101): �In the returns ofIDPs pushed forward by the Network, the voluntary character hascontinued to be questionable, owing to lack of socioeconomic alter-natives, lack of information and lack of a participatory process for theguarantee of security�. See also Codhes 2004e.

6 For instance, on 31 May, 2004 the Network of Social Solidarity statedthat the drop in displacement in that year was of 48% (El Tiempo, 31May 2004, p. 2-8). In any case it is important to note that the variousentities and organizations that have information systems that monitorthe situation of the displaced in Colombia present significant levelsof under-registration of data. That is to say, many people who areeffectively in conditions of displacement are not reported by theseorganizations. Among the entities undertaking this monitoring task,some have a government affiliation, (such as the Network of SocialSolidarity) and others are international in character (InternationalCommittee for the Red Cross) and others are NGOs (like Codhes).

167Needs and Rights

people in conditions of displacement, a reduc-tion which can hardly be considered a long termtrend, particularly if one bears in mind the mostrecent massive and individual displacementswhich have befallen many regions of the coun-try7 . As evidenced by the public defender�s of-fice and the Procuraduría General8 (2004), thenational government has not defined the mea-sures it has taken or would be prepared to taketo strengthen the strategy of prevention of dis-placement and its consequences. It should benoted with respect to this that the measures forthe protection of goods and rural inheritancesof the population at risk or in conditions of dis-placement, contemplated in Decree 2007 of2001, have yet to be implemented (United Na-tions, 2004b: Para. 29).

Finally, the analysis of the situation of forceddisplacement in Colombia would not be com-plete if the following aspects were not taken intoaccount:

� The existence of confined communities, thatis, those which: 1) find themselves systemati-cally deprived of free access to essential ele-ments of survival, such as food,medicine, fuel,agricultural goods and drinkable water; 2) areprevented from receiving humanitarian aid; or3) are prevented from freely moving about,even to save the lives or personal security oftheirmembers (Codhes,2004a;UnitedNations2004b: Paragraphs 29 y 33).

� The growing number of Colombians acquir-ing the status of refugees in other countriesas a consequence of the political persecu-tion, massive violations of human rights,violations of international humanitarian law,or situations of generalized violence presentin Colombia (Codhes, 2004b and 2004d).

� Displacements caused by fumigations of il-licit crops. Requests presented by thosewhohave been force to flee because of the fu-migations to be counted in the Sole Regis-ter of Displaced Populations (Rupd) are rou-tinely rejected (Codhes, 2004a).

� Intra-urban displacements. It should behighlighted regarding this category of thedisplaced that the prescriptions elaboratedin the Ruling T-268 of 2003 of the Constitu-tional Court have yet to be implemented.

AGOVERNMENTALMANAGEMENT THATCONTRIBUTES TO THE CONFIGURATION OF A�STATE OFUNCONSTITUTIONALITY�

The degree to which affected sectors (those atrisk or in situations of displacement,) are notprotected or attended to constitutes a�state of unconstitutionality�. Now, the fact thatforced displacement is seen by the Constitution-al Court as �a state of unconstitutionality� is theresult of two issues that are closely linked: 1)the situation itself, and 2) the demands for pro-tection, assistance and reestablishment formu-lated by the affected sectors.

On the one hand the declaration of uncon-stitutionality obeys the recognition of objectivefactors:

1) The massive and generalized violation ofconstitutional rights which affects a signifi-cant number of people;

2) the prolonged omission by the authoritiesin their obligations to guarantee rights;

3) the adoption of unconstitutional practices,such as the incorporation of the Tutela ac-tion as part of the procedure for guaran-teeing inculcated rights;

4) the failure to expedite legislative, adminis-trative or budgetary measures necessary toavoid the violation of rights;

5) the existence of a social problem whose so-lution would involve the intervention of sev-eral entities and require the adoption of a

7 Thus, the International Committee for the Red Cross has regrettedthe intensification of massive displacement during the months ofJune and July of 2004 (El Tiempo, 27 July 2004, p. 1-6).

8 Translator�s note: the Procuraduría General is an investigative arm ofthe State which differentiates itself from the Attorney General�soffice in its oversight and disciplinary functions with respect to thegovernment.

168 Needs and Rights

complex, coordinated series of actions thatdemand a level of resources which wouldentail an additional and important budget-ary effort. � (Ruling T-025 of 2004).

On the other hand, the Court�s ruling is theproduct of a social action fed by demands fortruth, justice and reparation, which were focusedin their time through the Tutela action, that is,through an extraordinarymechanism for the pro-tection and realization of fundamental rights. Inother words, Ruling T-025 of 2004 is the conse-quence of a legitimate social pressure which wasexercised with the aim of obtaining explicit rec-ognition of the gravity of the problem, and withthe further aim of forcing the national govern-ment to offer an integral, timely and efficient so-lution.

From the perspective of the realization ofrights, the declaration of the above mentioned�state of unconstitutionality� manifests one ofthe more complex and complete readings of thesituation of the persons, families and social sec-tors at risk or in conditions of displacement.Consequently, it constitutes a roadmap for thevarious political agents involved in favorablytransforming the response of the state, institu-tions and society.

Its consequences with respect to the de-sign and application of public policies are var-ied. Particularly, it behooves us to underline thefollowing:

[. . .] the national and local authoritiescharged with assisting the displaced populationmust adjust their behavior in such a way as toallow for an agreement between their commit-ments to fulfill the constitutional and legal man-dates and the resources assigned them to as-sure the effective enjoyment of rights by thedisplaced, (ruling T-025 of 2004).

If well it is true that the state of affairs is theresult of many years and several administrationsthat have only marginally taken on the problemin non-structured and uncoordinated ways, it isclear that the policy managed by the currentGovernment is essentially a policy of doing thebareminimum, and does not adequately address

the crisis, but contributes to its configurationand deepening.

Thus, for instance, it can be noted with con-cern that the judicial order regarding the fixingof a budgetary effort necessary to meet Stateobligations has only been partly met. In effect,the National Council for Integral Attention to theDisplaced Population, the subject of said order,forgot that this fixing of a budgetary effort hadto be done �in fulfillment of the duty to effec-tively protect the rights of the displaced popu-lation� (Ruling T-025 of 2004), and consequent-ly proceeded to determine the budgetary effortwithout regard to basic criteria and indicatorsfor the realization of rights9 .

In general terms, the defining characteris-tics of the government proposal are: 1) the re-duction of the scope of the application of rightsto its minimum expression, 2) the determiningof policy based onmarket rationales (supply anddemand)10 , and 3) the delegation of State re-sponsibility to the international communitythrough the Humanitarian Action Plan, and thePeace and Development Credit, which, accord-ing to the Government itself, �seeks coherenceand complementarity between the State�s strat-egies and the bilateral and multilateral cooper-ation activities such as those of the United Na-tions system, the European Union and the WorldBank�.

In effect, Colombia has moved in the lasttwo years fromapolicy that recognized andmadeclear reference to the realization of human rightsin the management of the State and its institu-

9 The indicated fallacy in the text can be confirmed in: Red de Soli-daridad Social, 2004.

10 For instance, in the area of access to urban housing programs,Decree 2488 of 2002 does not establish preferential conditions forthe displaced population. This means that in practice people inconditions of displacement have to compete for the resources of ageneral fund, even if their socioeconomic conditions are more pre-carious than those with whom they are competing. According tosome analysts, Resolution 0510 of 7 May, 2004 issued in responseto the Ruling T-025 of 2004, follows the same logic of the decree(Sánchez, 2004). Likewise it should be highlighted that in the matterof territorial distribution of allocations for housing subsidies, postu-lations for return are being privileged. See La Crónica de Armenia,�Desplazados accederán a vivienda�, 19 July 2004.

11 It is necessary to clarify that this recognition was never translated intothe application of an integrated, timely and effective public policy.From this the phrase �state of unconstitutionality� justly derives.

169Needs and Rights

tions11 , to a public policy focus designed to�manage� the structural crisis (social, humanrights and humanitarian). President Uribe Vélezhas not only transformed the response, but hasalso sought to ignore both the frame of under-standing forcible displacement as well as theconglomerate of obligations which institutionalaction ought to be oriented towards meeting.

Some elements of the National Plan for As-sistance to the Displaced Population � which,two years into the administration has notmoved beyond a draft form � show the abovementioned regressive movement. Reading thedocument, one finds as guides for institutionaland social action: 1) Social competition, 2) the�attractivity� and the cohesion of work on vul-nerable areas, and 3) the integration of the �af-fected population into local dynamics, throughthe coordination of actions and resources be-tween the community, the local economicagents (private firms, national and internation-al NGOs) and entities of the State, with a senseof mutual benefit�.

In this manner, the humanitarian focus ofthe policy (humanitarian protection, missionsand spaces) is left to one side, and affirmativeaction, which has represented the principal pos-sibility for generating conditions of equality forthe displaced population12 is negated in prac-tice, (United Nations, 2004a: Para. 101).

Hence, in sketching the new public policy,the criteria for the fulfillment of rights which waspresent in the prior design have been deliber-ately abandoned13 , at the same time as the guid-ing principles for Internal Displacement14 , rec-ognized by the Constitutional Court as part ofthe package of constitutionality15 are being ig-nored.

It is an ethical and a political imperative tobroaden the base of social participation in thereformulation and adjustment of public policy.As such, guaranteeing the conditions for thatparticipation is a State obligation. What happensto the populations at risk or in conditions of dis-placement will depend in large part on the de-gree to which this obligation is met. Coming outof the crisis, however, requires also that the

armed actors assume the responsibility of re-specting humanitarian law, and that the inter-national community forces the Colombian stateto fulfill its obligations in the areas of HumanRights and International Humanitarian Law.

12 Regarding the need to design and implement affirmative actions forthe displaced population, see Ruling T-602 of 2003. In that ruling,the Constitutional Court argued that only through this type of actionwould the reestablishment of the rights of people in conditions offorcible displacement be possible.

13 Before 2002, the following were mentioned as general criteria forassistance to displaced populations: Equality, quality, pertinence,security, integrity, environmental protection, voluntary character ofreturn, participation, and a population based approach (Age, gender,disability, and ethnicity). For greater detail, see Red de SolidaridadSocial, 2001.

14 With regard to the importance of the Guiding Principles for theInternally Displaced, the Constitutional Court has indicated that therights enshrined in the Colombian Constitution ought to be interpre-ted in conformity with the treaties ratified by Colombia whose policyimplications are collected and reiterated in these principles, andparticularly in accordance with the interpretation of those internatio-nal instruments by the relevant organs authorized to interpret them.Likewise the Court has emphasized that the reader should favor thatinterpretation of constitutional norms and principles which is mostfavorable to the enjoyment of rights by the displaced. In this sense,see Ruling T-602 of 2003.

15 On the notion of the constitutional package, see Ruling T-1319 of2001.

170 Needs and Rights

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Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento �Cod-hes�, 2004b. �Vecinos en el borde de la crisis�, en: Boletíninformativo No. 49, 21 de abril de 2004. http://www.codhes.org.co

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Defensoría del Pueblo y Procuraduría General de la Nación 2004,Primer informe conjunto de la Procuraduría General de laNación y la Defensoría del Pueblo sobre el cumplimiento de laSentencia T-025 de 2004, Bogotá, junio de 2004, mimeo.

Forero, Edgar, 2004, �Apreciaciones acerca de los desarrollos re-cientes de la política pública de restablecimiento de laPSD�, en: Martha Nubia Bello (ed.), Desplazamiento forza-do. Dinámicas de guerra, exclusión y desarraigo, Universi-dad Nacional de Colombia / Acnur, Bogotá.

Naciones Unidas, Consejo Económico y Social, Comisión de Dere-chos Humanos, 2004a, Informe del Alto Comisionado de lasNaciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre la situa-ción de los derechos humanos en Colombia, 60º período desesiones, Tema 3 del programa provisional, E/CN.4/2004/13, 17 de febrero de 2004.

Naciones Unidas, Consejo Económico y Social, Comisión de Dere-chos Humanos, 2004b, Situación de los derechos humanosen Colombia, Declaración del Presidente, 60º período desesiones, Tema 3 del programa, E/CN.4/2004/FUTURE.5,21 de abril de 2004.

Red de Solidaridad Social, 2001,Guía de atención integral a la pobla-ción desplazada por la violencia, Presidencia de la Repúbli-ca, Bogotá.

Red de Solidaridad Social, 2004, Avance de cumplimiento a 14 demayo de 2004 de la Sentencia T-025 de 2004 y del auto deabril 27 de 2004 proferidos por la Corte Constitucional, Bo-gotá,mimeo.

Sánchez Giraldo, José Miguel, 2004, �Desplazados... también delos subsidios de vivienda�, en Caja de herramientas No.100, junio de 2004.

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I

Deepening of the War?

INTRODUCTION

n the first semester of 2002, ÁlvaroUribe Vélez, the primary critic of thepeace processes between the ad-ministration of Andrés Pastrana andthe FARC and ELN insurgen gropus,was elected President of the Repub-

lic by six million Colombians: 25% of the elec-torate. The election created themandate for theuse of an iron fist, in the midst of Colombiansociety�s widespread skepticism in the face ofpeace dialogues which had failed over the courseof three years to yield the results which Colom-bians expected. The process with the FARC didnot manage to advance in the negotiation ofthe substantive areas of the �common agenda�;its design restricted the participation of civil so-ciety to the few public appearances, and finallydrowned in the dynamics of restructuring andbellicose escalation of both the State and theguerillas, which deployed themselves in parallelacross the negotiating table. For its part, theprocess with the ELN was characterized by amore open relationship with society, and sought

to overcome many of the problems of the mod-el constructed in San Vicente de Caguán, butnever reached the negotiation stage because ofproblems in themanagement of the process andthe opposition of paramilitary groups to the cre-ation of a �meeting zone�, among other reasons.

Under these circumstances, a turning pointocurred of profound consequences for the con-struction of peace. The crisis of the peace pro-cesses lead to a new period, characterized bythe measuring up of military forces without thechance of a political dialogue beyond the even-tual possibility of a humanitarian accord. Thereforms put forth in the negotiation agendaswere replaced by programs focused on the needsof war. The international community, which ac-tively participated in the facilitation of dialogues,has entered a period of retrenchment and skep-ticism regarding the possibilities of a politicalsolution, and the political space for the activi-ties of organizations and social sectors that strivefor peace, human rights and international hu-manitarian law has been reduced.

For these reasons, this document is con-cerned with two basic questions. Firstly, it seeks

Consultancy for Human Rightsand Displacement

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to examine the basic outlines of the strategiesand processes of restructuring the internal armedconflict, and their humanitarian consequences.Secondly, it analyzes the most significant politi-cal changes that have taken place in this periodin the national and international arenas, aim into arrive at some conclusions regarding the sus-tainability of the policies of the administrationof President Uribe and the conditions necessaryto return to a path that will lead to a politicalsolution to the armed conflict.

It is not the first time the nation finds itselfresorting to models of �integral war�, and in thissense the conflict maintains its basic structure.Nevertheless, in this document the notion of therestructuring of the conflict is adopted in orderto call attention to the new characteristics ofthe various strategies of armed confrontationand their consequences in both military andpolitical fields.

TOWARDS ANOTHERMODEL OF THEDEEPENING OF THEWAR

The processes for the restructuring of thewar were conceived at the same time as the exer-cise in dialogue was taking place. Because of this,in the last days of the Pastrana administration,neither the interesting recommendations of �thenotables� nor the prodigious efforts of civil soci-ety and the international community were suffi-cient to halt the forces that were dissolving thenegotiation process: the distancing of the partiesto the conflict, the skepticism of society, reiterat-ed and amplified by the mass means of commu-nication, in the midst of a fierce contest over thePresidency, and the growing �confidence� in theunlikely notion that weapons are the path to thepacification of the country.

The Government�s basic strategy was theprocess of military restructuring which involvedthe security forces in the fight against narcoticsin exchange for military aid, which opened thedoor for the greatest intervention yet by theUnited States in the form of Plan Colombia, anintervention that only grew with the transfor-

mation of American security policy following theterrorist attacks of September 11th, 20011 .From that moment onwards, the Colombian es-tablishment lost interest in peace processes, andthe military option came to the forefront. Theguerrillas, like the Government, strategically tookadvantage of the military opportunities afford-ed them by the peace process �in the middle ofthe conflict�, and once Plan Colombia was ap-proved, they dedicated their main efforts to theaccumulation of resources and to adaptat theirwar tactics to face the new period. Finally, theparamilitary groups had the greatest levels ofgrowth in the absence of any effective Statepolicy to counter the phenomenon which theyrepresent.

In this way, the country came to a profoundparadox, as the movements critical of the prob-lems in the peace process did not lead to peacebeing taken more seriously, but rather resultedin placing the emphasis on war, closing the spacefor a political negotiation. What is really regret-table is that the confidence in armed action (assharply present in insurgent and paramilitarygroups as it is in the Government) was extend-ed from the �theaters of operations� of the con-flict into the consciousness of many Colombi-

1 In the year 2000 a US aid package of US$1,600 million for a periodof three years was approved. These funds were presented as acounternarcotics program, but the money was primarily destinedtowards military investment and a program of massive fumigation ofillicit cultivations in the south of the country. In his time, the anti-drug Czar Barry McCaffrey publicly recognized that the primaryproblem in Colombia was one of security, and the subject of drugswas what allowed the US to help the Colombian State with thisproblem. Moreover, the second stage of Plan Colombia consisted inprojecting the strategy towards neighboring countries through theAndean Regional Initiative. Nevertheless, there remained a clearprohibition of using these funds for counterinsurgency operations,and the United States Congress established the procedure of certi-fication on human rights for the Colombian State as a condition forthe disbursement of these funds. In its first version, this certificationturned out in the negative, but the Clinton administration decided toapply an exceptional waiver through which the disbursement of thefunds was carried out for �reasons of national interst� which superce-de human rights issues. With the rise to office of the Republicanparty, and particularly following the passing of the Patriot Act afterthe terrorist attacks of September 11, the State Department produ-ced a much debated certification on human rights for the ColombianState, and later, in November of 2002, the United States Congressauthorized the use of the funds for counterinsurgency within theframework of the war on terrorism. The Patriot Plan represents thecontinuation of this strategy.

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ans, restricting the political space for peace ac-tivism and solutions based on national reconcil-iation. What is new, however, is not the escala-tion of the war, but the transformation of itscharacteristics and consequences.

Concretely, Colombia underwent a transitionfrom a model of dialogue between the Govern-ment and the insurgency, which was not alien tothe escalation of the war, to another model char-acterized by the deepening of the war accompa-nied by a process of dialogue between the Gov-ernment and paramilitary groups. In this newparadigm, the Government is pushing forward acomplex offensive centered around the expecta-tion of gainingmilitary control of the national ter-ritory, but posits as a condition for this successthe restriction of citizen�s rights and the brushingaside of basic aspects of international humanitar-ian law. The guerrillas have responded by resort-ing to tactical retreats in the short term, and aredeveloping new tactics of irregularwarfare todem-onstrate their capacity for destabilization, withtheir activities seeming ever more indiscriminatewith the lives of the civilian population and thenorms enshrined in international humanitarianlaw. For their part, the paramilitary groups havepreferred selective assassinations and systematicattacks against social leaders in this period, whileat the same time they expect the dialogue withthe Government to guarantee them total impu-nity, the preservation of their massive fortunes,acquired through bloodshed and drug traffick-ing, and the reproduction through other meansof the cooperation and joint action which theyexercise today in many regions.

The basic features of the various strategiesemployed in the first two years of the currentadministration will be outlined below. This is notan attempt at an exhaustive inventory of suchstrategies, but an exercise in characterizationwhich ought to allow for a holistic vision of therelevant consequences and perspectives, beyonda short term analysis. One thing is clear: theconsequences of these transformations of theconflict are the deterioration of democratic andhumanitarian guarantees in Colombia, not theirstrengthening.

The National Government: The Promise ofSecurity with Antidemocratic Regressions

The primary axis of President Uribe�s gov-ernment policy is the Democratic Securityproject, which involves multiple initiatives. Themost problematic of these is the thesis accord-ing to which security implies the sacrifice of cit-izen�s rights, democratic institutions and inter-national humanitarian law.

The formula of Democratic Security is con-stantly reiterated in the President�s rhetoric, buthis principal initiatives demonstrate a determi-nation to submit human rights to the militaryrequirements of a restricted conception of se-curity. The Government considers that the pop-ular election of the President authorizes him topush forward antidemocratic reforms, de-nounced even by the international community.Although the care of his argument is the needto strengthen the State in order to prevent theviolation of human rights, in practice, themeansof so-called �institutional strengthening� followan antidemocratic path. The importance of hav-ing a holistic perspective on the Government�sinitiatives is therefore key, with the aim of estab-lishing the concrete outlines of what has beentermed the �communitarian state� independentof the fact that some of the proposals have beencontested by successful exercises in democrat-ic and social resistance on both internal andinternational levels.

As it has been noted, the restructuring ofthe State�s response in themilitary sphere is con-ceived within the strategies and resources of PlanColombia: increasing technological sources ofintelligence (satellites) air offensives, (helicoptersand phantom jets), the military control of terri-tory with new military units in areas of precari-ous state presence, (Mountain battalions, jun-gle commandos, etc.), the professionalization ofthe troops, massive fumigation of illicit crops,particularly in areas with a strong insurgent pres-ence, and an increasing presence of civilian andmilitary advisors from the United States in Co-lombia. On this basis, inherited from the prioradministration, President Uribe has radicalized

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the alignment of his foreign policy to meet theinterests of the United States.

In exchange for the suppression of restric-tions and conditions on the use of the resourcesin Plan Colombia toward counterinsurgency,and at the same time securing the progressiveexpansion of Washington�s military presence2 ,the Colombian Government has presented it-self as a primary partner in the region for thedevelopment and defense of President Bush�sotherwise largely discredited Patriotic Doctrine.The fundamental thesis of this doctrine is thedetermination to make preventive, unilateraland arbitrary wars all over the world in the nameof a curious �national� interest of global scope.In addition, Uribe has passively accepted thesubordination of Colombian interests in keyareas such as human rights accords, free tradeagreements, the International Criminal Court,the environmental aspects of the counternar-cotics policy and other areas. The President alsoinsistently urged for the modification of theInter-american Reciprocal Assistance Treaty(TIAR) to open the doors for military interven-tions by neighboring powers in the internalconflict. He has demanded military coopera-tion from members of the European Union,notably Spain and England, has called for thepresence of UN peacekeepers, and has pro-posed the redeployment of American forces inthe Persian Gulf to the Andean region andAmazonia3 .

A second specific characteristic of Uribe�sproject is the policy of involving the civilian pop-ulation in the armed conflict, based on an ideo-logical blitzkrieg which denies the existence ofan internal armed conflict, replacing this notionwith a gross simplification that pits �terroristcriminals� against the �rule of law�. These poli-cies drastically reduce the citizenry�s autonomywith regard to the State and the irregular groups,by eliminating, in effect, the distinction betweencivilians and combatants, a key element of in-ternational humanitarian law, and replacing it withstrategies for authoritarian control of society bythe State. In this sense, the policy of Democrat-ic Security is inspired by a vision of the Law of

National Security which was declared totally in-valid by the Constitutional Court in 2001.

In accordance with this conception, pro-grams to develop informants, together with pro-grams oriented at the purchase of informationhave been developed. These programs lack pub-lic oversight and controls and are the primarysource of judicial proceedings undertaken by theAttorney General�s office. It is common knowl-edge that the majority of these detentions arearbitrary, carried out on the basis of proceduresof authoritarian justice completely alien to theguarantees of due process embedded in a dem-ocratic rule of law4 . In many cases these deten-

2 According to Daniel Pecaut, Uribe does not promote Colombia as acountry in need of international assistance, but rather as a key piecein the antiterrorist war declared by President George W. Bush. Pe-caut, Daniel, Midiendo Fuerzas, Bogotá, 2003.

3 Many of these measures contradict the role which the internationalcommunity has played in Colombia in recent years. In effect, onecan find in Colombia the presence of the principal UN agenciescontributing to the solution of the country�s problems related topeace, human rights and development. For its part, the EU has notonly distanced itself from the 2000 Plan Colombia, refusing todevelop programs of military assistance with the Colombian State,but fulfilled an important role along with other countries in facilita-ting the peace process of the last Administration.

4 According to the Fundación Comité de Solidaridad con los PresosPolíticos, between September 2002 and December 2003: �a total of6,038 persons were detained, of which 4,846 corresponded to mas-sive detentions (where more than twenty people were deprived ofliberty), 3,939 of which were arbitrary detentions, and of which 3,750were freed�. The report adds that �during the period of August 72001 to August 6, 2002, the Human Rights and Political ViolenceDatabase (of CINEP) registered the existence of 555 arbitrarily detai-ned persons, a figure which rose to 1,199 in the period of August2002 to August 2003, representing an increase of 129%. The diffe-rences in the statistics of the Comité de Solidaridad con los PresosPolíticos and the Database, correspond to the failure to count tem-porary deprivations of liberty, such as those which took place inSaravena (Arauca) on 12 November 2002, where more than twothousand people were detained and concentrated in the municipalstadium, and were marked on their bodies with a seal of permanentink�. Report by the International Federation for Human Rights FIDH,Las detenciones masivas, arbitrarias e indiscriminadas: Estrategia de laSeguridad Democrática, February 2004. Days later, the ProcuraduríaGeneral denounced the illegality of these detentions, the non-existence of arrest warrants, and the violations of judicial guaranteesduring the execution of �massive detentions� in municipalities of theDepartments of Cundinamarca, Bolívar, Córdoba, Valle del Cauca,Caquetá, Risaralda, Huila, Tolima, Arauca, Vichada and Meta, bet-ween 2003 and February 2004. During this time, 1,957 people weredetained in massive operations for crimes such as rebellion, conspi-racy to commit a crime and the traffic of narcotics, of which 754 havebeen freed. According to the entity, among the graver cases, severalstand out: �Operation Coffee� executed in Anserma and Riosucio(Caldas) where � 95 people were captured; 51 were freed � 44 werelinked to the investigation�; in the municipality of Acevedo (Huila),during the month of March 2003, 42 people were captured; theywere freed following a petition from the Procuraduría over the viola-tion of due process guarantees. Also in the municipality of Cajamar-

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tions have resulted in new cases of forcible dis-placement, as many people who are released forlack of evidence find themselves publicly stig-matized, and so lose the minimum guaranteesthey would need to return to their homes, wherethey are targeted by the armed groups, particu-larly by the paramilitaries5 .

This practice of involving the civilian popu-lation in the logic of war, based on the fact thatcivilians are the primary victims, has extendedto other areas in a dangerous game of social po-larization. The President of the Republic himself,together with high ranking officials, have under-taken a systematic campaign to discredit andpublicly stigmatize social and human rights or-ganizations, taking this to the extreme of de-monizing any form of critical attitude and pub-licly singling out social and political movementsthat proposed the strategy of active abstentionto challenge the referendum of 2003 as accom-plices of terror6 . In other words, the governmentis seeking to reproduce under new pretexts andwith a new name the simplifying logic of �withus or against us�, a relic of the National Securitydoctrines of the cold war period. This logic dan-gerously erodes the guarantees of free expres-sion and activism of communities and socialmovements.

In the same way, this Government has re-sorted to States of Exception to limit the funda-mental rights of its citizens and produce abusesagainst the civilian population, as shown by thereports of the Procuraduría General7 regardingthe Rehabilitation Zones of theMontes deMaríaand Arauca8 . Faced with a persistent Constitu-tional Tribunal which has declared the majorityof the measures undertaken by the State duringthe state of Internal Commotion to be invalid,the Government has launched openly into aproject of Constitutional reform in order to in-stitutionalize arbitrary actions and undue pow-ers, such as massive detentions, the intercep-tion of communications and the searches ofhomes without prior warrant, together with thegranting of judicial police powers to the armedforces, despite severe criticisms expressed by theOffice of the UN High Commissioner for Human

Rights in its recommendations for 2003 and2004, by national and international human rightsorganizations, by the European Union�s Councilof Ministers in the London Declaration of July2003, and even by a significant group of UnitedStates Senators. Nevertheless, in addition to theso-called antiterrorist statute, the legislators ofthe Government coalition have proposed suchmeasures as arming civilians, adopting censor-ship schemes for the press, and converting pri-vate security firms into networks of informants,among others.

This process of counter-reform of the bill ofrights in the 1991 Constitution goes beyond thehumanitarian dimension, and its immediate ef-fect is the debilitation of the democratic rule oflaw. From the very beginning, the Governmentcoalition has sought to hold on to power in thelong term (for twelve years, according to thePresidential advisor Rudolf Hommes) through

ca (Tolima) 20 out of 41 detainees were freed as a result of a requestfrom the Public Ministry, given the illegality of their detention; sevenof these continue to be linked to the investigation. Procuraduría PressRelease 040-04, La Procuraduría advierte irregularidades en �capturasmasivas�, Bogotá, feb 22 of 2004. Taken fromwww . p r o c u r a d u r i a . g o v . c o / n o t i c i a s / 2 0 04 / F e b r e r o / 2 2 /B_040_Febrero_22_2003_Capturas_Masivas.html

5 This is because in the majority of cases massive detentions take placeinplaces where the presence of guerillas is presumed, and as suchthe local populations are arbitrarily suspected of collaboration withthese groups.

6 This has taken place with social organizations that participated in theLondon Declaration of July 2003, despite the fact that this is animportant group of peace initiatives, human rights and the expressio-ns of social movements that maintain communication with the Gover-nments of the 24 nations which comprise the G-24, the UnitedNations and the national Government. With these words, spokenbefore security forces at the swearing in of a new commander for theAir Force, the Government not only eroded any form of confidencefor dialogue on the problems of peace and human rights, but alsoeroded the conditions necessary for human rights work in the countyand sent a message of disregard for the human rights cause to asociety which has unfortunately long ago come to accept and tole-rate arbitrary abuses of power.

7 Translator�s Note: The Procuraduría General is an investigative arm ofthe state which differentiates itself from the Attorney General�soffice in its governmental oversight and disciplinary functions.

8 The Special reports of the Procuraduría General on the rehabilitationzones demonstrate the failure of this policy in terms of its capacity toprevent the reproduction of the conflict, and particularly in terms ofthe construction of confidence among the citizenry in the State�sauthority, given the list of arbitrary abuses to which it was subject, andthe absence of policies in the social sphere to confront the crisisfaced by many regions. The reports on the rehabilitation zones inArauca and Montes de María were published on 10 June and 28August of 2003, respectively. Reports taken from:www.procuraduría.gov.co .

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particular governance strategies, selectivecounter-reform of the Political Constitution of1991, and the reelection of the President. Thetwo least popular cases of this regressive ten-dency are the goal of eliminating the Tutela ac-tion, a mechanism to which any citizen may re-sort to demand satisfaction of their economic,social and cultural rights, and the determinationto limit the powers of the Constitutional Courtin those areas in which this entity has exercisedeffective control over abuses of power or thefailure to meet official obligations in such a waythat compromises the rights of citizens. Similar-ly, the decision to attempt to amend the consti-tution to enable the immediate reelection of thePresident subordinates expectations of the con-tinuity of the security policy to the interests ofthe Government coalition9 , monopolizes thecause of security for electoral purposes, andsends an ambiguous message regarding the re-sults of the security policy.

In terms of the political regime, the tenden-cy is towards the authoritarian concentration ofpower in the executive, to the detriment of in-stitutional and citizen autonomies enshrined inthe Constitution of 1991. Because of this, theGovernment has proposed eliminating the pub-lic defender�s office, and themunicipal �person-erías�, cutting the autonomy of the judicialbranch, returning to the model of extraordinarypowers which in the past allowed for legislationby decree, and reforming the statute on statesof exception in order to return to the arbitraryformula of the Political Constitution of 1886.These proposals are echoed in other halls ofpower within the state, given that the veryProcurador General publicly suggested in 2003the idea of granting extra-constitutional powersto the President10 , while the Attorney Generalsuggested in 2002 that the �war will be won bythe bullet�11 . More recently, the elimination ofthe disciplinary oversight functions of theProcuraduría General with respect to the secu-rity forces has been proposed, despite the mul-tiple scandals in which units of the armed forceshave become embroiled, such as in the cases ofGuatarilla and Cajamarca, quickly and euphe-

mistically characterized by relevant authoritiesas �mistakes� and �friendly fire� incidents12 , andnot cases which ought to be examined withinthe framework of humanitarian norms.

In this perspective, the social sphere hasbeen the first to be sacrificed, and the primaryfield in which the Government faces a crisis oflegitimacy, given that its basic alliance is with thetraditional economic elites. This explains thecontinued service of the economic team and thepriorities of their policy: regressive fiscal adjust-ment, the punctual payment of duties to inter-national creditors, and the obsession with ob-taining resources that will make the strategy ofwar sustainable. These were the priorities of theconstitutional referendum rejected by the Co-lombian people, despite clientelist tactics, theomnipresence of the Government in the massmedia, and the intimidation and pressure exert-ed by businesses against their employees to pushthem to vote.

The Government�s plebiscite strategy failedin the midst of opposition by various social andpolitical sectors, as shownby the successful cam-paign for active abstention for the Constitution-al Referendum, and the election to importantlocal offices of alternative political figures, suchas mayor Luis Eduardo Garzón of Bogota, whorepresented the antithesis of Uribe�s platform onpeace and social policy in the 2002 presidentialcontest.

9 In practice, the official rhetoric has denied the possibility of having apublic debate on the content of security policies, and monopolizesthis banner for the Government coalition, to the point of turning itinto an electoral tool. It seems relevant to note here the speechdelivered by Senator John Kerry to the Democratic Party Conventionin 2004, where he criticized President Bush precisely for his preten-sion of converting security policy into a partisan issue and questio-ning the patriotism of those who formulate criticisms of the doctrineof unilateral war.

10 �En el país hay una carnicería�. Interview by the reporter CeciliaOrozco to Procurador Edgardo Maya. Lecturas Dominicales. Diario ElTiempo. March 2, 2003.

11 Interview with Attorney General, �La guerra se gana a bala�, El Espec-tador, august 25, 2002, pg. 4-A.

12 Several means of communication noted the official use of theseexpressions in their reporting of these cases. Among these, CaracolNoticias on June 24, 2004, available on the internet and El colom-biano: �Fuerzas militares van a replantear operaciones�. Even officialsources indicate that �President Uribe says the army made a mistakein good faith�. www.sigob.presidencia.gov.co/snol/noticia_anterior.asp?ID=72663

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The Government�s behavior is resulting in asituation of growing international isolation, par-ticularly with regard to the human rights agen-da. With very few exceptions, the new LatinAmerican Governments prefer a political solu-tion to the Colombian armed conflict, and haveexpressed concern over the growing militarypresence of the United States in Colombia: fortheir part, the Governments of the EuropeanUnion, the United Nations, important elementswithin the United States and varied expressionsof international civil society have posited evergreater concerns over the Colombian Govern-ment�s policies, especially in relation to the hu-man rights agenda, the social crisis, and the mil-itary option as a solution to the problem of illicitcrop cultivation.

Finally, in the area of dialogue, the Govern-ment has moved forward with a process of rap-prochement with paramilitary groups (detailedbelow) while with insurgent groups it has posit-ed a perspective on dialogues which combinessupport for the creation of spaces to facilitatenegotiations with a series of conditions antithet-ical to those proposed by the guerrillas, both inthe initiation of a peace process and for poten-tial humanitarian accords. In fact, the Govern-ment has invoked the assistance of the UN, andon a national level, of the Catholic church, andtried to employ civilian spaces for facilitation,both for humanitarian accords and for eventualdialogues with the respective groups. But, wellbeyond the normal differences in perspectiveand interests, the fundamental issue is a struc-tural dichotomy between the hypotheses fordialogue which the State and the insurgencieshave set forth. The Government policy seeks todevelop a dialogue in the middle of successfulmilitary offensives. In the best of cases, the of-fer on the table is some model of Disarmament,Demobilization and Reintegration without con-sidering the possibility of structural agreementson socioeconomic, political and humanitarianissues contained in the common agenda agreedto in el Caguán and in the National Conventionproposed by the ELN. The Government com-plements this strategy with a denial of the polit-

ical character of the insurgent organization13 anddemands that they be homogeneously treatedas terrorists by the international community14 ,even as it occasionally requests the assistanceof these countries to facilitate a rapprochementwith these groups.

Making the possibilities for peace conditionalto the unfolding of the armed conflict ignoresthe social and political potential of Colombiansociety and of the international community toseek reconciliation alternatives. It also submitsthe country to the indefinite timelines of a com-plex experiment in the measuring of forces, andin the end to the capacity of the state to changethe balance of military power in order to forcethe insurgents into an advantageous negotiation.From the government�s perspective, the insur-gents will only accept a genuine negotiationwhen they feel the State�s forces are progres-sively superior to their own; in the Guerilla�sopinion, the Colombian elites will only negotiatesubstantive issues with a powerful armed insur-gency. This kind of logic is very dangerous, notonly because it is employed by the Government,the paramilitaries and the guerrillas to justify theiractions and the arbitrary abuse of power, butbecause it erodes the space in which socialmovements within the civilian population mightwork to ameliorate the conditions that repro-duce exclusion and inequality.

The Guerrillas: Between Tactical Retreat andNew Forms of IrregularWarfare

The changes in strategy of the various in-surgent groups are more difficult to examinethan those of the State, owing to the very na-

13 I n fact, the reform of Law 418 of 1997 (Law 782 of 2002), suppres-sed the demand of recognition of the political status by the Govern-ment in order to advance dialogue with the armed groups. This typeof message produces resistance within the insurgent groups, whichreject their being treated in the same way as the paramilitary groupsin the political arena.

14 The FARC and the ELN appear on the lists of terrorist organizationselaborated by the United States and the European Union. The sameis true of the AUC, although it is not known if the Colombian Gover-nment requested that these groups be placed on such lists. The USstate department, Canada and the EU included them in their listsowing to their extensive record of human rights violations.

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ture of these organizations. Nevertheless, it ispossible to evaluate the various public actionsundertaken during this time period, whichrange from a strategy of retreat (that is, a gen-eral tendency not to openly combat the armedforces in areas where the State has developedits primary offensives) to the continued use oftraditional modes of operation, to incursion intonew manifestations of irregular warfare, whichare ever more indiscriminate. What follows is adescription of the more visible activities of theinsurgency15 .

In the first place, it behooves us to notethat, in marked contrast with the predominantmodel of attacks on military units (during theSamper administration) and the strategy of at-tacks on towns and the destruction of local po-lice units with gas cylinders, (robustly developedduring the Pastrana administration) in the newperiod the guerillas have increasingly focusedtheir attacks on paramilitary groups and thecommunities in which they operate. This reflectsthe consequences of the restructuring of thepublic security forces, which in turn pressuresthe reorganization of the modes of action em-ployed by the insurgents, and also results fromthe movement of paramilitary groups into in-surgent controlled areas, and the movement ofguerillas into paramilitary areas, with the atten-dant consequences for the civilian populationthat has become essentially the booty of war.The national Government attributes the retreatof the guerrillas to the success of its offensivemilitary operations, and without doubt this ispart of the explanation, but it should also beunderstood as a political strategy on the part ofthe insurgency, which seeks to preserve its ba-sic structure while putting the Government strat-egy to the test of time16 .

Although the broad trend is towards retreat,in recent months new large scale attacks onmilitary units have been witnessed, such as thecombat around the military base of Tolemaidain Melgar (Tolima Department), the downing ofairplanes, confrontations resisting the offensiveof the Plan Patriota in Putumayo and generallyin the south of the country, and the seizure of

towns in Cauca and Huila17 . In turn the FARChas been dealt serious blows, such as the cap-ture of Simón Trinidad and other important re-gional leaders, particularly in the Department ofCundinamarca, and the capture or desertion ofrank and file guerillas.

A second type of action attributed to theseorganizations has been urban attacks, in whichthey have employed powerful explosives of in-discriminate reach on the civilian population; forinstance, the FARC is blamed for a rocket attackin Bogota on the day of President Uribe�s takingoffice, an attack on the United States embassy,the use of powerful explosives in the nightclubEl Nogal, the Tequendama residential complex,and near the Airport in Neiva, among others.Likewise, dynamite attacks have been attribut-ed to the ELN in Arauca and Cúcuta.

Thirdly, the insurgent groups have singledout civilians who presumably participate in theGovernment security programs as military tar-gets, closing the humanitarian space and deep-ening the dynamics of civil war in the regions;the polarization which the various strategies aim-ing to integrate the civilian population in thearmed conflict have produced directly challengevarious forms of social leadership and erode thechances of democratic organizational process-es. Armed detentions, the trapping of popula-tions, restrictions on free movement etc. onlyadd to this problem.

Fifthly, the guerrillas have increased their kid-nappings and killings of political leaders and ofthe civilian population in several regions of the

15 This general evaluation of the context is based on the armed group�stypes of actions, based on press reports, the UN Humanitarian Situa-tion Room, and the Sisdhes system of Codhes. Owing to limitationsof space, only the broad outlines are presented.

16 Ordinarily, the issue of time is examined based on the risks andopportunities determined by the changes of government owing tothe Presidential term. However, in a long term conflict, this factor isless important than the time periods associated with the evaluation ofthe effect of a particular policy, in this case that of military offensi-ves. In this sense, it is probable that the guerillas are more interestedin discrediting the aggressive security policy than any particular admi-nistration.

17 The observatories on the Conflict maintained by the Vice Presidencyand the Foundation for Security and Democracy show a complexmulticolored map of offensive operations, but for the purposes ofthis text, only the basic outlines are presented.

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country, particularly within the strategy of pres-suring the exchange of members of the armedforces and political leaders for guerilla membersheld in State prisons. In the same manner, thethreat against local authorities is maintained inthose territories where the State has greater dif-ficulty maintaining a military, judicial or socialpresence.

In the political andmilitary arenas, new stra-tegic cooperation agreements have been reachedby the ELN and the FARC, which overcome themany local conflicts which have arisen betweenthese two organizations in the last two years.This change is significant for the developmentof the conflict, and will certainly affect the dif-ferentiated models which these groups havebeen developing with regard to political negoti-ation, humanitarian accords and other prob-lems. But there still exists no new version of the�Guerilla coordinator� as demonstrated by thefact that these organizations maintain differen-tiated political initiatives.

Finally, the insurgent groups maintain someopen avenues for dialogue with the Governmenton subjects of strictly humanitarian character,and accept the involvement of the Church, sec-tors of civil society and the international com-munity to facilitate these processes. Neverthe-less, few advances have beenmade, and the livesof the kidnapped continue to hang by a threadin a macabre dialectic which pits governmentannouncements of military rescue operationsagainst the threat of cold blooded killing by theguerillas.

While the Government unrolls the Plan Pa-triota, designed to capture insurgent leaders orliberate the civilian and military victims of kid-napping, the FARC has focused on the subjectof a humanitarian exchange, forcing the Gov-ernment to endure the double pressure of mili-tarily or politically resolving a problem that,should it prolong itself indefinitely, will becomeemblematic of the failure of the security policy.For the moment this contest has resulted attimes in successful rescues, (as with the Bishopof Zipaquirá, rescued by security forces) and atother times in tragedies, such as the murder of

the governor of Antioquia Gustavo Gaviria andhis assistants at the hands of the FARC in themidst of a rescue attempt. Some kidnapping vic-tims have also been released as a result of dia-logue processes, as in the recent case of severalforeigners kidnapped by the ELN in the SierraNevada de Santa Marta18 (2003).

This description should outline the complexfeatures of the conflict in which the dominanttendency is the State�s major military offensive,while the guerillas maintain a considerable of-fensive activity in the short term and an unpre-dictable one in the medium term. It should benoted, however, that the historical evidence in-dicates that the militarization by the State of anarea does not necessarily imply the recovery ofcontrol within that area, and that it is most prob-able that the civilian population and persons pro-tected under international humanitarian law willsuffer for it.

The Paramilitary Groups: DialogueWithout aCeasefire

In this area the restructuring of the conflicthas moved forward on two fronts: firstly, thedevelopment of a process of negotiation accom-panied by a relative relaxation of tensions, andsecondly a qualitative change in the forms ofviolence employed by the AUC, which havemoved away from traditional large scale massa-cres to individual assassinations targeted againstsocial and community leaderships.

Paramilitary groups maintain an expansion-ary trend, but have entered a political crossroadsby accepting a process of dialogue with nationaland international public visibility, in a time whenthe issue of security has become the primarybanner of the Government, a fact which detractsfrom the room for maneuver of the paramilitary

18 This case was resolved through an understanding reached betweenthe national Government and the ELN guerillas, with the mediation ofthe Catholic church, the Civil Facilitation Commission, and entities ofthe international community. The ELN proceeded to free those kid-napped and the State committed itself to examine and take measuresto resolve the humanitarian crisis in the Sierra Nevada, as manifestedby the report produced by a special commission created for just thatpurpose with the participation of the public defender�s office.

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discourse. The relationship with the public di-mensions of this process has placed the contra-dictions of the dialogues in evidence, togetherwith the less visible interests of the paramilitar-ies and the internal disagreements amongst thevarious factions. In turn, these problems havegenerated a series of reservations and critiquesfrom the international community and fromColombian civil society which have forced a re-formulation of the initial conditions for the dia-logue, placing at issue its capacity to effectivelyovercome the paramilitary phenomenon.

The process� problems are related to thefailure to honor a ceasefire, the demand for to-tal impunity by the paramilitary groups, the re-sistance to considering the rights to truth, jus-tice and reparation of victims, the absence ofspaces and guarantees for the expression anddemands of victims, and the absence of strate-gic issues such as the violent concentration ofland wealth and the relationship with the nar-cotics trade in the negotiation agenda.

The first evident problem is the failure tohonor a unilateral cessation of hostilities declaredby the AUC, which has been documented bythe Government itself: the most conservativestatistics show that in this time paramilitaries arepresumed responsible for the death ofmore than400 Colombians, in addition to massacres suchas that which took place in la Guajira (2004) andfor the killing and disappearance of some of theirown leaders. Moreover, on the day when thenegotiating table was opened, the paramilitariesreformulated the thesis of the cessation of hos-tilities, demanding that the State first guaranteesecurity in the regions where these groups op-erate. They further announced that they wouldcontinue their offensive against guerillas (underthe rubric of which barbaric acts are routinelycommitted against the civilian population) whilebeing careful not to confront Government forc-es, (which they would not in any case ordinarilyconfront, seeing them as allies). Both the Gov-ernment and observing entities, in this case theOAS, bear responsibility for this problem.

A second problem consists in the fact thatthe process does not involve all expressions of

paramilitarism and has evidenced difficulty inconstructing a unified negotiating position, evenamong the groups involved in the process. Thisfact warns of the possibility that themost stronglyarmed groups will continue in the war, or thatthe process will prolong itself indefinitely for lackof the political will to push decisive issues, orthat it will break down, in which case the Stateand the international community must take ex-treme measures to ensure the security of socialleaders, who continue to be the primary targetsof these groups. But even in the unlikely case ofa successful process of negotiation, there existsa social demand that the post conflict condi-tions to which these dialogues lead establishgenuine democratic guarantees for the devel-opment of political participation in the regionswhere paramilitarism today has a significant pres-ence. This is particularly the case because thereexist areas where political processes have beenlargely taken over by the armed groups, and thesolution is democracy, not an eventual conver-sion of the country into a massive �rehabilita-tion zone�.

A third issue is the dichotomy between theobjectives of co-existence to which any processof dialogue must aspire and the handling of theissue of truth and justice with regard to the crimesagainst humanity which have been committedby paramilitaries. In this area, the AUC have de-manded total impunity, the preservation of thewealth they have illegally and violently acquired,and the conditions to reproduce their domina-tion of certain regions through other means. Thefirst project presented by the Government ap-proximated this aspiration, demanding only sym-bolic reparations andminimizing the dimensionsof truth and justice. The reaction of civil society,political actors and above all the internationalcommunity have forced the government to re-position itself on this front. Nevertheless, the newproject of penal alternatives which tackles theseissues is currently in a state of limbo. Given theuncertainties, the international community hasbeen inhibited in participating in direct media-tion, but remains vigilant of basic standards ofinternational law in matters of human rights. For

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its part, the OAS and the United States Govern-ment have manifested more direct support, buthave also posited strong critiques; in the case ofthe former entity, through the Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights, the latter withregard to narcotics issues and demands for theextradition of certain participants in the negoti-ations.

For these reasons, the chances of definitivelyovercoming paramilitarism continue to be slim,so long as the interests of victims remain unex-amined, the economic interests that underlieparamilitary strategies remain unaddressed, andparticularly so long as the historical significanceof the inherent political responsibilities relatedto the development of these expressions of ex-treme violence in the country are not deeplyexamined. International pressure on social andpolitical actors within the country19 , in favor ofguaranteeing that the process not convert itselfinto a symbol of impunity or the deepening ofthe war are favorable factors in the fight to over-come paramilitarism, but the transcendentaldecisions that would allow for this have yet tobe taken.

A CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT ANDPERSPECTIVESONPEACE

In conclusion, we are witnessing today a periodof restructuring of the armed conflict which isconducive to the escalation of the State�s mili-tary offensive, the expansion of paramilitarism,the progressive transformation of the guerillas�strategies and the constriction of the politicalspace in which it is possible to construct solu-tions based on dialogue and negotiations, to-gether with guarantees for the right to act ofsocial movements. We are dealing with a pro-cess which posits a series of questions aboutthe future of war and peace in Colombia, ques-tions which must be examined with due seri-ousness, and not simply through the lens of slo-gans and short term interpretations.

The national Government blithely points tocertain statistics as indications of the success of

its so-called democratic security policy, but thehypothesis it maintains is very short term inoutlook, and fails to take into account broaderdynamics of the costs of this war in Colombia.Neither does it acknowledge the depth of thehumanitarian crisis in a period of complex mili-tary contestation. In fact, not all indicators ofviolations of human rights and international hu-manitarian law have decreased; on the contrary,disappearances, international displacement ofrefugees, arbitrary detentions, political assassi-nations, the confining of populations and thekidnapping of political leaders, among other fig-ures, have been growing, and we are witnessingever increasing instances of institutional actionsthat seek to justify arbitrary action and the dis-respect of human rights and international hu-manitarian law in the name of security. The sameis taking place with regard to forcible displace-ment, the general figures for which drop from2002 to 2003, while growing in absolute andrelative terms, precisely in those areas where themilitary offensives and clashes are greatest.

Moreover, there exist today entire regionswhich have been converted into macabre labo-ratories for war, in which the activities of irregulargroups, (such as armed strikes, selective and sys-tematic assassinations, trappingof civilians in theirtowns, food roadblocks, rigid controls on the free-dom of movement, disputes over economic re-sources, threats to local authorities, the displace-ment of political forces andmore), are juxtaposedwith new policies of massive fumigation of illicitcrops, the creation of new military battalions,peasant soldiers, networks of informants, accus-ers programs, areas of rehabilitation, clandestinesearches and arbitrary detentions of civilians,among other practices. Can it be concluded thatin these regions the humanitarian and social con-ditions have improved? Do conditions and dem-

19 In this sense, the initiative spearheaded by senator Rafael Pardo ofcreating public audiences, with the backing of the Congress, isimportant, together with the actions pushed forward by the Con-fluencia por la Democracia and the Congresso Nacional de Víctimas,whose fundamental demand is a national debate on the nature of theparamilitary phenomenon and the condition of acknowledging theinterest of victims through processes of historical clarification andthe development of the rights to truth, justice and reparation.

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ocratic guarantees exist for the exercise of civil,political and social rights in these contexts? Theevident answer is no. The result of these formu-las for the deepening of the war is the radical de-terioration of the conditions for social confidenceand coexistence.

A second level of analysis should acknowl-edge dynamics which resist the war, such asdemocratic exercises and the constituent pro-cesses in Nariño, Cauca and Tolima, the peacelaboratories in the Oriente Antioqueño, Bolívarand other regions subject to the rigors of thearmed conflict. The same is true of social move-ments, particularly marches organized by thewomen�s movement, mobilizations in favor ofhumanitarian accords and the reactivation ofpeace movements.

These processes of resistance comprise apart of a more profound and persistent changein the national and international political con-text20 and begin to show the limitations of strat-

egies of war and open new possibilities for push-ing for a political solution. In the internal arena,the electoral processes of October 2003 starklyillustrated that there is no unanimity in favor ofthe Government�s policies, and that, while someregions have begun moving towards a model ofsingle candidates in elections, in many otherparts of the country social and political processesare a source of democratic diversity which, ingeneral terms, demands concrete solutions toancient social problems and at the same timesupports solutions based on the principles ofdialogue and a political solution to the war. Inthe international arena, the political failure of theliberty killing doctrine of unilateral wars amidstmassive civil mobilizations which have impact-ed the political and electoral processes in Eu-rope and the United States, opens a new pathto civility, and legitimizes the search for humanrights, democracy and alternatives other thanwar to address historically rooted conflicts.

20 We are witnessing a series of profound changes on the international level. Following the tragedy of 11 September the pragmatic logic of war wasimposed and both human rights agendas and the prospects for dialogue passed to a second tier. But the proposal of unilateral, preventive andarbitrary wars has been rejected on a global level with important repercussions: the progressive return of multilateralism, the strengthening of theUnited Nations, political transitions towards democratic values and human rights in Europe and the United States, and the progressive strengthe-ning of democratic processes in Latin America which are more interested in political peace in Colombia than the development of the logic of war.

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: Codhes. This table on the preception of the displaced in terms of responsibility shows long term tendencies in the level of activity of the variousarmed groups involved in the conflict, in this case in the realm of forcible displacement.

FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIABEHAVIOR OF RESPONSIBLE ARMED ACTORS 1985-2003

21%

33%

54%

47%49%

43%

52%

38%

32%

26%29% 29%

35%

28%

35%

43%

49%

27%

19%16%

6% 6% 6%

1%4%

22%

11% 10%

17% 16%

4%

9%

35%

8%

20%20%

1985-94 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002-2003

Paramilitaries Guerrillas Military Forces Others

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T

�DEMOCRATIC SECURITY� TOANTIDEMOCRATIC INSECURITY�

The special representatives, independent ex-perts and presidents of working groups char-gedwith the Commission�s special proceedingsand the advising program, having met inGeneva 23 to 27 June 2003 . . . express theirdeep concern over the rapid growth of poli-cies, laws and practices which many stateshave adopted in the name of the war on te-rror, which challenge the viability of practica-lly all human rights: civil, cultural, econo-mic, political and social�

(Human Rights Commission 2003b: 23).

he administration of Álvaro UribeVélez does not have a Human Rightspolicy to speak of. Nevertheless, thePresident has been emphatic in af-firming that �the democratic securi-ty policy is a human rights policy�(Office of the President, 2003a: 2).

The Authoritarian TonePolitical and Civil Rights and

International Humanitarian Law

Cinep�s Human Rights andPolitical Violence Database

Cceeu Observatory of Human Rightsand Humanitarian Law *

He tends to defend this policy by arguing that itis a strategy that seeks to provide security to allcitizens, without discrimination of any kind. Theinstruments he has chosen to implement thatstrategy, however, radically contradict the �dem-ocratic� aim of which he speaks. In reality, thispolicy �fails to recognize international humanrights and humanitarian law, and ultimatelyamounts to a restricted and arbitrary conceptionof security.� (Joint Declaration, 2003: 1). As such,the policy of �democratic security� has been con-verted, thanks to the spell of its own instruments,in the greatest and most radical antidemocraticinsecurity1 .

* Cceeu - Coordination Colombia - Europa - Estados Unidos.1 According to the government, �Strengthening the rule of law is the

necessary condition for accomplishing the goal of Democratic Secu-rity: the protection of each and every inhabitant of Colombia, as thePolitical Constitution demands. If the rule of law reigns withoutcontest, the rights and liberties of the citizen will be protected; andin as much as the citizen feels protected, citizen participation andsecurity will be strengthened� (Office of the President, 2003b:13).Rescuing precisely these criteria, insecurity is a direct consequenceof the application of the �democratic security� policy: The social ruleof law is dismantled and violations committed against significantsectors of the Colombian population increase.

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In the first place, the application of the�democratic security� policy has conceded tothemilitary excessive judicial powers, which havelead to the substantial weakening of the socialrule of law and to violations of human rights andhumanitarian law. The government charged themilitary and police forces with implementing its�democratic security� policy. This decision didnot take into account the fact that a thoroughcleansing of these organizations is urgently need-ed, owing both to the persistent linkages be-tween them and the paramilitary groups, and tothe fact that soldiers and policemen have com-mitted war crimes and crimes against humanity.Nevertheless, the government considered grant-ing exceptional powers to the military forces in-dispensable for the success of its strategy2 .

The results of the application of the mea-sures adopted under the state of exception wereominous3 . Nevertheless, in April 2003, the gov-ernment presented a legislative proposal�through which articles 15, 24, 28 and 250 ofthe Colombian Political Constitution are modi-fied to face the terrorist threat�. On December18, 2003, Congress approved the constitution-al amendment which confers to the military thepermanent ability to exercise judicial powers andto execute searches and seizures, arrests, andinterception of communications without judicialwarrants, among other powers4 . On June 172004, Congress approved a statutory law whichregulates the �antiterrorist statute� throughwhich the Constitution was amended5 .

The legislative proposal and the statutorylaw attack the constitutional area which repre-sents the spinal column of the social rule of lawinstitutionalized in 1991, in asmuch as they seekto erode the fundamental rights envisioned bythe constitution�s framers6 . Moreover, their ap-proval violates sections of the Vienna Conven-tion on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) forbiddingunilateral actions by states parties to a treaty tomodify its content once it has entered into force.Consequently, as indicated by former presidentAlfonso López, with the adoption of the so calledantiterrorist statute, �basic civil guarantees wereignored and� free reign was given to new insti-

tutions erected over the remains of the demo-cratic constitution�7 .

Secondly, the implementation of the �dem-ocratic security� policy involves the civilianpopulation to a greater degree in the armedconflict. On the one hand, the government con-siders the military collaboration of civilians tobe an absolute duty. On the other hand thegovernment systematically and generically sus-pects the civilian population of collaborationwith the guerillas, has cast that population asenemies, and as such has made them the tar-get of official attacks.

Broad segments of the civilian populationhave been converted into auxiliaries of the armedforces through programs like the network of in-formants and cooperators, and the peasant sol-

2 Such powers were granted through decree 2002 of September 9,2002, issued in response to the state of internal commotion, whichlasted from August 11 of 2002 to February 4, 2003. On April 29,2003, the Constitutional Court declared a renewal unconstitutional.

3 According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, during2003, the increase in grave violations of human rights was a conse-quence of the application of �the governments security policies bythe security forces� and of �the powers which certain laws granted tothe security forces, including the military, to restrict human rightsand fundamental liberties without judicial order� (Human RightsCommission 2004, párr.71). The Colombia office of the UN HighCommission for Human Rights, the Prosecutor General�s Office andthe Public Defenders office have negatively evaluated the value ofthe so-called areas of rehabilitation and consolidation (Arauca andCórdoba-Sucre), together with the adoption of the measures inclu-ded in decree 2002 of 2002 in other parts of the country.

4 Legislative Act 02 of December 18 2003. Several NGOs presented tothe Constitutional Court a suit in which they sustained that thislegislative project was unconstitutional. The Court has yet to rule onthe matter (as of July 2004).

5 It passed immediately to the Constitutional Court for review. Giventhe Constitutional court{s ruling declaring unconstitutional Legisla-tive Act No. 02 of 2003, upon which its legitimacy rests, this law willmost likely be declared invalid. Nevertheless, it is probable that itwill be once again put forth, in its entirety.

6 At the time of this writing, the Constitutional Court had just announ-ced its ruling, in which it confirms the existence of irregularities inthe approval of this constitutional reform. As such, both the Gover-nment and the Congress will have to pass the reform again, holisti-cally, in order for the Constitutional Court to evaluate its merits andvalidity. Although this process could take another two years, it isunlikely that the content of the new legislation will differ substantia-lly, so that the arguments elaborated in this text remain relevant.

7 Alfonso López, �El estatuto antiterrorista�, El Tiempo, Bogotá, 27June 2004, pg. 1-19.

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diers or �soldiers of my town�8 . For the Admin-istration, thesemeasures are justified in asmuchas �security is � the product of the collectiveeffort of the citizenry: it is everyone�s responsi-bility� (Office of the President 2003b:17). In turn,the Ministry of Defense brandished other rea-sons, which point to the military advantage toimplementing these measures: �We must havethe population on our side. It is the only way towin the war�9 . However, by assigning a militaryfunction to the civilian population, the state iserasing the line between civilians and combat-ants and is exposing common people to attacksby the insurgents. For instance, in Saravena(Arauca), the FARC threatened the families of 39peasant soldiers that were forced to fulfill theirobligatory military service in that program (Am-nesty International 2004a: 26).

The �democratic security� policy also ig-nores the principle of distinction between com-batants and civilians by generalizing the suspi-cion of collaboration with guerilla groups toencompass the entire civilian population. Basedon the consideration that the guerillas �blendinto the civilian population� (decree 2002 of2002), military operations directed against civil-ians have been justified, since civilians are auto-matically and arbitrarily considered the same asguerilla combatants10 . �The Army�s strategy oftrying to cut the guerilla�s support from underthem has affected in some cases the civilianpopulation owing to the stigmatization to whichit was subject as well as to violatory actions, sei-zures and threats.� (Human Rights Commission2004: para. 62).

Thirdly, under the banner of repressing anderadicating the insurgent armedgroups, the �dem-ocratic security� policy hides the more sinisterintention of attacking and destroying unarmedcivilian opposition. �Within the context of the �waron terror� Colombia stands out as the most ex-treme example of the tactic of using measuressupposedly aimed at combating illegal armedgroups to hunt, kill, and silence human rightsactivists� (Amnesty International 2004a: 15).

Although it denies this, the government hascontinued the repressive tradition incipient in

the nation�s culture, which takes root in thedoctrine of national security, the same ideologythat in years past inspired the generalization ofhuman rights violations throughout the conti-nent11 . The fundamental target of state repres-sion continues to be organizations, movements,groups, communities and persons who challengethe prevailing social, political or governmentalstatus quo. That said, the model of state repres-sion has changed: the central role of practicesof extermination, disappearance and torture �which continue to be employed in moderation�has been shifted to the use of more tolerableinstruments within political and external spheres,such as those offered by the judicial system, withits enormous vulnerability to manipulation, inorder to legally pursue those who are consid-ered enemies.

�We the undersigned Human Rights NGO�s considerthat all the measures undertaken by the current govern-ment are based upon a conception of counterinsurgencywhich focuses on the suspicion of infiltration on the partof guerillas into social organizations. This perspectiveconverts such organizations into targets of military in-telligence activities, including the interception of commu-nications, searches and seizures, among other methods.

8 � Soldiers of my Town Program: The national army projects that it willpresent this year to the Colombian people 142 units additional to theexisting 423 in the various municipalities of the national territory,thereby making their presence felt in 80% of the country. TheDepartments with the greatest concentration of municipalities withsignificant peasant soldier presence are: Cundinamarca, Antioquia,Santander and Putumayo. With these new units, it is estimated thatby the end of 2004 there will be 2,600 peasant soldiers in thecountry� (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). The legal reform ofregulations that govern the operation of private security firms alsowas oriented towards integrating them in the execution of the �de-mocratic security� policy.

9 �Armed Peasants�, Semana, Bogotá, 26 August, 2002, pg. 28.10 In President Álvaro Uribe�s view, �the guerilla groups are not comba-

tants because they are terrorists�� With this posture, the Presidentdenies the character of combatants to those who clearly are such,and converts into combatants those who are not, that is, civilians.This is a monstrous open door to barbarism, as it �represents theerosion of the basic foundations of humanitarian law� (ColombianCommission of Jurists, 2003: 1).

11 �Democratic Security differs from the conceptions of security es-poused by authoritarian regimes, proponents of ideological hege-mony and political exclusion. This government does not espouse oldconceptions such as that of �National Security� in Latin America,which took as a point of departure considering ideological groups orpolitical parties as �internal enemies�. Leter from the President of theRepublic, Álvaro Uribe Vélez (Office of the President 2003b: 5).

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The application of this paradigm of counterinsurgencyhas unleashed widespread persecution of social and hu-man rights organizations and political opposition move-ments. Military and police intelligence officials have shownlittle inclination to make the distinction between legiti-mate opposition, social protest or human rights promo-tion activities and the actions of guerillas. In fact, underthe current administration openly arbitrary searches andseizures have been carried out against persons and insti-tutions committed beyond any doubt to the consolidationof a peaceful and democratic society.

(�) There exist sufficient pieces of evidence to suggestthat the Uribe administration is employing judicial mea-sures far more than previous governments as a mecha-nism for countering the activities of social and humanrights organizations.�(Non Governmental Program, 2003: 2 y 96).

With the power it grants to atrocious prac-tices, the judicial system in Colombia is beingrendered arbitrary. Along these lines, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (CIDH)has warned:

�The CIDH has been consistent in manifesting the viewthat the punitive powers of the state, and its judicialapparatus should not be manipulated with the aim ofharassing those who engage in legitimate activities. Onthis subject, the Commission has received informationand continues to receive pieces of evidence regarding re-peated instances in which it is alleged that authoritieshave used so-called �judicial farces� with the aim ofharming or silencing human rights defenders that areengaged, among other activities, in documenting the hu-man rights situation, defense of accused persons, in re-presenting victims before tribunals, or in accompanyingcommunities in situations of high risk.�

(CIDH 2004: cap. IV, para. 16).

Fourthly, the application of the �democrat-ic security� policy has allowed a glimpse of theunderlying arbitrary bent by seeking to submitjudicial power and security organs to the execu-tive power, and by reinforcing the high indexesof impunity which have historically prevailed inthe area of human rights and humanitarian law.

The administration has frequently sought to in-tervene in police and judicial actions, and ob-tained the immediate submission of the Attor-neyGeneral�s office. In effect, this institution �hasplainly integrated itself into the strategy of coun-terinsurgency and coordinates the operationsand the counter-terrorism strategy together withthe armed forces, in the recently created anti-terrorist coordination structure� (Amnesty In-ternational 2004a: 41).

On the operational level of the war on ter-ror, the government has pushed forward thecreation of �inter-institutional support structuresto coordinate and complement the actions ofstate entities on the regional and local level,thereby facilitating the work of judicial authori-ties� (Office of the President, 2003b: 36). Thefirst of these structures had been created by thedistrict attorney�s office in Arauca in 2001. Inaddition to the denunciations alleging irregularbehavior on the part of officials from the districtattorney�s office in the carrying out of their du-ties, particularly during operations in which se-curity forces carried out apprehensions, the de-velopment of this inter-institutional supportstructure attracted the attention of the Procura-dor12 General�s office, which concluded that itplaced �in doubt the full realization of constitu-tional and legal principles regarding autonomy,impartiality and judicial independence� (Procura-dor General�s office 2003: 20).

In this manner, impunity and judicial arbi-trariness are converted into two facets of a sin-gle strategy, managed by a single branch of gov-ernment: Crimes against humanity are tolerated,while those considered responsible for �crimes�of opposition, social protests and non-confor-mity, who refuse to integrate into the prevailingpolitical and economic models are ruthlesslypunished.13 . The arbitrary power of the judicialauthority is even greater in as much as it oper-ates in close cooperation with the executivepower. Consequently, no policy causes greaterantidemocratic insecurity than this one, as itthoroughly erodes the principles which in anydemocracy protect its citizens from abuses ofpower: the principle of the independence and

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impartiality of the judicial apparatus; the princi-ple of legality; the principle of due process; andthe principle of the presumption of innocence14 .

Lastly, the execution of the �democratic se-curity� policy does not necessarily imply a statemonopoly on the use of force. Since its concep-tion, paramilitarism has always obeyed a singleguiding principle: to blur the line between the civiland the military such that the repressive or vio-lent actions which the military is unable to takewithout delegitimizing the state can be undertak-en by civilians with ambiguous, clandestine, orcamouflaged links to the military apparatus. Thewide range of opportunities which the currentadministration has opened for broad sectors ofthe civilian population to link themselves to aux-iliary tasks in themilitary enterprise obey the sameprinciple. In this sense, thedemobilizationof para-militaries could be seen as a kind of combatantrecycling process, spitting the so called ex-com-batants back into the hostilities through the in-formant and cooperator�s networks, the peasantsoldiers program and private security firms15 .

A CRITICAL HUMAN RIGHTS ANDHUMANITARIAN LAWSITUATIONWORSENS

During 2003, the human rights and humanitarianlaw situation in Colombia continued to worsen16.Human rights violations continue to be the con-sequence of grave, systematic and widespreadpractices, while violations of humanitarian law arethe result of generalized practices executed on agrand scale. (Human Rights Commission 2002a:para. 72). In this sense, the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights, in her reporton 2003, stated that �the human rights situationin Colombia remained critical� (Human RightsCommission 2004a para. 67).

In 2003, CINEP�s database registered thedestruction of 4,447 human lives as a conse-quence of political violence. 1,339 extra-judicialexecutions were noted, perpetrated presumablyby military or paramilitary agents: 1,140 (25.64%of the total) constitute intentional homicides ofprotected persons, given that the victims were

eliminated as �enemies� while another 199(4,48%) were the result of the abuse of poweror of social intolerance. Another 422 intention-al homicides took place: while 279 (6.27%) werepresumably perpetrated by guerillas in 143(3,21%) cases it was not possible to determinewith precision if the responsibility fell on gueril-las or the state or paramilitary groups. Therewere also 837 (18,82%) political assassinationsthe blame for which cannot be determined.1,849 (41,58%) combatants lost their lives dur-ing the conduct of hostilities.

Moreover, the CINEP database registered theincidence of torture, disappearances and arbi-trary detentions during 2003. 238 persons werevictims of torture: 170 cases of torture are at-

12 Translator�s Note: the Procuraduría General differs from the AttorneyGeneral�s office (fiscalia) in its internal government oversight func-tions, forming part of the Public Ministry

13 The Colombian Attorney General absolved of any blame the retiredArmy general Rito Alejo Del Río, despite having obtained against himcopious evidence that he was responsible for hundreds of crimesagainst humanity in the areas of Urabá and the lower Middle Atrato. Insharp contrast to such impunity of rights violators who are shelteredby the state, numerous peasants of San José de Apartadó have beendetained, accused of being FARC militants, tortured for many hours,intimidated, and submitted to judicial proceedings based on falsetestimonies paid for with public funds. Within the microcosm of SanJosé de Apartadó one can clearly observe the way the twin strategiesof impunity and judicial arbitrariness are employed and, and arereplicated the length and breadth of the country revealing the wides-pread failure of justice.

14 Recently, the Special Representative for the independence of ma-gistrates and lawyers warned: �The last Special Representative con-solidated the idea that the rule of law implies judicial supervision (orits equivalent) of the constitutionality and legality of the decisions ofthe executive power, of its administrative acts and of laws. I underlinethe fact that such supervision should not be understood as a manifes-tation of institutional rivalry among the judicial, executive and legis-lative branches, but rather as a containing mechanism designed toprevent the development of authoritarian tendencies and to guaran-tee the rule of law in all circumstances. The current Special Repre-sentative shares this view that to seek to limit or even suspend thissupervisory role for the judicial amounts to an attack on judicialindependence, and for his part is determined to remain vigilant of anysuch developments� (Human Rights Commission, 2003c: párr. 29).

15 With regard to the demobilization of the Cacique Nutibara Block ofthe United Autodefenses of Colombia (AUC) which operated in Me-dellín (Antioquia), see Instituto Popular de Capacitación (IPC), Endeuda con los derechos humanos y el DIH. Diversas miradas críticasen Medellín-2003, Medellín, IPC, March 2004, pgs. 68 a 79. Seealso Amnesty International �s statements (Amnesty International2004a:).

16 �Very high levels of violations are maintained. Further, while therehas been a relative reduction in some types of violations, there isevidence of intense growth in other grave violations, such as arbitrarydetentions, tortures and restrictions of freedom of movement, withthe tendency to worsen thanks to the elimination of legal barriers�(Colombian Commission of Jurists 2003, 5).

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tributed to state and paramilitary agents; in 10cases the guerillas are faulted and in 58 casesthe blame has not been able to be fixed withprecision, though the political motive seemsclear. 182 persons were victims of forced disap-pearances: while 140 disappearances were per-petrated by military and paramilitary agents, theresponsibility for the remaining 42 disappearanc-es has not been ascertained. In addition, 1,191persons were victims of arbitrary detentions.

As the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights warns, despite the decrease in some indi-cators, the frequent occurrence of human rightsviolations and infractions of humanitarian lawwhich affect in particular the right to life are ex-tremely worrisome (Human Rights Commission2004a: paras 42, 44 y 54). The figures on politi-cal violence can rise or fall intermittently, depend-ing on factors that only havemomentary effects17 .The quantitative diminishing of one modality ofviolence in one year does not represent a defini-tive change in the overall trajectory of violencewhich Colombia lives. The combatants� completedisregard for human life, revealed by the heinousmassacres perpetrated in Guatarilla (Nariño), onMarch 19 2004; in Cajamarca (Tolima), on April10 2004; in Bahía Portete (La Guajira), on April18 2004; in Tame (Arauca), on May 19 2004; andin La Gabarra de Tibú (Norte de Santander), onJune 15 2004, however, are highly worrisome.

Tracking down the total number of victimsof the gravest violation of the right to life, thatwhich is perpetrated by direct or indirect agentsof the state, allows one to affirm that a substan-tial change in rights violations has not takenplace. During the period from 1990 to 2002,CINEP�s database registered an annual averageof 1,067 extrajudicial executions. In 2003, 1,140extrajudicial executions were counted (see box).

On another front, from 1996 to 2002, anannual average of 296 intentional homicides ofprotected persons were registered, the respon-sibility for which either falls on insurgent groupsor cannot be ascertained. In 2003, 422 inten-tional homicides of protected persons were reg-istered, maintaining the trajectory of the lastthree years (see box).

Types 1 2 3 4 5Years1990 313 1.961 217 1.229 -1991 560 1.658 189 1.364 -1992 1.242 1.601 237 1.638 -1993 957 1.665 173 1.150 -1994 720 1.191 170 1.083 -1995 994 862 111 899 -1996 1.046 701 192 731 1211997 1.213 618 192 1.295 3061998 970 333 240 1.495 1301999 1.173 940 261 1.437 3762000 1.942 2.431 402 1.677 2592001 1.748 3.136 259 748 4062002 995 1.734 162 2.624 473

Total 13 years 3.873 18.831 2.805 17.370 2.071*

Average year 1.067 1.448 215 1.336 295Average Month 89 120 18 111 242003 1.140 137 840 1.849 422*

Average Month 95 70 12 154 35

1. Extrajudicial executions ans intentional homicides ofprotected persons, perpetraded by state and para-stateagents.

2. Muders for political motives or social tolerance withoutand identified cause.

3. Forced disappearances.4. Deaths in war actions.5. Intentional homicides of protected persons.

* The databank began to register violent acts classified as againstthe International Humanitarian Law, according to the conven-tions. It is calculated on the base.

** 279 intentional homicides - protected persons by insurgentgroups and 143 deaths against IHL(DHI) by combantants fromstate groups or insugent groups in which cases the informa-tion does not allow to individualize the responsibility.

Principal incidences of political violencePrincipal incidences of political violencePrincipal incidences of political violencePrincipal incidences of political violencePrincipal incidences of political violenceRegistered in the DatabaseRegistered in the DatabaseRegistered in the DatabaseRegistered in the DatabaseRegistered in the Databasebetween 1990 and 2003between 1990 and 2003between 1990 and 2003between 1990 and 2003between 1990 and 2003

17 Among the factors it behooves us to mention: a) periods immedia-tely before or after elections; b) moments of ebb and flood withinthe various actors in the conflict in addition to the intensification orstability of their internal cohesion; c) periods of tactical offensivesand retreats; and d) moments of extermination of social and politicalmovements, as targets of persecution, and the deactivation of theextermination owing to the effects of terror.

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According to the High Commissioner forHuman Rights, the persistence of the critical sit-uation of violations of human rights is evidenced,among other situations, by extrajudicial execu-tions, by the increased numbers of complaintsof �acts torture, cruel, inhuman or degradingtreatment, and of excessive use of force byagents of the Colombian security forces�, by�forcible disappearances, and illegal or arbitrarydetentions� by �violations of due process owingto lack of respect for the independence and im-partiality of the judicial apparatus, violations ofprocedural guarantees and of the principle ofthe presumption of innocence�. She adds thatviolations of humanitarian law were particularlyreflected in the victimization of the civilian pop-ulation:

�In those areas under strong influenceof illegal armed groups � the inhabitantshave suffered increasing pressures and thesubmission of the population to acts of ter-rorism, homicide and torture, the restrictionof free movement of people and basic ne-cessities, the destruction of goods and pil-laging� (Human Rights Commission 2004apárr. 43 y anexo II).

In March 2004, during an examination ofthe fifth periodical report on Colombia, theHuman Rights Committee expressed its con-cern over attacks against human rights de-fenders, union leaders, politicians, judges andjournalists, and over the persistence of thepractice of kidnapping. The Committee mani-fested particular concern over the plight ofIngrid Betancourt (Human Rights Committee2004: para. 11).

PERSECUTION OF HUMANRIGHTS DEFENDERS

�The special representatives, independent experts andpresidents of working groups charged with theCommission�s special proceedings and the advising pro-gram deplore the fact that, human rights defenders arethreatened and vulnerable groups targeted under the pre-text of fighting against terrorism.� (Human RightsCommission 2003b: 23).

During the administrations of ErnestoSamper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana(1998-2002), the Colombian government madetimid and limited strides towards granting legit-imacy to the work of human rights defenders.Presidential directives n° 011 of July 1997 andn° 07 of September 9 1999 were important for-mal manifestations of the supreme authority ofthe Colombian state. Following their issuance,national and international human rights NGOsand intergovernmental organisms called atten-tion so that all administrative authorities shouldobserve these directives from the president, andmost particularly that the highest levels of themilitary do so.

Today, the government�s regression is evi-dent. Although there exists a directive of theministry of defense on human rights defenders,it is no longer a matter of preventing the issuingof �declarations made by public and military of-ficials in which they publicly cast human rightsdefenders as terrorists and in which they expressthe view that the work undertaken by such de-fenders is subversive in character� (HumanRights Commission 2002b: para. 267). It is nowa matter of preventing the President of the Re-public from making such statements and extol-ling such behavior among public functionariesat all levels by example18 .

President Álvaro Uribe Vélez has persistedin maintaining a hostile attitude towards humanrights defenders, towards national and interna-tional human rights non governmental organi-zations, and even towards intergovernmentalorganizations. In 2003, the President made al-lusions to human rights organizations as

18 �Several NGOs have formally requested of the President that herectify his insinuations against the good name of social, peace andhuman rights organizations. [Legal Petition of December 19 2003, inthe Presidency of the Republic]. Far from doing so, the Presidentratified his statements, indicating that such views were �the expres-sion of the political opinion of the President, who as head of state andof government is constitutionally authorized to express his views,either to inspire Colombians, or simply to form public opinion ingeneral. The president is called upon by the constitution�s framers todirect or govern the country, and he symbolizes national unity [Officeof the President, Legal Secretariat, December 31 2003, number24684]� (Colombian Commission of Jurists 2004: 30).

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�mouthpieces of terrorism� and �human rightstraffickers� (Office of the President 2003a). In2004, he referred to Amnesty International andto other NGOs as �culpable accomplices of ter-rorism� (Office of the President 2004c)19 .

The highest level of government has becomethe primary source of disrespect for the legiti-macy of the work of human rights defenders.According to the UN High Commissioner forhuman rights, such questioning of the work ofhuman rights organizations run counter to Di-rective n° 09 of July 2003, issued by the Minis-try of Defense. The could, moreover �inspire actsagainst the life and liberty of persons related tothe defense of human rights or to the trade unionmovement� (Human Rights Commission 2004aparas 87 y 88).

In effect, the persecution of human rightsdefenders continues to be systematic, and adoptsnew forms of violence, particularly extra-judicialexecutions and arbitrary detentions. Over thecourse of 2003, 15 human rights defenders losttheir lives violently. Likewise, during the periodbeginning January 1 and ending June 30, 2004 atleast six human rights defenders were victims ofextra-judicial executions20 . Moreover, a consid-erable number of human rights defenders, unionmembers and social leaders have been victims ofprolonged arbitrary detentions or detentions thatviolate due process.

What is more, some human rights defend-ing organizations find themselves with almost alltheir staff in prison (Joel Sierra Human RightsCommittee); others have been victims of assaultsdisguised as searches, (Permanent Assembly forPeace); others still have fallen victim to beingframed by the Ministry of Defense (Inter-eccle-siastic Commission of Peace and Justice); manymore live in the shadow of threatened judicialaction, given that the President�s thesis, accord-ing to which many of these organizations serveas a facade for or operate as �defenders of ter-rorist organizations� is shared and respected bymany judicial officials (particularly collectives oflawyers). There are also officials who tried todefend the fundamental rights of unjustly ac-cused persons, and as a result now find them-

selves the subject of criminal proceedings andprotective measures. Moreover, there can be nodoubt that the government counts on the col-laboration of the means of mass communica-tion to enhance its anti NGOpolicy: thesemeansof communication assist greatly in the propaga-tion of lies and either keep silence or report withextreme austerity and without follow up on thepersecution of human rights defenders and so-cial organizations.

The government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez hasalso sought to discredit the statistics producedby human rights NGOs. In his opinion, suchorganizations manipulate human rights and hu-manitarian law figures, exaggerating violationsand refusing to recognize government gains inreducing the terrorist violence that lashes Co-lombia. Even if only partially, the executivebranch�s attempts to discredit the statisticalrecords of the NGOs was supported by the Unit-ed States embassy in Colombia, by the NorthAmerican paper the Wall Street Journal and, onthe domestic level, by Semana magazine21 .NGOs, for their part, have demonstrated thatmany figures produced by the government arenot credible and that the exorbitant growth ofnew modalities of violations of fundamentalrights do not allow for the claim that at this

19 Outside the bounds of diplomatic custom, President Álvaro UribeVélez referred to the United Nations within the context of a srequestfor good offices that the Rio Group might direct to the intergovern-mental organisation in the following terms: �I won�t tell the UnitedNations to stop criticizing, but I do tell them to commit to resolving[the crisis]. Sometimes the United Nations gives the impression thatit fears the verbal attacks of the violent groups in Colombia. I don�tthink that the United Nations can abstain from helping us initially inColombia because the armed groups disrespect it.� // �The UnitedNations needs to choose what interests it will serve: will it serve thefear produced by the violent groups in Colombia, or the need of theColombian people for assistance from the international communityto overcome this violence� (Office of the President 2003d).

20 María Lucero Henao, José Mendivil Cárdenas, Martha Cecilia Agui-rre, Giovanni de Jesús Montoya Molina, Carmen Montes and CarlosBernal. Source: Colombian Commission of Jurists, Database ofHuman rights and political violence of CINEP.

21 The relevant article announces its content thusly: �A report by theUnited States embassy on the figures of human rights NGOs promi-ses to raise blisters�. �The finger in the wound�, Semana magazine,Bogotá, n° 1.127, 8-15 December 2003, pgs. 42 to 44. Mary Anas-tasia O�Grady �[title]�, Wall Street Journal, pg. A17.

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juncture �progress� has been made in the hu-man rights crisis22 .

THE LOGIC OF EFFICIENCYUNDERLYING�DEMOCRATIC SECURITY�

The Government has misleadingly assertedthat the drop in figures of violence, particu-larly the national homicide rate, reflects thesuccess of the application of its �democraticsecurity� policy. It also affirms that, based onthe figures resulting from this policy it can beconcluded that the human rights situation hasimproved23 .

The logic of efficiency which underlies thepresentation of statistics is revealed in a sim-ple analysis of the relevant figures on the op-erational gains of the State security forces. Ac-cording to the Government, the success of thefight against terrorism has been absolute.During the period of August 1, 2002 and Jan-uary 31 of 2004, 16,868 terrorists were neu-tralized: 13,594 terrorists (9,357 subversivesand 4,237 members of illegal paramilitarygroups) were captured, while another 3.274(2,787 subversives and 487 members of ille-gal paramilitary groups) were killed (Office ofthe President, Ministry of Defense, 2004: 5).According to this, State security forces wouldhave eliminated the threat posed by 57.83%of guerilla forces and 44.99% of the illegalparamilitary group�s membership24 .

According to the Government sources,these figures demonstrate that their policy hasbeen successful25 . Upon examining them inrelation to the magnitude which has been at-tributed to the �terrorist phenomenon�,doubts emerge. From a human rights perspec-tive, these doubts multiply. For one thing, it isessential to inquire as to whether these fig-ures count as �terrorists�, the thousands ofpeople arrested in the massive detentions ef-fected by the government, many of which hadto be released few days after their arrest, ow-ing to �violations of the judicial guarantees ofthe apprehended, the illegality of their deten-

tion, and the arrests without prior legal or-der.� (Attorney General�s office, 2004)26 . Foranother, one must consider the time honoredpractice of counting as combat deaths civil-ians that were the victims of extra-judicial ex-ecutions. To this entrenched military practiceone must add, recently the new modality ofparamilitary combatants killed by their owncommanders with the aim of contributing tothe official image of �combating equally alldelinquent groups�. (Office of the President2004a: 5)27 .

22 Both CINEP (2004) and the Colombian Commission of Jurists (2003)have referred in detail to the questioning of NGO produced statisticsand to the inconsistencies in statistics produced by governmentagencies. See the Database of Human Rights and political violenceof CINEP & Justice and Peace (BCJP), �Our Data in Question?�, Nightand Fog � Panorama of human rights and violence in Colombia,Bogotá, BCJP, n° 28, July to December 2003, pgs. 15-25. ColombianCommission of Jurists, �Alert regarding governmental figures onhuman rights in Colombia�, Informational Bulletin of the Colombia-Europe-USA corrdination, Bogotá, n° 13, September 2003, pgs. 16 -26.

23 In its response to the seventh report (2003) of the United NationsHigh Commissioner for Human Rights, the Government affirms: �Thereport undervalues the gains made in 2003; reducing the homiciderate from 68 to 52 for every hundred thousand citizens, the lowestrate in the last 16 years, cutting the death of labor union membersby 57%, forcible displacement cut by 52%, massacres cut by 33%,and kidnappings by 26%, not to mention the reclaiming of the right tomove and think freely in vast areas of the national territory within theshort period of one year ought to be considered an important ele-ment of analysis in the appraisal of the Colombian situation made bythe report.� (Office of the President, 2004b 2).

24 The guerrillas would have approximately 21 thousand combatants intheir ranks, and the paramilitaries 10,500. �The initial 48 members ofthe FARC had become eight thousand by the end of the 1980�s, andtoday there are some 16,500 effective combatants, distributed over62 fronts and seven divisions that cover almost the whole of thenational territory. The ELN doubled its forces between 1991 and2001, reaching 4.500 combatants, distributed over 41 fronts and fivedivisions. The paramilitaries moved from 1.800 in 1990 to close to10,500 in 2001, organized in ten divisions.� (UNDP 2003: 83-84).These figures coincide with those used by the Government in theformulation of the National Development Plan (Office of the Presi-dent 2003c:17).

25 �This successful action carried out by State security reflects that inthe Presidential term the number of kills has grown by 43% and thenumber of captures of members of subversive groups by 167%�.(Office of the President, 2004a: 5).

26 According to the Attorney General�s office, 754 people were freedout of the 1,957 cases which agents of the Public Ministry oversawthe judicial processes.

27 According to one testimony registered in the Human Rights Databa-se, an Army commander in [tal zona], some months ago requested ofa paramilitary commander that he �collaborate with some gains�which meant killing some paramilitaries. The paramilitary leader agreed,and ordered the sacrifice of the latest men to join the illegal group.

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NON-COMPLIANCEWITHRECOMMENDATIONSBY UNITED NATIONS

�Personally, I believe that the trial by fire is tocomply with United Nations recommendations.When Colombia, which has received so manyrecommendation and somany unfulfilled reports,respects these recommendations, a huge stepforward will have been taken� (Statement madeby Vice President Francisco Santos)28 .

Throughout 2003 and 2004, the Govern-ment consistently ignored the recommendationsformulated by the authorized agencies and des-ignated experts of the United Nations, particu-larly those made by the High Commissioner forHuman Rights and the Human Rights Commis-sion during its 59th and 60th sessions29 . TheGovernment�s action in direct contravention ofthe High Commission�s strenuous recommen-dation not to grant the military judicial powersstands out as a glaring example30 . The Govern-ment actively promoted the approval of the con-stitutional reform and its laws, despite havingcommitted itself not to do so with the 53 statesthat in 2003 comprised the United Nations Hu-man rights Commission.

In its seventh report, the Office in Colom-bia of the High Commissioner for Humanr Rightsassessed thusly the Government�s response tothe recommendations:

�Generally speaking, it can be affirmed thatthe Government has considered the recommen-dations and dedicated spaces for the discussionand programming of these within its institutionsand with the Colombia Office. That said, the rec-ommendations do not seem to have represent-ed a priority or played an integral in the Govern-ment�s Public Policies, which may explain whythere exist contradictions between the re-comended actions and some Government mea-sures. Likewise, this may suggest that the Gov-ernment, until now, has not assimilated in all itsdimensions the utility of an instrument that seeksto positively contribute to assisting national ef-forts to improve the humanitarian and humanrights situation in Colombia� (Human RightsCommission, 2002a: para. 16).

28 �The trial by fire is complying with UN recommendations�, El Tiem-po, Bogotá, 13 July 2003, pg. 1-2.

29 In 2003, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rightsformulated 27 recommendations, some simultaneously directedtowards various state entities and the illegal armed groups. Thefulfillment of 18 of these was the direct responsibility of the Gover-nment. The High Commissioner further directed six recommenda-tions to the Attorney General�s office, four to the ProcuraduríaGeneral (Translator�s note: the Procuraduría General differs from theAttorney General�s office (fiscalia) in its internal government over-sight functions, forming part of the Public Ministry), four to theRepublic�s Congress, two to the Public Defender�s Office, one tothe Superior Counsel of the Judicatura, and five to the illegal armedgroups.

30 �The High Commissioner requests of the Government and the Con-gress of the Republic that, in adopting policies and developinglegislation they pay due attention to the obligations assumed byColombia as a State party to international human rights and humani-tarian instruments. She urges them to take into account internationalprinciples of legality, necessity, proportionality, temporality, andnon-discrimination when adopting or applying policies and measuresconcerned with security and public order. In particular, she callsupon them not to introduce into the Colombian judicial system lawswhich allow members of the armed forces to exert judicial policingfunctions, nor other functions which are incompatible with judicialñindependence� (Human Rights Commission 2003: para.169).

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Presidencia de la República (2004c), Discurso del presidente Uribeen la Escuela de Policía "General Santander", Bogotá, SNE,16 de junio de 2004, http://www.presidencia.gov.co/dis-cursos/escuelapolicia.htm

Procuraduría General de la Nación (2003), La zona de rehabilitacióny consolidación de Arauca. Informe Especial, Bogotá, http://www.procuraduria.gov.co/noticias/indexno.html

Procuraduría General de la Nación (2004), Procuraduría advierteirregularidades en "capturas masivas", Bogotá, 22 de febre-ro de 2004, http://www.procuraduria.gov.co/noticias/2004/Febrero/22/B_040_Febrero_22_2003_Capturas_Masivas.html.

Programa No Gubernamental de Defensores de Derechos Humanos,Informe de la delegación colombiana a la Segunda conferen-cia internacional de la Plataforma de defensores de dere-chos humanos, Dublín, multicopiado.

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T

¿Witch hunt?Massive Detentions and

Democratic Security

Collective Lawyers Group�José Alvear Restrepo�

Foundation Solidarity withPolitical Prisioners Committee

�The thing is that to generously open by de-cree the vaults of the treasury to munificen-tly pay informers, denouncers, and witnes-ses to certain crimes, is to foolishly openanother door for criminality. It is to presentourselves before the world as a people witha somnolescent, anesthetized conscience,which requires the tinkling of coins from theheights of power to fulfill duties and obliga-tions mandated by positive moral law. (�)Flattering at the same time that hateful cha-racter, the bounty hunter, is something wemust repudiate in the name of law and jus-tice � as a consequence of it will arise falseaccusations, the arrest of innocents, undig-nified clandestine interviews with �secret in-formants� the hurtful game of offer andcounteroffer for testimony in the very altarsof justice.�

Hernando Londoño Jiménez�Law and Justice�

he Universal Declaration of Humanrights1 , the International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights, (IC-CPR)2 , and the American Conven-tion on Human Rights3 , among oth-er instruments of international law,

clearly establish the liberty and security of indi-viduals as fundamental rights. This body of lawestablishes strict limits, which States ought torespect in the moment of depriving their citi-zens of liberty.

The �imprisonment or other grave depriva-tion of physical liberty in violation of the funda-mental norms established in international law�figures prominently among the crimes againsthumanity compiled in the Statute of the Inter-national Criminal Court4 .

1 Artícles 8 to 13.2 Artícles 9 to 153 Artícles 7 to 94 Artícle 7 of the Statute

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In principle no individual ought to be de-prived of liberty except for reasons previouslyfixed by law and with recourse to the processesestablished therein. As such, nobody can be le-gally subject to arbitrary detention.

According to the United Nations WorkingGroup on Arbitrary Detentions, there exist threecategories of arbitrary detentions: a) When it isclearly impossible to invoke any legal basis forthe deprivation of liberty; b) When the depriva-tion of liberty is a result of the exercising of rightsand liberties proclaimed in articles 7, 13, 14, 18,19 y 215 of the ICCPR; and c) When the partialor complete failure to observe internationalnorms regarding the right to an impartial trial,established in the Universal Declaration on Hu-man Rights and other pertinent internationalinstruments adopted by the affected States isof such a degree of gravity that the deprivationof liberty acquires an arbitrary character.

International law allows for certain limitationson the enjoyment of the right to personal liberty,but it is emphatic in establishing that deprivationsof liberty cannot become a general rule, and inany case ought to respect fundamental rights.Even in cases where detention is practiced forreasons of public security, the practice must beruled by international norms. That is, it must notbe arbitrary, must conform to the justificationsfixed by law and be carried out in accord with theprocedures established therein6 .

On this subject, the Inter-American Courtof Human Rights has reiterated that:

�No person can find himself deprived ofliberty except for causes, cases and circum-stances expressly codified in law (material as-pect), and, moreover, with strict adherenceto the procedures objectively defined therein(formal aspect). In this second statement onefinds a conditionality according to which noperson can be subject to detention or impris-onment for reasons or through means which,even if qualified as legal, can be impeached asincompatible with respect to the fundamen-tal rights of the individual by being, amongother things, unreasonable, unforeseeable ordisproportionate�7 .

Given this robust international protectionfor the fundamental right to liberty, it is impossi-ble not to affirm with grave concern that thecurrent Government of Colombia has ignoredthis body of law and failed to respect interna-tional recommendations pertaining to this fun-damental right.

TheGovernment, within its policy of defenseand democratic security, has adopted the policyof massive detentions as a strategy to �isolate�the guerillas and process terrorist auxiliaries8 .Nevertheless, in practice,massivedetentionshavenot been directed against people who form partof these armed organizations, but rather havefundamentally fallen upon the civilian population:on the shop owner, the shoemaker, the bus driv-er, the teacher, the nurse, the baker, the localauthorities, former elected officials, social, laborand populist leaders, peasants, and human rightsdefenders, among others.

The irrationality which characterizes themassive detentions which are being carried outthroughout the country can be understood with-in the context of public statements made by thenational authorities: The President of the Repub-lic calls for more detentions9 ; a general ordersindiscriminate arrests10 ; the Minister of Defenseaccepts excesses11 .

5 Refers to the rights not to be submitted to torture or cruel anddegrading treatment; the non expulsion of foreigners; equality befo-re the law and justice; due process; freedom of thought, religion andconscience; freedom of expression, assembly and peaceful de-monstration.

6 General Observation No. 8 of the ICCPR�s Committee.7 See the cases of Bámaca Velásquez, Durand Ugarte, and Villagrán

Morales, among others.8 �Massive detentions must continue with transparency and full judi-

cial support, but with full determination, as they form a part of ourstrategy to isolate terrorist groups and force them to live in themountains eating roots�. Speech given by Presidente Uribe, decem-ber 15 of 2003.

9 Regarding detentions in the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta he mani-fested to the Police commander: �I told him that in that area we can�tcontinue with detentions of 40 or 50 every sunday, but rather of200�.

10 General Gallego in the Commune 13 of Medellín ordered: �We haveto arrest everybody, and later we can see who has nothing to do with itso that they can be freed.�. Quote taken from the Human Rights andPolitical Violence database of CINEP , May 2003, page 25.

11 �It is not blind fishing. In each capture some or most of the detaineesare freed at the begining, but those that remain after the first hours havecriminal processes opened against them for confirmed reasons�. Se-mana Magazine, interview wiith Defense Minister Jorge Alberto Uri-be, number 1134, Jan. 31, 2004.

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The fact that massive detentions are fun-damentally directed against the civilian popula-tion can be explained because the policy of so-called �democratic security� flatly ignores theprinciple of distinction, a basic tenet of interna-tional humanitarian law, according to which onemust differentiate with clarity between combat-ants and non-combatants in order to protectthe civilian population. The Decree 2002/02 ev-idences the negative effects of ignoring this prin-ciple. Stating that the members of the insurgen-cy blend into the civilian population, this decreeturns all people who reside in areas of conflictinto targets of the abuse of power12 . On severaloccasions the President of the Republic has pub-licly expressed that in Colombia the citizenry hasonly two choices, to be on the side of the Stateor to be allies of terrorism.

Against this backdrop, the judicial branchis suffering a profound debacle in the area ofindependence and impartiality. In addition to theconstitutional reform which sought to grant ju-dicial police functions to the military forces13 ,the Attorney General�s office has been uncon-ditionally submitting itself to the policies orderedby the executive power. This is particularly clearwith regard to massive detentions, a strategycrafted by the Government and applied withoutreservation by that investigative entity14 , an actwhich profoundly affects its independence andimpartiality while contributing to its growing lackof prestige and legitimacy. This is particularly thecase if these detentions exactly meet Presiden-tial demands, evidence of which can be seen inthe item published by the magazine Semana on26 August, 2004 in the section on secrets, inwhich it is affirmed that �having evaluated thecriticisms, the results and the costs, the Gov-ernment ordered the Security Forces to suspendthe massive detention of people accused of be-longing to the armed groups. President Uribetook this decision after having reviewed statisti-cal tables which demonstrated that the massdetention of suspects was not causing real dam-age to the subversives, who could easily replaceany lost recruits. At the same time the Palaciode Nariño found that each operations had a high

economic cost owing to the need to mobilizeuniformed soldiers, judicial functionaries, planes,helicopters and vehicles�.

Article 113 of the national Constitution in-dicates which are the branches of public power,article 114 determines the functions of Con-gress, Article 115 the functions of the Presidentand the Executive branch, and article 116 de-termines the functions of the courts, judges andprosecutors, conceding only to these last judi-cial powers; under a social rule of law, the exec-utive cannot order the detention of any citizen.This can only be done by an authority with judi-cial functions, and as such, the President can-not order the Attorney General to detain peo-ple. The Attorney General should require thatthe President submit proof, or evidence beforeproceeding to order the arrest, rather than in-discriminately detaining citizens in order tomeeta Presidential request.

FIGURES ONMASSIVE DETENTIONS

To speak of massive detentions in terms ofstatistics is not an easy proposition for severalreasons, including: the fact that there is no con-sensus on the number of persons detained orcharacterized as such15 ; because some figuresonly consider people who have been judiciallyprocessed, and ignore those who have not gonethrough the system; because not all massivedetentions have been duly registered; and be-cause the data covers different time periods.

In any case, by way of illustration, the Min-ister of Defense reported that in the first year ofthe development of the Democratic Securitypolicy 125,778 people were deprived of liberty,

12 As a justification for this decree it was stated that �among the primarysupports for the criminal activities of such organizations, one findsthe blending of their members into the civilian population�.

13 On 30 August of 2004 legislative act 02 of 2003, also known as theantiterrorist statute was declared unconstitutional.

14 Point number 33 of the democratic manifesto of Uribe Vélez, positsthat we need an antiterrorist statute that ficilitates detentions, arrestsand searches.

15 The report of the Procuraduría on massive detentions establisheseight as the minimum number to qualify as such.

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which is the equivalent of a daily average of 334people detained as part of the policy of �Demo-cratic Security�16 . Other figures from the sameMinistry establish that from the beginning of theterm of office of Álvaro Uribe Vélez up to themonth of August 2003, 50,470 persons wheredeprived of liberty for reasons of public order17 .

What is paradoxical is that the prison popu-lation up to the month of November 2004 wasof 62,541 persons18 , 26,838 of them under ac-cusation, which is to say that the vast majorityof detained persons would eventually have tobe freed.

A report of the Committee for Solidarity withPolitical Prisoners revealed that between Septem-ber of 2002 and December of 2003 6,038 per-sons were deprived of liberty in 202 cases19 , ofwhich themajority quickly regained their freedom.

In effect, there have been detentions,which are alarming in their scale and the num-ber of people which have been deprived of lib-erty. For instance: in Saravena (Arauca), 2,000people were detained20 ; in Medellín, 1,000 peo-ple21 ; in Cartagena del Chairá (Caquetá), 120people22 ; in Sucre, 15623 ; in Arauquita (Arau-ca), 15024 ; in Quinchía (Risaralda), 8925 ; in Vi-otá (Cundinamarca), 5026 ; in Quipile (Cundi-namarca), 53; in Cisneros (Valle del Cauca), 42;in Cajamarca (Tolima), 7427 ; in Acevedo (Hui-la), 3928 ; in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta,3929 ; in Baraya (Huila), 4030 ; in Villa Nueva andSanta Catalina (Bolivar), 3031 ; and in San Juande Arama (Meta), 7432 .

CHARACTERISTICSOFMASSIVE DETENTIONS

The policy of massive detentions has presenteda wide variety of characteristics that can be sum-marized as follows:

� Detentions realized without warrant andwithout regard to flagrance33

� Arrest warrants written at the moment ofarrest34

� Arrest warrants written after the fact of thearrest35

� Detentions carried out based on the infor-mation of hooded, anonymous witnesses36

� Indiscriminate search warrants37

� Detentions based on testimony from �rein-tegrated� former combatants and/or �infor-mants network� in the context of the offer-ing of gifts, the exertion of pressures, orthreats.38

� Detentions based on declarations made bymembers of state security forces or reportsput out by security forces39

� The �cloning� of witnesses, whereby a sin-gle witness participates in several judicialproceedings under different identities40

� Witnesses who are war criminals or com-mon criminals converted into �auxiliaries ofjustice�41

� Themanipulation of witnesses, the alterationand supplanting of informants and docu-ments42

16 Figures from press conference in July 2003.17 Statistical information submitted by the Attorney General, the Pro-

curaduría and the Public Defender�s office to the FCSPP show 67cases of massive detentions in Colombia from August 2002 to June2004. This difference is explained by the Governments aim of showinga high number of arrests as proof of the success of the policy of�Democratic Security�.

18 Figures from the National Penitentiary Institute�INPEC.19 Counting only those persons arrested for alleged crimes of rebe-

llion, criminal conspiracy, terrorism, carrying arms, kidnapping oruse of military uniforms.

20 They were locked into the municipal stadium, 12 November, 2002,Source: FCSPP

21 In Operation Orion22 7 September 200323 17 August, 200324 2 September 200225 28 September 200326 ppdh@presidencia.gov.co �Bitácora� � List of Detentions27 24 August 200328 11 March 200329 29 September 200330 29 July 200331 6 July 200332 9 May 200333 Cases in San Luis (Antioquia), Cartagena del Chairá, among others.34 Cases in Cartagena del Chairá, Saravena, Quipile and others.35 Detentions in Sucre on 22 October, 2002.36 Cases in Sucre, Quipile, among many others.37 Cases in the Medellín Communes38 Almost all massive detentions are based on such testimonies. Exam-

ple: Cases in Quinchia, Villahermosa and others.39 Cases in Quipile, Sucre, entre otros.40 Case in Cisneros41 Cases in Arauquita and Viota, among others.42 Cases in Norte del Tolima, Quipile, detention of the Social leader

Marco Nieves.

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� Evidence obtained by violating constitution-al norms and human dignity43

� The undignified treatment of detained per-sons, (torture44 , illegal interrogations, themarking of people with permanent ink, ex-cessive restraints, and the parading of de-tainees before the public, etc.)45

� The communities most affected by the de-tentions are those which live in areas of gue-rilla influence or presence46 . That is, theyare criminalized and persecuted for living inthese areas.

As can be clearly seen, the irregularitieswhich have accompanied detentions of a mas-sive character are numerous, a fact which af-fects in a number of ways the fundamental rightsof communities and social organizations47 .

SUBSEQUENT EFFECTS OFMASSIVE AND/ORARBITRARYDETENTIONS

The Colombian Government is undertaking apolicy of massive and arbitrary detentions whichconstitute grave violations of the right to per-sonal liberty. The violations of this fundamentalright have acquired a massive and systematiccharacter. In addition, the victims suffer not onlythe immediate effects of the detentions or thethreat of being detained, but also the conse-quences which extend in an alarming mannerto other forms of violations of human rights suchas a state of judicial insecurity and anxiety48 ;torture, forcible displacement, murders49 , dis-appearances50 , etc.

Another effect that results from these de-tentions is the rending of the social tapestry, aspeople who have experienced a detention, ei-ther directly (having been detained) or indirect-ly (having family or friends detained) tend to dis-tance themselves from a variety of socialorganizations for fear of being targeted, threat-ened, disappeared or killed.

To better illustrate this point, it behoovesus to highlight the persecution which paramili-tary groups have organized against people who

have been detained and/or judicially processedby the Attorney General�s Office in the munici-pality of Villahermosa, in the Department of Toli-ma51 : In the urban center of this municipality anumber of selective homicides have taken place,despite the strong presence of the national Armyin the municipality since September 2003, a sit-uation which national authorities were alertedto with anticipation. It is known that the mur-ders and disappearances were committed byparamilitary groups operating in the area.

� In November of 2003 in the Yarumal valley,Mr. Gabriel Arévalo was killed in his home,and his entire family threatened with death,forcing them to flee the region. It should benoted that Mr. Arévalo had an arrest war-rant against him under the process whichthe Attorney General�s office was carryingout against dozens of inhabitants of Nortedel Tolima. In the same month, another in-habitant of the same valley who was alsowanted as part of this roundup was mur-dered under suspicious circumstances.

� Inmid December of 2003, some blocks fromthe main plaza of Villahermosa, Mr. Jair Me-jía was murdered. Mr. Mejía had worked theyear before as an educational agent in theVillahermosa hospital and was currentlyworking for the mayor�s office.

� Towards the beginning of the month of De-cember, 2003, a relative of Mr. Willix Palo-mino �who had been detained under thesame process�, was victim of an attempton his life, and forced with his family to fleethe region52 .

43 Cases in Sucre and others.44 Case in el Salado (Bolívar): Mr. Carmelo Catalán was tortured by

members of the First Infantry Brigade 13 October, 2003. Source:Report by the Colombian Commission of Jurists regarding arbitraryand massive detentions.

45 Cases in Calamar and Arauquita.46 Southern area of the country, among others.47 Case in Cajamarca, vicinity of Potosí.48 Case in Quipile, FCSPP49 Case in Villahermosa, among others, CCAJAR.50 Case in Calamar among others, SEMBRAR.51 The cases highlighted below were obtained from the Database of the

Colectivo de abogados �José Alvear Restrepo�52 Database of the Colectivo de abogados �José Alvear Restrepo�

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� Several of the municipal functionaries de-tained by the Attorney General�s office havebeen kidnapped by the paramilitaries,abused, and then liberated with threatsagainst their lives.

� On 14 December, 2003, Mayor AntonioGiraldo, who is currently in a protection pro-gram run by the Attorney General�s office,was kidnapped in the area of Castillo by para-militaries, who demanded as a condition forfreeing him 10million pesos, threatening hisentire family with death and forcing themto flee the region. It should be noted thatlocal inhabitants interceded with the para-militaries for the freedomofMr. Giraldo, andtoday the lives and security of these per-sons is in grave doubt.

� Towards the beginning of February, 2004,paramilitaries operating in the municipalityof Palocabildo in the North of Tolima, dis-appeared Mr. Aurelio Aguirre and Mr. SanínAguirre, who were transported, it seems, tothe locality of Frías � Falan. Their lifelessbodies were found on 10 February in thearea of San Pedro in the municipality ofArmero Guayabal. These two individualswere well known in the municipality as busi-nessmen, and worst of all, they had beenfreed by the Attorney General�s office twomonths before.

� In the third week of December, Mr. Al-demar Osorio, a well known driver affec-tionately known in the region as �the lit-tle bear�disappeared. Mr. Aldemar wason his motorcycle, in the company of ayoung woman when he was interceptedby paramilitaries in the location knownas Campo Alegre, five minutes from theurban center of Vil lahermosa. Theyforced him off the motorcycle and or-dered the young woman to continuedown the road. His lifeless body wasfound eight days later in las Palomas, tied,stabbed and decapitated.

REGARDING THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTINGDETENTIONS

The majority of massive detentions are preced-ed by declarations originating from the networkof informants, or by reintegrated ex-combatants.To a lesser degree, they proceed from DAS re-ports, Police investigations, military reports orreports made by the Technical Investigation Unitof the Attorney General�s Office�CTI53 .

In numerous processes of massive deten-tion, the reports produced by the DAS, the se-curity forces, the GAULA or the CTI have as theirsource �reintegrated� ex-combatants, or, con-versely, the testimony of the ex-combatants hasas a source the reports of the State entities. Inthe Department of Cundinamarca, municipalityof Quipile, members of the National Army, ac-companied by representatives from the Attor-ney General�s office, the CTI, the GAULA�s spe-cial forces, the DAS and transit police arrivedon 15 June 2003 around 4:30 a.m., in the po-lice barracks of La Botica and in the urban cen-ter of Quipile, and, list in hand, proceeded toarbitrarily detain 53 local inhabitants.

The basis for these detentions was onceagain the testimony of informants from withinthe security forces. One of the informants, Pa-ola Andrea Muñoz, stated, in amplifying her tes-timony that: �her statements were shaped by the in-dications given her by officers of the National Army,as she new nothing about this person whom she hadnever seen�.

In this manner, the program of �reintegra-tion� has been perverted in order to �provideevidentiary assistance� for massive detentions.The ex-combatant limits him or herself to ac-cusing all persons whom they are told to identi-fy as subversives or guerilla auxiliaries; most ofthe time they do not even know the person be-ing accused. An allegation can be found in thefiles of the Public Defenders office, which alleg-es that �Luis Manuel Valencia Rojas, 52 years ofage, amerchant dealing in handicrafts andmem-

53 Case in Quipile (Cundinamarca)

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ber of the union of mobile merchants of theDepartment of Meta (Sinvam), was arbitrarilydetained and tortured, presumably by membersof the CTI. The individuals in question asked himfor the identities of people with whom he hadspoken after having been offeredmoney 25 daysbefore in exchange for �confessing� that he wasa member of the ELN who had been reintegrat-ed and offering false testimony against Hernan-do Hernández, former president of the UniónSindical Obrera (USO), who was incarcerated atthe time. Two days after his torture, Mr. Rojaslodged a complaint with the public defender�soffice, and a doctor confirmed his physical con-dition after his detention.

By and large, these �witnesses� cooperate�voluntarily� with security forces, including DAS,GAULA, and CTI, who tend to manipulate themthrough doling out rewards and threats. Thereare ever increasing numbers of cases where wit-nesses retract their testimony and denounce themanipulation which they were subjected to. Inthe case of Hernando Hernández, the primarywitness, Elizabeth Diaz Cardenas, retracted herstatements in the trial and accused the prose-cutor charged with the case of pressuring herand offering her money for testifying against thelabor leader54 . These testimonies almost alwayslack other evidence to substantiate them55 , butfor the prosecutors, these accusations withoutfundament are sufficient reasons to deprive peo-ple of their liberty.

In sum, massive detentions are executedwithout the Police or the Prosecutors havingundertaken serious investigations of the allega-tions. In many cases the testimonies of witness-es are delivered the same day that the deten-tions are carried out. In the case of the detentionof John Bayron Vega, in Barranquilla, the ruralGAULA�s intelligence report 0593 was releasedon 16 July 2004, the relevant prosecutor in Bar-ranquilla, Carlota Isabel Nuñez, expedited war-rant number 0065360 on 16 July, 2004, and theaccused was detained on the same day at 12:00.It should be noted that in the report on the cap-ture of Mr. Vega it was stated that he was de-tained with a pre-existing arrest warrant56 . This

case demonstrates the submission of the pros-ecutor�s office to the interests and demands ofthe state security forces. In this way the intelli-gence reports and the testimony of witnessesare not submitted to any form of verification,but become sufficient reasons to order and ex-ecute massive detentions that constitute actsof irresponsibility and represent �efficientist� at-titudes that injure the civilian population andparticularly labor, social and populist organiza-tions upon which the weight of massive and ar-bitrary detentions fall with the greatest force.

In the majority of cases, the Attorney Gen-eral�s office fulfills a marginal role, as the securi-ty forces57 , and/or the State security organismstake the lead in massive detentions, bearing inmind also that many local prosecutor�s officeshave their headquarters in military or police in-stallations. Regrettably, the Attorney General�soffice has been reduced to an entity that blindlyfollows the directions of the Executive or of theMilitary authorities58 , with grave resulting dam-age to the independent and impartial adminis-tration of justice59 .

This situation has also been denounced bythe Office of the High Commissioner for HumanRights in the following terms: �It has also beendenounced that the Attorney General�s officehas retroactively legitimized the initiatives of thesecurity forces in the development of searches,�voluntary� registrations, and administrativedetentions without the required evaluationswhich wouldmake these interventions legitimateand justified��60 . In this manner the AttorneyGeneral�s office is often reduced to a role of �le-

54 Because of this there is a disciplinary and criminal investigationagainst the Prosecutor accused by the witness.

55 In 75% of cases of massive detentions followed by the ColectivoJosé Alvear Restrepo and the Comité de Solidaridad con los PresosPolíticos, the only evidence against the accused is the testimony ofex-combatants.

56 Number 191311 of the V specialized prosecutor�s office in Barran-quilla.

57 Moreover, many prosecutors are military men in the reserve.58 Case of Mayra García San Juan, detained 12 July of 2003 in el

Carmen de Bolívar.59 The public defender�s office denounced the lack of autonomy of

prosecutors in cases of rebellion.60 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

on the human rights situation in Colombia during 2003.

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galizing� arrests and massive and/or arbitrarydetentions. This institution forgets that its in-vestigative role should be accompanied by itsobligation to respect and uphold the fundamen-tal rights of citizens and to ensure judicial guar-antees for them. The Attorney General�s officetends to incur and connive with practices thatconstitute a violation of due process, as has beenillustrated in this document. It realizes massivedetentions that violate fundamental rights, some-times impeding quick access to lawyers; it fre-quently receives simultaneous investigations,where a single prosecutor interrogates severaldetainees who also have only a single lawyer rep-resenting them; detained persons are almost al-ways taken to installations of the state securityforces. What is worse, the Attorney General im-poses his criteria and his political posture uponthe local prosecutors with the threat of unspec-ified retaliations. The best example of this is thepublic recrimination of the relevant Prosecutorbefore the Criminal court of the Superior Tribu-nal of Sucre for having revoked , with full justifi-cation, the detention of 128 individuals who hadbeen victims of a massive detention61 , even re-curring to lies in order to do so62 . In addition,by way of warning other prosecutors, he openeda criminal proceeding against this prosecutor inwhich a preventive detention was ordered63 .

In order to overcome this grave violation offundamental rights, it is necessary to:

1. Immediately eliminate the strategy of mas-sive detentions as a political expression ofthe policy of �democratic security�.

2. Fully meet international norms and interna-tional recommendations related to the re-spect for due process and personal liberty.

3. Not to utilize the reintegration program, in-telligence reports and the network of infor-mants as mechanisms to criminalize the ex-ercise of fundamental rights, to persecutepolitical opposition and to arbitrarily involvepeople in criminal proceedings.

4. Take necessary measures to guarantee ju-dicial independence and impartiality.

5. Takenecessarymeasures toensureconditionsof dignity for persons deprived of liberty.

��But, what about the invisible cages? Inwhat official report or opposition denuncia-tion do prisoners of fear appear? Fear of lo-sing employment, of not finding any, fearof speaking, fear of listening, fear of reading.In the country of silence, one can end up ina concentration camp for the glimmer ofone�s gaze�Censorship truly triumphs whenevery citizen becomes the implacable censorof his own actions and words. The dictator-ship turns the barracks and police stations,empty cars and grounded boats into prisons.Doesn�t it turn every person�s home into aprison as well?

Eduardo Galeano�Días y Noches de amor y de Guerra�

61 Occrring in August 200362 It was announced publicly that the prosecutor had been removed.63 According to the resolution of 4 May, 2004.

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After 20 months of negotiations be-tween the Government of PresidentÁlvaro Uribe and the United Auto-defenses of Colombia (AUC), theHigh Commissioner for Peace, LuisCarlos Restrepo, made clear what

the Government�s objectives are in initiating andinsisting upon this negotiation, which enjoys littlenational support, andeven less international back-ing. In his statement in Congress this past 3rd ofAugust, Commissioner Restrepo faced the mas-sive tideof criticism for having authorized the tele-vised public appearance accorded to the threeleaders of theAUC in theNational Congress. Evenmembers of the Government�s coalition, such asCongressmen Rafael Pardo and Gina Parodi, hail-ing from Bogotá, protested the paramilitary lead-er�s presence, agreeing with representatives fromthe Democratic Pole, such as Gustavo Petro, alsofrom Bogotá. This kind of unity is very unusualbetween these two political camps, the one pro-government, the other in the opposition.

The AUC, The Government and

Society:

The contest is onlybegining

Mauricio Romero*

Commissioner Restrepo�s intervention clar-ified that from his perspective the negotiationsare not simply a conversation amongst allies, ora conversation between �me andmyself� as Gov-ernment critics have claimed, referring to theties between the paramilitaries and sectors ofthe armed forces in some areas of the country,both past and present. The Government has fig-ures to substantiate its claims. According tothese statistics, the number of paramilitariesdetained or killed has grown significantly underthis administration, as stated by the Commis-sioner in Congress, contrasting this with prioradministrations1 . It seems clear that the HighCommissioner for Peace has in mind a processof demobilization and submission to justice2 ,while the chiefs of the AUC have in mind a polit-

* Professor of the Faculty of Governance, Finance and InternationalRelations, Universyty Externado of Colombia.

1 See chapter 1 of this report.2 www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/

206 Conflict

ical negotiationwith judicial benefits, as they elab-orated in their public appearance on 28 July inCongress.

Furthermore, the leader of the AUC�s ne-gotiating delegation, Salvatore Mancuso, madeclear that Colombian society should be thankfulto them for having liberated half the countryfrom subversion3 , without regard to the violentmethods employed, the illegally acquired wealth,the number of lives taken, the displacement ofmasses of people, and the effects upon thou-sands of families that have been destroyed bythe violence. Not to mention the impact on thepolitical system of that project of the extremeright which has systematically sabotaged the in-corporation of the guerillas into the politythrough peace negotiations, which has been un-fortunately successful in the case of the FARCand the ELN, prolonging the conflict indefinite-ly. As has been stated in a variety of contexts4 ,the linkages between the AUC and the drug tradeis but the tip of the iceberg when it comes tocharacterizing this organization and its effectsupon the people of Colombia. This is not to un-dervalue this key factor in the resolution of thearmed conflict and in particular for the mobili-zation of international support.

Which of the two conceptions of these ne-gotiations will prevail in the end? CommissionerRestrepo insisted that the Government has fourobjectives in this process: The strengthening ofthe rule of law, the consolidation of a monopolyon arms in the Government, the total demobili-zation of the AUC, and the guaranteeing of se-curity for those regions where the AUC�s mili-tary apparatus is demobilized5 . Achieving theseaims would be ideal, although it seems clear thatthe road that must be traveled to get to them isas long as it is wide, and is crossed by PresidentUribe�s reelection bid. For instance, the Govern-ment has not included within the package ofprojects to be discussed in this legislative ses-sion the reparation, justice and truth projectwhich has replaced the law of penal alternativespresented last year. Commissioner Restrepo an-nounced that more time is being sought toachieve a national accord, and not simply the

backing of the pro-government bench in Con-gress.

Nevertheless, Congressman Gustavo Petroand other sectors of the polity have another in-terpretation. These groups consider that the visitby the AUC chiefs to Congress was part of a strat-egy designed to obtain the support of membersof Congress close to the AUC for the reelectionbid. Once this has been achieved, these samemajorities would define how heavily the weightof law will fall on the paramilitary leaders6 . Sincethis will only be defined before themiddle of nextyear, the negotiations are beginning to travel thefamiliar paths of the process with the FARC inthe last administration.

FROM CAGUÁN TO SANTA FÉ DE RALITO

In effect, the negotiations are increasingly as-suming the traits most criticized by the Presi-dent himself of the negotiations between thePastrana administration and the FARC. Thesetraits include the absence of a timetable and clearcommitments on the part of the illegal group,the ceding of sovereignty over a part of the na-tional territory indefinitely, public visibility withofficial sanction for an illegal armed group, thestrengthening of their political support, attacksupon the civilian population, and illegal activi-ties, including drug trafficking and the use offorce to obtain public and private resources.Let�s begin by examining the issue of a timeta-ble and defined commitments. The demilitarizedzone in el Caguán was the subject of fierce con-troversy: criticisms from the armed forces, fromCongress, from then candidate Uribe Vélez him-self, and from the United States Governmentargued for the folly of prolonged negotiationsand the demilitarized zone without a timetableor clear commitments from the FARC. Such anindefinite ceding of sovereignty to an illegal

3 www.colombialibre.org4 See Antonio Caballero�s column, Semana, 21 June, 2004.5 www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/6 www.viaalterna.com.co7 See interview with Senator Germán Vargas Lleras, Cambio, 14 Octo-

ber 2001.

207Conflict

armed group was deemed inadmissible and in-convenient7.

Currently, we are in the 20th month of ne-gotiations and of a much disputed cease of hos-tilities which, judging fromofficial figures, theAUChave not honored. Table N° 1 shows the figurescompiled by the office of the High Commission-er for Peace, which, for an organization suppos-edly in the process of demobilization, are hardlyencouraging. Moreover, other statistical sourc-es indicate an even graver situation8. In exchangefor this supposed cessation of hostilities, theGovernment ratified an already existing concen-tration zone in Santa Fé de Ralito, made officialthis last 1st of July, where the suspension of ar-rest warrants was in effect long before the be-ginning of negotiations in December 2002. Inhis speech in Congress, Commissioner Restrepostated that since 1 July the violations of the ces-sation of hostilities have beenminimal, implyingthat the AUC�s machinery of assault on the ci-vilian population is at last deactivating itself. Werethis true, it would be imperative to ensure thatthe situation continues into the future, althoughthere are no clear guarantees that this machin-ery of death will not reactivate itself.

paramilitary groups brought together in SantaFé de Ralito. There does not exist a commonfront negotiating with the government, but rath-er a competition of over who will be the first totap into President Uribe�s generous heart. If thistrend continues, Commissioner Restrepo�s pro-posal of submission to Justice will come to thefore, and it will remain to be seen what will cometo pass in Congress regarding the judicial bene-fits to be accorded to the leaders of the variousparamilitary organizations.

What is most disconcerting is the numberof concessions made to these groups in ex-change for nothing concrete beyond announce-ments, without a timetable and clear commit-ments for each of the steps along the road todisarmament and demobilization. It is said thatthe concentration zone in the municipality ofTierralta, Córdoba, is significantly smaller thanthat ceded to the FARC in el Caguán in the southof the country. However, the former is locatedin a vast region in which the AUC have convert-ed themselves into a complementary force tothose of the state, and where effective territori-al control is exercised by the irregular forces.The way in which the negotiations are develop-ing continues to strengthen these illegal armednetworks and not the civil and legitimately con-stituted forces. What then happened to the callsfor strengthening the state and the rule of law,made during the presidential campaign of 2002?If the Government has clear what it seeks onpaper, in the real world the AUC�s project is inthe forefront of this process.

RULE OF LAWOR RULE OF DEFACTOREALITIES?

Given the Government�s decision not to submitthe reparation, truth and justice project to Con-gress in this legislative session, we do not knowhow the negotiations will proceed, although allthe prerogatives granted to the commanders of

TTTTTable N° 1able N° 1able N° 1able N° 1able N° 1Violations of the cease of hostilities committed byViolations of the cease of hostilities committed byViolations of the cease of hostilities committed byViolations of the cease of hostilities committed byViolations of the cease of hostilities committed by

the AUCthe AUCthe AUCthe AUCthe AUCDecember 2002 � April 2004December 2002 � April 2004December 2002 � April 2004December 2002 � April 2004December 2002 � April 2004

Homicides 408

Massacres 18

Kidnappings 217

SourSourSourSourSourcecececece: Office of the High Commissioner for Peace

The announcements of the demobilizationof paramilitary groups in the eastern plains fromArauca to Guaviare, together with that of theNorthern Block of the AUC, are undeniably Gov-ernment achievements, although it remains tobe seen how effective these demobilizations willbe, and if the timetable and initially agreed uponcommitments will be honored. The fact of thesedemobilizations in themselves illustrates the fis-sures among the negotiators of the different 8 See Chapter 1 of this report.

208 Conflict

the AUC continue in effect, or are being expand-ed. Themore operational aspects of the process,such as the concentration of forces, verificationby the OAS of the cessation of hostilities and ul-timately disarmament are contingent on whatjudicial incentives for demobilization and submis-sion to justice are agreed upon in Congress.

Similarly to the FARC, the AUC are demon-strating that they are more interested in havingthe status of negotiators and the privileges thisstatus grants them, and less interested in actu-ally assuming the commitments which ought tocorrespond to such concessions. Examples ofthis attitude include the ongoing situation ofarmed confrontations and attacks on the civil-ian population in the eastern plains, the confis-cation of planes loaded with drugs in MiddleMagdalena, the shipments of coca in Córdoba,and the armed control of the Medellín com-munes. The State, as representative of the gen-eral will of Colombian society, does not seem tobe demanding clear commitments from the AUC.Hence, in exchange for very little, the AUC areexperiencing a strengthening of political supportand public visibility without precedent, otherthan the very example criticized about the peaceprocess in el Caguán. What is the message sentto the public with the visit of three paramilitarychiefs to Congress in the capital of the country,transported there in a Colombian Air Forceplane, broadcast nationally on official television?Not a very useful message, in any case, if one isaiming to construct the rule of law instead ofthe rule of defacto realities in Colombia.

The High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Car-los Restrepo, has been very clear regarding thetype of negotiation he wants to have. The lackof unity within the AUC weakens their petitionsfor a more political negotiation just the same astheir redefinition of the cessation of hostilities.In this redefinition, the AUC seek reciprocationfrom the State�s armed forces and the recogni-tion of the need for the paramilitaries to defendthemselves against the guerillas. This seems likea logical enough point, but it carries within itthe risk of perpetuating the regional situationsin which the AUC have consolidated their pow-

er. This would mean essentially continuing thestatus quo, where the paramilitaries would havethe authority to determine who is and who isn�ta guerilla. Worse still, picking up on the AUC�srhetoric, they would have the authority to de-termine who is disguised as a civilian but in ac-tuality a subversive, a category sure to be ap-plied to critical individuals, social groupsdemanding justice and rights, and political op-ponents. And all this to say nothing of the drugtrade. In this redefinition of the cessation ofhostilities demanded by the AUC, the subject ofdrug trafficking rises as a critical point. How doesone differentiate the self defense activities of theAUC�s military apparatus from those associatedwith the drug trade? This was also one of themore controversial issues in the peace processwith the FARC in the demilitarized zone in elCaguán, and arises again in the context of thenegotiations with the AUC without having beenforeseen by the Government.

It seems clear that the Government is vac-illating between, on the one hand, its electoralcommitment to strengthen the rule of law andthereby create conditions for defeating the in-surgency or forcing them to come to the table,and on the other hand a militarily aggressivestrategy against the FARC with the support ofirregular armed groups, such as that employedin the Antioquian Urabá when President Uribewas governor in the mid 1990�s9 . Within thisstrategy, his discourse of strengthening the ruleof law would be nothing more than a means ofobtaining votes and support, even if this pathwill lead Uribe to commit the same mistake thathe himself denounced regarding the Pastranaadministration�s peace process when he wasrunning for office. This strategy would alsostrengthen an irregular armed group character-ized by its links with the drug trade and its re-sponsibility for forced displacement of the civil-ian population, the violation of human rights,arbitrary expropriations and the acquisition ofwealth through violent means.

9 Mauricio Romero (2003): Paramilitares y autodefensas, 1982-2003,IEPRI-Editorial Planeta.

209Conflict

In other words, the policies concerning thestrengthening of the state, the rule of law andthe possibilities of peace become at times partlyan electoral game focused on the short term,which remains far from achieving the genuinerule of law. This highly risky electoral gamble withissues of war and peace, identified by interna-tional conflict resolution experts as one of thefirst signs to be avoided at all cost in situationsof armed conflict, seems to be exactly what Pres-ident Uribe is tempted to push forward. Follow-ing such a path in the midst of a reelection bidwill undoubtedly deepen the country�s alreadysignificant divisions. Despite his patriotic rheto-ric invoking the defense of the nation, in itselfsuspect owing to the priorities it implies, Presi-dent Uribe runs the risk of deepening a path ofgreater political division and fomenting furtherquarrels and more tenacious disputes.

ELIMINATION OR ASSIMILATION OF ARMEDRIVALS

The various attempts to reconstruct a monop-oly on the organized use of force by the Co-lombian State since 1998 are charted in tableN° 2. States have two extreme options in the

face of armed rivals: either elimination or ne-gotiation. Generally, Governments opt for acombination of these two extremes. Neverthe-less it can be stated with some degree of con-fidence that during the Pastrana administration,(1998-2002) the Government�s aim leaned to-ward assimilating the FARC into the politicalsystem through a political negotiation comple-mented by reforms. Being an insurgent organi-zation on the military offensive, the FARC wouldnot be accommodating for anything less. Asregards the AUC, the Government�s tendencywas towards elimination in the same time peri-od, although the effective measures to achievethis aim were scarce or at least devoid of con-crete results. The Pastrana administration nev-er clearly defined a position with respect to theELN, and the possibilities for an eventual ne-gotiation arose more out of difficulties at thenegotiating table with the FARC than from anyState conviction or initiative.

The extremecasesof assimilationof all armedactors or their elimination require very specificpolitical conditions. In the first instance, the con-solidation of a broad political coalition within thegovernment which decides to open a process ofnegotiation with all the armed sectors in searchof a global peace accord is required. Until the

TTTTTable N° 2able N° 2able N° 2able N° 2able N° 2Attempts at reconstructing a State monopolyAttempts at reconstructing a State monopolyAttempts at reconstructing a State monopolyAttempts at reconstructing a State monopolyAttempts at reconstructing a State monopoly

on the use of organized force between 1998-2004on the use of organized force between 1998-2004on the use of organized force between 1998-2004on the use of organized force between 1998-2004on the use of organized force between 1998-2004

Administration / Coalit ionAdministration / Coalit ionAdministration / Coalit ionAdministration / Coalit ionAdministration / Coalit ion El iminat ionEl iminat ionEl iminat ionEl iminat ionEl iminat ion El iminat ionEl iminat ionEl iminat ionEl iminat ionEl iminat ion AssimilationAssimilationAssimilationAssimilationAssimilation NegotiationNegotiationNegotiationNegotiationNegotiation

/ Assimilation/ Assimilation/ Assimilation/ Assimilation/ Assimilation

Andrés Pastrana AUC ELN FARC Political negotiationwith reforms

Álvaro Uribe FARC ELN AUC Judicial andsubmission to Justice

DissidentsBroad political coalition within the irregular FARC, ELN, AUC Global peace

groups accord

Overwhelming influence

of the United States on the Government FARC, ELN, AUC

210 Conflict

present, the various Governments since the endof the 1980�s have witnessed fragmented pro-cesseswith limited results. Areweheaded towardsthat alternative of global negotiation following thisfirst term of office of President Uribe? The eventsof coming months will give clues as to whetherwe are headed in that direction or will continuealong the path of separate negotiations. In thesecond scenario, that of the total elimination ofthe armed actors, there exist no possibilities fornegotiation. This option would presuppose thetotal disappearance of the capacity for maneu-ver of internal political groups and a greater vol-ume of resources from the United States, neitherof which is probable in the short tomedium term.

It remains before us to analyze the Uribeadministration within the logic presented in thetable. For the Government elected in 2002, thearmed actor chosen for eliminationwas the FARC,while the ELNhas remained in its own special lim-bo, mired in a strategic game where the otherplayers retain the initiative. The AUC have beengiven the opportunity for assimilation or accom-modation within this administration. Neverthe-less, being a para-state organization, the negotia-tion proposed by the government with the AUChas been reduced to an act of submission and adiscussion of judicial benefits, given the lack ofpeace negotiations with the guerillas and the en-larged capacity of the legitimate armed forces. Inother words, this organization has moved frombeing a momentary solution for the containmentof the guerillas and the reforms associated with apeace process to being a problem for the legiti-macy of the state, both in the domestic and in-ternational arenas.

What the AUC chiefs believe and aspire to isanother story altogether. Their gains in the cur-rent negotiation scheme depend on the balanceof power in the Congress, on the level of pres-sure exerted by those sectors interested in in-fluencing the negotiations, and on the positionsadopted by international players. On the locallevel, the influence of the AUC does not seem tohave a counterweight in the regions where theyhave a presence, a fact which was clearly illus-trated by the public audience granted to the

three AUC leaders in Congress. The internation-al arena is the least favorable one for this orga-nization. On that level, the AUC�s links with thedrug cartels and with crimes against humanityhave denied them opportunities for support andjustification for their anti-subversive, anti-reform-ist and anti-democratic policies. On the nation-al level, in the capital, although there exists avery critical tendency in the face of the negotia-tions and support for the AUC�s submission tojustice prior to a negotiation with benefits, thissituation could easily change. The cohesivenessof the coalition in Congress supporting the re-election of President Uribe will have much to dowith this possibility.

For the time being the AUC sympathizershave won the streets of the capital, and in par-ticular the Plaza de Bolívar on the day of theparamilitary visit to Congress. The presence ofsectors that have sought truth, justice and rep-aration in the negotiations with the AUC wasscarce that day on the streets, despite the factthat Bogotá is the national center of humanrights organizations and a rallying point for vic-tims of the violence. The speeches given by theparamilitary chiefs before the audience and thetelevision cameras made clear that they expectat the very least some form of reward for theirservice to the State in the adjudication of eachof their cases. Commissioner Restrepo has saidthat he will stand by what has been signed uptill now at the negotiating table, even as his coun-terparts talk of new concentration zones, thecessation of fumigation efforts in areas of illicitcrop cultivation, social investment plans and thesuspension of extraditions, among other things.For the High Commissioner, none of this will bethe subject of discussions at the table in SantaFé de Ralito, at least not openly. Which is to saythat after 20 months of dialogue between theGovernment and the paramilitary leaders itseems that the true contest between the inter-ested parties is only beginning. The final resultwill depend on how each player in this gameplayshis cards.

211Conflict

The Urban Conflictworsens

WWHAT IS URBAN CONFLICT?

e begin by making a distinction be-tween urban conflict and urban vio-lence and warfare set in an urbancontext. By urban conflict we mean:An antagonistic relation that deals

with the construction of urban space, under-stood as the French school of urban sociologyhas defined it. In this case meaning that the axison which the counterposed objectives are con-figured is the process of social production andsocial organization for the built environment inrelation to aspects of the work process and thepolitical administration of a culturally construct-ed territory.1

We understand violence to mean �all formsof human interaction in which, harm is broughtto another through force in order to obtain anend�2 and consequently we speak of physicalviolence as a form of behavior or expression of

Rights and Urban Conflict ObservatoryPopular Training Institute

Jesús William Balbín Álvarez*

conflict. War is more an act of force, a disputebetween armed factions, with the aim of impos-ing one�s will on the other.

Urban conflicts have a variety of causes:3

1) Productive space (industrial, commercial orservice-oriented) over the location and distribu-tion of the different activities, the change of con-centration or decentralization, the flow of prod-ucts and services across the different spaces,conflicts pertaining to income and the field oflabor in general; 2) Conflicts over consumptionand over means of collective consumption(roads, domestic public utilities, housing, among

* Director Observatorio de Derechos y Conflicto Urbano del IPC.1 Vilma Liliana Franco, �Violencias, conflictos urbanos y guerra civil: el

caso de la ciudad de Medellín en la década del noventa,� in JesúsBalbín, ed. Violencias y conflictos urbanos: un reto para las políticaspúblicas (Medellín: IPC, March 2004).

2 Saúl Franco, El Quinto no matar (Bogotá: TM Editores-Iepri, 1999), p.3.3 Vilma Liliana Franco, Marco teórico y conceptual sobre conflicto

urbano y herramientas metodológicas para su descripción analítica(Medellín: IPC, July 2004), p. 15.

212 Conflict

others), conflicts that arise fromurbanization andland use and the appropriation of urban land; 3)Conflicts over circulation, including the trans-portation of people and merchandise, electron-ic networks, and the flow of information in sec-tors such as finances and communications; 4)Conflicts related to public administration,which focus our attention on the State as theagent of urban policy related to the planning andallocation of resources; policies are disputed bylocal powers to ensure human rights and theyproduce segregation and center-periphery op-position, rich and poor residential areas, andresidential, commercial, or industrial zones; 5)Territorial conflicts, which are defined as ac-tions of defense, dominion, conquest, demar-cation and stabilization on the part of differentactors who positively or negatively exclude oth-ers, leading to conflict.

From this perspective, the concept of ur-ban conflict is much broader than urban vio-lence and war, because these are just some ofits expressions and some of the ways conflictsplay out in the urban setting.

ILLEGAL SUBDIVISION AND SQUATTING INCOLOMBIANURBANIZATION

The guerrillas were involved in waves of forceddisplacement caused by violence in the country-side in the 1950s (brought about by the war be-tween the two traditional parties) and in the mid-1970s. Thewave that began in the 1980s involvedthe guerrillas, the paramilitaries and the drugtrade. All three have led to aprocess of unplannedurbanization and growth in the cities for whichthe local authorities were not prepared in termsof service provision, attention to the new arriv-als, and the ability to offer the advantages of de-velopment and urban life to all citizens.

The fact that cities grew more as a result ofthe migration of people forcibly displaced by vi-olence or searching for better conditions thanthrough the expansion of productive work haspresented thousands of newcomers with theplight of finding a bit of urban land where they

can settle and build a house, whether it be bysquatting or by the illegal division into lots. Inaddition to the illegal possession of land thereare issues concerning the legality of the construc-tion undertaken, which has led to state perse-cution often by means of violence. This particu-lar path of migration has left large urban sectorsin the development periphery, marginalized fromproductive work, citizenship, the exercise ofrights, or power.

Another characteristic that we want to high-light are the lessons in violence these residentslearned in the countryside. They reproduce theirexperiencesandmemories in theprocessof appro-priatingurban land. Thesepractices share the stagewith urban expressions of violence by organizedcrimeandyouthgangs, andeven the territorial con-trol exerted by armed groups�guerrillas and para-militaries� in the barrios of our cities.

We begin with the hypothesis that urbanconflicts and violence are not something short-lived and unique to some Colombian cities orthird world countries; rather they are a harbin-ger of what will come to pass in the world�s cit-ies in the 21st century. The criminal gangs, thedrug mafias and gunrunners, the mercenariesand the private armies, the control of urban ter-ritory, are sui generis expressions of the urbanspace and its conflicts.

EXPRESSIONS OF URBAN CONFLICT AND THERIGHT TO THE CITY

The different expressions of urban conflict aremerely the struggle for the right to the city, toaccess the basic conditions for existence andlife in dignified conditions, to create the condi-tions to live together with others and constructcitizenship, the struggle to participate in deci-sion-making and in urban policy and to enjoythe urban space.

Homicide andMassacres: The Tip of the Iceberg

In the broadest sense, homicides are a violationof the right to life. In the strict sense of the term,

213Conflict

though, only a percentage of homicides �be-tween 15 and 27 percent4� can be consideredan outgrowth of the political armed conflict andclassified as a violation of human rights and in-ternational humanitarian law.

Contrary to the widespread opinion thatviolence reached its peak at the beginning of the1990s and associated with the Medellin carteland Pablo Escobar. Table 1 demonstrates thatthe highest levels, both at the urban and na-tional levels, occurred in 2002. That year therewere 15,733 homicides in the 50 largest citiesand 28,837 homicides in the country as a whole.This is a homicide rate of 69.98 per 100,000 inurban areas. Whereas in the country as a whole,the highest homicide rate took place between1991 and 1993, with a rate equal to or above73.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants; urbanviolence reached its highest rates in 1995, 1996,and 1999 (Table 1). Only in 2000 and 2003 did

the rate of urban homicide surpass the rate ofthe country as a whole, but it is a revealing indi-cation of the sharp growth in urban violence,which has tended to boost overall violence fig-ures between 1990 and 2002.

Urban violence over the last 14 years hasrepresented 55.23 percent of the country�s vi-olence, with a mean homicide rate of 58.62, ascompared with the national rate of 66.37.

Over these 14 years, urban violence has killedenough people to depopulate a city the size ofBarrancabermeja, and the national toll wouldwipeout a city the size of Valledupar orManizales, 13thor 14th on the list of large cities.

If we assume that 15 percent (the lowestfigure) of the urban homicides are due to politi-cal violence, we are talking about a number of30,400 over the 14-year period, that is to say2,171 political killings per year.

Between July 2002 and March 2003 in thecountry�s 50 biggest cities there have been 60massacres with 320 victims, which is equivalentto three urban massacres per month.

Homicides and massacres are the most se-rious and visible aspects, the tip of the iceberg,of the violation of human rights and they revealthe complex problems associatedwith social andpolitical exclusion of large sectors of the urbanpopulation. These are not exclusively problemsof political violence by anti-government groupsor paramilitary groups from low-income areas.

The Armed Groups: Communities CaughtBetween Common Criminals and Anti-government or Paramilitary Groups

The guerrillas changed their mode of oper-ation when they shifted from being a logisticalbase of support for the war in the countrysideand tried to wage warfare in the cities (Barran-cabermeja and Medellín are examples). At a lat-er point, the presence of paramilitary groups wasfelt in the cities, violently displacing and con-fronting the existing settlements of militiamen

1990 12821 24308 52.74 52.66 63.43

1991 15260 28284 53.95 64.79 73.78

1992 15435 28224 54.69 63.34 73.65

1993 15428 28173 54.76 61.58 73.50

1994 15030 26828 56.02 59.59 69.99

1995 14964 25398 58.92 56.63 66.10

1996 15311 26642 57.47 56.77 68.06

1997 13692 25379 53.95 55.24 64.80

1998 12663 23096 54.83 46.89 56.89

1999 14034 24358 57.62 55.62 58.84

2000 14851 26540 55.96 65.58 62.96

2001 14926 27841 53.61 63.55 66.97

2002 15733 28837 54.56 65.98 66.09

2003 12508 23013 54.34 52.46 52.35

Total 202.654 366.921 55.23 58.62 65.37

Population

1993 24.596.819 44.129.567

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: IPC, based on information from the Observatory of the Office ofthe Vice-President.

TTTTTable No.1able No.1able No.1able No.1able No.1

HomicidesHomicidesHomicidesHomicidesHomicidesin the 50in the 50in the 50in the 50in the 50Larges tLarges tLarges tLarges tLarges tC i t i e sC i t i e sC i t i e sC i t i e sC i t i e s

YYYYYea rea rea rea rea r Na t i ona lNa t i ona lNa t i ona lNa t i ona lNa t i ona lhomicideshomicideshomicideshomicideshomicides %%%%%

UrbanUrbanUrbanUrbanUrbanHomicideHomicideHomicideHomicideHomicideRate (perRate (perRate (perRate (perRate (per100,000)100,000)100,000)100,000)100,000)

NationalNationalNationalNationalNationalHomicideHomicideHomicideHomicideHomicideRateRateRateRateRate (per(per(per(per(per100,000)100,000)100,000)100,000)100,000)

4 UNDP, El Conflicto callejón con salida. Informe Nacional de DesarrolloHumano (Bogotá: UNDP, 2003), p. 105.

214 Conflict

and guerrillas (the cases of Barrancabermeja,Cúcuta, and Commune 13 in Medellín). Where-as in cities like Medellín, Cali, and Bogotá therewas a significant presence of criminal organiza-tions and gangs, in others the presence of theparamilitary groups became common. They be-came part of the landscape, everyone knew theyexisted and were found there, but no one namednames or admitted seeing them or knowingabout them.

InMedellín, the selfsame paramilitaries weresaid to control more than 60 percent of the citywhile the authorities were silent on the matter;from one moment to the next, 871 members ofone of the blocs operating in the city showedup at the time of demobilization. They continueto pursue their political and social work in thebarrios. In Bogotá, another paramilitary bloc hasmade its presence felt in economically impor-tant zones such as the shopping districts wherecontraband merchandise is sold (San Andresi-tos) and the wholesale food market Corabastos,as well as in barrios in the southern part of the

city. In Montería, they even had an impact onthe University of Cordoba.5 In Cúcuta their pres-ence can be felt in the barrios of the city and inpublic entities such as the Prosecutor�s Office6

and the City Hall.7 And in Barrancabermeja, thesite of a bloody war against the National Libera-tion Army, ELN, and many civilian victims, theyconsolidated their position.

The armed groups are present in low-incomeareas, they control entry and exit and move-ment, they supplant the official justice system,they collect �taxes,� and they rely on the unsat-isfied demand of citizens for security. Their cus-tomers are people for whom it does not matterwho offers the service, just that it be efficientand in the hands of a single group. Moreover,they undermine democracy by taking away theaspects of plurality and diversity of opinion.

Graphic No. 1Graphic No. 1Graphic No. 1Graphic No. 1Graphic No. 1Urban Homicide vs. National FiguresUrban Homicide vs. National FiguresUrban Homicide vs. National FiguresUrban Homicide vs. National FiguresUrban Homicide vs. National Figures

UrbanCountry

5 Semana, 10-17 May, pp. 40-42.6 A prosecutor was dismissed for alleged ties to the region�s parami-

litary chiefs.7 The mayor-elect for the period 2004-2006 was detained and questio-

ned about ties to paramilitary groups.

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In this way an overlapping set of differentforms of violence and interests, and a mixtureof projects and plans, is produced in which it isboth difficult to delineate and difficult to differ-entiate the plans that come from the state andthe ones that are parastatal or proto-statal innature, as proposed by different armed groups.The example of security is a good one becauseit affects the guarantee and realization of hu-man rights.

The presence of armed groups in the cityreveals a conflict for control of territory or re-lated to territoriality insofar as these groups actto defend territory, to expel others and exer-cise their dominion, to demarcate invisible bor-ders, and to control movement. Territory is asource of resources, because the dominantgroup is the one that can make use of the re-sources derived from the �toll� that is paid tomove through the territory. Strong armedgroups subordinate the weaker ones to theirpolicies and, in some cases �if they do notassimilate them completely � they allow thema �franchise� to use the armed group�s trade-mark for specific types of action.

This dispute for territorial control betweenguerrillas and paramilitaries is seen in the south-eastern neighborhoods of Barrancabermeja andin Commune 13 in Medellín, where the guerril-las were displaced and the paramilitaries are nowin a consolidated position.

Since November 2003, the demobilizationof a faction of the Colombian United Self-De-fense Groups (AUC), the Cacique Nutibara Bloc,has been underway as part of the Santafé deRalito accords. This paramilitary group operat-ed in Medellín and neighboring municipalities.Of those who demobilized, 326 are now em-ployed by different decentralized state agen-cies andmunicipal secretaries� offices in Medel-lin, with incomes that range between minimumwage plus benefits, to contracts worth 1 mil-lion pesos. A total of 436 are receiving$600,000 pesos per month to finish school; inaddition, 107 are studying at the secondary oruniversity level, and 407 are doing a diplomaon community leadership8 .

Forced Displacement in the Urban Territory

A dual dynamic has been occurring in cit-ies in recent years. On one hand, the cities arethe destination for people who have been forc-ibly displaced by the violence in the country-side. This phenomenon, first thought to besomething temporary because the displacedwould return home, has instead grown. In cit-ies all over the country, barrios of displacedpeople have sprung up; the Nelson Mandela inCartagena, Cantaclaro in Montería, or the 45settlements of Medellín are only a sample ofthe locations where hundreds of thousands ofdisplaced people who have arrived in the citiescongregate. On the other hand, the dynamicof the urban armed conflict has obliged peopleto move out of their small territories towardother barrios and communes in the same city,producing intra-urban displacement and inmany cases a re-displacement. This is the caseof the residents of the El Esfuerzo barrio in Bel-lo (Antioquia Department), which was burnedin May 2001 and whose inhabitants are foundin �temporary lodging� in the Coliseum TulioOspina and the Zamora barrio in Bello.

Disputes Over the Use and Appropriation ofUrban Land

The dispute between the right of citizensto have a decent quality home, or at least aplace to survive in, and the property rightsof owners of the urban or suburban land, haspitched generations of citizens into conflictover the use of urban land. This has led toconflict and a series of confrontations be-tween those who invade land and the localauthorities who enforce the regulations onland use and rights to the city. Squatters areplaced in a situation where they fall outsidethe law (because they have invaded land orbecause they have not followed the buildingcodes with all necessary approvals). As a re-

8 Medellín City Hall, Press Bulletin, No. 331, 16 June 2004.

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sult, between 30 and 40 percent of the in-habited areas in 15 large cities are illegal, thestate being one of the most adversely affect-ed because 575,269 urban public propertieshave been invaded9 .

In Medellín, 110,000 properties have notbeen legalized (17.6 percent), in Barrancabermejathe percentage is 67.7 percent. In Cartagena itis estimated that 70 percent of the propertiesare illegal, while in Cali there are 37,287 illegalinhabited lots.

This situation has worsened in recent yearsas violence has stepped up and forcibly displacedmany peasants who have moved to live in thecities.

Other expressions of urban conflict overland use relate to the disputes between citi-zens and the state for changes in the zoningof urban areas from housing to services ortraffic.

Public Space: A Dispute over Primacy of Rights(The Right to Work, to Use and Enjoyment, toMovement and Travel, and to Ownership)

Public space is another problem to examinein the portrait of urban conflict, because it pitsworkers and street vendors who struggle for theright towork and survival, in quite precarious con-ditions, against other citizens and their right touse and enjoyment, recreation, and movement.It is a conflict over the fundamental rights ofsome, and the rights of these and all others tocirculate freely, engage in recreation and enjoythe city.

At times, street vendors come up againstmunicipal regulations that were not devel-oped with them and they have conflicts withproperty owners. Also, small conflicts ariseamong neighbors or with the owners of vehi-cles over the appropriation of the streets forplay space, given that there is no other pub-lic space for that purpose. At other timesconflicts are produced by the use of publicspace as a parking lot, blocking the free move-ment of passersby.

SOMESPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS ANDVISIBLEMANIFESTATIONS OF URBAN CONFLICT ANDVIOLENCE IN FOUR CITIES

Medellín: Commune 13, San Javier

With its 130,000 inhabitants, Commune 13has served as an arrival place for the displacedpeople who have populated its hillsides, and asa home base for militias and guerrillas at the endof the 1990s. It has seen urban developmentprograms such as the International Program forSubstandard Barrios of Medellín, a municipalprogram; participatory urban development plan-ning, the Dream-makers program; and the ar-rival of the paramilitary groups at the end of theprocess. In the process of �recovering� the zone,several joint military operations were conduct-ed, among which the Mariscal and Orion opera-tions stand out. There were dozens of deathsand injuries in the civilian population and 240people were detained, of whom 60 percent hadto be released.More than 60 people disappearedafter Operation Orion and an intensive programof investments (among these investments wasthe building of a battalion headquarters) tookplace. A dramatic reduction in homicides wasseen �from 467 homicides in 2002, the num-ber dropped to 92� and the presence of para-military groups diminished in 2003. This has beena pilot experience for the policy of �democracysecurity� applied to urban areas.

Barrancabermeja: Commune 7

This is a zone located between the down-town and the southeast of the city. Commune 7began to emerge in 1966 and today has 28 set-tlements and 17,515 inhabitants (70 percentfrom Barrancabermeja and 30 percent from oth-er departments). Six years ago the ELN and FARCwere present in the area; today it is the paramil-itaries. The public space, the street, is where thebarrio is controlled. The lookouts can report on

9 El Tiempo, 20 May 2004, p. 1-2.

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everything that is happening in the barrio, andthey have a sort of mini-prison that recalls the�punishment cells� where the armed groups usedto incarcerate offenders. Moreover, everyoneknows where the suppliers of stolen gasoline areto be found10.

Cali: Agua Blanca District, Commune 15

One of the worsening and recurrent issuesin this part of Cali is the recruitment of youngpeople by guerrilla movements and by self-de-fense groups, especially the youths who live insubstandard settlements. The conditions of pov-erty in which most of the families live and theirabandonment by the State are a breeding groundthat sends youths to the forefront of the armedpolitical confrontation, in a war that they do noteven understand from an ideological standpoint.

Although more work is needed to under-stand the phenomenon in Commune 15, it ispossible to observe some mechanisms that thearmed groups use to recruit young people fortheir ranks. The most relevant feature is thatnone of these mechanisms rely essentially onideological socialization or a political project, butrather they employ a heavy dose of threat andblackmail.

Forced recruitment is accomplished bythreatening the young person or his/her familywith death. The threat is made verbally, orthrough flyers or graffiti on the walls. If they findout that the young person is thinking of runningaway, the threat becomes more pointed or theykill them before they go. Recruitment throughblackmail is used most often with the youthgangs and takes the form of supplying the groupwith drugs, money and weapons for a short time,and then later demanding their help. Such helpmay be to distribute the flyers demanding pro-tection money and to collect the funds, autho-rizing the gang to steal from or murder the vic-tim who does not pay up.

Voluntary recruitment is done by offeringpayments of 300,000 to 500,000 pesos amonth,and by supplying weapons, drugs and permis-sion to visit the family. This makes the young

person into a mercenary at the service of thearmed groups11.

Soacha: Altos de Cazuca

The border area between Bogota and thetown of Soacha is a strategic location for thearmed groups (guerrillas and paramilitaries) dueto its proximity to the South Highway. It is stra-tegic for undertaking actions, to reach the coun-try�s capital (blockades, road takeovers, trans-porting bombs) and for the flow of illicit tradegoods (arms and drugs trafficking). In addition,it is close to zones traditionally known to beguerrilla belts around the Colombian capital.

The development of the zones shows theexistence of different forces at work. In Cazuca,the constitution of the barrios occurred at theend of the 1980s and the beginnings of the1990s, in the context of the political persecu-tion of militants from the movements that rep-resented alternatives to the traditional parties,for example the genocide of the Patriotic Union.These people, on abandoning their regions,moving into Bogota, and later participating inthe settlement of Cazuca, also intersected witha process of negotiation and amnesty involvingthe M-19 Movement (19th of April Movement)in which the state granted deeds to the land inthe upper reaches of Cazuca.

�This first stage was characterized by inter-nal conflicts between the factions of the M-19and the Patriotic Union who were settled in theupper andmiddle parts of the zone respectively.This influenced the ways the population interre-lated since state aggression was less pronouncedin the upper part as a result of the negotiationprocess, whereas in the middle part a constantconfrontation between the settlements support-ed by the Patriotic Union and the public forcestroops was taking place, exacerbated by the cre-ation of the stigmatizing social depictions of the

10 Informe de Barrancabermeja, Plataforma de Conflicto Urbano y Jóve-nes PCUJ. Estudio exploratorio en cuatro ciudades del país, 2004.

11 Informe de Cali, Plataforma Conflicto Urbano y Jovenes PCUJ, Estudioexploratorio en cuatro ciudades del país, 2004.

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�paracos� (paramilitaries) from above and the�guerrillas� from below.�12

The armed actors sustain these strugglesalthough they are not clearly seen in search ofdominance in the territories, as happens in therural areas. They are not looking for visibility buttrying to intermingle with the urban conflicts andviolence. They exercise violence through actionssuch as murder and threatening sectors of thecivilian population, and the underlying featureof this violence is the maintenance of territorialcontrol. Here arise elements that hinder the cre-ation and consolidation of the social fabric.

FINALOBSERVATIONS

Beyond an overview of some aspects of Colom-bian urban conflict and the important reductionin indicators of urban violence in some cities (ex-amples of these are homicides), the treatmentof conflicts narrowly defined as urban are dealtwith by the government of President Uribe moreby force and repression than through dialogue.Clear examples are Commune 13 in Medellin,which led to the displacement of an armedgroup, and the failure of the public forces troopsto consolidate their monopoly over the use offorce, or the strike by the Workers Trade Unionat Ecopetrol that was declared illegal, leading tothe firing of more than 240 workers. The �socialtoll� of 1,000 pesos levied on vehicles that trav-el the north highway in order to construct a two-lane road between Bello and Hatillo is anotherexample. This led to the uprising of several com-munities in the northern part of Valle de Aburra(Copacabana, Girardota and Barbosa) which wasrepressed by the public forces.

12 Informe de Bogotá, Plataforma Conflicto Urbano y Jovenes PCUJ,Estudio exploratorio en cuatro ciudades del país, 2004.

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¿Who is responsible forthe kidnapped?

Owing to the state of defenselessnessof the victim, kidnapping is one ofthe worst crimes and one of thegravest violations of human rights.The kidnapping victim is deprived ofessential rights, such as the right to

liberty, to dignity, to freedom of movement, tothe free development of personality, to contactwith loved ones, and to minimal conditions ofhygiene, health and alimentation.Moreover, theyare deprived of basic human conditions that areabove any constitution and are not denied evento prisoners serving life sentences, such as theright to love, to companionship, to see, even ifonly once in a while, one�s children, to cele-brate Christmas and birthdays, to receive min-imal information regarding one�s country andone�s people, to attend the burial of one�s par-ents.

All this suffering is exacerbated in Colom-bia today by that even more inhuman modalityof kidnapping which results in the detention of

Juan Carlos Lecompte

a person for an undefined period of time, as inthe case of the police and soldiers who have nowspent seven years in the hands of the Farc.

It is almost unimaginable that someonecould negotiate at the cost of seven years of thesolitude and torment of another human being:it can only be explained if one bears in mindthat for the kidnapper, the kidnapped is a pieceof merchandise to be stored until favorable con-ditions arise for selling or trading it. The busi-ness of kidnapping obeys the same logic as thebusiness of real estate; a plot of land acquiredas an investment is only sold years later, when ithas sufficiently increased in value as to yield aprofit.

According to official statistics, between 1962and 2003, 25,578 people have been kidnappedfor extortionary purposes in Colombia. Everysingle day a child is kidnapped in this country,which bears the unfortunate mantle of havingthe greatest number of minors deprived of liber-ty in the world: in 2002, 384 were kidnapped,

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and during the first eight months of 2003, 201further cases were reported.

I find myself among the Colombians forcedto live in a constant state of panic since my wifewas kidnapped on February 23, 2002. From thatday forth I came to form part of the long list ofthose who fight for the liberation of the morethan three thousand kidnapping victims that existtoday in Colombia.

We are not able to grow accustomed to theuncertainty of demands that change accordingto the whims of the guerillas or the government,demands which never clear the path to genuinenegotiation. Sometimes the government placesas a condition that freed guerillas leave the coun-try, other times it says they could be allowed tostay. The Guerillas, for their part, demand thattwo Departments, or one, or a small zone bevacated by the army. Sometimes possible nego-tiations are framed so that there will be no ex-change of civilians, only kidnapped soldiers andpolice, other times politicians are included, andin certain moments the notion has been posit-ed that no extortionary kidnappings will be ne-gotiated at all. Still other times the give andtake results in a game of all or nothing.

Meanwhile, we the families of victims ago-nize, watching the negotiating parties hardentheir positions, as when President Alvaro Uribecuttingly announced in April 2004 in Neiva thatthere would be no humanitarian accord with theguerillas. Some few days later, Raúl Reyes, amember of the Farc�s high command, stated thatthere would be no release of kidnapped personsduring Uribe�s administration, given the presi-dent�s unwillingness to approach a humanitari-an accord.

Some families of kidnapped victims haveopted to not inform the authorities in order toremain at liberty to resolve the issue themselves.Their decision is more than understandable. Irecently met Juan Carlos Blumberg, an Argen-tine industrialist whose son was kidnapped inBuenos Aires towards the beginning of March ofthis year, and killed six days later during a res-cue operation. He greatly regretted having in-volved the authorities, and assured me that had

he not done so his son might still be alive. Thesame happens to many families here in Colom-bia. By not involving the authorities, a rescueattempt, which implies a high risk to the life ofthe kidnapped, is avoided. This strategy also hasthe benefit of denying the government the abil-ity to foul up potential negotiations with unnec-essary conditions and obstacles, or to fake anegotiation process with the intention of track-ing down the kidnappers and liquidating them,thus imposing a rescue by fire and blood.

For those of us who are unmoved by anyinterest other than the freedom and life of ourloved ones, it is absolutely clear that the onlyrealistic way forward is a humanitarian exchange.Such an agreement would entail the guerillasfreeing their kidnapped hostages and the stateallowing a certain number of captured guerillasto leave its prisons.

Kidnapping in Colombia has become gener-alized to a notorious degree, given that, althoughthe Farc are the guerilla group that most benefitfrom this practice, petty criminals, narcotraffick-ers, paramilitaries, and other armed groups suchas the ELN also engage in it. And in that partic-ular form of kidnapping which involves the dis-appearance of people, the Armed Forces alsotake part.

Matters have worsened under the presiden-cy of Álvaro Uribe, a man who follows the leadof the American president, George W. Bush: astrong hand, war and intransigence as a sup-posed solution to conflict. What can be expect-ed of a mindset like that displayed by the Amer-ican ambassadorMr. WilliamWood, who, referringto the lot of the three Americanmercenaries whofell into the hands of the Farc, and to the otherhostages under the control of that guerilla group,said �What are we going to do, after all there arealso terminally ill patients in hospitals.� For Mr.Wood, a hostage is a terminally ill patient, noteven worthy of being cared for, as his life is al-ready forfeit. Under the presidency of ÁlvaroUribe the possibility of a humanitarian accordhas vanished utterly: that is why I am personallyappalled at the possibility of a reelection, be itof Uribe or of Bush.

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A humanitarian accord would be, above all,a gesture of peace, but president Uribe wants todrag all Colombians into the logic of war. ThePresident is not even sensitive to such elemen-tal requests as the petition that a person whohas been kidnapped for several years should nothave to pay taxes or declare income. It is gro-tesque for a kidnapping victim to be chargedthe so-called �war tax� to support that policy ofsupposed �democratic security� which the gov-ernment is prosecuting through military action.

In contrast, responding to the calls of thefamilies of the kidnapped, the mayor of Bogotá,Lucho Garzón, has recently sanctioned a billpresented by councilman Fernando Rojas, whichexempts the kidnapped and their families frompaying a variety of taxes, including housing andvehicular taxes. The bill also concedes otherbenefits, such as that the children of victims havefree access to the education and health servicesof the Capital District.

I blame the guerillas for practicing and fo-menting the inhumane crime of kidnapping, andI demand that they unilaterally release all hos-tages in their power.

I blame the government of president Uribefor not assuming his responsibility to help thekidnapped and their families, for the apathy heconsistently demonstrates in the face of what Iwould argue is the single most pressing prob-lem to resolve in Colombia. In any other coun-try in the world where there were a similar num-ber of citizens kidnapped in their own territory,this would be considered the primary and ex-tremely urgent challenge facing any leadership.I therefore demand of the Colombian presidentthat he act to resolve this situation as quickly aspossible. This is not a matter of an act of gener-osity, but of a duty which he has before the na-tion to defend the life, the security and the in-tegrity of each one of its citizens. The presidentmaintains that he is meeting his duty bystrengthening the hand of force, guaranteeingorder, and finishing the war by military means.In response, I can only say to him that perhapshe is fulfilling his duty to the war, to his war, buthe is failing his duty to life itself. Before anything

else, he must resolve the problem of the seri-ously imperiled lives of the kidnapped, just ashe must answer for the lives of the thousands ofunarmed Colombians who suffer from the vio-lence in their very flesh.

The future of the planet and of the humanrace revolves today around the dichotomy be-tween war and peace. Between those who thinkit realistic, or beneficial, to resolve conflicts vio-lently, through the force of arms, and those ofus who seek the peaceful, negotiated path ofdialogue and understanding. Without doubt,Presidents Uribe and Bush, together with primeminister Blair and the deposed Aznar, find polit-ical and economic benefits in a policy of scorchedearth, a true anachronism now that we haveentered the twenty first century and such vio-lence should be a thing practiced only by thebarbarian peoples of the past.

I also believe in the broad path of solidarityand of social mobilization to press for the libera-tion with life of all hostages. But the escalationof violence that we are living is such that theColombian people find themselves utterly en-gulfed by it, each person absorbed in his ownsorrows and fighting his own battles. This hasprevented mass mobilizations to oppose boththe kidnappings by guerillas as well as the willfulindifference of the government, beginning withPresident Uribe, who prizes above the urgentneeds of victims his personal need for vengeance,his hatred for the Farc, who supposedly killedhis father.

In order to force a genuine solution, we willhave to be thousands of Colombians taking ourvoices to the streets to tell the President that ifhe does not change the posture of his heart, hewill never be able to change Colombia. Interna-tional public opinion, every day more sensitiveto this drama, has been a great support, and inmy case has become the strength that allowsme to go on in my determination to liberate allthe victims of kidnapping in Colombia.

Calling the world�s attention to the dramaof the kidnapped in Colombia, Nobel Prize win-ning author José Saramango declared �Threethousand human lives are spurned (in Colom-

222 Conflict

bia) for reasons of state. But what kind of stateabandons even those who, like soldiers and po-licemen, have lost their liberty for rising to de-fend it?� To close his denunciation, Saramangoadds �President Uribe has at least three thou-sand good reasons not to sleep well�. We alsowish him long and sleepless nights until the dayhe decides to apply himself with determination,honesty, good faith and a spirit of peace to putan end to this tragedy which is tearing apart ourcountry.

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IINTRODUCTION

t was a society weary of violence, ofthe levity of former president Pas-trana and his peace process, thatbrought Álvaro Uribe Vélez to thePresidency of the Republic astride acolossal wave of support, not only

from the absolute majority of the voting elec-torate, but also from the mass media, the pow-erful interests, the country�s land owning fami-lies, and the business community.

From thatmoment forth the President�s out-spoken, confrontational and militarist style hasdominated thedaily life of Colombia, and seducedthe more than 70% of citizens that, according tothe polling firms, claim to still support him. Ofcourse, these same polls also tell us that, asidefrom his personal charisma and support for hissecurity policies, other areas of his administra-tion�s governance project do not receive nearlythe same levels of regard: in employment, healthand education, for instance, the public approval

Antiunion Policy

National Labor Union SchoolHuman Rights and Labor Area

does not surpass 50%. It�s a shame that thesenot so glowing figures are rarelymentioned in thetelevision reports on the subject.

If labor and employment are not the favor-ite topics on the Presidential agenda, however,security definitely is, and speaking on this sub-ject, Mr. Uribe, both as candidate and as sittingPresident, has affirmed in public statements thathe is seeking a Colombia where the business-man and the unionist can return to freely exer-cise their activities without violence.

This text seeks to evaluate the degree towhich Colombian trade unionists two years intothe government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez can exer-cise, in conditions of freedom and security, theright to associate, to go on strike, to collectivelynegotiate, or even, at least, the very right to live.

A BRIEF REMINDER OF THE RECENT HISTORYOF VIOLENCE AGAINST LABOR UNIONS.

From 1991 to the present, the National LaborUnion School has been compiling all of the avail-

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able information on the genocide which has beencarried out against Colombian organized labor.In addition to the horrific murder rates, (see Ta-ble 1) the school has registered information onarbitrary arrests, kidnapping, threats, illegalsearches, murder attempts and harassment.

The history of this massacre of labor union-ists, which we have been witnessing and record-ing since 1991, can be divided into two clearlydefined stages. The first runs from 1991 to 1997and is characterized by the occurrence of a goodnumber of massacres of union memberships ofthe Department of Antioquia, and in particularin the Urabá region and the Northeast of theDepartment.

1996 was the bloodiest year in the historyof Colombian organized labor. That year 286workers affiliated to unions were killed, 207 inAntioquia alone and 195 members of Sintraina-gro, a union which associates the workers of thelocal banana agro-industry. Of these 195 victims,101 died in 14 massacres perpetrated both bythe FARC and by the United Autodefenses ofCórdoba and Urabá. President Uribe must re-member well this nightmarish tale, for he wasthe governor of Antioquia during those years.

The pacification of Urabá thusly secured,and with Paramilitarism growing to prominencein the Department of Antioquia, the strategy ofextermination of Colombian organized laborchanged. Beginning in 1997, we see a series of

escalating, selective attacks, especially of Unionleaderships, and a significant drop in the num-ber of deaths: 79 homicides in 1999. At the sametime, the threats come in torrents, 678 in thatsame year. In addition, anti labor violence rosesubstantially in the Southwestern Departmentsand those of the Caribbean coast.

However, beginning in 2001 we see a newrise in violence against labor unions, related tothe generalized growth of violence and the stalledpeace process. It should be emphasized that inmore than 99% of the cases of homicide whichwe have registered, the investigations mountedby the Government have produced no results:the perpetrators remain unknown, and thechances of a responsible party being sanctionedare vanishingly thin.

Against this backdropÁlvaroUribe Vélez roseto the Presidency of Colombia on August 7 2002.

VIOLENCE AGAINST LABOR UNIONS DURINGTHE ADMINISTRATION OF ÁLVARO URIBE

From August 7, 2002 to June 8, 2004 the Hu-man Rights database of theNational Labor UnionSchool (Escuela Nacional Sindical) has registeredthe perpetration of 164 murders of unionists.528 have been threatened with death, 26 mem-bers of labor unions suffered attempts on theirlives, 62 were victims of some form of harass-

Type of

worker 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total

Affiliated 91 98 190 86 149 253 147 78 57 103 133 134 55 19 1.593

Union Leader 18 50 26 27 32 31 39 29 23 32 63 50 36 8 464

Total 109 148 216 113 181 284 186 107 80 135 196 184 91 27 2.057

TTTTTable 1able 1able 1able 1able 1Union Members murdered in ColombiaUnion Members murdered in ColombiaUnion Members murdered in ColombiaUnion Members murdered in ColombiaUnion Members murdered in Colombia

1991 � 20041991 � 20041991 � 20041991 � 20041991 � 2004

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: Human Rights Database, Escuela Nacional SindicalN o t e :N o t e :N o t e :N o t e :N o t e : 2004 data is registered up to 8 June.

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ment, 57 were arbitrarily detained, 98 have beenforced to flee, and 15 have been the subject ofillegal searches.

There are three issueswhichought tobehigh-lighted from these broad figures: In the first place,the steep growth of violations of the human rightsof female labor unionists. From August of 2002 toJune of 2004, women were the victims of 265 vio-lations of the right to life, to liberty and physicalintegrity, amounting to 28% of all human rightsviolations registered. This figure breaks down into153death threats, 41homicides,42displacements,10 detentions, 9 cases of harassment, 5 kidnap-pings and 4 illegal searches.

Secondly, it is important to note that of thetotal number of human rights violations againstworkers, 45% (438 cases) were committedagainst union leaders, members of governingboards, executive committees, and sub-direc-torates of the major unions. Of the total num-ber of Unionists murdered, 51 were leaders, afigure which conforms to the more or less con-sistent trend of the last decade. Of the 528 deaththreats, 252 (representing 48%) were directedat union leadership figures, 33 union leaders were

detained, and 12 were the subject of illegalsearches of their homes.

Lastly, it behooves us to note that the work-ers affiliated with the Central Unitaria de Traba-jadores (CUT), continue to bear the brunt of vi-olations of life, liberty and physical integrity. Ofthe total number of violations registered in ourdatabase, 95% of victims (926 cases) were mem-bers of CUT. Of 164 murdered union members,147 (89%) were affiliated with CUT. Moreover,96% (510 cases) of threatened labor unionists,belong to CUT. It should also be noted that allmembers of the executive committees of theCUT�s subdirectorates in the Departments ofValle, Atlántico, Arauca, Caldas and Risaralda,received death threats, as a consequence ofwhich many were forced into exile.

PASTRANA VS. URIBE. HOWMANYDIFFERENCESARE THERE?

Making the comparison between the last twoyears of the Pastrana administration and the firsttwo of Uribe, we can present the following results:

Type of Violation August 7, 2000 to August 6, 2002 toAugust 7, 2002 June 8, 2004

Threats 357 528Illegal searches 2 15Murder attempts 39 26Disappearances 23 8Arbitrary detentions 10 57Forcible displacement 73 98Homicides 387 163Harassment 32 62Kidnapping 69 16Torture 2 1Total 994 974

TTTTTable 2able 2able 2able 2able 2TTTTTotal violations against the life, liberotal violations against the life, liberotal violations against the life, liberotal violations against the life, liberotal violations against the life, liberty and physical integrity of Colombian unionized workersty and physical integrity of Colombian unionized workersty and physical integrity of Colombian unionized workersty and physical integrity of Colombian unionized workersty and physical integrity of Colombian unionized workers

August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004

SourceSourceSourceSourceSource: ENS Human Rights Database

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The figures in Table 2 tell us a number ofthings. In the first place, there is no substantialdrop in the total number of registered violationsin the two periods. Secondly, there is a signifi-cant drop, particularly in homicides, which, fall-ing from 387 to 163 show a positive change of58%; likewise, murder attempts, disappearanc-es and kidnappings have fallen. However, a sig-nificant rise in threats, searches, arbitrary de-tentions, displacement and harassment is alsoregistered. These figures reinforce our observa-tion that while there have been fewer violationsrelative to the rights to life and physical integri-ty, this trend has been accompanied by signifi-cant growth in violations of human rights relat-ed to liberty, and, consequently, there has beenan increase in the responsibility of the state forviolations of the human rights of labor union-ists. Our database registered 30 violations, thereal or presumed responsibility for which corre-sponds to the State�s security forces betweenAugust 2000 and August 2002. During the sametimeframe of two years, from 2002 to 2004, 90cases of state responsibility for the violations ofthe rights of labor unionists have been registered.

Contrary to what one might have expect-ed, the first five months of 2004 do not corre-spond to the positive trends that were seen as aresult of the 51% drop in homicides, and 77%drop in kidnappings of union members in 2003.The figures of these first five months, however,do confirm and substantiate the thesis that thepositive trends were exclusively a result of thehighly contingent changes in the logic of actionof the various armed actors, that is, their politi-cal and strategic calculations, and not the resultof the execution of any government policies seek-ing to guarantee and protect the life, liberty andright to association of unionized workers in Co-lombia

As indicated in our semi-annual and annualreports, violence against Colombian labor unionsis selective, discriminate and highly calculated.The nature of this violence is newly confirmedin 2004 by the fact that 64% of death threatsand 19% of homicides were directed againstmembers of union directive boards, and by the

fact that the threats and killings coincide withand are the result of the labor disputes in whichthese union leaders are engaged.

THE STRATEGY OF TERROR AGAINST FEMALEUNIONISTS

As we have stated above, the human rights sit-uation of female labor unionists has taken a dra-matic turn for the worse. Making a comparisonbetween the total number of violations of thehuman rights of unionized womenwe report withhorror a growth of 323% compared with thesecond biennium of the government of AndrésPastrana; the figure jumped from 82 violationsof the human rights of unionized women to 265cases in the first biennium of the government ofUribe. As we have argued in other reports, thesubstantial growth in violations directed againstfemale labor unionists discredits the thesis ofcollateral victims. These cases are part and par-cel of a discriminate logic of violence whose ob-jectives lie beyond the mere intention of silenc-ing the victim. These systematic violations reflecta symbolic and strategic aim of immobilizing andterrorizing the labor movement as a whole. (SeeTable 3)

A woman killed in front of her children, awoman mutilated, a woman whose children�slives are threatened, or who�s life is used as ameans of pressure, is converted into the sym-bolic vehicle through which others are cowedinto submission. As such, these violations arenot ends in themselves, they are forms of terrordirected against others: children, relatives, neigh-bors and union colleagues. These violations seekto conclusively shape the choice between life,physical integrity, and union activism.

STATE PERSECUTION TO UNION UNDER THEURIBE ADMINISTRATION

Analyzing the situation lived by Colombianunionists in 2003, the National Labor UnionSchool regards with concern and condemnation

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the way the administration of Uribe is accompa-nying his policy of security and war with an atti-tude of persecution and penalization of partici-pants in the economic and social conflict, whichlies clearly outside the realm of the armed con-flict.

This year, as a result of the government�ssecurity policies �policies of war� there has beenan outrageous rise in repression of the right tounionize and an increase in the number of de-tentions, searches and harassments perpetrat-ed by state security forces against labor organi-zations within the context of labor disputes.

There exists, furthermore, a clear and per-sistent policy of stigmatization, political isolation,and disrespect towards labor organizations, apolicy that seeks to close any type of avenuesfor labor to pursue collective action or socialdialogue. The administration has determined toplace the blame for a good part of the country�seconomic woes on labor organizations, and inthis it has been clearly supported by the massmedia.

This antiunion posture has been reaffirmedtime and again by events. For instance, the rul-

ing this last March 26 of the 28th circuit court ofBogotá, in which the union leader of the USO,HernandoHernández, was absolved. The Judge�sdecision highlighted the manipulation of whatlittle evidence existed, that the witnesses werepressured and paid, that information had beendistorted, and that false evidence had been pre-sented to frame Hernando Hernández with thecrime of rebellion. Although this process wasinitiated before Álvaro Uribe came to office, thecontext in which it came about, against the back-drop of labor disputes with Ecopetrol, illustratesthe manner in which the judicial apparatus canbe manipulated in order to complement cam-paigns to discredit Colombian labor organiza-tions.

Luz Perly Córdoba, Human Rights specialistfor the Federación Nacional Sindical UnitariaAgropecuaria (Fensuagro) fell victim to a similarsituation in 2004. On 18 February her home wassearched, and shewas subsequently arrested andcharged with rebellion. Or take the 8 March ar-rest of Gilma Culman Sánchez, of the Union ofAgricultural workers of Tolima, who was paradedbefore the media as a member of the insurgency.

TTTTTable 3able 3able 3able 3able 3TTTTTotal violations of the rights to life liberotal violations of the rights to life liberotal violations of the rights to life liberotal violations of the rights to life liberotal violations of the rights to life liberty and physical integrity of Colombian female unioniststy and physical integrity of Colombian female unioniststy and physical integrity of Colombian female unioniststy and physical integrity of Colombian female unioniststy and physical integrity of Colombian female unionists

August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004August 7, 2000 � June 8, 2004

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: ENS Human Rights Database

Type of Violation August 7, 2000 to August 6, 2002 toAugust 7, 2002 June 8, 2004

Threats 19 153Illegal searches - 4Murder attempts 5 1Disappearances 2 -Arbitrary detentions - 10Forcible displacement 7 42Homicides 43 41Harassment 2 9Kidnapping 4 5

Total 82 265

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The first four months of 2004 were markedby a surge in the number of death threats insituations of strong labor conflicts, such as thoseof Sinaltrainal, within the context of growing vi-olence in Atlántico and Valle Departments, to-gether with regular trends of violence againstlabor leadership, against a backdrop of a persis-tently anti-labor government policy.

This antiunion policy of persecution is alsomanifest in other very important areas, wherebrutal limitations are imposed on Colombianorganized labor�s ability to exercise their lib-erties.

We would like to highlight the drop in 2003in the number of collective work contracts, to-gether with the diminishing of their coverageand scope, the worst such drop in the last 13years. In 2003, there were a total of 284 col-lective work contracts, 199 less than in 2001,representing a drop of 41.2% with respect tothe year with which the comparison must bemade, given that most collective contracts areagreed to for two year periods.

The greater part of the drop in collectivecontracting took place in the public sector, par-ticularly in the municipalities, where over 70collective labor agreements were abandoned asa result, (a) of processes of State restructuringinitiated after the application of law 617 of 2001,which represented a significant reduction in thepersonnel employed by municipalities and de-partments, and (b) significant staffing cuts inpublic hospitals embroiled in theworst economiccrisis of their history, consequence of law 100 of1993, which reformed the country�s social se-curity system. It should also be noted that anumber of unions and subdirectorates have dis-appeared from hospitals and municipalities as aresult of pressures from paramilitary groups.

The majority of public sector workers, clas-sified as �public employees�, are excluded fromthe preceding data. The unions of such em-ployees are denied the right to present petitionsand to sign collective conventions. All of theabove is in complete violation of internationallabor norms, in particular Convention 151 of theILO, ratified by Colombia in 1997 through law411, which obliges states party to the Conven-tion to adopt necessary policies to facilitate col-lective negotiation for public servants.

Likewise, the advantages codified by laborlegislation in both public and private sectors fa-voring contractual flexibility have resulted inwidespread subcontracting of workers throughnon-unionized contracting modalities in whichthe workers are denied the rights of associationand collective bargaining.

The way in which three of the largest Stateowned enterprises were reformed, (Ecopetrol inthe petrol sector, Telecom in the telecommuni-cations industry and the Social Securities Insti-tute in the healthcare sector), speaks clearly tothe nature of the current government�s laborpolicy, and to how that government understandsits relationship with labor organizations. Telecomwas transformed with the sole intention of anni-

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: Ministry of Social Protection Data processed by ENS.

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003Collective 502 264 491 328 492 173ConventionCollective 252 214 153 149 204 110AgreementUnionContract 1 - 4 6 4 1

Total 755 478 648 483 700 284

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003176.741 150.066 186.963 115.153 176.774 72.264

TTTTTable 5able 5able 5able 5able 5Workers benefited by collective contractingWorkers benefited by collective contractingWorkers benefited by collective contractingWorkers benefited by collective contractingWorkers benefited by collective contracting

TTTTTable 4able 4able 4able 4able 4Collective labor conventionsCollective labor conventionsCollective labor conventionsCollective labor conventionsCollective labor conventions11111 , agreements and, agreements and, agreements and, agreements and, agreements andcoverage of collective contracts in Colombiacoverage of collective contracts in Colombiacoverage of collective contracts in Colombiacoverage of collective contracts in Colombiacoverage of collective contracts in Colombia

1 Translator�s note: Collective Conventions (Convenciones Colectivas)are the product of labor management negotiations and acquire legalcharacter, governing labor relations so long as they remain in force.

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hilating its union, which had more than 6,000members, and with the same stroke finishing offthe collective labor convention the unionachieved.

The Colombian Petrolium firm, Ecopetrol,was divided into three firms to prevent the unionfrom having a say in exploration contracts, whichare awarded under extremely favorable condi-tions for multinational corporations. The firmrefused to negotiate the petitions presented bythe union, and instead imposed upon it an arbi-tration tribunal which tore down the worker�shard fought conventional victories. Only after a36 day strike, during which 248 unionized work-ers were illegally fired, did the petrol workersmanage to partially temper the measures takenby the government with the company. The ne-gotiations over reparations and labor conditionscontinue at the time of this writing.

The Social Securities Institute (ISS) was alsosplit into two companies: one specialized in en-suring against professional hazards, pensions andhealth care; the other to administer and pro-vide all healthcare services to the more than 3.2million clients. Of the 17,494 workers the Insti-tute employed, most of them members of thebranch union Sintraseguridad Social, 13,741were assigned to the firm that provides health-care, and were converted into �public employ-ees�, without the same rights which they hadhad by virtue of the collective labor conventionwhich Sintraseguridad social y and the SocialSecurity Institute had signed. Their new statuseven denied them the right to be representedby their Union.

Since Uribe�s taking office, we have also wit-nessed a radical shift in the government�s han-dling of labor issues. Instead of dialogue andagreement with labor organizations, the optionhas been one of delegitimizing and legally sanc-tioning their actions. There has been a clear risein solicitations of intervention in labor conflictson the part of the managers of public and pri-vate firms, who are sure of a positive responsefrom the State. The manner in which the gov-ernment responds positively to such solicita-tions, violating yet again international labor

norms, is grotesque. Over 80% of the appealsand solicitations of legal action presented in thelast two years have been resolved in ways thatcompromise the independence of the Ministryof Social Protection and the very legitimacy ofthose actions. In Colombia, it is not labor judg-es that resolve these appeals, but the Ministryof Social Protection, which, does so quickly andeasily, with unobstructed administrative deci-sions that cast it in the role of both Judge andparticipant in the legal drama.

At the same time, we have witnessed a bru-tal drop in the legal recognition of emerging la-bor organizations. The Ministry of Social Pro-tection routinely rejects the applications of newlabor organizations citing obscure bureaucraticreasons and even reasons of public order as pre-texts; once again the government fails to meetinternational legal standards, interferes in theinternal affairs of labor unions and violates theprinciple of autonomy, so important for the fullenjoyment of the right to association.

Other grave events frame the Government�santi-union policy of making labor precarious. Forinstance, the Colombian negotiators for the FreeTrade Agreement have opposed including in the

TTTTTable 7able 7able 7able 7able 7Registration of Labor organizations - ColombiaRegistration of Labor organizations - ColombiaRegistration of Labor organizations - ColombiaRegistration of Labor organizations - ColombiaRegistration of Labor organizations - Colombia

2002 2003Unions 23 9Associations of pensioned persons 13 4Total 36 13

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: Records in the Diario Oficial de Colombia

TTTTTable 6able 6able 6able 6able 6Declarations of illegal strikes by the Ministry forDeclarations of illegal strikes by the Ministry forDeclarations of illegal strikes by the Ministry forDeclarations of illegal strikes by the Ministry forDeclarations of illegal strikes by the Ministry for

Social Protection - ColombiaSocial Protection - ColombiaSocial Protection - ColombiaSocial Protection - ColombiaSocial Protection - Colombia

2000 2001 2002 2003Request for declarationsof illefality 7 6 15 30Declarations of illegality 4 0 12 26

Source:Source:Source:Source:Source: Ministry of Social Protection.

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agreement the respect for international labornorms. Moreover, All opportunities for nationalcoordination and social dialogue have beenclosed, and the law which reforms the adminis-trative career of public servants in Colombiatears down the job stability of career officials,and does not guarantee the right to associate,much less to negotiate collectively and to strike.The proposals set forth by President Uribe for anew reform of the pension system seek, by elim-inating special regimens, to ignore collectiveconventions which have legal standing in Co-lombia, aggravating further the precarious re-spect for labor law in the country. In the ILOConference which concluded towards the endof June of this year, the Colombian Governmentmanaged to spin the grave labor rights situationsuch that it was not mentioned in any of thedeclarations of the Conference, or by any of thespecialized organs of the ILO; one might hopefor an important discussion on the matter in thesession of the Committee for Free Labor Orga-nization in the coming month of November,which is dedicated entirely to the Colombian sit-uation.

The actions of the current administrationtwo years after its taking office, are tied to a sys-tematic drive to neutralize the last strengths oflabor unionism. To leave behind a country with-out unions and a citizenry without the right toassociate and protest or negotiate the condi-tions of their employment, this is the labor pol-icy of the current Government, a policy whichgrossly violates fundamental rights to employ-ment and to the association of labor.

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�And the criticism we face, will we pay at-tention to it? We would lose what we haveaccomplished in a year. We would losewhat we have built up in public opinion.�

Alvaro Uribe Vélez, 8 September 2003

CENSORSHIP ANDSELF-CENSORSHIP

he presentation of The AuthoritarianSpell in September 2003 was the firstimportant crack in the hithertounanimous opinion on the govern-ment of Alvaro Uribe evidenced inthe mass media. It spawned a vio-

lent attack by the president on human rightsorganizations that is still perceptible. Paradoxi-cally, the president�s statements actually spreadthe information about the report and allowedthe nongovernmental organizations tomove intospaces that up to that point had been reservedexclusively for information emitted by the ad-

Journalism and freedomof expression:

Colombia, a reality incamouflage

Claudia Julieta Duque*

ministration without any prospect of debate.The reactions of some media to the asser-

tions about the lack of freedom of expression inthe country (�the media are only authorized totransmit the official version of the story�2 ) werealmost as strong as the presidential wrath. Sem-anamagazine, for example, published this com-ment, �everyone who works in the Colombianmedia knows that this latter statement is bothfalse and rash.�3 However, the reality of censor-

T 1 Journalist, author, and research on human rights issues. Currentlyresearcher with the Jose Alvear Restrepo Lawyers� Collective (Cca-jar). This chapter benefited from the contributions and analysis of theFoundation for Freedom of the Press (Flip), the Press and SocietyInstitute (IPYS) and Reporters without Borders (RSF), as well as a richcollective discussion that took place among these organizations du-ring April and May 2004. Nevertheless, the opinions expressed in thisarticle are the exclusive responsibility of its author and do notnecessarily represent the views of the aforementioned organizations.

2 Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desa-rrollo, �Derechos Humanos en Contravía,� The Authoritarian Spell:Alvaro Uribe Velez�s First Year in Power (Bogota: September 2003), p.119.

3 �La ira presidencial, � Revista Semana, no. 1115, 4 September 2003.

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ship was revealed when on 9 September, oneday following the Uribe�s outspoken attack, theCaracol Television program La Lechuza decidednot to air the debate on The Authoritarian Spellin which three members of NGOs and, RafaelPardo Rueda, a senator from the Uribe camp,participated. The reasons that were put forwardby the journalists were clear: �a call from thepresidential palace.�

Censorship and self-censorship in the Co-lombian mass media is not a new phenomenon.Jose Salgar put it well this past 3 May when hesaid that �after sixty years of uninterrupted workin journalism, it hurts to admit that I have neverbeen close to what is termed freedom of expres-sion.�4

It is true, nevertheless, that during the UribeVelez government a small reduction in the num-ber of journalists murdered (from an annual av-erage of seven murdered in the line of duty tofive) has occurred. It has been accompanied byan alarming silencing of themassmedia in termsof �sensitive� issues for the government, whichhas devoted itself to the task of �constructing�public opinion supportive of government actionsand the democratic security policy.

The referendumwas a clear example of alien-ation and the alignment of media power on theside of President Uribe, and the results were alsoa defeat for Colombian journalism because theyexposed the lack of impartiality that character-ized the days leading up to the election. Movingbeyond the editorial and opinion columns, themedia embarked on a clear campaign in favor ofthe approval of the referendum, which was crit-icized by those favoring abstention and the ad-vocates for a No vote.

Messages such as �Yes to the referendum,No to point 4 (Semana5 ); entire pages in whichthe supposed advantages of approving the 19points were explained one by one; and phrasessuch as that of Yamid Amat at the close of thevote �at 4:30 we have it� (News One SpecialReport and CM&, 25 October), as well as thecover up of the president�s defeat,6 and the at-tempts at electoral fraud as the press agenciesand international media were telling the world

that the vote was No, demonstrate that theColombian reality is not accurately portrayed.

The municipal and departmental electionson 26 October also triggered censorship. Sixcolumnists writing for the Medellin newspaperEl Colombiano, resigned their space in the paperafter receiving a letter in which they were in-formed that �we view it as healthy for a balancedpresentation of information in the paper that noreference is made to those aspiring to electedpositions in columns and readers� letters.�7 Thiscontradicts the explicit purpose of the opinionpages in the media, which is to express andespouse political and personal positions freely.

According to the newspaper (one of theircollaborators, Sergio Fajardo, was running foroffice and won the race for mayor of the Antio-quia capital), this was not an act of censorship:

The fact that El Colombiano decided thatcolumns supporting or opposing a particularcandidate in the upcoming elections of 26 Oc-tober will not be published in the editorial pagescan be seen as an act of censorship or as a ruleof fair play. It all depends, then, on the lens usedto view it.8

More recently, other acts of official censor-ship have been revealed. One of the most at-tention-getting is the case of another veteranreporter, Yamid Amat, who recently stated that�the most serious problem of journalism todayis censorship�9 and publicly acknowledged thatin the cases of Guaitarilla and Cajamarca10 the

4 Presentation by Jose Salgar on World Press Freedom Day, �Treshombres del Siglo XX hablan del periodismo en el Siglo XXI,� [Three20th Century Men Talk About Journalism in the 21st Century] , 3 May2004.

5 �No al 4 del Referendo�, Revista Semana no. 1116, 21 September2003.

6 The media treated the true results of the referendum as very low-level news, until December 2003 after the National Electoral Coun-cil admitted that only question number one was approved.

7 Letter send by the editor of El Colombiano to all the newspaper�scolumnists, with the objective of �informing on the editorial policy�defined with respect to the elections of 26 October and signed inEnvigado on 6 August 2003.

8 �¿Censura o Equidad?� El Colombiano, editorial, 12 October 2003.9 Hablando claro con la prensa, program broadcast on Caracol Televi-

sion, 19 June 2004.10 Translator�s Note: For those unfamiliar with the issues, these are

Colombian towns where incidents took place in which civilians andpolicemen were killed in unclear circumstances.

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task of reporting had been obstructed by theMilitary Forces. Yamid Amat is recognized as oneof the most compliant journalists when it comesto government information, and his statementsconstitute an path-breaking advance for the rightto information. Among other things, Amat crit-icized the executive branch, ministers, the po-lice, the Army and the Prosecutor�s Office forapplying pressure and stated that on severaloccasions he has been subjected to �informa-tion reprisals� when the news that was broad-cast did not please public officials.

According to a survey of the Media Obser-vatory of La Sabana University, five percent ofthe directors of themedia outlets state that theyhave been pressured by the president himself,Alvaro Uribe Vélez, and 20 percent acknowledgepressure from officials close to the president�soffice.11 This also demonstrates the lack of aclear policy of respect for freedom of the pressin Colombia.

Despite the fact that President Uribe hasstated that during his government there will beno restrictions on the practice of journalism, hiscriticisms (that he is bothered and inconve-nienced) about some of the information that ispublicized � what he has termed �the costs ofdemocracy� � and his calls to the press to ex-ert �self-control� as a way of supporting the anti-terrorist fight, constitute clear calls for self-cen-sorship.

Likewise, there were efforts made to intro-duce censorship in the early drafts of the regu-lations for the Anti-terrorist Statute. One of thearticles called for prison sentences of eight to12 years for those found guilty of divulging in-formation �that could obstruct military or po-lice operations.� In the end, this was not pre-sented to Congress for its evaluation. Morerecently, the issuance of a call from the presi-dential palace for the accreditation of journal-ists who would be covering the talks betweenthe paramilitaries and the government in SantaFe de Ralito leaves little room for optimism thatthe issue of freedomof expression is understood.

Several organizations of journalists havespoken out about these matters. For example,

the Bogota Circle of Journalists and Reporterswithout Borders (RSF) criticized the governmentannouncement about restricting the press in theparamilitary concentration zone and the fact thatthe accreditations would only be handed out inBogota, more specifically in the offices of thepresident, arguing that journalists in the hinter-land would find it difficult to obtain credentials.

During this government, moreover, attackson journalists covering protests against govern-ment polices and obstruction of the press (12cases) have grown more severe. This has beenreported from Copacabana (Antioquia), Carta-gena (Bolivar), and Barrancabermeja (Santand-er). In 2003 three cases of obstructing the presswere reported, one attack on a graphic report-er, and one case of espionage perpetrated bythe Interior and Justice Ministry and the Nation-al Police against El Espectador newspaper. Thetrend so far in 2004 is toward an increase inattacks and instances of obstructing the workof the press by the public force, in particular bythe Mobile Riot Squad.12

SELF-CRITICISMANDREFLECTION

It is important to note that the media have beenengaged in a self-critical and reflective process.El Tiempo newspaper, for example, has developedaManual for the Coverage of the Armed Conflict that isintended to provide standards for handling infor-mation in conflict situations. Likewise, on 3 May2004, eleven newspapers and two weeklies pub-lished a declaration and recommendations oncovering the armed conflict to mark World Press

11 Media Observatory, Faculty of Journalism and Communication, LaSabana University and Circle of Journalists, Bogota, El Presidente deColombia visto por 20 directores de medios de comunicación de supaís (Bogota, May 2004). The study states that �five percent of theeditors admitted that they had been pressured directly by PresidentUribe to broadcast information, and the same percentage had beenpressured to omit information.... Twenty percent of the editors sur-veyed revealed that representatives of the President had exertedpressure on them, while 15 percent were coerced to omit informa-tion.�

12 Foundation for Freedom of the Press (Flip), Diagnóstico de la libertadde prensa en Colombia: Primer semestre de 2004 (Bogota: FLIP, June2004).

234 Conflict

Freedom Day. Despite its timidity it considersimportant information management issues.13

An important change over recent monthsis the reporting on topics that were being �hid-den� under the guise of inconsequential news:the paramilitary infiltration of the ProsecutorGeneral�s Office, themassacres in Guaitarilla andCajamarca, the favor-swapping at work to se-cure presidential reelection, and the declarationsof General Jaime Humberto Uscátegui about theties between the military and the paramilitariesare good examples.

However, information biased in favor of thepresident is still the norm and the use of �mediadissing� against those considered �enemies� ofthe government is obvious; this is the case ofSenator Hector Eli Rojas, who was profiled in ElTiempo after bringing to light the appointmentsof some congressmen�s relatives to the diplo-matic service. The article stated that his denun-ciations originated as a settling of scores afterthe departure of his political friends from gov-ernments posts.14

THE SHAMECONTINUES

�Murder, threats to journalists, and impunitybring shame on our democracy,� said PresidentAlvaro Uribe at the beginning of 2003.15 Orga-nizations such as the Press and Society Insti-tute (IPYS) say �everything indicates that theshame continues.�16

Censorship and direct attacks on the me-dia and journalists are two sides of the same coin,what IPYS has taken to calling �a chilly climate�that works against the rights to freedom of ex-pression and information that are enshrined inArticle 19 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-man Rights, the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights, the Inter-American Conven-tion on Human Rights, and the Inter-AmericanDeclaration of Principles on Freedom of Expres-sion (2001). The situation is so serious in someregions of Colombia that the IPYS believes that�despite the existence of mass media, clearlythere is no press freedom.�17

Despite the reported drop in violations, thestate of press freedom in Colombia remains se-rious. Between August 2002 and June 2004, 12journalists were murdered, two of them in thepast six months. In addition, between January2003 and June 2004, eight professionals wereattacked, 69 were threatened as a result of theirwork, and seven left the country for exileabroad.18 During the period, most murders ofjournalists were attributed to reporting instanc-es of corruption by public officials or privateparties who had some relation to armed ac-tors.19

Organizations that work for freedom ofexpression in the country relate the reductionin the numbers of homicides, kidnappings, andattacks on journalists in Colombia to censorshipand self-censorship � phenomena that are dif-ficult to document but which have even more

13 The document was the outcome and conclusions of the seminarCalidad de la Información sobre el Conflicto Armado en Colombia,[Quality of Information on the Armed Conflict in Colombia] that washeld in Cartagena at the end of April 2004. In it, the media �call on�the Military Forces and the Police to establish a dialogue with journa-lists about the responsibility that they have as producers of informa-tion about the war. Likewise, the mass media agreed to adopt a set ofminimum standards to guarantee quality coverage and to launch whatthey called Proyecto de Calidad Periodística [Quality in JournalismProject], which aims to monitor the coverage of the conflict andimprove the quality of information. On 3 May, all the participatingmedia published their conclusions and requested that their work berespected.

14 �Los amigos incómodos de Héctor Elí Rojas,� El Tiempo 25 April2004. This article produced angry calls for rectification in correspon-dence to the newspaper�s Readers Advocate. On 9 May the answerwas published in the column �Independencia cuestionada� in whichthe advocate stated that the requests were being studied. The 29April editorial in El Tiempo rejected the criticisms and stated that�the finger-pointing in the debate about a report from the Investiga-tive Journalism Unit published on Sunday concerning the links ofHéctor Elí Rojas with a person who was fired from the Oversight andSecurity Regulatory Commission is unacceptable. The question wasaired by President Uribe himself, and basic journalistic responsibilityrequires the professional to look for an answer. To deduce from thatthat we are taking our cues from the presidential place is nonsense.�

15 The Colombian Government news agency (CNE) of the Presidency ofthe Republic, Saludo del Presidente con ocasión del día del periodista(Bogota: CNE, 9 February 2003). Consult the web site:http://www.presidencia.gov.co/cne/2003/febrero/09/01092003.htm

16 Press and Society Institute(IPYS), Colombia, informe final 2003: Entrelos linderos de la prudencia y la autocensura (Lima & Bogota: IPYS,March 2004).

17 Ibid.18 The figures were provided by the Foundation for Freedom of the

Press (Flip) for this report.19 See Flip, Los corruptos, principales agresores de periodistas colom-

bianos: Informe de Libertad de Expresión 2003 (Bogota: Flip).

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serious repercussions on information than di-rect attacks on the press.

The Foundation for Freedom of the Presscomments, �press freedom cannot be viewedwholly through a quantitative lens. The threats,attacks, and abductions that some journalistshave suffered during the past three years havecaused other reporters to take measures, suchas self-censorship, to avoid falling victim to thesame violations. This has the effect of reducingdirect attacks on the press.�20

According to IPYS, �The intimidating forceof armed actors, corrupt parties, and criminalsthat persistently attack the press is today bear-ing fruit: a press that walks a thin line betweenprudence and self-censorship. This situation ismainly found in the regional media.�21

Between 2002 and June 2004, the Ministryof the Interior�s Press Protection Program (creat-ed in the year 2000) has recorded close to 175cases of journalists put at risk and, according toorganizations for press freedom, their actionshavebeen essential in cases such as that of the jour-nalists threatened in Arauca Department.

Notwithstanding the above, during 2003two reporters were murdered who were includ-ed in the Program: Emeterio Rivas in Barrancab-ermeja and Luis Eduardo Alfonso in Arauca. Inaddition, the fact that representatives of theAdministrative Department of Security, DAS, andthe Police are found among the members of theProgram creates a situation of distrust for me-dia people who are being threatened by statesecurity agencies. Moreover, the measuresadopted by the Program are usually related tohumanitarian aid and elements of protectionsuch as bulletproof vests, armored cars, andbodyguards. There are no efficacious mecha-nisms in the Program to push for investigationsthat could lead to sanctions and punishment ofthose responsible for attacks on the press.

Perhaps for that reason, out of a total of 99journalists murdered over the past 10 years, onlyone person has been convicted of mastermind-ing a journalist�s murder.22 In March 2004, Car-los Castano was convicted to 38 years in prisonfor the murder of Jaime Garzon.

REGIONAL JOURNALISTS UNDER SIEGE

In regions such as Arauca Department and mu-nicipalities such as Barrancabermeja, Buenaven-tura, and Cucuta, journalists have been target-ed by armed actors, especially from theparamilitary camp, because of their activitiesreporting on and informing about the reality ofthe conflict in their areas.

In Arauca, 16 journalists were threatenedafter the killing of Luis Eduardo Alfonso, a jour-nalist and director of the Meridiano 70 radio sta-tion. Following their forceddisplacement and sub-sequent return, only official bulletins and reportshave been circulated. One of these journalists,Emiro Goyeneche, was detained in August 2003in Saravena and accused of subversion.

Six journalists have been threatened by dif-ferent armed actors in Cucuta (Norte deSantander Department), and Jorge CorredorQuintero was the victim of an attack that costthe life of his stepdaughter. The effect of the at-mosphere of intimidation and threat is that top-ics such as the paramilitary infiltration in theMayor�s Office and the Prosecutor�s Office areonly covered when the situation is reported bythe national media.

Flip, IPYS, and RSF have reported the exist-ence of a chilly climate for journalism that inhib-its press freedom in Barrancabermeja. Thethreats, the direct attacks, the murders, themudslinging from the public force and the armedactors, and the abductions of journalists in thispetroleum refining center and its surroundingmunicipalities have increased during the pastthree years.

Although there are three local televisionchannels, a newspaper, ten weeklies and numer-ous news and opinion programs on the radio,as well as an active group of almost 50 journal-ists, �there are very important subjects such as

20 See Flip, Diagnóstico de la libertad de prensa en Colombia: Primersemestre de 2004. (Bogota: Flip, June 2004).

21 IPYS,. Entre los linderos de la prudencia y la autocensura: Colombiainforme final 2003. (Lima � Bogota: IPYS, March 2004).

22 Figures from the Inter-American Press Association, IAPA.

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the social controls imposed by paramilitaries inpoor neighborhoods (for example, on women�sdress, acceptable men�s haircuts, and so forth),or the massive theft of gasoline from the Eco-petrol pipelines perpetrated by the paramilitar-ies, that everyone is afraid to investigate. Theyalso believe that the authorities could be in-volved in these crimes.�23

The report reinforces the idea of self-cen-sorship as a survival strategy, �For many jour-nalists reporting the facts without any informa-tion to provide context or any analysis is a wayto avoid becoming a target. For example, dur-ing a time when which there were numerousdaily selective murders in the city, the mediapresented them as isolated events, the way theauthorities wished them to be seen. A weeklythat began to publish the number of deaths inthe city each day was immediately threatened.�24

ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION AND ANEWSILENCINGMODE

Given the current atmosphere of censorship andself-censorship in relation to human rights issues,it is important to draw attention to the informa-tion alternatives.Nongovernmental organizations,social sectors, and the poor are offering alterna-tives through electronic networks, Internet sites,andalternativemedia suchasDesde Abajo, LeMondeDiplomatique, U.N. Periódico, Cien Días Vistos porCinep and, recently, the weekly paper Palabra, aswell as radio programs such as Somos Sudacas andtheNational University Radio shows analyzing thenews. Other openings include community televi-sion channels and radio stations throughout thecountry, and spaces like Contravía, from the Euro-pean Union�s Andean Program for Democracyand Human Rights.

The existence of these outlets, such a hope-ful and positive sign in the midst of the monop-olistic presentation of information, has generat-ed a new attempt to silence the press, directedat journalists who struggle to build alternativespaces to present news and views. During thepast year Adriana Cuellar, the press secretary of

the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers� Collective (Cca-jar) has been threatened several times and herhome attacked. Laura Zapata, the press secre-tary for the Human Rights and DisplacementAdvisory Committee (Codhes) has been threat-ened and exiled. The kidnapping and torture ofInés Peña, journalist of the Popular Women�sOrganization (OFP), and the threats madeagainst the press secretary of the Regional Hu-man Rights Committee (Credhos) of Barrancab-ermeja, Ademir Luna, are other examples.

CONCLUSION

Freedom of expression, historically endangeredby attacks on and murders of journalists, as wellas through censorship and self-censorship, con-tinues to be nonexistent in Colombia. The at-tempts to open up alternative channels of infor-mation are also being cut down by the predatorsof press freedom. The right to information ofColombian citizens, therefore, is one of the mostjeopardized rights, and this has turned Colombiainto a misinformed country, a muzzled nation.

23 Flip, Ipys and RSF, Una voz que se resiste a callar, Mayo de 2004. Areport on journalism in Barrancabermeja.

24 Ibid.

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As the war worsens, no social groupor geographic area of the country isexempt from its effects and no partof the country can remain on thesidelines. The medical mission canbe understood as the set of persons,

institutions, resources, and actions that pro-vides medical care for victims of the conflict(civilians and combatants). This is one of thefields that as amatter of elementary ethical prin-ciples and according to secular humanitarianagreements�albeit often honoredmore in thebreach� should be respected in times of war.However, this does not turn out to be the case.

Offenses committed against the medicalmission are more and more common and in-creasingly serious in contemporary conflictsaround the world, such as Afghanistan, theMid-dle East war between the Israelis and the Pales-tinians, the invasion of Iraq, and the Colombi-an armed conflict as well. In Colombia, offensescommitted against the medical mission persist

under the current government and have evenincreased in some regions, for example the de-partments of Santander, Tolima, Arauca, Casa-nare and Caqueta. In addition to increasing innumber, these infractions are taking more seri-ous forms, and they are affecting the health oflarge segments of the population.

THEREALITY BENEATH THE SURFACE

Despite the severity of the problem, attacks onthe medical mission have received little atten-tion from the people involved in a conflict. Sev-eral factors combine to render these infractionsof international humanitarian law almost invisi-ble. In the first place, this is a problem that isnot even on the radar of institutions in the healthsector itself, nor is it noticed by non-governmen-tal organizations or the media. In fact, it is onlyrelevant to the media and the general publicwhen something truly extraordinary occurs,

National Movement for Health andSocial Security

Working Group on Health and Peace

Under attack:The Medical Mission in Colombia

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blood flows or death results, when an ambu-lance is burned or health workers are murdered,or when hospitals and health posts are invaded.In the institutional records there is still no re-quirement or practice of recording and provid-ing regular reports on such infractions. In thesecond place, the different studies and snap-shots of the issue are quite diverse. The few ex-isting studies refer to different periods and re-gions, or they use different methodologies,making it quite difficult to establish comparisonsor a sequence over time.

In the third place, fear casts a pall of si-lence over the subject. When infractions occurin a conflict zone, the different armed actorsdirectly and indirectly pressure the residentsand the health workers themselves, producingde facto situations of heightened risk. Even worse,recent statements by some high-level Colom-bian officials are further confusing the situa-tion and increasing the level of fear in the gen-eral public and the affected personnel.According to the country�s main newspapers,this was the case in the middle of last year whenthe vice-president and the prosecutor generalof the nation made statements to the effectthat the healthcare of illegal combatants couldbe considered as support or complicity withsuch groups. They stated that healthcare ser-vices are for the people and not for �terrorists.�Uncovering the truth then becomes a risky butnecessary task in the midst of a serious andworsening conflict and operating under intol-erant, authoritarian state policy that is inter-ested in maintaining a monopoly on reportingon the conflict and its developments.

THE LANGUAGE OF FACTS AND FIGURES

Notwithstanding the above description, sever-al information systems and studies conductedby government and academic institutions,trade unions, and NGOs demonstrate the mag-nitude of the problem in recent years, includ-ing during the early days of the current presi-dential mandate.

A study by the Social Protection Ministry,sponsored by the Pan-American Health Organi-zation1 recorded a total of 423 violations affect-ing the medical mission during the period 1999-2003. Several cases contained more than oneinfraction, yielding a total of 538 offenses. It isinteresting to note that there was a steady an-nual increase over the period (see Table One).Given that the study only had information forthemonth of January 2003 from one of its sourc-es and up to May from the other, the ministrywarns that �the projections indicate that an in-crease over 2002 may be expected� (Social Pro-tection Ministry, p. 14) .

The variety of infractions, according to thisstudy, was as follows: 64 percent were attackson the life and physical integrity of persons, in-cluding death, injury, retention, disappearance,displacement, threats, and torture. Twenty per-cent comprised acts committed against health-care activities, for example the theft of medi-cine and/or equipment; controlling themovement of patients, medicine or equipment;restrictions or prohibitions on the provision ofservices; or forcing personnel to provide careunder inadequate conditions. The remainder (16percent) entailed infractions directed against thehealth infrastructure and include attacks onhealth units or the means of transportation anddefining health units or transportation as mili-tary objectives. Theministry�s records show that54 health personnel or patients were murderedduring the 54 months observed, that is a mur-der per month. The infractions took place in 27of the country�s 32 departments, with a higherfrequency observed in Antioquia, Caquetá, Cun-dinamarca, Tolima and Cauca.

Another information source, the NationalAssociation of Hospital Workers (ANTHOC)2

maintains its own statistics on attacks on themedical mission, with special reference to at-tacks on their union members and affiliatedworkplaces. Between January 2001 and Septem-

1 Social Protection Ministry, Department of Health and Welfare. In-fracciones a la Misión Médica en Colombia, 1995-2003, Unpublisheddocument (Bogota: Social Protection Ministry, 2004).

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ber 2003, ANTHOC recorded 633 infractions,an average of 19 per month over the period.Virtually all of the infractions recorded by thisunion were related to threats and attacks on lifeand limb directed against healthcare workers:death threats (49 percent); displacement of per-sonnel (29 percent); and an alarming 84 homi-cides (13 percent). That yields an average of onehomicide every 12 days for the 33 months inthe sample, more than double the number re-corded in the Social Protection Ministry study.It is important to highlight the warning containedin the ANTHOC statistics �arbitrary detentions,or those based on inadequate evidence and pro-cedures, and indictments of health personnel onsuspicion of collaborating with illegal armed ac-tors are on the upswing. The infractions report-ed by ANTHOC are almost nation-wide �oc-curring in 26 of 32 departments� but theincidence is highest in the departments ofCaquetá, Meta, Tolima, Norte de Santander, andAntioquia.

These data provide a general idea of themagnitude and characteristics of the problembut they are not broken down to specify whichpresident was in office at the time. In order toobtain a more precise delineation of the impactof the current government, a careful examina-tion of attacks on the medical mission was un-dertaken, using cases recorded with exact datesand published in the periodical Noche y Niebla,3

edited by CINEP and Justice and Peace. Thenumbers correspond to the second half of 2002and all of 2003. This publication does not spe-cialize in medical issues; it reports instances ofpolitical violence and violations of human rightsin Colombia. During the 18 months selected forstudy, 67 cases were identified (totaling 94 of-fenses). The distribution of the violations is foundin the pie chart. In common with other data-bases, the most frequently reported offenseswere attacks onmedical personnel (63 percent),followed by those related to health activities (19percent), and those directed against health in-frastructure (18 percent). A total of 18 deathsare reported, distributed as follows: doctors, 33percent; health promoters, 22 percent; nurses�aides, 11 percent; dentists, 11 percent; others,28 percent. Cases were reported from 23 de-partments although they were especially preva-lent in Antioquia, Tolima, Norte de Santander,Arauca, and Atlántico.

Despite the lack of complete comparability,the research and figures presented above coin-cide on the serious nature of the problem, itsprogressive increase, the predominance of at-tacks that threaten life and limb, and the wide-spread distribution of infractions in Colombia,although the points of concentration vary some-what. The studies agree with results of threeothers carried out by the International Commit-tee of the Red Cross,4 the Antioquia RegionalHealth Directorate,5 and by students of theNational University.6 Three aspects of the latter

Year No. ofinfractions

1999 292000 842001 1322002 2362003* 57Total 538

TTTTTable No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1Infractions 1999-2003Infractions 1999-2003Infractions 1999-2003Infractions 1999-2003Infractions 1999-2003

* Cases from January in one source, and to May in theother.

2 Nacional Association of Hospital Workers, ANTHOC, Situación de laMisión Médica: Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos de los Trabajado-res de la salud en Colombia, Enero 2001-Septiembre 2003 (Bogota:ANTHOC, photocopy 2004).

3 Cinep and Justicia y Paz, Noche y Niebla: panorama de derechoshumanos y violencia política en Colombia, numbers 25, 26, 27, 28, 29and 30 (Bogota: CINEP, 2002, 2003, and 2004).

4 International Committee of the Red Cross, Infracciones a la MisiónMédica en el conflicto armado colombiano, 1995-1998 (Bogota, 1998).

5 Antioquia Regional Health Directorate, Infracciones contra la MisiónMédica y Sanitaria en el marco del conflicto armado interno Colombia-no. Departamento de Antioquia, enero de 1995-octubre de 1999.(Medellin: Antioquia Regional Health Directorate, November 1999).

6 Carolina Báez, Verónica Madroñero, and Saúl Franco, �El conflictoarmado interno y su impacto sobre la Misión Médica en Colombia: Elcaso de once municipios en Nariño y Boyacá,� Revista Odontología22:2 (June 2003), pp. 23-29.

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study, which was conducted by interviewinghealthcare workers in conflict-ridden areas ofeleven municipalities in Boyaca and Narino, areworth mentioning. A total of 62 percent of thoseinterviewed reported having experienced or wit-nessed at least one infraction; 52 percent ofthose interviewed said that they did not knowinternational humanitarian law, and 44 percentsaid they knew little about it; 98 percent point-ed out that they received no assistance fromgovernment or private institutions at the timeof the infractions.

SOME POINTS FOR ACTION

The situation we have described reveals a pro-gressive increase in attacks on the medical mis-sion that contravene international humanitari-an law. These are an outcome of theintensification and worsening of Colombia�s in-ternal armed conflict. The majority of the viola-tions are threats to life and limb with a signifi-cant number of fatal victims; offenses againstactivities that characterize the health sector inthe conflict zone are also quite important as wellas attacks on infrastructure, including ambulanc-es, which often become military objectives orare used improperly to the benefit of one of theactors in the conflict.

It is also important to emphasize that all theactors in the conflict bear responsibility for theinfractions. Although some may have more re-sponsibility, and an affinity for certain offensesby certain actors can be identified, an explicitand effective commitment by all the actors toensure compliance with international humani-tarian law and respect for the medical mission isa matter of urgency.

For several years now, social and non-gov-ernmental organizations and national and inter-national institutions have showed their concernwith the violations to the medical mission andhave begun to undertake research and concreteactions to call attention to the issue, to stimu-late a response from society, and to invite thearmed actors to observe international humani-tarian law and genuinely to respect the medicalmission. The studies cited above are evidenceof this concern as is the establishment of aStanding Committee on Respect for the Medi-cal Mission in Colombia, made up of social, aca-demic, trade union, and non-governmental or-ganizations and some government agencies. Thiscommittee has spearheaded two national daysof respect for the medical mission on the samedate as the Pan-American Day of the Doctor (3December 2002 and 2003). However, the workdone is absolutely insufficient in the face of themagnitude of the problem and its tendency to

Chart No. 1Chart No. 1Chart No. 1Chart No. 1Chart No. 1Infractions committed against the medical missionInfractions committed against the medical missionInfractions committed against the medical missionInfractions committed against the medical missionInfractions committed against the medical mission

Against life and physical integrity

Against healthcare activities.

Against healthcare infrastructure.

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grow. A clear and effective response is requiredfrom all levels and institutions of the State. Atthe same time a more organized, active, andparticipatory response is required from societyand the international community to increaseboth the recognition of the problem and thesearch for solutions, framed in the commitmentof all the armed actors to seek a negotiated po-litical solution to the conflict.

A VERY SERIOUS RECENT CASE

During early June this year, the FARC stolean ambulance belonging to the municipalhospital of Valparaiso, in the department ofCaqueta. On Friday 11 June, the ambulan-ce was abandoned with 20 kg of dynamiteon the road leading to the town, less than200 meters from the municipal seat of go-vernment, surrounded by antipersonnel mi-nes. The ambulance-bomb was detected bythe local peasants and later detonated un-der controlled conditions by the militaryauthorities.

Source: El Tiempo, 13 June 2004 and AFP(Agence France Presse).

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B

Childhood and youth:

The foot prints of thearmed conflict

Cultural Foundation �Rayuela�*

�It is necessary that we hear the story of theHomeric youths,those who have learned how to live in theedge of deathand, it is also necessary, that they with themultiple languages of art,be changed from victims into interpreters andtransformers of their reality.�

William Ospina.

esides the fact that the guerrillagroups and the paramilitary havestructurally incorporated certain in-fractions to the Humanitarian Inter-national Right into their militarychore; Colombia faces a great polit-

ical difficulty, at the moment, for its applicationand it is derived from the interpretation that thecurrent Government makes of the social andarmed conflict. A recent report from the Officein Colombia of the High Commissioner of theUnited Nations for the Human Rights manifests

that the government of Álvaro Uribe has derivedto �consider all violence like terrorism and bythis way ignoring the existence of an internalarmed conflict and the necessity of consequentlyapplying the Humanitarian International RightHIR�. And it has tended to �encompass all thisin the fight against terrorism� (Report of the HighCommissioner of the United Nations for theHuman rights in Colombia. February 2004. P. 2and 15).

Diverse analysts concur on asserting thatif the conflict is misread, it will also be ap-proached in a mistaken way. By not recognizingthe political-military nature of the armed con-flict or by treating the insurgent forces as terror-ists, the government reduces the possibility toapply the IHR. Also to demand the execution ofa humanitarian minimum, or to establish agree-ments that contribute to regulate the war, and

* Document written by the team in the Cultural Foundation �Rayuela�,

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it achieve that the combatants behaviour con-forms to the international norms andmost of allto preserve the fundamental rights of civil pop-ulation.

It is obvious that if the State fights againstterrorists, it is impossible to demand them re-spect toward the IHR, but if confronted with aforce whose fight has a political purpose. Issueslike the use ofmines and non conventional weap-ons, kidnapping, forced displacements and chil-dren recruitment could be regulated by instru-ments as the Agreements of Geneva and it�sadditional Protocols, as well as the different trea-ties and agreements of the United Nations, TheOttawa convention and the International PenalCourt dispositions, among others.

LINKED AND DETACHED CHILDHOOD OF THEARMEDCONFLICT1

The recruitment of boys and girls present alarm-ing numbers, although this practice is specifi-cally forbidden by the international legislationand its also considered as a crime of war in theInternational Penal Court Statute, both in inter-national and in internal armed conflicts.

Colombia is the fourth country of the worldwith more boys and girls linked to war (the fig-ure oscillates between 6.000 and 10.000). TheFARC is the one that gathers the biggest groupof minors in their lines (67%), followed by theAUC (20%) and the ELN (13%). In 1999 the Armyofficially suspended the recruitment of minors,although the High Commissioner of the UnitedNations for the Human rights tin its last reportsustains that �the office in Colombia receivedaccusations about the use of minors by de Armyas informants or in the range of the intelligenceoperations� (Report from theHigh Commissionerof the United Nations for the Human rights inColombia. February 2004. P. 50, Numeral 28).

According with the gathered data in theNational Report of Human Development (PNUDThe conflict, alley with exit 2003, P 251), 92%of the recruited boys and girls are from ruralorigin and only 8% urban. However, studies from

the Restrepo Barco Foundation evidence �thesignificant growth from urban militias and theprecarious conditions of life in the big cities pre-dict a significant increase in this type of recruit-ment. (Armed Conflict and Fundamental Rightsof Childhood in Colombia. Restrepo Barco Foun-dation. 2004. P. 38-39).

It is worth remarking that Colombia haswelcomed great part of the Declarations andInternational Protocols, which look for the avoid-ance of the boys and girls participation on thearmed conflict. However, they have continuedbeing victims of displacements, antipersonnelmines, indiscriminate attacks and recruitment.They are used in different ways on the war con-text, equally on the illegally armed groups, ason the Public Force.

Diverse organizations have denounced thatthe Ministry of Defence has been carrying out aseries of programs that are openly against theinternational norms prohibiting the linking ofboys and girls to the armed conflict:

The Coalition Against the Linking of Boys,Girls and Young to the Armed Conflict in Co-lombia has information that evidences the useof boys and girls by the National Police in thepromotion of civic campaigns in which the chil-dren appear uniformed, without caring that theyare in war zones. (The peacemaker Pútchipu.Bulletin No 9. Bogotá. February 2004).

The Watch List on Children and Armed Con-flict has enticed the attention of campaigns like�Soldiers for one Day�, a proposal, that looksfor the linking of boys and girls to the Armythrough the use of playful activities, the distri-bution of candy and the use of clowns (Colom-bia: the war on boys and girls. February 2004).

By the same token one has knowledge thatthe Public Force has been implementing theCampaign �Colombia Acts against Terror-ism�. An initiative which includes the paymentof pensions and kits distribution of escolar ma-terial for boys and girls of schools located in ar-

1 We understand �children� every human being under eighteen yearsof age, as it is writen in the international Convention for the Rights ofChildren.

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eas affected by violence like the Ciudad BolivarBorough in Bogotá and the Fourth Commune inSoacha (Altos de Cazucá y Ciudadela Sucre). Thechildren that consent to these �benefits� arehaircutted crew-cut style and receive chats inbarracks and military garrisons. This widelyharms their right to life and personal integritybecause in these areas, as the Defensoría delPueblo, (A government organization to defendthe rights of people) the Ministry of Justice andthe Mayor�s Office of Bogotá have are aware ofthe existence of diverse illegally armed organi-sations.

Currently this campaign is implemented inDepartments like Caquetá, Meta, Antioquia,Putumayo, Vichada and Cundinamarca. Accord-ing with official declarations of the Army officers�they make part of a recruitment preventioncampaign towards illegal armed groups. They area way to approach the parents and the olderbrothers to stimulate the possible desertion offamily members from the guerrilla lines� (Co-lombia: the war on boys and girls. Watch List onChildren and Armed Conflict. February 2004).

Clearly, these initiatives harm the right forlife and a free development of the boys and girlspersonality. They openly violate the IV Agree-ment of Geneva, the International Conventionof the Children�s Rights and its Facultative Pro-tocol and the Statute of the International PenalCourt.

According to the United Nations ChildrenFund UNICEF, the figure of minors linked to ille-gal armed groups has substantially increased inthe past two years. In spite of the efforts of thecurrent government that assures that about1.600 minors have been demobilized between1999 and 2004.

How is this situation explainable? Is it un-derstandable that in spite of stimulating andachieving the desertion of hundreds of combat-ants, the population of the illegal armed groupshasn�t decreased? Is it understandable that inspite the efforts to prevent and to under-stimu-late the linking of boys and girls to the armedconflict, the number of minors combatants con-tinues to increase?

In Colombia, the demobilization of thearmed people has been searched through tworoutes: the collective demobilization, prod-uct of the agreement with some armed groupsin a peace negotiation context and the individ-ual and voluntary demobilization. An initia-tive that sustains a peculiar way of understand-ing and facing war, that makes an integral partof the current government�s Democratic Secu-rity Politics. In the present circumstances, thestrategy of individual and voluntary demobiliza-tion wants to detach boys and girls from theillegal armed groups but �since the countrydoesn�t have solid demobilization and reinser-tion politics�, it prevents the children to breakties with war. (PNUD. Colombia Alley with Exit.2003. P. 235).

The current voluntary demobilization strat-egy is a setback, because it is framed in a strat-egy and counterinsurgency conception. It isknown that when released or captured, manyof these boys and girls are forced to make adeclarations to the Army. This besides consti-tuting a clear violation on the arrangement withthe International Convention for the Children�sRights increases the vulnerability that supposesdesertion from organizations where tescape ispunished by death. Furthermore, in order to carryout this activity many demobilized boys and girlshave been used as informants and have receivedrewards on behalf of the Military Forces. It hasbeen publicly recognized by the Vice minister ofDefence Andrés Peñate when declaring that:

�During the last year the demobilization pro-gram has offered economical incentives to thedemobilized persons from different groups. Thisfacilitated the recompilation of war material andinformation to prevent terrorists attacks. Theminister informed that these rewards or �incen-tives� have twomayor purposes: �First, take awaythe weapons and prevent terrorists attacks andsecond, compensate the exploitation of whichthe demobilized victims were exposed whenworking in illegal groups. We are giving a smallbonus and they are all contributing with peacein Colombia (Casa de Nariño News. Presidencyof the Republic, May 7 2004).

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Its worth writing that the Decree 128 fromjanuary 22 of 2003 regulates the protection andattention of the detached from a �superior in-terest of the child� perspective and in which itsspecifically prohibited the use of minors in theintelligence activities.

The figures that the Humanitarian AttentionProgram to the Demobilized Phad from the Min-istry of Defense show that in the last five years,there have been 3.848 voluntary demobiliza-tions, of which 1.603 correspond to minors. Aswe see, a little bit more of 40% of the demobi-lized are minors and have been assisted by theProgram for Detached Boys, Girls and youths ofthe Armed Conflict, directed by the ColombianInstitute of Family Well-being Icbf; a program thathas shown significant advances in the last years,but it still needs to be complemented with ac-tions such as:

� The creation of a solid Evaluation andMon-itoring System by an agency of civil charac-ter under the coordination of the Ministryof the Interior and of Justice that gathersinformation about what is going on with theminors who enter and leave the program.

� The entailment of the Pedagogic Universityin the design of an Educative Program thatallows, former girls and boys involved in thecombats, to receive high quality and thatthey are educated as peace makers.

� The design of a Pshycosocial Attention Pro-gram that allows the children to unlearn vi-olence, built confidence, overcome the se-quels of war and to fortify their resilientcapacity.

� The enrollment of the SENA in the direc-tion of a Work Formation Program focusedon the creation of labor competition andthe management of a solid productive in-sertion.

� The instauration of a Supervising SystemwhereONG´s and national and internationalsocial organizations participate.

Finally, it�s necessary to point out to thereport of February 17 of 2004, where the High

Commissioner of the United Nations for theHuman Rights recognizes that: �Colombia�s of-fice has received information about several seri-ous difficulties in carrying out of the reinsertedassistance�. This is causing �that some decideto return to the old violent way, involving tocontrary groups specifically asmembers of FARC-EP that would have been inserted in the lines ofthe paramilitary groups (Report from de HighCommissioner from United Nations for HumanRights in Colombia. February of 2004.p. 14 Nu-meral 29)

BOYS AND GIRLS IN CONDITION OFDISPLACEMENT

The phenomenon of the displacement has gen-erated a humanitarian crisis of incalculable pro-portions. This information was confirmed by theConstitutional Court in the year 2000, whenconsidering it as the most serious humanitariancrisis in the western world. In the same direc-tion points a recent study of the FoundationRestrepo Barco that affirms also, that the fightfor the territorial control has ended up trans-forming the civil population into the main vic-tim of the conflict and hasmade of the displace-ment its main consequence (Armed Conflict andFundamental Rights of the Childhood in Colom-bia. Foundation Restrepo Barco. 2004. P. 53).

Important differences exist among the fig-ures thatmanage the government entities, whichdeal with this topic like the Net of Social Solidar-ity (RSS) and those of the non-government or-ganizations as the Advisory for the Human rightsand the Displacement (Codhes). The RSS countsa total of two million displaced people until theyear 2003 and the Codhes affirms that the fig-ure overcomes the threemillionmark amply. Thetruth is that the situation continues being cata-strophic, in spite, of the government�s optimis-tic balance contained in its Yearly Report of Hu-man Rights. The DIH 2003 recapturing figuresof the Net of Social Solidarity points out, thatafter 18 months of government and due to ofDemocratic Security Policy in 2003, the displace-

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ment has lowered in 52% with regard to theimmediately previous year (Presidency of theRepublic 2004).

The following information is important andmust be carefully read. Nevertheless, the HighCommissioner of the United Nations for theHuman Rights ratifies in his 2003 report a de-crease in the number of collective displacement..II too points out that there are continuous anddramatic human movements mainly in the de-partments of Antioquia, Cesar, Bolívar, Putu-mayo, North of Santander, Valle and Cundinama-rca. The last department mentioned, with 9,398reported cases of displacement, has been occu-pied mainly by de AUC.

When you go over and over the govern-ment�s data it is necessary to stand out threeessential aspects. 1) That they don�t includeunderreporting, aspect that in accordance withthe RSS can be by the order of 30 to 35% of thereported cases. 2) That they don�t have mindthe intercity displacement, forgetting that theConstitutional Court guided in March of 2003its right to obtain the benefits and the attentionforeseen by the Law. 3) That the global data dono permit to see the individual displacement,which is carried out generally in silence bywomenalone or with her children. It conforms an in-complete family group that settle within mar-ginal urban sectors that many times are con-trolled by illegal armed groups; women that areinserted in nuclei of extensive family that �so-cialize their poverty�; Women that hide theircondition to survive and work within the infor-mal economy and who slowly sink into anonym-ity. 4) The situation of the boys and girls indisplacement condition show a inverselyproportional curve to the signed for the glo-bal figures (in the 2000 it was of 27%, in the2001 of 45%, in the 2002 of 46% and in the2003 of 51%). If we keep in mind, the data givenby the Net of Social Solidarity and the calculat-ed underreport. For the underline, reasons abovethere can exist at the present time more than amillion and half of boys and girls in displacementcondition. The State is not creating educationalprograms or psychosocial attention, beyond the

temporary measures of emergency, processesneeded in order to help them to overcome thesequels of the war or to break fear patterns andto overcome the temptation of hate and ven-geance.

BOYS AND GIRLS VICTIMS OF ANTIPERSONALMINES

According to the Observatory of AntipersonnelMines and the Foundation Restrepo Barco, thenumber of boys and girls cases, affected by theantipersonnelmines, have increased progressive-ly: 19 in the 2000, 46 in the 2001, 102 in the2002, except for the 2003 where the figure de-creased to 47 cases. Of the total of registeredcases, 42 girls and boys lost the life, while 172were wounded. It is striking that the number ofdeaths is smaller than the number of wounded.The antipersonnel mine is a weapon whose pur-pose, more than to kill is to harm. In the physicalfield, the effects of this armament type areagainst the children and consist in the loss oftheir members, the wounds and the total orpartial loss of their reproductive capacity. In thepsychological field, it leaves emotional alterationsdifficult to overcome. In the social field, it re-duces them to the isolation; it transforms theirvital projects and diminishes their productivecapacity.

The Colombian State has advanced in itsfight to eradicate the use of this armament type.It created in October of 2001 the multi sectoralCommission of Action against the Antiperson-nel Mines. In their Report on Human rights andDIH 2003, it points out that the last year, thepublic force destroyed 698 mined fields and1.292 stored mines. However, such as is indi-cated by the Office of the High Commissionerof theUnitedNations for theHumanRights, thereis much to be done, because it is known thatmore than 150 municipalities, in 24 depart-ments, are affected by the presence or suspi-cion of existence of antipersonnel mines.

It is urgent that the government acceler-ates the destruction of stored antipersonnel

248 Conflict

mines, such and as it was outlined by the Con-vention of Ottawa.2 (As we remember whensigning the Convention of Ottawa, the Colom-bian State committed to destroy the entiretyof the mines stored in a maximum term offour years; that is to say, that will be destroyedthe total existence of antipersonnel mines bythe Public Force for the 2005). It is impera-tive that the topic of the destruction of minesmakes part of the calendar of possible �hu-manitarian agreements� between the govern-ment and the illegal armed groups. The socialorganizations, the affected communities andthe international organisms should be includ-ed in this activity; for example, the Service ofAction against Mines of the United Nations,the Organization of American States OAS andto the Body of Desminado that participatedin this work in Central America (Sowing MinesHarvesting Death. Ministry of Communica-tions. 2002. P. 31).

Es de anotar que a pesar de los esfuerzosdel Observatorio, el Alto Comisionado de lasNaciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanosha llamado la atención en el sentido de que �per-sisten dificultades en la señalización de camposminados en áreas de peligro, en la prevención yla limitación de los riesgos para la población, enespecial de los desplazados y retornados, asícomo en el fortalecimiento de los mecanismosde asistencia a las víctimas� (Informe del AltoComisionado de las Naciones Unidas para losDerechos Humanos en Colombia. Febrero de2004. Pág. 15. Numeral 32).

Is worth taking into account that, in spiteof the Observatory efforts, the High Commis-sioner of the United Nations for the HumanRights hasmade a call for attention. In the sense,that: �difficulties persist in the signalling of themined fields in danger areas, in the preventionand the limitation of the risks for the popula-tion. Especially for those displaced and returned,as well as on the reinforcement of the mecha-nisms of attendance to the victims� (Report fromthe High Commissioner of the United Nationsfor the Human Rights in Colombia. February2004. P. 15. Numeral 32).

Lastly, it is imperative that the national Gov-ernment understands that the eradication of thistype of practice not only concerns to the publicforce but to the society in general. It shouldcommit with the process of participation for thedesign of the NATIONAL PLAN DE DESMINA-DO. It should contemplate, among other aspects:effective and preventive projects and programs,psychosocial attention and educational, produc-tive and cultural inclusion, of those who havebeen victims of this terrible device

BOYS AND GIRLS, VICTIMS OF �SOCIALCLEANNING�

Alvaro Uribe�s government has been emphaticwhen pointing that thanks to the DemocraticSecurity and the presence of the public force in93% of the national territory, the homicidal ratehas significantly decreased, However, accordingto the High Commissioner of the United Nationsfor the Human Rights in Colombia �in the year2003 the selective homicidal politics and thesocial cleaning continued in the paramilitarygroups and was increased by the guerrilla� spe-cially in Cundinamarca�s State (Report fromHighCommissioner of the United Nations for theHuman Rights. Annex II. Numeral C14. 2004).

This situation is particularly evident in Altosde Cazucá in Soacha and in Ciudad Bolivar�s lo-cality in Bogotá, areas in which, besides the pre-carious conditions of their way of life, the socalled �social cleaning� has teenagers and youthas it�s main targets.

On August the 19th, according to the De-fensoría del Pueblo, the young Mario AndrésRodríguez Macías (20 years), William Rivas Pino(15 years), Jaime León García (16 years) y CarlosAndrés Garzón Peña (20 years) were murdered.Between January andMarch of the present year3,

2 Ratified by Colombia in 2000 and introduced internally by Law 554-2001.

3 In 2003, more than 100 young may haudied in the sector end bet-ween january and august 2002, the Soacha Goverment Secretaryspoke of 105 victims of �drop by drop massacre� Semana Journalpp.38-40.

249Conflict

about 30 more young may have been murderedon this area, the Fourth Commune in Soacha(Defensoría del Pueblo. Press official statementNo. 956. August 20. 2004). On the other hand,in Ciudad Bolivar,the Mayors Office of Bogotáand the Justice Ministry have been forced todeclare an Early Alert, after verifying the exist-ence of 36 selective deaths between January andFebruary of 2004 (El Tiempo. Sunday, May 162004)

According with one report of the Defensoríadel Pueblo, the illegal armed groups that workin those areas are responsible for these murdersand in their opinion �those responsible for this grad-ual barrier for the civilians, are the FARC�s UrbanMilitia Antonio Nariño and the Main Block of theAUC� an organization, that according to figurespublished on the newspaper El Tiempo in May�they may have around 400 men in those ar-eas, whosemission is blocking themobility corri-dors and the nets of support from the differentfronts from the FARC that work in Bogotá andits surroundings (El Tiempo. What�s behind thealert of Ciudad Bolivar? May 16 2004)

It is public knowledge that �Ciudad Bolivarand Altos de Cazucá are areas that receive hun-dreds of displaced people every day due to thearmed political conflict. They come from statesas Meta, Tolima, Huila and Cundinamarca� (ElTiempo June 2004). Therefore besides needingthe permanent presence of the Public Force, aneffort by the civil authorities, the local and na-tional government commitment is required.However, because of the lack of state presence,the right for life is now in a precarious state. Thehelpless situation of its inhabitants Right for Lifeis so serious that a Law of Silence is imposed bythe armed groups and therefore these areas havebecome places which produce interurban dis-placement.

The solution to the violence conflicts in theseareas cannot only be amatter of the Public Forcewhich has been the solution assumed by thecurrent government and it also needn�t to beapproached as delinquency gangs, as the localgovernment does. The Main Front of the AUCgroup, according to the expressed by the De-

fensoría del Pueblo in different documents ispresent on this area and its part of the Centau-ros Block, a paramilitary fraction whose com-mander is Miguel Arroyave, one of the negotia-tors that this armed group has selected tosustain dialogs with the actual government andthat is actually located in the Santa Fe de Ralitoarea. (El Espectador. August 29 to September 42004. P7A).

According to the above-mentioned, circum-stances we think that this is a unique occasionfor the Government to demonstrate its commit-ment towards peace and the responsibility oftaking care of the girls, boys and Colombian cit-izens lives. The Government also needs to dosomething about the �selective punishment� andthe miscalled �social cleaning�. As requested inthe past

days the Government Secretary of Medel-lin, Alonso Salazar convoked the attention of theHigh Peace Commissioner �to have a debate inSanta Fe de Ralito and that it is presented to theOEA�(El Tiempo. August 19 2004) an organiza-tion, that has assumed a verifying commitmentin the cease of hostilities with the National Gov-ernment and the Colombian society.

On the Third Report of Colombia, beforethe Childrens Rights Committee, tne NationalGovernment recognices that in addition to theinternal armed conflict:

�The boys and girls situation is becomingmore difficult every day due to the increasingpoverty levels and indigence that affect their livesdirectly, to the lack of educational options andto the nonexistence of a minimum of survivor-ship conditions, that guarantees theirRights�(Presidency of the Republic. Third Reportbefore the Children�s Rights Committee. Bogotá.2004).

It is evident under such circumstances thatthey should include the �social cleaning� sub-ject in Altos de Cazucá and Ciudad Bolivar inthe AUC negotiation agenda. The overcomingof violence against boys, girls and young in thoseareas requires the creation of education, culture,employment, and health programs and the in-frastructure so the boys and girls are able to live

250 Conflict

and develop in good conditions. SOCIAL JUST-NESS is the only way to build what Dr ÁlvaroUribe has committed to guarantee every Colom-bian citizen in his National Development Plan2002-2006 Towards a Comunitary State.

BOYS AND GIRLS VICTIMS OF KIDNAPPING

Kidnapping is one of the illegally armed groupsfinancial sources in the internal conflict. Con-sidering this situation the Colombian State hasbeen equipping itself with a series ofmechanismsas the law 733 of 2002. This law raises the pen-alties for extortive kidnap, as for the simple4 one.It has created the National Council Against Kid-napping and other Attempts against PersonalFreedom �Conase-, The Presidential Programfor Personal Freedom Defense �Fondelibertad-and the unified groups for Personal Freedom �Gaula-. The goal of all these Groups is to pre-vent this felony.

According to the Human Rights ant theIHR Report 2003 of the Presidency of the Re-public, kidnapping figures have shown a sig-nificant improvement. However, those of theboys and girls victims in this type of crime showa completely different situation: 335 cases in2000, 313 in 2001, 400 in 2002, 348 on 2003and 64 between January and March of thepresent year.

Daily a child is kidnapped in Colombia con-sidering that minor kidnapping is crime of warby the International Penal Court Statute. Thecurrent Government has taken special intereston the subject emphasizing on the importanceof the rescues increment, the disarticulation ofcriminal organizations dedicated to such prac-tice and reinforcing the preventive capacity ofthe State. High Commissioner of the UnitedNations for the Human Rights has acknowledgedthese improvements. He also has called for theGovernments attention by pointing that theyhave improved their capacity of coercion, buthaven�t achieved the same on prevention. Thereinforcement of the Early Alert System hasn�timproved on the existent flaws on the risk eval-

uation matter, the official answer effectivenesstowards the crime commission and the atten-tion processes for the victims still deficient.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to escape the labyrinth of war the Stateand the society must pay careful attention tothe Children�s Rights. If our boys and girls keepsocializing in the middle of war, being manipu-lated and used to overcome adversaries, if theycontinue being defenseless victims of the hurri-cane of the violence, if they are not able to es-cape the pest of hate and vengeance, tomor-row�s wars will be guaranteed.

Humanity disposes from various instru-ments to preserve boys and girls from the bar-barism of the armed conflicts. If we ignore thepolitical-military character of the conflict thatbleeds us, these tools will not help. It is urgentthat EVERY group involved in the armed conflictis committed to respect the IHR. They shouldconscientiously proceed. There should be Su-pranational Authorities that watch and help toimpose the proper punishments. EVERY actorinvolved with the conflict must understand thateven war has its limits. Therefore, mobility re-strictions, displacements, antipersonnel minesinstallations, indiscriminated straggles, arbitrarydetentions, kidnapping of civil hostages, humanshields use, using civil informants, children asmeans to win the war, occupations of construc-tions protected by the IHR like schools, disre-spect toward the medical missions, out of lawexecutions and the selective punishment out ofbattle are intolerable and inhuman practices.Such practices cannot continue being used asthe High Commissioner for the Human rightspoints out in his 2004 Report.

Lastly, it is essential to point out that itsnot enough regulating the war. The causes andreasons that serve this purpose must be eradi-

4 Simple kidnapping is not linked to the armed conflict, while extorsi-ve kidnapping is generally found to be linked to irregular armedgroups, eventhough often it is done tougther with delinquent groups.

251Conflict

cated: twenty four million poor and hundredsof thousands of peasants without land amongothers. Therefore it� is necessary to obtain thegovernment, industrials, political groups, aca-demics, investigators, ONGs, social organizationsand everyone�s commitment to promote a sys-tematic, integral, committed social politic withassured rights for every associate. Dedicatedpolitics with the administration of actions direct-ed to attack the intergenerational poverty cy-cles. Eradicate exclusion, discrimination, injus-tice and ignorance of the Human Rights as themaximum expression for human dignity.

There�s an incalculable debt with childrenthat must soon be settled. Popular wisdomteaches us that a society harvests what it hasplanted. The big percentage of boys and girlstied to war, to the illegally armed groups are driv-en by a strong vengeance desire. The children�sdesires are nothing else that an outcry, a com-plain and a big call for attention.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

El Tiempo. ¿Qué hay tras la alerta de Ciudad Bolívar? (What�s behindCiudad Bolivar�s alert? Bogota. May 16 2004

Coalición Contra la Vinculación de Niños, Niñas y Jóvenes al Con-flicto Armado en Colombia. El hacedor de paz Pútchipu.(Coalition against the enrollment of boys, girls and young tothe Colombian armed conflict. The peacemaker Pútchipu).Bulletin No. 9. Bogotá. February 2004.

Fundación Restrepo Barco. Conflicto Armado y Derechos Fundamen-tales de la Niñez en Colombia. (Armed Conflict and theFundamental Rights for Childhood in Colombia). Bogotá.2004.

Ministerio de Comunicaciones. SembrandoMinas CosechandoMuer-te. (Ministry of Communication. Planting Mines HarvestingDeath) Bogotá. 2002.

United Nations. Report from the High Commissioner of the UnitedNations for Human Rights in Colombia. Bogotá. February2004.

Presidency of the Republic. CASA DE NARIÑO News. Bogotá. May 72004.

Presidencia de la República. Informe sobre Derechos Humanos yDIH. Presidency of the Republic. Third Report before theChildren�s Rights Committee and HIR. Bogotá. 2003

Presidencia de la República. Tercer Informe ante el Comité de losDerechos del Niño. Presidency of the Republic. Third Reportbefore the Children�s Rights Committee and HIR. Bogotá.2004

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo PNUD. UnitedNations Program for Development UNPD. National Reportof Human Development. El Conflicto, callejón con salida.(The Conflict, alley with exit). Bogotá. 2003.

Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict. Colombia: la guerra enlos niños y las niñas. (Colombia: the war between boys andgirls) Bogotá. February 2004.

Populations 4

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255Populations

Peasants without Land

Selective killings, continuous and in-discriminatemassacres, forcible dis-appearances, the singling out ofpeasants as subversive collaborators,the prosecution of rural leaders andinhabitants, the persecution of peas-

ant organizations, blockades on regions wherethe entry of food, medicine, clothes and eventhe free movement of the inhabitants is denied,the compulsory incorporation into military ser-vice through the peasant soldiers or the networkof informants, all add up to the bottom line thatduring Álvaro Uribe�s mandate, the violations ofthe fundamental rights of peasants have vastlyincreased1 .

This article focuses on the most importantright for the peasant: the right to land and terri-tory as a foundation of independence, food se-curity, integral sustainability and the full realiza-tion of livelihoods and cultural practices.

Although article 64 of the National Consti-tution establishes that it is the duty of the State

Germán BedoyaNational Agrarian Coordinator

to �promote progressive access to ownership ofthe land of agrarian workers, either through in-dividual or collective modalities�.with the aimof improving the income and quality of life ofpeasants�, and the American Convention onHuman Rights, (San José Agreement) containsin article 21 the right to property as a recog-nized and guaranteed right, the current Govern-ment�s development plan does not affirm the

1 According to the 2003 report of the Colombia Office of the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights, cited in the Amnesty InternationalReport of Jan-Dec 2003, the number of reports of violations directlyattributed to State security forces significantly grew. According tothe reports, the Armed Forces were directly responsible for graveviolations of human rights, including murders, dissappearances, arbi-trary detentions and torture. In 2003, the paramilitaries were respon-sible for the death or dissapearance of at least 1,300 people, morethan 70% of homicides and dissappearances, despite the declarationof a cessation of hostilities. In 2004, the paramilitaries continue to beresponsible for killings, selective homicides, dissappearances, tortu-re, kidnapping and threats in wide agrarian areas. Amnesty Internatio-nal and the UN documented specific cases of the massive detentionof peasants and agrarian leaders in Sucre, Tolima, Arauca, Cundina-marca and Cauca.

256 Populations

redistribution of land ownership to peasants whodo not have any.

The peasantry�s access to land is only im-portant to the Government in terms of modali-ties of provisional assignment and renting with-in production chains, and not as an option forlife and identity; for the current Governmentpolicy, the only viable subject in the countrysideis the �businessman� within the contexts of effi-ciency, productivity and competitive spirit.

The Government seeks to adapt the coun-tryside to the new relationship between specu-lative large estates and transnational investmentand infrastructure, particularly means of com-munication, and the extractive, agricultural andforestry industries. The Government�s bet is noton the peasant economy but rather on the agro-industry, competitive accords, strategic allianc-es and production chains.

This agrarian policy leaves the peasant withonly one option for obtaining credit, access toland, and other complementary services: to sub-ordinate himself to the businesses of the greatlandowners and investors through contracts.The Priority is competitiveness in internationalmarkets and the fundamental actor in this gameis the businessman. The peasant is relegated toassisting theprocesses of accumulation andbeinga support for governance and counterinsurgen-cy strategies.

According to the Comptroller General�s of-fice, contrast and asymmetry in access to polit-ical tools between the peasant economies andcommercial agriculture is stark. Programs andpolicies like the Incentive for Rural Capitalization(ICR), credit programs, investigation and tech-nological development continue to be appropri-ated by and concentrated in the large and me-dium owners or agro-industrial businessmen2 .

In the National Development Plan, just thesame as in prior ones, the peasant is not con-sidered as a subject or an important actor inpublic policies, but rather as a backwards ele-ment in the agricultural and livestock industries.As a consequence of this, he is denied his rightsand the possibility of being a beneficiary of ademocratic redistributive policy in terms of ac-

cess to land and respect for his demands andprotests (Salgado, 2002).

The institutionalization and legalization ofthe stripping of property from displaced peas-ant communities has been attempted undervarious modalities. Law 791 of December, 2002,has the aim of facilitating the acquisition of own-ership through uninterrupted possession, andrepresents a way of facilitating the ordinary ac-quisition of ownership of root goods, the timerequired for which was reduced from 10 to 5years. In as much as displaced peasants are notin a position to interpose their claims in the re-spectivemunicipalities so that their property andpossessions are respected, they are unable toprevent the registration of their abandonedlands; hence the Decree 2007 of August 2002,which supposedly sought to protect the land ofthe displaced, has become inapplicable.

With the lapse of time necessary for extraor-dinary acquisition of ownership through unin-terrupted possession reduced by Law 791 of2002, false titles to land expedited between 1974and 1984 will become valid, and we can expecta wave of legalizations for violent takeovers ofland through extraordinary acquisitions of own-ership, false titles and ordinary acquisition ofownership of the lands of the displaced3 .

Law 812 of 2003, by modifying Article 20of Law 160, places as a condition on the hand-ing over of subsidies that they benefit �produc-tion systems of a business character�, with whicha capitalist economic logic is imposed, and thepeasant economic logics of many regions erad-icated. It is not intended for peasants to becomebusinessmen, but rather that they subordinatethemselves to the business logic of the industryif they wish to reap benefits.

Decree 1250 of 2004, issued by the Minis-try of Agriculture, through which the Govern-ment regulated subsidies for the purchase of

2 Comptroller designated for Agriculture and Livestock Industries,Report of 2003.

3 According to Semana Magazine (edition 1152 of june, 2004), inrecent years 961 families which were granted plots of land by theIncora in el Cesar, were forced to abandon, cede or sell their landsunder paramilitary pressure.

257Populations

lands, established that beneficiaries can sign ei-ther a contract of assignation or provisional ten-ancy, whereby the Colombian Institute for RuralDevelopment (Incoder) will turn over temporarytenancy of the land, pending the definition of aproductive project of a business character, orthe lands are turned over with assignation con-tracts, or rents under the same conditions.

Section 2 of Article 28 of Law 812 of theNational Development Plan, also establishes thata peasant who would be beneficiary of agrarianreform under the original conditions of Law 160of 1994, can nowbe substituted for another �pro-ducer�. This producer can be any businessman,merchant or large landowner who, taking advan-tage of the abandonment of a farm acquired bythe peasant, can undertake legal processes to-gether with the respective integral subsidy.

In the current Colombian context of forc-ible displacement and violent takeovers of land,this law can represent a means to ignore thesituations of force that provoke abandonment,and guarantee that the displaced never return,even if it is under the pretext of installing otherdisplaced persons in the same land. The law willnot only work to consolidate violent takeovers,the perpetrators of which will benefit immense-ly, but will be a catalyst for new forcible displace-ments of the beneficiaries of the agrarian reformwho remain in possession of their plots (Mon-dragón, 2004).

This escalation of laws and projects for con-stitutional reform, together with the mutilationof the Tutela process to prevent it from address-ing collective, environmental, economic, socialand cultural rights has significant effects on theinstitutionalization of the illegal usurpation of thelands of peasants. The result will be that thelands under the control of paramilitary leaderswill not be returned in the event of a successfulnegotiation process with the Government, andon the contrary, that the history of the middleof the 20th Century of the legalization of mil-lions of hectares expropriated from peasantsthrough violence will be repeated.

The Government has promised the distribu-tion of 150 thousand hectares of land with pro-

ductive potential to associative groups in fouryears, with financial, technical and commercialassistance. Of this total, 40 thousand hectareswould be through the voluntary negotiation ordirect acquisition by the Incoder. According tothe report of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez in theopening of Congress on 20 July 2004, to that dateonly sixty families had benefited with 3.216 hect-ares4 . 110 thousand hectares are because of theexpiration of ownership of parcels in the powerof armed and narco-trafficking groups. Accord-ing to the national director of counter-narcotics,Colonel (r) AlfonsoPlazas V., to date only ten thou-sand hectares of land have agricultural potential,of which 550 were handed over with great fan-fare in la Dorada (Caldas) to 61 families, with aprovisional assignation contract of 5 years to ad-vance successful competitive business projectsas a condition for full ownership.

Programs which might be an alternative toagrarian reform, such as the areas of peasantreserves, have been suspended. Other areas ofpeasant reserve, such as that in the valley of theCimitarra river, constituted and delineated on10 December, 2002, was revoked and paralyzedby paramilitary pressures, and the actions ofcongressmen elected with their support. Theexpiration of the right to ownership over privateproperty based on law 200/36, the instrumentthrough which the Incora expired almost fivemillion hectares without cost, has been suspend-ed in practice during the current Government,as only 479 hectares were expired between 2002and 2003.

On 14 March, 2004, in Semana magazine,and on the 25th of that same month, making aspeech at the Colombia dos perspectivas forum�5 ,which took place in the Virgilio Barco library inBogotá, the Vice-minister for Agriculture, Andrés

4 According to the report of Incoder (a new entity which assumed thefunctions of Incora) up to June 17 of 2004, this entity had onlyacquired for peasants eight plots of 2.547 hectares.

5 Forum convened by El Tiempo, Fescol, UNDP, Universidad Javeriana:Colombia: dos perspectivas, to analyze the studies: El conflicto calle-jón con salida, UNDP and Andes 2020, una nueva estrategia para losretos de Colombia y la región del Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores deEstados Unidos (Council On Foreign Relations).

258 Populations

Felipe Arias, clearly set forth the agrarian reformpolicy of the current government:

�The Government seeks to make a last gen-eration agrarian reform, based on the policy ofexpiration of ownership and on the strengthen-ing of Democratic Security, through the devel-opment of new mountain battalions and mobilebrigades. The idea is to liberate the land andsubstitute formal economic activity in that land,so that the �social management of the country-side� consolidates as a natural ally of the policyof �Democratic Security�. Between these twopolicies, the subversive narco-terrorist forces willbe completely defeated and forced to submis-sion by the citizens of good.�

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Congreso Nacional Agrario, 2003, Mandato Agrario, en:www.plataforma-colombia.org

Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural,Manejo Social del Cam-po: 15 iniciativas de impacto social para el campo, 2003, en:www.minagricultura.gov.co

Plan de Desarrollo 2003-2006, Hacia un Estado Comunitario.Revista Semana, Los señores de la tierra, mayo 31 a junio 7 de

2004.Rubio, Rocío, Cuadernos Tierra y Justicia, No.8, 2002, ILSA, Bogotá.

259Populations

A forgotten worldRights of Afro-Colombian

Communities

This article attempts to set forth ourperspective on the human rights sit-uation of Afro-Colombians againstthe backdrop of the Government�sDemocratic Security policy. We willfocus largely on demands for

progress in the implementation of public poli-cies formulated for our communities, empha-sizing the funding of some investments and theneed for the Colombian State to fulfill interna-tional reccomendations specifically oriented to-wards Afro-Colombians.

CONTEXTOGENERAL

The descendants of Africans in Colombia liveprimarily in the Carribean and Pacific Coasts,the inter-Andean valleys of Cauca, Patía andMagdalena, and in the great urban centers ofthe country, particularly Cali, Medellín, Bogotá,Barranquilla and Cartagena. Some of the ruralareas with large concentrations of Afro-Colom-

Black CommunitiesProcess in Colombia

bians are of strategic importance, owing to theirgeography and natural resources of varioustypes. In urban zones Afro-Colombians tend tobe concentrated in the more marginalized, lessaffluent, substandard areas.

According to figures from the DevelopmentPlan for Afro-Colombian communities, formu-lated for the period of 1998-2002, Afro-Colom-bians1 represent 26% of the total population ofthe country, and have a presence in almost allthe Departments. This data contrasts with theresults of the latest national census of popula-tion and housing, according to which the totalnumber of people who identify themselves asAfro-Colombians was 502.3432 in the entirecountry.

Generally speaking, the majority of Afro-Colombians live in conditions of acute poverty,

1 Report of mission to Colombia, Mr. Doudou Diene, Special Repre-sentative on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination,Xenophobia and Related forms of Intolerance. February 2004.

2 Second Afro-Colombian Conference on Institutional Strengthening,Cartagena August 4 to 6 of 2004, Final Declaration Project.

260 Populations

marginalization and exclusion. According to theUnited Nations Special Representative on thesubject of racial discrimination, who visited thecountry in 2003, the national Government ac-knowledged that 82% of Afro-Colombians livewithout the satisfaction of basic needs, that theAfro-Colombian population has illiteracy ratesthree times those of the rest of the country, in-fant mortality rates four times the national aver-age, and that 42% are unemployed and 76% livein conditions of extreme poverty3. These livingconditions, which are themanifestation of struc-tural racism, are aggravated in urban and ruralcontexts by the various forms of aggressionwhich Afro-Colombian communities suffer withinthe context of the armed conflict and general-ized violence.

Afro-Colombian communities only cameinto existence as specific subjects of rights withthe constitution of 1991, when transitional arti-cle 55, which later gave rise to Law 70 of 1993,recognized their rights to identity, participation,development within the framework of their owncultural aspirations, and to some of their ances-tral lands, together with the corresponding nat-ural resources, particularly on the Pacific coast.After more than a decade, the implementationof Law 70 of 1993 has been generally quite lim-ited. In addition to some initial gains in the areaof ethno-education, the other highlight has beenthe granting of titles to six million hectares ofland in the Colombian Pacific region.

The demands of Afro-Colombian commu-nities for equality and identity have a close rela-tionship, among others, with the Convention 169of the ILO, in addition to more general interna-tional instruments, such as the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),and the International Covenant on EconomicSocial and Cultural Rights (CESCR).

RACISMANDDISPLACEMENT

The Structural racism which Afro-Colombianssuffer is expressed in the levels of poverty, ine-quality and exclusion which our communities

experience, and in the areas where we live. Afro-Colombian youth, one of the most vulnerablesectors of our communities, are being increas-ingly criminalized, they are often presumed guiltyof crimes, and they are the object of so-called�social cleansing� projects of the extreme right.Some of the figures emblematic of this situationwere presented to the Human Rights Commis-sion of the Second Afro-Colombian Conferenceon Institutional Strengthening. According towhat was expressed, in the city of Cali4 , out of3,820 persons killed in acts of violence betweenJanuary and October, 2003, 2,680 were Afro-Colombian youths.

Another atrocious crime which the Afro-Colombian communities have faced has beenforcible displacement. Afro-Colombians are oneof the most affected populations by this phe-nomenon in the country. Some of the statisticson this issue allow one to see the gravity of theproblem, which some activists have labeled asdesplaza2, making a clear reference to thetransatlantic trade and the slavery to which thesecommunities were submitted beginning in thefifteenth century. Nevertheless, it has been diffi-cult to obtain general data on the number ofdisplaced Afro-Colombians. The reasons posit-ed by State organisms to justify this failure arenumerous and of diverse origin, though never-theless inexcusable.

As a result of the adoption and implemen-tation of the policy of democratic security, thenational Government has cited statistics whichshow a drop, among other things, in the num-ber of forcibly displaced persons. The same gov-ernment figures, in specific reference to Afro-Colombians, show that instead of dropping thepercentage of Afro-Colombians in conditions ofdisplacement, it almost doubled between theperiods of January 2000 to June 2002, and be-tween June 2002 and April 2004. In the first ofthese periods, according to the Network of So-

3 Cited by Luis Carlos Osorio, �Conflicto en el Chocó, Talanquera nadaresuelta�, in Actualidad Étnica, 10 November, 2003.

4 Medios para la Paz, Conflict Statistics, May 21 of 2004.

261Populations

cial Solidarity5 , 18% of displaced persons wereAfro-Colombians. For Doudou Diene, the UNSpecial Representative, who visited the countrytowards the end of September 2003, citing offi-cial sources, Afro-Colombians constituted 17%of the total displaced population. Nevertheless,six months after his visit, citing Government fig-ures from the Displacement Information System,(April of 2004), Means for Peace6 stated thatthese represented at that same date 33% of thetotal displaced population.

A crucial aspect which prevents the ob-taining of figures on this issue and understand-ing the phenomenon of displacement and itsimpacts on the lives of ethnic groups is thatonly those who abandon their areas are offi-cially considered displaced. Displacement, asdefined by Afro-Colombian activists is �all situ-ations where it is impossible for the members of thesecommunities, either individually or collectively, toremain in or maintain control over their territoriesand natural resources.7�. This definition acknowl-edges the growing number of communities andpersons in various regions of the country whofind themselves physically trapped, and who arenot included in official statistics. Trapping pop-ulations represents a change in strategy for thearmed actors, who prevent communities fromfreely moving, restrict the access to food, med-icines, fuels, health services and humanitarianaid in areas like the North of Cauca and therural areas of the municipality of Buenaventu-ra, among others. It is also important to statethat the reduction in the absolute numbers ofdisplaced Afro-Colombians is also the result ofactions and measures to combat displacementdeveloped by community organizations.

DEMOCRATIC SECURITY

With respect to the consequences which theDemocratic Security policy has had on Afro-Colombian populations, themost significant arethose caused by the creation of networks of in-formants. In Cisneros, a locality of the munici-pality of Buenaventura, the paramilitaries an-nounced their intentions to the local population

in a meeting which involved, towards the end,members of the CTI and the Prosecutor�s of-fice. Among the measures which were an-nounced were prohibitions on using braids,making disturbances and arriving home at latehours. In the presence of the Police, a group ofinformants then began to operate in the area.

On 27 July, 2003, members of the Policeand the CTI arrived in helicopters and searchedthe homes of the local inhabitants, accusingthem of rebellion. These actions were accom-panied by the declarations of then governor ofthe Valle Villegas, who indicated that the entirepopulation were guerillas, bandits and insurgentcollaborators. Sixteen people were detained inthis community, and were placed in a containerand spun around until some fainted and had tobe taken to a hospital. All of them were subse-quently freed in the absence of evidence againstthem8.

The Democratic security policy, moreover,presents a profound obstacle for the rights anddemand for autonomy of the communities as aresult of its intent to link civilians with the war.This contradiction and its risks were clearlyenunciated by the United Nations Special Rep-resentative on Racial Discrimination, who stat-ed in his mission report:

�Democratic legitimacy is invoked by thedemocratically elected Government to demand,through public declarations at all levels of theadministration, that the population accept thesecurity argument and become active and vol-untary agents in support of the military and stra-tegic operations against the guerillas. Neutrality,even if it be passive, is viewed by the armed forc-es on the ground as, in the best of cases, hostility

5 Report of mission to Colombia, Mr. Doudou Diene, Special Represen-tative on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xeno-phobia and Related forms of Intolerance. February 2004 para 43.

6 Corporation Professional Communal Services �Sembrar� Corporation�Sembrar�, urgent action �Nephew of Human Rigths Defender Diss-apeared in Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca, mayo, 2004.

7 Inter-ethnic group work on ethic groups forced displacement, Bogo-tá, august, 2001.

8 Memory of communal workshop, the case of Buenaventura, august,2003.

262 Populations

towards the Government, and in the worst, asconnivance with and support for the subversives.Consequently, the priority for these military forc-es is not to protect the civilian population fromthe violence to which the various armed groupssubject them, but to utilize that population as astrategic instrument and to repress it�9.

The National Development Plan �Towards aCommunitarian State� adopted through Law 812of 2003, indicated that the National Governmentwould develop a strategy oriented to overcomingpoverty and the social, legal, political, economicand cultural inequalities facedby ethnic groups. Inthe specific case of Afro-Colombians, it commit-ted to guaranteeing participation and the improv-ing of living conditions, the strengthening of legalinstruments, and the adoptionof urgentmeasuresfor their protection in relation to the internal armedconflict. It also pushed a program of granting oflands for Afro-Colombian communities which donot have any, or have insufficient quantities. Alsoincluded in the plan is the implementation of pro-grams oriented at the legalization of ownership ofurban housing in substandard areas, the access tohousing programs, the equipment of recreationaland cultural areas, the guaranteeing of health andemployment policies, access to loans and cooper-ation resources thatcanserveasabase tostrength-enproductivedevelopmentprocesses. Littleof thishas been achieved.

LAND IN THE CENTER OF THE DISPUTE

The defense of land rights has become, in recentyears, one of the main rallying cries to which theAfro-Colombian movement has committed agreat deal of its efforts. Of the total number ofhectares aimed at in the Pacific regions, onemil-lion hectares were still pending adjudication bythe current Government, for which process only500 million pesos were assigned for the remain-der of 2004, a reduced figure compared to thoseallotted by previous administrations. Only 350million pesos were allotted for 2005 for the pro-gramof acquisition and granting of lands for Afro-Colombian communities in the Atlantic regions,

Antioquía, the coffee producing region, San An-drés and Providencia, the North of Cauca, Southof Valle, the two Santanders, Cundinamarca, Pu-tumayo and Casanare. The special program forthe acquisition and granting of lands for Afro-Colombian communities in areas not susceptibleto collective ownership of lands has received nofunds to date.

In one of two national Afro-Colombian Con-ferences celebrated in Cartagena in August of2003, the President of the Republic committedhimself in the presence of roughly five hundredAfro-Colombian participants from all corners ofthe country to adopt a Conpes document andeffect a Communal Council to analyze the prob-lems and adopt solutions in favor of Afro-Co-lombians. The second National Conference onthe institutional strengthening for Afro-Colom-bians was held in Cartagena, on 4, 5 and 6 Au-gust of 2004. Although the President�s partici-pation was expected and reflected in the agenda,he did not appear10. In a clear demonstration oflack of political will, more than a year after thePresident committed himself, the Conpes docu-ment remains to be approved, and has beencriticized by members of the Cunsultative Com-mission for not incorporating measures, timeta-bles, government responsibilities and specificeconomic commitments. The promised Commu-nal Council has yet to take place.

Demonstrating a holistic understanding ofthe process of collective ownership, the affect-ed communities have insisted that collectiveownership be complemented by the formulationof land management plans and the implemen-

9 Report of Mission to Colombia, Mr. Doudou Diene, special reppor-teur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xeno-phoby and inter-twining forms of intolerance, february 2004, pa-ragraph 43.

10 �FINALLY, we sincerely regret the absence of important personalitiesand goverment officias invited to share with us our worries, problemsand dreams. Especially we regret the absence of the President of theRepublic Alvaro Uribe Vélez, who last year at the I Inter-constitutio-nal Conference made important promises to the Afro- Colombianpopulation that are still pending. We hope, nevertheless, that theseabsences are not a sing of deafness to the fair clauis made by theAfro-Colombian population final Declaration, Conference for Insti-tutional Afro Colombian Streng thening. Cartagena, august 4-6,2004.

263Populations

tation of sustainable productive developmentprograms. Despite the environmental richnessand biodiversity of the Pacific region, and againstthe wishes of many communities, organizationsand leaders, the cultivation of African Palm hasenjoyed a special stimulus, including the com-mitment of important national and internation-al resources. African Palm is a crop that gener-ates large environmental impacts and affects thesocial and cultural lives of Afro-Colombian com-munities, and its promotion was not submittedto any sort of consultative process with thesepopulations. In both the North and South of thePacific region, in the midst of the armed conflictand the multiple pressures faced by communi-ties, the growth of cultivation of palm consti-tutes one of the more serious threats to collec-tive ownership and biodiversity in the region.

HARRASMENT AND IMPUNITY

On 23rd April of 200411 , agents of the MarineInfantry and the High Mountain Battalion, withjurisdiction in Buenaventura, arrived at the Yuru-manguí river and installed themselves in the vi-cinities of Barranco and San Antonio, searchinghomes and persons, carrying out arrests withoutawarrant, photographing houses and inhabitants,and registering the identity of all who came andwent on the river. The next day, they arrestedand took with them the youths Manuel ValenciaViveros and Heli Anisares. The latter was asked ifhe owned a chainsaw, and the device was takenalong with him. In the same area, they searchedthe house of one of the leaders of the Communi-ty Council of Yurumanguí river, duringwhich plantswere killed and two outboard motors were de-stroyed. It is known that members of the MarineInfantry began cutting trees in an area of approx-imately 700 meters with the aim of building aheliport. Upon leaving the area, the troops firedmachine guns indiscriminately into the woods,despite the fact that members of local communi-ties were engaged in subsistence activities suchas mining, agriculture, hunting and logging at thetime. These events constitute, among other

things, a violation of Article 49 of Law 7 of 1993and Articles 6 and 7 of the 169 ILO convention.

Another worrisome aspect relates to theimpossibility of exercising justice, which has theeffect of perpetuating crimes against affectedpopulations, since the negligence of authoritiescharged with investigating, sanctioning and pro-viding reparations for violations of the rights ofthe civilian population is ever more evident. Cas-es such as those witnessed by the Afro-Colom-bian communities of Cacarica12, Jiguamiandó13,in the lower Atrato and Sabaletas14, Yuruman-guí15 in Buenaventura, lower Naya in el Valle andin the Department of Cauca are evidence of this.All are displaced populations who have attempt-ed returns, but against whom threats, intimida-tion and violations of human rights are againperpetrated.

Even more worrisome is the possibility of thecreation of new mechanisms for maintaining andincreasing levels of impunity. One particular exam-ple is the Government�s determination to grantjudicial police functions to the military. This is ameasure that, as has been warned by the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Human Rights, isincompatible with international treaties signed byColombia.Byand large, judicial actionsdonot tendtogobeyond the formalorpreliminary stages, stateagents are not investigated in depth and victimsare even held responsible for the impunity.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Democratic security policy constitutesa serious limitation on the right to autono-my of Afro-Colombian communities. The

11 Corporation Professional Communal Services �Sembrar� Corporation�Sembrar�, urgent action �Nephew of Human Rigths Defender Diss-apeared in Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca, mayo, 2004..

12 To humans in the world, 2002-2004 in http://es.geocities.com/justiciaypazcolombia/cmcac.htm

13 See www.geocities.com/v-tamara/ cartas/muerte-carlos-salinas-becerra.txt - 8k, http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/c i j y p 2 . h tm l , h t t p : / / c o l h r n e t . i g c . o r g / n ew i t em s / j u n 0 3 /pazpacifico.601.htm

14 See http://www.defensoria. org.co/ accion/comunicados_a.php?c=881

15 See http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/5a80eaed24177642c1256d940030 1ee0?OpenDocument.

264 Populations

relation between war and racism is accent-ed within the framework of this policy, a factwhich explains the growing involvement ofAfro-Colombians in the armed conflict onboth sides of the spectrum.

2. The current Government has made few ad-vances in the adoption of affirmative actionmeasures, which are the product of inter-nal legislation, international recommenda-tions and of the commitments acquired bythe Colombian State in the Plans and Dec-larations of Santiago and Durban.

3. At the same time, the situation of povertyin which the Afro-Colombian communitiesfind themselves is growing more acute, pro-pelled above all by internal forcible displace-ment, with respect to which there have alsonot been any significant advances in theparticipatory definition of policies andmea-sures for specific attention to Afro-Colom-bian communities.

4. Violence continues to escalate in areas oflarge Afro-Colombian concentrations, whichare seen as strategically important by thearmed groups and by the State, either forthe development of war agendas, for thecultivation of illicit crops, the developmentof large scale projects or other activities.

RECCOMENDATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT

1. To promote a law on racism and racial dis-crimination, creating mechanisms for ac-countability that would allow for the imple-mentation of existing legislation.

2. To accelerate the process of land grants toAfro-Colombian communities, assigning thenecessary resources to the Special Programfor the Acquisition and granting of lands,and broadening collective ownershipschemes for those communities outside thePacific region that have solicited them.

3. To guarantee a greater and more substan-tive participation of Afro-Colombian popu-lations in the decisions which affect them.

4. To respect the economic, social and cultur-al rights of Afro-Colombian communities,through the fulfillment of the DevelopmentPlan for the Afro-Colombian People.

5. To meet its duty to defend Afro-Colombianpopulations from violence in areas of con-flict.

6. To assign public resources to areas primarilypopulated by Afro-Colombians more fairly.

7. To promote the adoption of affirmative ac-tion measures in favor of the Afro-Colom-bian people, in order to augment their op-portunities for employment and improve thesocial, political, economic and educationalcircumstances of these historically margin-alized communities.

8. To develop concerted, timely and effectivepolicies for the protection of Afro-Colombi-an populations and prevention of violationsagainst their human rights, including the is-sues of forcible displacement, forced re-cruitment, and the like.

9. To take effective and urgent measures toimprove the judicial protections for Afro-Colombian populations.

10. Give priority to meeting the obligations ac-quired through accords, laws and interna-tional treaties which favor the Afro-Colom-bian population, ensuring the formulationand implementation of integral policies toguarantee the enjoyment and free exerciseof the specific rights enshrined in law forthese communities.

265Populations

Boys and Girls butwith Rights

Reflections about the State of Boy�sand Girl�s Rights in Colombia

When we are talking about childhood,it�s important to think for a whileabout those times when fathers andmothers were the greatest peoplein the world; when teachers kneweverything and when life friend-

ship�s were built in five minutes. How manyyears ago, only a few, really and truly? But itmeans, definitely, an entire life. A boy or a girl isa person under 18 years, being the subject ofsocial rights, as it was established on the Chil-dren�s International Convention for Children�sRights and adopted by the Colombian Govern-ment by means of Law 12 from 1991.

This article will approach children�s condi-tion after two years of president Alvaro UribeVélez term in office from the perspective of eco-nomic, social and cultural rights; with empha-sis on those who are under special vulnerabilityconditions,. As established on article 44 of theNational Constitution, childhood rights prevailover the rights of the other members of society

Corporation �Punto de Vida�*Ingrid Torres**

and its broad fulfillment constitute an obligationof the State, the family and the society. Accord-ing to the National Department of Statistics(DANE), in Colombia there are 16�716.530 chil-dren, the equivalent of 37.4% of the total Co-lombian population.

First of all, it is necessary to recognize thatColombia has a legal tradition of abiding toagreements and international declarations suchas: The rules of Beijing (minimal rules for theadministration of justice to children); the Guide-lines of Riad (for the prevention of the juveniledelinquency); the Rules of the United Nationsfor the Protection of the Minors Privated of Free-dom; the Protocol 138 of the OIT (with respectto the worst forms of infantile work); the Inter-

* (Non Government organization whose social object is the promotionand defence of the Rights of boys, girls and adolescents, member ofthe Colombian Platform of Human rights, Democracy and Develop-ment from the year 2002)

** Journalist, Social Comunicator, Director of Corporation �Punto deVida�.

266 Populations

national Convention against the Torture; theInternational Pact of the Social, Cultural andEconomic Rights; the International Pact of Civiland Political Rights and another series of trea-ties related to the protection and defence of thehuman rights that look toward the guaranteeof a worthy life. Uribe�s administration has con-tinued with this tradition. It has signed and/orratified international pacts to protect boys andgirls and to guarantee the full enjoyment of itsrights, such as the Convention against the Tran-snational Organized Delinquency, and the Pro-tocol to Prevent, to Repress and to Sanction thesmuggling of human beings , especially of Wom-en and Children (Law 800 of 2003); also the Fac-ultative Protocol of the Convention on the Rightsrelated to the children�s participation in theArmed Conflicts (Law 833 of 2003), and the In-ternational Convention against the taking ofHostages (Law 837 of 2003).

To enforce the Constitutional provisions,the treaties, the conventions and the interna-tional resolutions, a decisive factor the develop-ment of policies, laws, programs and is the bud-getary allocations that these demand. �Duringthe last ten years the percentage of the GrossDomestic Product (GDP) dedicated to childhoodhas fallen from 2,5% to 1,5%, while the expen-ditures on foreign debt increased from 2,5% to7,5%, without mentioning the military outlays�1

according to the Agency of International Coop-eration �Save The Children�. (Report on child-hood and armed conflict. September of 2003).

The challenges proposed by Uribes�s admin-istration, related to childhood are includedwithinthe chapter to Build Social Equity of the Nation-al Plan of Development �Toward a CommunityState�. They are: 1) the Educational Revolutionthat contemplates as a goal, the creation of 1.5million new scholar placements in basic and pri-mary education; 2) the enlargement and im-provement of protection and social security,where programs such as the National NutritionPlan that seeks to achieve five hundred thou-sand new openings of food supplements (break-fast and lunch for minors under 18 years). It alsoentertains a 95% coverage in vaccination and

last but not least the formulation of a Plan ofPrevention and Eradication of the infantile workin addition to the reestablishment of family andcommunity bonds and the change of the presentMinor Code into a General Law of Childhood andFamily to reinforce the judicial and legal mecha-nisms of protection.

The National Development Plan include el-ements such as the promotionof the family, socialand community milieus and the specializationof the Colombian Institute of Family Wellbeing(ICBF), a public institution ascribed to the Min-istry of Social Protection, as an assembling andexecutioner entity of policies for children wel-fare. The Ministry of Education and other na-tional entities are also responsible for the devel-opment of programs related to childhood.

Uribe�s administration intended the restruc-turing and decentralization of the Colombian In-stitute of Family Wellbeing, ICBF in order to ac-complish the objectives set in the chapter onfamily and childhood. Its position is to transferthe execution of services and programs of theICBF gradually to the territorial entities and com-munity organizations. This restructuring and de-centralization are perceived as gradual processesof privatization, where the guarantee of the chil-dren�s rights is delegated to private institutionwhich offer services; programs with communityparticipation, that guarantee the decentralizationare also disassembled, creating an incoherencebetween the strategies proposed by the Govern-ment and thepolicies actual execution. Suchcasesas the Project of Communication for the Child-hood (PCIN) and the budgetary cuts for the Ob-servatories forChildhoodand the Family programsthat guaranteed the right to participate to boys,girls and community, have been affected by suchreforms. Likewise, it is of much concern the lackof knowledge of the local administrations on hu-man rights; municipal development plans con-

1 The organizations Save the Children UK, Foundation Restrepo Barco,Unicef and Cinde published in July of 2003 an analysis of the impactof the economic policies on the budgets dedicated to childhood inthe last ten years, text that wide east topic. Sarmiento, Alfredo;González, Jorge Iván; Delgado, Liliana. MARTÍNEZ, Rafael. PuentesJuly (2003) Public Finances childhood and youth.

267Populations

centrate on the execution of works of great infra-structure leaving out budgetary resources devot-ed to children and family.

SOCIAL CRISIS OR STRUCTURAL CRISIS

Any time you may stroll by the streets of thecommercial districts of cities like Bogotá, Cali orMedellín, you will encounter harrowing scenes:boys and girls requesting money to eat, sellingchewing gums, selling their body or seated inthe streets with signs that show their displace-ment condition. Sadly, in Colombia 38.9% of theboys and girls live in poverty and 17% underconditions of misery. Poverty conditions whichdiminishes their possibilities to obtain education,adequate nourishment and a worthy dwelling,frequently forces them to work at an early ageor expose them to sexual exploitation, physicalmaltreatment and abuse.

Uribe�s Government recognizes in the lastreport to the International Committee of theBoy�s Rights that:

�The country is confronted by the need of abigger assignment of resources for the at-tention of a growing number of boys, girlsand adolescents that demand special mea-sures of protection and the necessity of ta-ming the present fiscal deficit and of givingpriority to the requests for macroeconomicadjustment.� 2

Confronted with this argument it is neces-sary to focus our attention on the prevalence ofthe rights of the children and the girls, conse-crated in the National Constitution and the in-ternational treaties of obligatory execution forColombia, among them the International Con-vention of the children�s rights, mentionedabove. The Commission of Human Rights ofUnited Nations regretted the violations of theright of survival of great number of children: �Thecommission also expressed their concern for the preva-lence of children�s abandonment, infantile work, abuse

and sexual exploitation, and to the continuous interfa-milial physical maltreatment and violence. The com-mission also regrets the continuous violations and abus-es of the economic, social and cultural rights of womenand children.� 3

INFANTILE EXPLOITATION: THEMANIFESTATIONOF AN EXCLUDING ECONOMICMODEL

�Buy me this chocolate bar; give me kumis (lacteousbeverage) or a coin�. Amid dirty faces there alwaysappear beautiful eyes and in spite of the socio-economic conditions they continue being boysand girls full with dreams, although during theirshort lives they are already aware of social ex-clusion. In Colombia, one out of seven childrenworks, for a total of 1.567.847 working infants.More than half are exploited or subjected to theworst forms of infantile work.4 1.047.000 boysand girls don�t attend the school, according tothe Survey of Infantile Work carried out by DANEin 2001. The Survey of Quality of Life of 2003carried out by the same entity, shows that theproblem continues, and it is fuelled by the dis-placement conditions and poverty. The GeneralAttorney�s office of the Republic5 reported thatin Colombia 6.5 million of boys and girls live intotal poverty andmore than amillion live in mis-ery. The Attorney General of the Nation, Edgar-do Maya, has asserted that: «under these con-ditions a nation worth its name is simply notfeasible.�6

The family is becoming poorer due to thepolicies of structural adjustment imposed by theInternational Monetary Fund and adopted byColombia to deal with the problem of the for-eign debt. The reduction of public expenses, with

2 Third Report of Colombia, to the International Committee of theBoy�s Rights, 1998-2003, June of 2004.

3 Office of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Humanrights (2004). Informs and recommendations for Colombia, Article34. www.hchr.org.co.

4 Armed conflict, sexual exploitation, domestic work, mining, cons-truction, industry and crops of illicit use and trade.

5 Inform of the General Attorney�s office of the Republic, March 15 of2004.

6 Newspaper the Nuevo Siglo, March of 2004, 16 P. 5.

268 Populations

particular incidence on health and education,as well as the lack of the adults� employment,they all impact especially on children. The headof the Colombian Institute of Family Wellbeing,Beatriz Londoño, has expressed: �The economicsituation has obliged parents toward a reduction onexpenses and as first step they generally have to takeout their children from schools, or children moved bypoverty prefer to leave school as to unload theirparents of the economic burden and decide to work inorder to help them make ends meet�. As a step toconfront this problem, the Government has pre-sented the Third National Plan for the Eradica-tion of Infantile Work. �It intends to give economicincentives to the municipalities with more developedsocial policies for the eradication of the Infantile Work;along the same lines it looks forward to elevate withinthe Social Policies Council, the eradication of the in-fantile work as a high priority�7

It is urgent to develop fair and just policiesof employment, directed specifically toward adultmen and women as well as the police persecu-tion of mafias preying on children and the cre-ation of educational stimuli for children outsidethe school systemor for those children who havebecome over age with regard to due school en-rolment.

A RIGHT TO FAIR TREATMENT?

When on television most popular series it is ob-served, that the �Chavo del Ocho� (a boy) is mis-treated by �Don Ramón�, Mrs. Florinda and theprofessor Jirafales (all adults), one can think thatthey represented behavioural rolls of the seven-ties. Although it seems improbable, the blows,lashes, fists, claps, slaps and even the kicks, con-stitute part of the punishments that some adultsinfringe on boys and girls, from their point ofview, to correct what they regard as thechildren´s deviant behaviour. During the year2003 and according to the figures reported bythe National Institute of Legal Medicine, therewere10.900 cases of registered Interfamily vio-lence, but the figure can be higher if one keepsin mind that these situations are not denounced

to the competent authorities out of fear or ig-norance.

Boys and girls are entitled to be happy, toplay, to laugh and to enjoy their family, but thereality is different. According to information pub-lished in the Web page from the General Officeof the Nation, 114.960 cases of interfamilialabuse have been reported from the year 2002to the 2004. The severe physical infantile mal-treatment which represents 58% of the cases,affects more children 5 to 14 years old. By sex45% of the total cases affects males and 55%females. It goes without saying that during 2002,319 babies less than one year old were reportedas mistreated.

Another abuse form toward the boys andthe girls, it is given by parent�s negligence andthe irresponsible paternity. �63% of the 24.974Colombians that confront processes for respon-sible paternity have not gone to the official ge-netic laboratories that requested their presenceto practice the necessary paternity tests. Thereare 15.270 men that have disregarded the callof the family judges.�8 Likewise, the disregard ofalimony judicial settlements is the second crimestatistic in the country with a total of 267.075cases between 2002 and 2004. This situationevidences the urgent necessity to transformpatriarchal and macho patterns that remains tothe long and wide of the country within allspheres of social life.

WITHOUTWORDS...

There are caresses that hurt. According to theGeneral Attorney Office between the years 2002and 2004, 17.124 cases of sexual acts with per-sons smaller than fourteen years old have beendenounced. 86% of the verdicts for sexual abusewere made with boys and girls. Children aged10 to 14 are the most affected, with 37% of thecases followed by the 5 to 9 years of age, with25%. In this type of abuse, Legal Medicine veri-

7 Newspaper the Nuevo Siglo, May 18 of 2004, p. 28 Newspaper El Espectador June 26 of 2004.

269Populations

fied that in 78% of the cases the aggressor wasthe boy�s or of the girl�s acquaintance, especial-ly the father, stepfather or another relative. It isnecessary to emphasize that these figures un-derstate the reality. In spite of a rise in the num-ber of cases reported, it continues to be a crimecommitted within the family sphere and withinan intimate environment.

The Renacer foundation assesses that thereare twenty thousand girls and boys sexually ex-ploited; this figure has not been updated since1997. Likewise, an increment of the sexual tour-ism is perceived where young girls and boys arethrown into this growing market. There are nostatistics available on this regard and althoughthe Administrative Department of Security (DAS)is engaged and there is a new penal code thattypefaces this type of crimes, the Government�sactions have not been guided to dismemberthesemafias, neither to generate policies of pre-vention so that boys and girls can develop tothe full extent of their capacities.

AWORRING NORMATIVEMARK

The International Committee on Children Rights,during its 669ª meeting recommended to theColombian State to amend its legislation so asto guarantee the rights of the children and itsadjustment to the principles of the Convention.Recommendation that the Colombian State hasnot completed, it still relies on the Minor Codelike juridical instrument. Code thought from afocus of irregular situation �Conceives the child-hood like a group of necessities to be satisfied, it tendsto turn into pathologies situations that are of struc-tural origin, generated by conditions of poverty� (Or-tiz 2000: 28). This perspective is in open oppo-sition to the focus of the InternationalConvention on Children�s Rights which elimi-nates the concept �minor� to consider it pejo-rative and discriminatory; it views boys and girlslike social fellows of right.

The Colombian government is much awareof the urgent need to make a legislative amend-ment with regard to juvenile judicial responsibil-

ity and its adaptation Vis a Vis the notion of over-arching protection set up within the frameworkof the Convention�s recommendations. Hencea new law is being prepared to be soon debatedin the National Congress.

The new �Law for the Childhood� containsa controversial provision thereby making boysand girls aged 12 and over legally responsiblefor their acts. This provision goes in blatant op-position to the International Convention onChildren Rights, the National Constitution andinternational agreements including some alreadysigned by Uribe´s government itself. Accordingto the report delivered by the Colombian gov-ernment to the International Committee onChildren Rights �boys and girls under 18 yearsof age are legally fully accountable and will un-dergo a special procedure for their protection�

The Defensoria del Pueblo (an official hu-man rights defence watchdog) asserted that 99%of children under the aegis of public institutionsbelonged in 2002 to low or extreme povertysocio-economic strata with high school drop outrates (48%). Likewise, it has issued several legalresolutions on the aukward conditions of boysand girls confronted with legal authorities in sev-eral regions of the country pointing in particularto their troubling situation.9

State resources have been diverted to coverthe legalproceduresnot to thepreventionof crime.The president has taken issue asserting that:

�I am not in favour of lowering the age limit underwhich individuals are legally responsible as it were atabula rasa. I believe an opportunity should be openedto the judge and to the fiscal attorney to assess thedegree of danger posed by an individual and thus defi-ne how this underage person should be dealt with. Ienvision authorities as capable of establishing the na-ture of each particular case of the underage law trans-gressor. This boy has killed fifteen people but he isunder age. These are instances where the degree of riskhas to be weighed much more that the chronological ageof the criminal� 10

9 Bulletin Number 7. Childhood and their rights. Defensoría del Pueblo.

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Confronted with the General Prosecutorproposal Edgardo Maya has said:

�Colombia must veer on the subject of normativity, fo-cusing its attention on the process of rehabilitation, al-though such a process should be handled on the basis ofinternational standards so it should not be used to com-mit crimes while seeking to uplift the underage crimi-nals from their conditions. We must adopt preventivemeasures�. 11

The organizations gathered for the SocialForum on children of the Americas, have statedtheir misgivings on the proposals to lower theage of full legal responsibility because they ex-plicitly contradict the principles of the Conven-tion on children rights. These organizations de-mand that governments preserve the 18 yearsof age limit as the minimum age for an individu-al to be considered legally accountable. 12

FULFILLING THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION:WAYOUT

If the Colombian government guarantees theright to education of boys and girls taking intoconsideration the recommendations expressedby Katarina Tomasevsky, Special Secretary (ex-plicitly stated in the chapter on the right to ed-ucation in Colombia in this volume) it will movein the right direction as an initial step for the fulldevelopment of boy and girls rights. The increaseof educational expenditures from 4 %to 6% ofGNP, the full protection of human rights as wellas the preservation of the �tutela� right for theDESC are steps in the same direction. By thesame token education should be viewed by Gov-ernment as a right and not merely as a service.The guarantee of the right of education in par-ticular for vulnerable social groups and the fullexpression of boys and girls rights are necessaryto favour a happy childhood. Most of the prob-lems of the unequal development of boys andgirls are rooted in the lack of equal opportuni-ties and in the need of a �non class oriented butfree for all� education as voiced by the repre-

sentatives of many cities of Colombia gatheredaround the Social Forum for boys and girls13 .They have also requested more participatoryspaces, and to be listened to by the adults whoonce upon their lives were also children.

RECOMENDATIONS

1) It is necessary to put together the will ofgovernment, entrepreneurs, male and fe-male academicians and social researchers,of social organizations and by every he andshe to promote a comprehensive and en-gaged social policy aiming to effectivelyguarantee boys and girls rights, to break upthe intergenerational poverty circles, eradi-cate social exclusion, discrimination andinjustice.

2) The recommended equality plan for wom-en should also include the education of re-sponsible males with regard to their sexualpractices and with their sons and daugh-ters. The actions proposed by Alvaro UribeVelez on this matter fall short of the mark.Even thought punishment for interfamily vi-olence has been raised this behaviour con-tinues and the statistics do not point to anymarked improvement.

3) It is important to fulfil the goals outlined bythe national government with regard to boysand girls. Additionally it is regarded as animprovement the construction of the Na-tion Plan, ten year childhood plan 2004-2015 for Colombia.

4) The Colombian government should payheed to the recommendations set up by theInternational Committee on Children rights

10 Presidency of the Republic, June of 2004, 26 News House of Nariño,www.presidencia.gov.co.

11 Newspaper, Nuevo Siglo March of 2004, 16 P. 5.12 Declaration of the participant organizations of childhood of the So-

cial Forum of the America. Quito, July 2004.13 The Social forum of Boys and girls Colombia has been a participation

space in which boys and girls that participate in processes of differentsocial organizations of Colombia converge. It is articulate to thedynamics of the World Social Forum in Colombia.www.foroninosyninas.galeon.com

271Populations

aiming at a full fledged legislative develop-ment that guarantees the observance ofboys and girls rights from a human rightperspective. Care should be taken with theminimum age of 18 years to make legallyaccountable the adolescent population.

5) The resources for family and children pro-grams can�t rely on market behaviour,they need permanently important budget-ary allocations in order to guarantee theprevalence of the rights of boys and girls.

6) It is urgent the development of a uniquesystem of information, monitoring and pur-suit by the state of the rights of the chil-dren in Colombia.

7) It is urgent to continue with preventioncampaigns to avoid violence and intrafamil-iar maltreatment and programs of adult ed-ucation enhancing children rights as well asconverting these behaviours in culturallyrejected patterns of conduct.

8) It is necessary to bring to court those re-sponsible for crimes against the boys andthe girls, and to maintain the principle ofprevalence of their rights at the moment tojudge law transgressors.

9) It is necessary to fulfil the recommendationsof the Special Secretary with regard to theright of education.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Presidencia de la República (2002) Plan Nacional de Desarrollo2002 � 2006. Hacia un Estado Comunitario. National Planof Development 2002 - 2006. Toward a Community StateDepartamento Nacional de Planeación. Bogotá.

Oficina Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los DerechosHumanos, Informe y recomendaciones para Colombia. Na-tional Plan of Development 2002 - 2006. Toward a Com-munity State (2004). www.hchr.org.co

Vicepresidencia de la República (2004), Informe Derechos Huma-nos del Gobierno Colombiano. Report on Human rights of theColombian Government.

Comité Internacional de los Derechos del Niño (2000), Observacio-nes Finales al informe del Gobierno Colombiano. Final Obser-vations to the Colombian Government�s report.

Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (2004) Informe del Go-bierno Colombiano al Comité Internacional de los derechosdel Niño. Informs from the Colombian Government to theInternational Committee of the Boy�s rights.

Sarmiento, Alfredo; González, Jorge Iván; Delgado, Liliana; Martínez,Rafael; Puentes Julio (2003) Finanzas públicas niñez y ju-ventud. Finances public childhood and youth. Save TheChildren UK, Fundación Restrepo Barco, UNICEF, Cinde.

Unicef, Federación Colombiana de Municipios (2004). Un Árbolfrondoso para niños, niñas y adolescentes. A leafy Tree forchildren, girls and adolescents.

Ortiz, Pinilla Nelson (2000) Diseño y Evaluación de proyectos, Fun-dación Antonio Restrepo Barco, Unicef, ICBF, FundaciónFES.

Presidencia de la República, 26 de Junio de 2004, Noticias Casa deNariño, www.presidencia.gov.co.

Nuevo Siglo, 16 de Marzo de 2004 pág 5, Bogotá.Tomasevski Katarina (2004). El derecho a la Educación en Colombia,

The right to Education in Colombia Informe de la RelatoraEspecial por el derecho a la educación, Naciones Unidas.

El Espectador. 26 de junio de 2004. Bogotá.

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273Populations

Women: a residualpolicy

In order to review public policiesaimed at women gathered in the doc-ument �Women Manufacturers ofPeace and Development 2003-2006�, this paper analyzes some ofthe objectives, programs, actions

and significant achievements of it. However, wewill not deal with the following themes: sexualand reproductive health, education and culture,political and social participation and the integralpolitics for populations in displacement situa-tion even though they are outstanding and de-cisive in the life of the women, in terms of hu-man development and a conquest to overcomesocial inequities.

Three strategies are enclosed in the policiesaimed at women by de present government.They are oriented toward: promotion of normsin favour of the rights of women; empowermentof several institutions specialized in women, asthe Advisory Office and the negotiation of dif-ferent types of resources. The principles that

Tribunal Regional Women and Escr*

sustain the policies are: justness and equality ofopportunities among women and men, whichhas as itsmain objective to incorporate the �gen-der dimension� in plans, programs and projectsof the national and territorial order; the civicparticipation whose objective is to stimulate thedemocratic processes of organization, participa-tion and the women�s mobilization in the exer-cise of the power and the decisionmakingmech-anisms in the political, economic and socialprocesses. The respect for the human rights ofthe mature, young and minor women and tothe DIH is orientated to look after the securityand the women�s integrity and to diminish theimpact of the gender violence in mature wom-en, young women and girls.

* Document elaborated by the Corporation �House of Woman� in themark of the agreements with the Tribunal Regional Women andEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, integrated by the Institute ofAlternative Legal Services ILSA, the Association of InterdisciplinaryWork ATI, and the Corporation House of the Woman.

274 Populations

Plurality and diversity are worked out byenhancing programs that generate specific ben-efits for women taking into account their diversecharacteristics such as age generation, ethnic,cultural, geographical and sexual diversity; theyincrement supporting actions of instruction, alldirected toward the equality of opportunities, theplurality of roles and thewomen�s sexual and eth-nic-cultural diversity. Thepolicies, besides its strat-egies, mentions some high-priority topics suchas the employment and the training of women tobecome self employed, general health conditions,sexual and reproductive health, the violenceagainst women, women�s participation, the ruralwoman and public institutional invigoration.

SOCIAL EQUITY ANDHUMANDEVELOPMENT

Three programs have been developed to tacklewomen unemployment. Small andmedium sizedfirms headed by women, the woman�s micromanager first public fair and the National Train-ing Plan. The Advisory Office only includes in-formation on the entities which carry out thestated programs, but it doesn�t provide infor-mation on goals and resources or achievementsup to date.

The document on salary differences formen and women, in the sevenmain cities, 2000-2004, is the analytic axis in the salary breaches.It shows an increase in the labour participationof women and an important increment in theirlevel of education. Yet it does not provide evi-dence of a complete closure of the existent gapbetween men and women. This breach in thedifferential average salary1 between men andwomen situation, that during the nineties andup to the year 2002 experienced important re-ductions (from 16.64% to 8.93%); an effectiveimprovement in the relative wage of women,experienced a setback in the year 2003, whenit returned to the initial level: 14.28%. (DANE-UNDP, 2004, p.28).

Likewise, the General Controllers Office ofthe Republic recognizes that �the unemploymentaffectsmorewomen, the feminine unemployment

rate has remained (during the study period) abovethe masculine rate for two percentage points, al-though the growth of the level of the rate hasmeant a reduction of the difference in relativeterms� The existence of high unemploymentlevels has transformed the family conformationof the homes and it has encouraged the growthof precarious form of employment, the under-employment and job informality. The configura-tion of the extended families has been an alter-native to mitigate the impacts of theunemployment� (Controllership 2003).

The homes under feminine responsibilitywhich in 1999 represented 25% of the total, inthe year 2003 reached 30,9%.�The percentageof homes with feminine household heads, with-out spouse and with children18 years of age orless, almost quadrupled during the period, es-pecially in urban areas. And the incidence of thepoverty is larger in these homes� (Controllership2003). The rates of feminine unemployment aresystematically larger than those of masculineunemployment for the whole period 1999-2003,in almost 4.5 percentage points on the average(DANE-UNDP, 2004, pgs 27, 28). The new bur-dens have not diminished women�s responsibil-ities vis a vis domestic work. Women assumedthis task in solitude, they raise the number ofhours worked daily as well as the week days theylabour and limit their acting possibilities in otherenvironments, as well as their self care. 2 Alter-natively they strengthen their links to the infor-mal sector of the economy, characterized by lowquality, uncertainty and low productivity.

But still, �the biggest salary differences forgender are present in the group that has receiveduniversity education, as well as in the sectorsand occupations in which the women partici-pation is the highest, that is services, trade, res-

1 When the DANE report refers to �salary� it only takes account indivi-dual workers, goverment and domestic. The �non-salary� workersrefer to ones classified as independt or basses.

2 DANE reports that during the last 4 years the number of women, asheads of households has increased, and that it shows that (unlikemale head households) in 90% of the cases it is without the presenceof a consort and with children younger than 18 years old. (House-holds where men without headed households the presence of aspouce do not reach 15% of the cases).

275Populations

taurants and hotels� (DAMAGE-PNUD,2004,p.28). In contrast, the smallest salary differenc-es occur in sectors of scarce presence of wom-en (construction and transport). These aspectspose a question: The sectors that the govern-ment reports as of more growth in his last re-port (tourism, trade, financial sector), are theydistributing the benefits of his growth equallybetween men and women?

The changes in the family structures, theentrance of the women into the labour market,the demographic transformations and the situ-ation of the women promoted by forced dis-placement, among other, demand a wide sys-tem of children care that furnishes worthyconditions for the women and the minor. Butthe lack of coherence between the economicpolicies and the social reality doesn�t contributeto alleviate this situation. On the contrary, �thepopulation in risk has increased and the demandfor the services of well-being is bigger every time.As an answer, the function of the State has weak-ened with the argument of the efficiency. Themyopic vision of politicians has not well thought-out that the investment in the well-being of thefamilies guarantees the future survival of thenation.� (Controllership 2003)

One may conclude that the policies aimedat the female population with regard to socialjustice and human development, have notachieved important changes thatmodify substan-tially women�s conditions. On the contrary, theresults are meagre. For example, the goal of fe-male household heads to be provided with creditand training � is of 9.500; during Uribe´s govern-ment only 1.936 women have benefited, that isonly 20,4% of the forecasted figure�. (Sarmiento,2004) With two years still to go the governmenthas accomplished only 25%of the projected goal.

THE GOVERNMENT�S SECURITY FOCUS

The discussion of crime statistics, in terms ofhomicide rates, kidnappings and the attacks topopulations ignore the specific situation of wom-en. In spite of the fact that the proportion of

women victims of the different modalities ofcrimes, in comparison with men, is low, the lev-els of violence against women continue to behigher than the average for both sexes for thelast years. In areas where the armed conflictacquires bigger proportions, the women areespecially the victims of arbitrary detentions; (30percent of the cases were against them), followedby political homicides (25.9%), massacres(17.8%) and the political threats (17.7%). Byoccupational categories the most vulnerablegroups for all these crime modalities (includedthe forced disappearance), were in the first placepeasant women, followed by housewives, teach-ers, students and human rights activists. Alsominority women constitute one of the most vul-nerable groups in this sense (CPDH, 2003).

In regions where the armed conflict hasbeen exacerbated, the rates of sexual crimesoscillated between 12 and 81 cases (women) and1 and 19 cases (men) for each 100.000 inhabit-ants. In the case of the capitals of the depart-ments of Santander, Antioquia, Choco, Risaral-da, Valle, Cauca and Putumayo, excepting thecity of Cali and Medellín, the capitals presentedsome higher rates that the national and depart-mental level, with Mocoa, Popayán and Quibdobeing the cities with the highest rates of sexualcrimes on women. (Instituto de Medicina Legal,2002),. Other realities are hidden or blurred andthey therefore exhibit higher levels of impunity.

To confront the situation of insecurity andviolence against women, the Advisory Office(Consejería sobre Mujer y Familia) has pursuedthe following programs: Women�s networksagainst community violence, councils of wom-en, campaign of instruction and training againstprostitution, programs for family democracy andthe campaign �Ursula Iguarán - or return to theEarth�. The programs advanced by the Adviso-ry Office don�t report on the resources, goalsand action plans that link to the responsible dif-ferent government bodies and state instancesof assisting the problem of violence against thewomen. The programs described in the reportsfocus on some sector of women, but no articu-lation is shown with the rest of government in-

276 Populations

stitutions and without continuity with previousprogram geared to the same objectives such asthe Make Peace Program. (Programa Haz Paz).For this latter program, the State and the Inter-national Cooperation agencies had investedheavily in training officers of the national andterritorial order in the prevention of violence andin the development of support networks.

The Colombian government has not imple-mented the recommendations from the SpecialSecretary of United Nations with regard to vio-lence against women who exhorted the Govern-ment to increase the funds available to the Unitof Human Rights of the General Attorney Officefor the program of witness protection, trips,communications equipment, safety and capac-ity to gather proofs, among other items. TheSpecial Secretary encourages the Unit in her fu-ture work, as a necessary requisite to preservethe state of right. Taking into account the om-nipresent social violence against women for rea-sons of gender, the special practical knowledgethat is needed to investigate, to evaluate and topursue in an effective way those crimes and thepersistent way to exclude them, the Special Sec-retary urges the General Attorney to appoint alegal adviser. (Special Secretary, 2001

After two years of his term of office, re-sults with regard to legislation in favour of wom-en�s rights are poor under Uribe�s government.As of today the government has not presentedany law project or developed norms to protectwomen�s rights. The government neither signedthe convention for the Elimination of all Formsof Discrimination against Women -Cedaw3- northere exist a further juridical development of thecongress approved Law for Equal Women Op-portunities. With regard to a special AdvisoryOffice for Equity for Women as well as other in-stitutions, the Advisor asserts that �as a specialoffice of the Presidency no resources have beenallocated by the national budget for the year2003 since by that year the Advisory Office wasnot under operation. Only by the approval ob-tained by means of presidential decree 519 ofMarch 2003 has this office been under opera-tion again with new functions� (Advisory Office,

2004, pag.3). The same communiqué recogniz-es the importance of the contributions of PNUD,ACDI, UNIFEM, GTZ and AECI to its normal op-eration.

Present public policy for women lacks aclear boundary between programs, projects andactions. It focuses mostly on actions in spite ofits limited duration and concentration on par-ticular populations and leaves outside of its scopethe structural factors that generate inequities forwomen. The transversality condition, which de-pends highly on political will, runs the risk ofbeing a good excuse for reducing the programsto just what under a first glimpse can be done.The necessary transversality would have to de-fine the root causes of discrimination againstwomen and treat them in a comprehensive fash-ion. (Women Tribunal and DESC, 2004 p. 13). Itshould include issues such as educational poli-cies and their relationship to the realm of work,or the relationship between political and socialreforms undertaken by the present governmentand the protection and widening of women�shuman rights, or labour policies and the sup-port of women�s reproductive roles, or the rela-tionship between a sexist culture and the rise inyoung women pregnancies, sexual diseases (VIH/AIDS) and prostitution.

In short, during the first two years of gov-ernment the policy for women remains unartic-ulated. Its goals are below what has been pro-grammed, they do not meet the expectationsand goals of Colombian women and lacks re-sources. It is a marginal policy with regard tosocial and economic policies and Colombianwomen continue to face serious problems suchas forced displacement, violence against them,unemployment, crime impunity, the lack of acoherent social policy to protect their rights andsocial welfare programs. The erasing of poverty,

3 �Protocol� is a legal mechanism, annexed to the convention thatintroduces subjects not treated in it. It is open to ratificaction bythose states that had ratified the convention. it is said to be optionalbecause states are not obliged to do so. It is needed because actualmechanisms are insufficient and there are no specific procoduresthat take care of individual cases or extensive violations of the Rightsof Women, with the possibilitiy of obtainig indemnity.

277Populations

the uprooting of inequalities, the constructionof an equal opportunity agenda for women, donot belong to the political agenda or areas ofinterest of government.

With the obtained information of the Advi-sory Office one cannot affirm yes new resourcesexist, if the actions or programs that the agenciesof Cooperation develop are only with governmentinstances or with non government organizationsor yes there are projects that are carried out fromprevious years. Also,a revision of the budget andtheplanof investments of theNation for the years2003 and 2004, showed there were no depar-tures to develop programs directed to improvethe conditions of the women�s lives.

The current public policies for women lacka clear delimitation among programs, projectsand actions. It gives special relevance to the lat-ter, without considering that they have the char-acteristic of disappearing quickly, focalize popu-lations and more often than not do not tamethe structural causes of the situation of disad-vantage and iniquities of women. The transver-sally, as always depends on the perspective andof the political will, also runs the risk of becom-ing a good justification for notmakingmore thanthat that apparently one can. The necessarytransversally would have to define the causes ofthe discrimination toward the women, and toapproach them in an integral way (Tribunal Wom-en and DESC, 2004, p.13). For example, theeducational policy and its necessary relationshipwith the world of the work; or the relationshipamong the early political and social reformationsand the present government and the amplifica-tion and protection of the women�s humanrights; or the labour politics and the support ofwomen in their reproductive functions, or therelationship among the sexist culture, the incre-ment of the pregnancy in the young women, ofthe infections of sexual transmission VIH/SIDA,the prostitution and the commerce of people.

In synthesis, to two years of governmentthe politics for the woman is disarticulated, itsgoals are below that programmed do not coverthe expectations and the Colombian women�snecessities, and it doesn�t have enough resourc-

es. The politics continues being residual insidethe economic and social policies, and criticalproblems subsist for the women like the conse-quences of the forced displacement, the violenceagainst them, the unemployment, the impunity,the lack of an appropriate institutional answerfor the protection of their human rights and ofprograms of well-being. The eradication of thepoverty, the elimination of the iniquities and theconstruction of equality of opportunities for thewomen don�t make part of the political calendarand of the current government�s interest

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Comité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (Per-manent Committee for the Defense of the Human rights) �CPDH-, (2003), Informe Estadístico de Derechos Huma-nos, 2003.

Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer (2003), MujeresConstructoras de Paz y Desarrollo, Una política nacional orien-tada ala paz, la equidad y la igualdad de oportunidades, (WomenManufacturers of Peace and Development, A nationalpoliticy oriented toward peace, equity and equality of oppor-tunities,) Presidencia del a República Bogotá, Colombia.

Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer, Repuesta dederecho petición interpuesto por la Corporación Casa de laMujer (Answer to a right of petition interposed by theHouse of Woman, julio 2004.

Contraloría General de la Nación, Evaluación de la Política Social,2003 (Evaluation of the social policies). Colombia. Im-prenta Nacional. Bogotá 2004

Corporación Casa de la Mujer (2003), ¿Una Política Pública paralas Mujeres?, en El Embrujo Autoritario, primer año de go-bierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez, (A Public Politics for theWomen?, Authoritarian Bewitch, first year of government ofÁlvaro Uribe Vélez), Colombian Platform of Human Rights,Democracy and Development.

Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo.DANE-PNUD, La Perspectiva de Género: Una aproximación desde

las estadísticas del DANE, 2004, (contiene entre otrosproductos: Análisis de género de la jefatura de hogar en Co-lombia, con base en la Encuesta de Calidad de Vida ECV,2003 y Diferenciales salariales entre hombres y mujerespara las siete principales ciudades colombianas, 2000-2004,con base en la Encuesta Continua de Hogares 2000-2003).(, The Perspective of Gender: An approach from the statis-tics of the one DANE, 2004, (it contains among other pro-ducts: Analysis of gender of the home headquarters in Co-lombia, with base in the Survey of Quality of Life ECV, 2003and Differential salary between men and women for theseven main Colombian cities, 2000-2004, with base in theContinuous Survey of Homes 2000-2003).

Departamento, Nacional de Planeación �DNP (Sinergia) (2004),Informe al Congreso 2004, Alvaro Uribe Velez, ((Synergy)(2004), Inform to the Congress 2004, Alvaro Uribe Vélez)Presidencia, República de Colombia, Imprenta Nacional.

Informe de la Relatora Especial de Naciones Unidas sobre la violen-cia contra la mujer, sus causas y consecuencias,( the vio-lence against the woman, their causes and consequences)señora Radica Coomarswamy , Comisión de Derechos Hu-manos, 58º período de sesiones, E/CN.4/2002/83/Add. 3,marzo 2002.

nstituto de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, (Institute of LegalMedicine and Forensic Sciences,) Forensis, 2002, Impren-ta Nacional, Bogotá, 2003.

Sarmiento, Anzola Libardo, Balance Social del Gobierno Uribe,(SocialBalance of Uribe�s Government) en Caja de Herramientas,año 13 No. 101 Bogotá, agosto de 2004.

Tribunal Regional Mujeres y Derechos, Económicos, Sociales y Cultu-rales, Políticas Públicas en Colombia para las Mujeres, �Losdiagnósticos como cortinas de Humo�,( �The diagnoses ascurtains of Smoke�), 2004 (documento sin publicar).

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Government, Children andCommunity Mothers:

Privatization of services

TBROAD OUTLINE OF POLICY ON CHILDREN

he Colombian Institute for FamilyWelfare (ICBF) coordinates the na-tional family welfare system. It is alsoresponsible for social policies and theprograms related to assistance forchildren and families. Since the be-

ginnings of the 1980�s, the Community Mothershave been affiliated with these programs, in con-ditions of great vulnerability, assisting, taking careof and educating children from the ages of zeroto six living in the poorest rural and urban areasof the country.

Over the course of its evolution, the ICBFhas been empowering women and communitieswith the management and execution of theseprograms, delegating in this way its own respon-sibility for the protection of children. For thesewomen, affiliated as �solidarity workers�1 , �vol-unteers� or simply �mothers�, raising new gen-

Colombian Communication ServiceLatin American Institute forAlternative Legal Services

erations on their own would be an obligationsuited to their exclusive competency, ability andcondition.

The current Government�s policies regard-ing children and childhood are framedwithin thislogic and within the processes of decentraliza-tion and privatization in terms of their prioritiesand most relevant aspects.

Uribe Vélez�s government agenda hastapped ICBF with the principal function of spe-cializing in the formulation and direction of child-hood related policies. In turn, the execution ofthe various programs have been delegated, lit-tle by little, under the ICBF�s supervision, to re-gional entities and community organizations,proportional to their varying degrees of institu-tional development.

Along these lines, theGovernment proposedfrom its first days in office the creation of pre-school kitchens to attend the needs of poor

1 Law 89 of 1988 and Decree 1340 of August 10, 1995.

Populations280

children from 0 to 5 years of age, whose moth-ers work outside the home. It is foreseen thatsaid kitchens will be managed by communitymothers in cooperatives, and as such thesewomen will be associated with the nutrition ofthe children as micro-entrepreneurs.

Specifically, the Government has announcedthat it intends to �Organize 82 thousand com-munity mothers into cooperatives in order togive lunch and refreshment to some 400 thou-sand children. Currently, 900 thousand receivesuch assistance. In this way we intend to broad-en coverage, improve the productivity of com-munity homes, and increase the amounts of thestipends given to themothers and link themwithfamily subsidies�2 .

In the foundations of the National Devel-opment plan (2002-2006), the decentralizationand privatization scheme for the ICBF programsdescribed above is reaffirmed, as it is stated thatthe ICBF �Will specialize in the formulation anddirection of childhood related policies and thesupervision of programs. Their execution will beentrusted, little by little, to territorial entities andcommunity organizations�different alternativesfor administration through NGOs will be evalu-ated � it is foreseen that the supervisoryscheme will be outsourced...�3 . The means forgenerating information and measuring the im-pact of initiatives are the responsibility of themunicipalities.

It is announced, moreover, that, �resourc-es will be drawn from family compensation funds,from territorial governments, from the nationalgovernment, from communities and other pri-vate sources�4 for the construction and main-tenance of the multiple homes.

Finally, the initial Government aim of pro-moting �Associative entities of a pre-cooperativecharacter, comprised exclusively of communitymothers, whowill be offered training�� has beenreaffirmed. �These organizations will be con-structed through self management mechanismsdesigned to facilitate the achievement of theirsocial and economic objectives, and will be ableto offer the services of child restaurants andschool cafeterias, among others�.

Within the context of the childhood and fam-ily policies of the current Government lead byUribe, community mothers arementioned as thegroup which must constitute, comprise and or-ganize cooperatives, through which the womenwill assume nutritional duties in the ICBF pro-grams that relate to childhood. The Coopera-tive will be, therefore, the mechanism for eco-nomic solidarity by the private sector, which willbegin to play a role in social policies related tochildren; and the ICBF will become the stateentity that directs such policies. This is a decen-tralization and privatization scheme which pro-motes and watches over the programs and oth-er measures, such as the cooperatives.

FROM BAD TOWORSE

Since the committee of the International Cove-nant onEconomic Social andCultural Rights (ICE-SCR) issued a series of recommendations to theColombian government in 1995 and 2001, call-ing for amelioration of the conditions of discrim-ination against women and the working condi-tions of community mothers, no Government,including that run by Uribe Vélez, nor the respon-sible institutions, the ICBF or the AdministrativeDepartment of Social Welfare in Bogotá (DABS),has made advances in the definition of policiesdirected at the recognition of these rights.

Within the framework of stipends, a com-munity mother in 2000 received $134,442 pe-sos, while the legal minimum wage was$260,000; in 2001, the stipend was of $124,452(the minimum wage in force was $286,000 pe-sos), a drastic reduction from the year before5 .

2 Taken verbatim from �Manifiesto Democrático; Los 100 puntos Álva-ro Uribe Vélez�. Point 45. Can be found on www. mineducacion.gov.co/documentos/Manifiesto_Democratico/ pdf , p. 6.

3 See �Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (2002-2006) Hacia unEstado Comunitario, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Bogotá,2002, p. 147.

4 Ibid , p.. 148.5 It is important to clarify that Community Mothers are remunerated

according to the number of children attended. The juridical term isa stipend, through which the ICBF places a family with a child fortheir attention, and certain resources, detailed in the rubric of thebudget of an HCB. The work of the community mother is consideredwithin this framework.

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In 2002, the figure was $132,120, a sum whichdid not quite reach the 2000 level. In 2003, itwas $153,000. For 2004, the stipend is$161.070, always below the minimum wage inforce: $360,000. The following should be clari-fied: the reduction of the stipend in 2001 was aresult of a small drop in the number of childrenbeing attended to, which fell from 15 to 13 perDepartment; nevertheless, the responsibilities,duties and time invested by the communitymothers remained unchanged. Since that time,the annual budgets of the ICBF have been tiedto the number of children attended to per De-partment, a figure which oscillates between 12and 14. In the last year of the Pastrana adminis-tration, the year 2002, there was a small increasein the stipend with regard to the figure for 2001.The calculation wasmade for 12 children attend-ed to. In 2003 and 2004, the increases havenot been greater than the inflation index, andthe calculations have beenmade for 13 children,a number that predominates in the majority ofcommunity homes.

It is important to note that the work of acommunity mother is valued significantly belowthe minimum wage. While in four years the min-imum wage has grown by some 100 thousandpesos (from $260,000 it moved to $360,000),the stipend received by communitymothers onlygrew by 27 thousand pesos: from $134,000 to$161,070. This is a truly problematic figure, ifone considers the reference point of the mini-mum wage. Since a community mother is grant-ed remuneration according to the number ofchildren attended to, it can be stated that in2004, for the attention to one child for one day,a community mother receives the absurd sumof $619 pesos. In 2003 it was $589. The differ-ence: $30 pesos. In real terms, this was the in-crease. And the services provided involve greatresponsibility: integral care of the child for 8hours daily, including physical and educationalduties. This situation provides for the perpetua-tion of the conditions which result in the wom-en who work in childhood related policies doingso under undignified working conditions, andremaining below the poverty line.

With regard to community homes, in 2003there were some 43,444 full time, and 17,732part time. For 2005, we find of the former a to-tal of 42,905 and 17,601 of the latter. This rep-resents a drop of 670 homes in one year, a littlemore than 1%. In terms of coverage, this means8,710 children that will not be attended to inthis modality6 .

The increase in funds for nutrition, more-over, was insignificant. In 2003 the daily cost offeeding a child was $1,157. In 2004, it was barely$1,192. The ICBF only increased the child�s dai-ly ration by $35 pesos.

Nor have advances been made in the areaof social security. The State has an outstandingdebt with the community mothers for not hav-ing defined a clear policy to guarantee servicesfor their families in dignified conditions. Decree047, which specifically affiliated communitymothers with the �contributive regime� of so-cial security states that the persons who com-prise the family unit of the community motheror father will not be affiliated with this regime,but will be considered a priority population forthe subsidized regime, and that �communitymothers, as independent workers, will have theoption of affiliating their family groups with thecontributive regime, in which case they will haveto pay a monthly fee equivalent to 12% of twominimum wages�7 . This is a sum which in realitycannot be paid by community mothers, whoreceive as pay less than the minimum wage,owing to which their families remain excludedform the guarantees of the contributive regime.

Some of the reasons cited by the ICBF forprogressively diminishing funding include thebud-get deficit and the economic crisis faced by theInstitute. This economic crisis is linked to theshrinking of the primary source of funds for theICBF: Parafiscal contributions8 . This has been aresult of, on the one hand, the evasion on the

6 Certainly it must be noted that in 2004 there was a slight increase inwomen working within the modality of Multiple Homes, but at thesame time a drop in Commercial Homes and in the FAMI modality.

7 Decree 047 of 2000, articles 17 and 22.8 These contributions are paid according to a percentage, from the list

of workers in businesses; they are what feed the ICBF (3%), Sena(2%) and compensation funds (4%).

Populations282

part of businesses of these contributions, and onthe other, the labor reform pushed by the cur-rent Government, which motivates businessmento generate employment without paying parafis-cal contributions. The result is fewer resourcesfor social investment. The growth of the ICBF�sbudget in 2004 was less than 7%. The direct con-sequences: remuneration for community moth-ers that violates labor rights, the closing of com-munity homes, the drop in coverage and deficientconditions for the nutrition and care of childrenand for the educational work, as noted above.

The State continues to violate the laborrights of Community Mothers by denying thema minimum wage, and moreover by denyingthem the right to live with dignity, negating forthem the guarantees of social security. It is alsoignoring the rights of children by reducing cov-erage and closing community homes, eludingthe responsibilities it acquired by ratifying nu-merous international treaties, conventions, cov-enants and declarations9 ; together with the ob-ligations specifically noted by the Committee ofthe ICESCR for the Colombian state in its rec-ommendations on the situation of communitymothers in 1995 and 200110 .

In general terms, it can be stated that fol-lowing the outlines of the Government�s devel-opment plan the process of restructuring theICBF continues, together with the processes ofdecentralization and municipalization of pro-grams, without social investment that mightguarantee the rights of the population, and inparticular the rights of women and children.Privatizations will continue, together with thesuppression of services and the cutting of oper-ational expenditures.

Precise data on the decentralization is notavailable, but it can be affirmed that a first stepis the dispersal of the ICBF�s power towards itsregional branches, in addition to the clear deci-sion to accelerate decentralization without theguarantee of greater social investment, either bythe ICBF or by the municipalities. The problemwith privatization through the NGO route lies inthe fact that the administration of resourcespasses from homes and heads of households to

the NGOs, detracting from community presenceand participation without guaranteeing efficien-cy and transparency.

CommunityMothers and their organizationsare concerned about the substitution of NGOsor private firms for associations, as it is perceivedthat these will have criteria based on profit andgain, not on a social spirit of solidarity; disman-tling special tariffs in public housing services; theincrease of the costs of housing costs by evalu-ating them as educational centers; the chargingof 4 per thousand; the demand of payment ofparafiscal contributions by homes that are notbusinesses; and the obligation to create the con-ditions for the formation of cooperatives for as-sociated labor. As related to these forms of eco-nomic solidarity, what concerns the communitymothers is not so much the philosophy or theobjectives, but the fact that, were they to beimposed, they would lose their role as educa-tors and socializers, and, moreover, by beingexcluded from current guarantees of social se-curity and the subsidy of pensions, it would haveto be the cooperatives themselves which assumethese responsibilities for their members.

WEPROPOSETOTHEGOVERNMENTANDTHEICBF11

In the document titled �Public Statement of theCommunity Mothers� subscribed to on 14 De-

9 Political Constitution of Colombia (1991), International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, (Law 74/68, in force since1976) and recommendations of the committee of the Convention onthe Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Law51/81, in force since 1982), Convention of Belem do Pará, andBeijing, Río de Janeiro and Cairo accords.

10 Recommendations of the Committee of the International Covenanton Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Colombian State:�The Committee considers also that the Colombian governmentought to: improve the training of community mothers, and regularizetheir labor conditions, treating them in all instances as workersemployed by a third party� (1995). �The Committee reiterates itsrecommendation of 1995 that the working status of CommunityMothers should be regulated, treating them as workers that have theright to a minimum wage� (2001).

11 IV Forum on Public Policies related to Childhood and Women, IInational meeting of community educators. Statement of the Natio-nal Union of Workers in charge of Childhood and welfare homes(SINTRACIHOBI), National association of Community Mothers (AMCO-LOMBIA), National Association for the Defense of the rights of Sonsand the People, foundation for Community Support (FUNDAC). 14December, 2003

Populations 283

cember, 2003 by the organizations of commu-nity mothers, by delegates from the communitymothers organizations of Bolívar, Cesar, Cauca,Boyacá, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Bogotá,Valle, Huila, Magdalena, Atlántico, Santander,Risaralda, Caldas, andQuindío. Affiliatedwith theAssociation of Community Mothers for a betterColombia (Amcolombia), the National Associa-tio for the Defense of the rights of Sons and thePeople (Addhip), the Union of workers in chargeof childhood and welfare homes (Sintracihobi),the community gardeners of the capital districtof the Foundation for Community Support (Fun-dac), and the Community Educator�s Inter-in-stitutional Committee for Economic Social andCultural Rights, the following is proposed:

� �That the community homes continue tobe implemented as a government policy,with the participation of the communitymothers that have been working in them,but with the guarantee of remunerationequivalent to the legal minimum wage inforce, the right to holistic social security withregards to health, pensions, protections andprevention of professional risks, attentionto our families, and the professionalizationof our work

� With regard to social security in healthcare,we demand that as dependent workers, ourfamilies be included in the contributive reg-imen, as established by law 509 (2nd para-graph, Article 4) and ratified by the StateCouncil (Second Section of the table onAdministrative Contentions within an actionof partial nullification of decree 047 of 2000;No. 1510-2000).

� With regard to pensions, we request theICBF�s determined support so that the en-tity that administers the pension solidarityfund re-affiliates all community motherswithout regard to the time in which theyhave not paid their monthly contribution,and allows them to continue benefiting fromthe subsidy established in article 28 of law100 of 1993, and specifically by the CON-PES-2833 of January 17 1996, Chapter III.

· Regarding professionalization, we demandthat the ICBF allot the necessary resourcesto create a professional base for our work(formal, high school and university) and pro-vide all community mothers with access toit, bearing in mind the experience, under-standing and knowledge acquired throughour social work in the Community Homes.

� We consider, despite the concerns of someorganizations, that the proposal of MultipleHomes is an alternative that could betterthe quality of services to children, so longas they are developed under the same con-ditions as the community homes, with theaffiliation and participation of all communi-ty mothers that may have to close theircommunity homes in order to incorporatethemselves into the Multiple Homes; withautonomy in their administration for theassociations; that they not imply new re-sponsibilities for community mothers suchas the payment of rents, public services andother costs; that the financing include theICBF�s contributions together with interna-tional cooperation, and that in any case,under the principle of progressiveness, thegains we have made in benefit of childrenand our families through organizational pro-cesses not be lost.

� We believe that the experience of somemulti-active or commercial cooperativesfounded and directed by community moth-ers is important. We are concerned that theproposal of cooperatives for child restau-rants does not guarantee the gains madeby the program, as it does not take intoaccount:

� The work of the community mother as aneducator and socializer, reducing her to apreparer of food.

� Rights to social security in health and inpensions, labor stability and other guaran-tees.

� We are concerned that the proposal of co-operatives, which would convert us intomicro-entrepreneurs or employees of

284 Populations

school restaurants will lead to the weaken-ing of a program which we helped to buildand improve over more than twenty years.We propose that before beginning to devel-op the cooperatives program and trainingin these, the national leadership of the ICBFmake a formal statement of its intentionsto the community mothers with regard tothese proposals, including their strategies,in order to facilitate a deeper discussion onthese issues with our full participation.

� In any case, bearing in mind that the for-mation of cooperatives is a voluntary act,any decision taken with regard to them andto the Multiple Homes should not be madethrough an imposed process, nor should itnegatively affect the 79 thousand commu-nity mothers. It ought to be communicat-ed through a written official order from thenational ICBF with the full knowledge anddeliberation of all community mothers.

� With regard to the co-financing of the pro-gram, we wish to highlight that the princi-ple entity responsible for financing is theState; because of this we reiterate what isstipulated in Law 89 of 1988, regardingparafiscal contributions as sources of fund-ing and what is mentioned in Accord 021 of1996. We likewise request information fromthe ICBF regarding the contributions of theinternational community and the possibili-ties which the organizations of communitymothers have to access projects funded bythat cooperation.

� We request of the National Government, ofthe local authorities, of the ICBF, of theDABS and of all relevant entities their at-tention and immediate response to our justdemands, which will guarantee the strength-ening of the program, the rights of childrenand their families, and our rights as womenand community educators�.

285Populations

T�.... they had her for a great decrepit doll that they tookand they brought to the corners, disguised with cloths ofcolors and the colored face with soot and achiote.... �.

Gabriel García Márquez.

�As it happened to Úrsula Iguarán in this passage of�A hundred Years of Solitude� people of advanced agethat live in our country have been associated to the decre-pitude, disguised, subsumed and forgotten amid the po-verty.... we speak of women and men in the day-to-dayness of their lives; those that we see be run over whenascending to a bus that we see gone by, that we see passwith a bundle to their shoulders, to make lines to chargethe pension, to stroll without rhym, to load grandsonsand great-grandsons for the streets, to cry, to laugh or toremain silent1.

An absent dimension:Human Rights of Adults

he conditions of discrimination,marginality and abandonment ofold people (O.P) in Colombia is to-day a blatant reality in spite of theirshare to the edification of the coun-try and its society, its growing pub-

lic presence and the pressing need to providean answer to an unprecedented world demo-graphic explosion. Colombian constitution fur-nishes legal protection for the third age (T. E.)group �The state, the family and the society willcome together for the protection of the T. E. personsand will enhance their integration into an active andcommunitarian life�. 2

Center for Investigation andLabor Studies, �Cestra�

María Tila Uribe*

* Director Cestra.1 �Age and Urban Poverty in Colombia�. Esperanza Trujillo Uribe, 2003.

Investigation carried out by Cestra, supported in interviews, testimo-nies and vivencias of P.M., informations, documental and bibliogra-phical sources; 641 surveys to P.M. of Bogotá, Cali and Cartagenawith 92 questions on topics that they approach the relationship amongthe age and their situation of poverty, 176 pages.

2 Article 46 of the Political Constitution of Colombia.

286 Populations

And yet, the governmental social and legalconception of the problem, with a marked biasfor assistencialism, recreation and utilitarianismand the cultural view overburdened with mythsand social prejudices on the third age as syn-onymof diminished abilities, uselessness, unpro-ductive life and infantilismblur or nullify the rightsof O.P above all in poor neighbourhoods whichare the most numerous. Old men and womenin Colombia, even at the prime of their mentalabilities, have been affected by these factors,thatmany adopt passively due to their ignoranceof their entitlements and the prevalence of char-itable practices. This policy is not only costlyand unsustainable, but hinders personal devel-opment, the organization of the O.P. groups; in-creases social marginality and leads present andfuture generations of old people to adopt a beg-ging mentality. Furthermore, they are labelledas unproductive (which includes more than amere reference to their monthly income) by theliberal model in contrast to �economic successstories�, furthering the tacit principle that �thosewho do not produce are of no use�. Persons notonly in the age range of sixty and over but alsowithin the age group 30 to 35 are left out of thelabour market under conditions of social exclu-sion without an active old age period and with-out visible social intercourse and human rights.

Neither the National Development Plan(PND) 2002-2006 nor president Uribe socialpolicies represent significant improvements forthe future conditions of the O.P. group. On thecontrary, they either represent a backward stepas in the case of people with old age social pen-sions or in the best of cases a non changingsituation due to the lack of comprehensive so-cial policies or of social support. The old agegroup lacks its own identity it is supposed tobe included among family programs, socialmatters or population groups, without a clearlabel falling into the category of crippled or moresimply minorities.

Former social or community leaders, unionmembers, teachers, technicians, artists and otherveterans are not granted recognition eventhough they still have much to add to social

practices; experience is not well regarded as wellas talent and values of O.P.. people. If the stategranted recognition to this experience it will beforced to be responsible for the distribution ofrights and goods in a concrete fashion, a ques-tion clearly avoided by the PND under the illu-sion of the empowerment of population groups.

�With regard to the full protection of the family,young people and children a new law will be passed toestablish the areas of responsibility of the nation andthe territorial public bodies with regard to familyprotection��.the protection of the family, the youngpeople and the children will be carried out with the par-ticipation of the National Institute of Family Wellbeing(ICBF) 3 �There is no word on the P. M. group.

As stated in the PND, the population group60 and older is regarded as a social group thatelicits social assistance, but nomention is madeof its process of development or its specific cul-tural and ethnical dimensions. It pays no re-gard to existing inequalities among the poorestO.P. groups in the country and ignores the par-ticular circumstances of old displaced4 popula-tions such as the afro Colombians and the na-tive5 population. It does not explore theapplication of the abilities and skills of the O.P.population nor does it assume such a responsi-bility. It does not improve social security condi-tions, health or economic circumstances, nordoes it enhance decisive social policies that mayalleviate the violence conditions that endures thepublic and private life of the O.P.population. TheInstitute of Forensic Medicine (Instituto de Me-dicina Legal) has repeatedly called the at-tention to the conditions of violence that oldpeople are subjected to by their children´s own

3 Apart from the Component of the PND, to Build Social Equity4 Starting from 3.500.000 people in displacement condition in the

last 10 years and according to the percentage of 7% recognized byDANE as bigger population�s relative volume in our country thoseP.M. of 60 years and more displaced they arrive at 210.000. (Estima-tivo of Cestra).

5 The community displaced Kankuama, for example, has been de-nouncing in different means the very bigger murder of 4 people,smaller leaders of Town councils of Minors and other Mamos biggerthan 80 years in the lapse of the last 3 years, cases that have been incomplete impunity. It is of scoring that for the indigenous commu-nities the Mamos represents the experience, the knowledge andthey are guides in becoming of these communities.

287Populations

hand, a situation that in Colombia is not recog-nizable by the common citizen. �in Colombia theviolence that suffer those O.P., in particular fromtheir children�s aggression has not been visual-ized in the public environment.�6 This is justone among many other known problems.

During the Ernesto Samper term of office theprogramreviving theSocialSolidarityNetwork7 gavefull support to projects geared to generate incomeamong the old age groups. It recommended creditlines forsmall andmediumsize firmsthoroughcom-munal organizations and NGOs, but the proposalnever came to be implemented, The next govern-ment, that of Andres Pastrana, did not take intoconsideration the program. Under the present re-gime, as it is public knowledge, the social securitysystem has been gradually dismantled under a se-ries of constitutional reforms. Under the 2002 con-stitutionalreformthesubsidizedaffiliationtothepen-sion plan was rescinded as well as the solidaritycontributions to the subsidy for social protection.

The work and the right to work are inti-mately bound to people�s dignity. The labourand functional contributions that those O.P.have provided in the course of their lives, can-not be underestimated: a social and economicdebt exists with this population. In order toobtain effective policies and programs in theirfavour, they should formulate clear objectivesand specify the terms for their execution, aswell as to assign economic and human resourc-es. Otherwise one doesn�t respond to the real-ity, as is the case in the realm of old age of thePND 2002-2006.

Before dwelling on other points of interest,it is worthwhile to point out to the absence ofgeneral or disaggregated official data, a reflec-tion of an ignorant state on the nature of thispopulation that makes it difficult to understandthe O.P. problem or to guide strategies or ser-vices geared to it. There is no reliable statisticaldata because the figures vary according to thestatistical sources and the dates. The last na-tional population census (1993) presented wide-spread data of old population but in a non dis-aggregated fashion. There are not indicators ofquality of life or of human development. There

is no data about O.P. family heads, displaced orstreet inhabitants, as well as population�s withspecific necessities. There are databases In somemunicipalities, but the information does not in-clude the access of the population to public util-ities and it is not systematic. There are few stud-ies or relevant research. We have based theresearch for this document on the investigationcarried out by the Center for Studies and Inves-tigations of Work: �Age and Urban Poverty inColombia.�

According to a preliminary assessment ofDANE (the national agency in care of statistics)in May of 2003 Colombia had a population of44.500.000 inhabitants. Of those 7.1%, that isto say 3.159.500 approximately correspondedto O.P. that is population over 60 years of age.The gender representation was as follows:1.642.940 women and 1.516.560 men. It ispertinent to keep in mind that P.M. is distribut-ed over big age subgroups. In addition, theproportion of pensioners with regard to the ba-sis population is very low; because of the3.159.500 citizens aged 60 and older 2.366.465do not have a retirement pension plan. Povertyis the most generalized characteristic in the sit-uation of O.P. in Colombia.

TTTTTable No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1able No. 1

6 Center of national reference on violence (Vol.7, july, 2002)7 COMPES document 2722, 8/94

The aging index (IE) is an indicator of changes in the agestructure of the population and it is defined as the numberof people aged 60 and over divided by the population 15and younger and multiplied by 100.In 1997 this index had a value of 20, the population projectionfor the year 2025 forecast a value of 54 P.M. for every 100people 15 and youngerPresent population trends show that the P.M. population isgrowing faster than the total population and that the P.M:population in Colombia will duplicate in the next 13 and ahalf years.According to a forecast carried out by Centra there are210.000 P.M. people victims of the displacement process.Life expectancy at birth for the population in spite of warconditions and poverty circumstances is 74.9 years forwomen and 67.9 for men. These figures indicate clearwidowhood phenomena in older ages.

288 Populations

In 1999 Dr. Olinto Rueda Plata, (Adviser onPopulationCensuses toDANE)estimatedthat �onlythe 9,3% of the old population, over 60 years anddenominated inactive was covered by the socialsecurity system. 14% lived in absolute poverty. 8%were crippled people older than 65 years, also inabsolute poverty�. The majority group of O.P. inColombia that we run into are people without in-come frompensionplans, belonging tomiddle andlower social strata. They are economically depen-dant on their families, some work for the informalsector and still others are independent workers.Thealmost total absenceof social securityevidenc-es the lack of rights of these O.P. whose life histo-ries show the wisdom and the flavour of simplepeople8 . The women are themost affected, eitherfor the absence of benefits from social security orfor the lack of care in their old age, because theirown generation devoted their young lives to do-mestic tasks, children�s upbringing, attention totheirmarriage partner or to the sick persons of thefamily. Public policies have not kept in mind thepresent social revaluation for the typeof domesticnot remunerated work that today old women hadcarried out for decades.

According to the General Controller Office(Contraloría General de la Republica) it counts800.000 people 60 years and older lived in year2.000 under conditions of misery. Most of themlive on the streets under sub human conditions.Some of the dwindling public institutions do notmeet minimum residence conditions. Others livein religious9 . Charitable trust institutions. Stillthere is a third type of social misery that is invis-ible: theO.P. that rambles searching for a place tosleep, seeking what to eat and that depend ofthe good will of friends and acquaintances.

The number of pensioners in Colombiamusthave been around 800.000. 76% of those havea monthly pension equivalent to a minimumwage, which is $359.000 pesos (roughly US 140)a pittance too low to support a dignified familylife. There are 210.000 pensioners from theArmed Forces and they enjoy a different pen-sion system. Only a minority of the populationhas enough resources to live in strata 5 and 6,the two highest social strata in the scale.

Law 100 aimed at the full unravelling anddevelopment of article 48 of the National Con-stitution. The social security system fully fledgedin Law 100 is the instrument to implement theexercise of non-transferable human rights of theperson and the community. Later on the sys-tem of social pensions was privatized and con-centrated around a few private firms. On June2003, the present president made a proposal tobe publicly voted as point 8 of a national refer-endum to �limit pensions and salaries of publicemployees�. The voters� rejection of point 8 ofthe referendum clearly reflected the prevalentpublic dissatisfaction with a decrease in the pen-sion system. However, the inclusion of point 8reflects the intention of the government to set aceiling to the pension system and to come upwith a general law of pensions that frames allother government and private decisions onmat-ters related to the national social security sys-tem. Thus, ensuing labour contracts will notprevail to the parameters set up by the ensuinglaw such as age of retirement, amount of pen-sions, affiliation rates, etc, (except for the armedforces, military and policemen due to the pecu-liar characteristics of their pension system)

Today, among the reforms in the pipeline ofCongreso, there is a proposal to bring up the ageof retirement and to reduce today�s monthly re-tirement payments. With regard to the effects ofthis reform, Patricia Buriticá, director of theWom-en Office of CUT (Central Unitary unit asserts:

�Due to the fact that women do not labour continuous-ly, they are excluded from a system of affiliation thatrewards only those persons, that for a long time, keep upin the labour force. By raising the number of weeks thatneed to be worked from one thousand to one thousandthree hundred in order to be entitled to a pension, thenumber of years that must be laboured is raised to twen-

7 Presidential Human rights programs. Right of Petition code 334339.Does a protection system exist and which is it P.M. for those poor nonindigent? R: The program doesn�t have resources to execute progra-ms or projects to specific populations, as those P.M. poor nonindigent.

8 According to statistical of DANE in a year 1997 564 institutionsexisted P.M. for the care of those; interned 348 modality; 28 externalattention; 188 mixed attention. The admission capacity was of 33.233.

289Populations

ty seven on average. According to the statistics, women�spresent active labour life amounts to sixteen years, or itsequivalent in weeks of seven hundred sixty eight weeks.If even today it s very difficult to reach the one thousandweeks limit, to increase this requisite still further makesthe goal of obtaining a pension for women even moredifficult. (�) The reforms proposed by the governmentraise the population that need state subsidies and simul-taneously reduce the number of people in the labour forcethat are entitled to rights and those who are not entitledto rights lose the full practice of their citizenship.� 10

From the document Law 812 of 2003, TheEquity Section we quote this paragraph:

�The access to the health service and to the delivery ofhealth services will be improved by the restructuring andcapitalization of hospitals, by the regulation of the entryprerequisites for health providing firms to the general heal-th system, the enhancement of the certification mechanis-ms in order to improve their quality and by the creation ofservice networks� (PND 2002-2006, Social Equity)

By Law 100 all the inhabitants must by cov-ered by a health plan. In the year 2000 theHealth Superintendent reported some progress:a higher population covered by health servicesin general and for the P.M. in particular. But thecrisis of the Institute of Social Security (Institu-to de los Seguros Sociales) and a trend to priva-tization have been key factors that limit the ac-cess, the opportunity and the quality of thehealth services. For example, the closure of theCentres for Basic Care (Centros de AtenciónBasica) in the urban neighbourhoods crowdedout other centres whereby the P: M: populationwas severely affected since there are no special-ized health service facilities for old age peoplein Colombia, as is the case in other countries.

A permanent source of concern for the peo-ple is drug payments that must bemet from theirown pocket. The closure of both the HortuaHospital and the Children�s Hospital that tookcare of the P: M: population has affected themseriously in Bogotá. In addition the governmentis considering the privatization of national hos-pitals such as theMother andChild hospital (Hos-

pital Materno Infantil), the National Cancer In-stitute (Instituto Nacional de Cancerologia) andthe Erasmo Meoz Hospital.

.As long as health services are regarded asa private business the only O.P. members whomay have access to them are those who canafford it. Pensioners are ascribed to the retribu-tive system. Only themeagre services of the sub-sidized medical system are left to take care ofmost of the aged population. The low coverageof the social security system, the rising cost ofliving, the family abandonment problems andtheir own instability leave this sector at its ownmercy thereby raising extreme poverty. Hence,theO.P.members regarded �worries and anguish�as the main cause for disease and emotionalhealth well above age considerations11.

The world today takes up new compromis-es alter twenty years of the United Nations In-ternational Action Plan on Aging also known asthe Vienna Plan with regard to the human rightsof the O.P. The gathering of 159 signing coun-tries, (including Colombia), for The SecondWorldMeeting on Aging in Madrid of the year 2002created a new action framework on aging calledMadrid´s International Action Plan. This planpresents a much clearer legal conception of theactions that must be followed in the next 25years with regard to one of the most vulnerablepopulations, the O.P., vis a vis the traditional as-sistentialist conceptions of the problem.

Both the Madrid Plan and the United Na-tions principles with regard to old age people �independence, self realization, care, dignity andparticipation12, favour the access to humanrights. But the present government has not beenable to translate those conclusions into legallybinding instruments and thus there are no pub-lic actions or monitoring systems nor there na-tional policies on aging and old age.

The political Declaration and the Interna-tional Action Plan include 11 central subjects andthree priorities that assert:

10 Magazine Culture and Work, No. 49: Congress of the CUT, LabourReforms

11 Investigation �Age and Urban Poverty in Colombia�, Cestra, 200312 1991, Resolution 46/91

290 Populations

�Assure the full enjoyment of the human rights andfundamental freedoms while promoting the enforcementof agreements and conventions and other instrumentsof human rights, Offer opportunities, support programsto stimulate the P,Ms to participate or to continue theirparticipation in the cultural, economic, political and so-cial life and in the life long learning process�

Other aspects of the Political Declarationrefer to health, development, and access to ed-ucational facilities, training, physical disabilities,internal wars and the erasing of poverty. TheColombian state that has signed both the Polit-ical Declaration and the Action Plan has accept-ed five agreements (see table 2). Its signaturemeans, above all that is politically responsibleto the international community and to the Vi-enna World Conference on Human Rights, onthe new human rights undertakings.

The National Development Plan (PND) re-fers among others, to mass media campaignsgeared to older generations, a widening of thesocial security system and a reinforcement ofsocial services. It is the opinion ofmanyO.P. peo-ple and other experts on the subject that thepresent social policy is merely a good wish listor window dressing. Since the policy announce-ments generate new expectations among thepopulation and they by their very nature do notbring out a quantitative and qualitative changein the conditions of the O.P. it is very likely oldpeople will be left wanting.

Given the diverse social and cultural back-grounds of the several actors just mentioned onwhat to do under these circumstances it is justnatural that they will increase without bounds.However, there is a common thread and that isthe certainty that the present Democratic Se-curity policy leaves little room for public pro-grams for the O.P. But the hope remains withinthe organization that the human rights of thissegment of the population will cease to be anunfulfilled aspiration and will come true.

II World Assembly on Aging,II World Assembly on Aging,II World Assembly on Aging,II World Assembly on Aging,II World Assembly on Aging,Madrid 2002Madrid 2002Madrid 2002Madrid 2002Madrid 2002

The presentation of Colombia (Madrid, 11.04.2004)underlines:� The resolution to confront the challenge of the aging of

populations.� The undertaking of actions in spite of the lack of a

comprehensive analysis of the implications of the agingof populations.

Colombia´s preliminary compromises:

1. A priority to the policy of early retirement, support to theincreases in productivity of the P.M. emphasizingcreativity and human development.

2. Widen the coverage of the social security system forhealth, pensions and professional risks..

3. Create an intersectoral commission, promote, defenceand enhance the rights of the P.M.

4. To develop a long term public policy that includes thewhole state.

5. To advocate the presentation of shared financial projectsto strengthen strategies and programs based on approvedsocial policies

TTTTTable No. 2able No. 2able No. 2able No. 2able No. 2

291Populations

BIBLIOGRAPHY

HelpAge InternacionalHelpAge InternacionalHelpAge InternacionalHelpAge InternacionalHelpAge InternacionalDocumentos sobre Envejecimiento y VejezPlan de Acción Internacional sobre envejecimiento 2001Plan de Acción Internacional sobre envejecimiento, Madrid 2002Programa de las Naciones Unidad para el desarrollo, PNUDInforme de desarrollo humano para Colombia 1999. Editores Tercer

Mundo DNP; PNUD.

Colombia, Fuentes de GobiernoColombia, Fuentes de GobiernoColombia, Fuentes de GobiernoColombia, Fuentes de GobiernoColombia, Fuentes de GobiernoPrograma Revivir, Red Solidaridad Social.Documento Compes 2722,8/94.Componente PND. Ley 812 de 2003. Construir Equidad Social.Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística Dane.Censo Nacional de Población 1993.Encuesta de calidad de vida 1997.Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, septiembre 1990 a 2001.

Colombia, otras fuentesColombia, otras fuentesColombia, otras fuentesColombia, otras fuentesColombia, otras fuentesLos Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales en Colombia. Pla-

taforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos Democracia yDesarrollo. Editorial impresión Escáner gráficas, diciembre2002.

Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones del Trabajo -Cestra-Plan Consulta Fase Uno. 1999.Investigación �Vejez y Pobreza Urbana en Colombia� . 2003.�Documentos Ocasionales�, 1 a 5, 2001-2004.LatinoaméricaRevista �Tercera Edad y Desarrollo�, Nos. 14 y 15, año 2003.Proyecto de Ley del Adulto Mayor, Bolivia.Proyecto de Ley del Adulto Mayor, Perú.Boletín No. 55, 2004. �Destinar Recursos en los Adultos Mayores

es una Inversión para el Desarrollo�, Chile.

292 Populations

Populations 293

More than beingInvisible

The Human Rights of lesbians,gays, bisexuals and transsexuals

TINTRODUCTION

he subject of sexual orientation andgender identity has only recently be-gun to be part of discussions of onhuman rights at the international lev-el1 . In Colombia, it was not until thePolitical Constitution of 1991 that

the subject was introduced through the right tothe free development of personality, to equality,and through the principle of human dignity.

This can be explained, in part, because is-sues of sexuality have been considered to betrivial and secondary to political and judicialmatters, owing to their associated with the pri-vate lives of individuals. This conception is par-ticularly strong in times of armed conflict andeconomic crisis, conditions which further weak-en the chances of the inclusion of sexual issuesin public agendas.

Germán Humberto Rincón Perfetti*

The fact that there are no public policies inthe areas of education, health, or social securitythat translate the rights of lesbians, homosexu-als, bisexuals and transsexuals into real plans andprojects in Colombia, either on a national, De-partmental or local level is evidence of this.

While the Constitutional Court has madeseveral relevant rulings, placing Colombia amongthe forefront of nations in the region on this sub-ject, it must be noted that the court�s rulingshave been on very particular cases, and havenot been complemented by legislative or gov-ernmental development in this area.

In this context, it is commonplace for lesbi-ans, homosexuals, bisexuals and transsexuals not

1 The Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for HumanRights on the human rights situation in Colombia, presented in Gene-va at the 60th session of the UN Human Rights Commission, includedhomosexuals among the list of vulnerable groups for the first time in2004.

294 Populations

to have a strong conviction regarding their rights,not to feel that they are the subjects of rights,and not to know aboutmechanisms for denounc-ing violations. Even when they do seek redressthrough the system, they tend to meet high lev-els of resistance from the relevant entities.

ABSENCEOF LEGISLATIVEDEVELOPMENT

One of the primary failures of the State in thisarea is the legislative omission which preventsthe full exercise of citizenship. In 2002 the Con-gress of the Republic considered a bill (Bill 043)to recognize the unions of same sex couples,and afford them registration, inheritance rights,coverage by social security in health and pen-sions, the granting of subsidies, and establish-ing the principle of non-discrimination.

The bill was supported by sectors of aca-demia and of the media2 , together with somestate entities, such as the Public Defender�s Of-fice, the Vice-minister of the Interior and Jus-tice, and the Personería of Bogotá, all of whichpronounced favorable positions on the subject,basing their support on issues of comparativejustice, and constitutional arguments3 .

Nevertheless, the then minister of Justice,Fernando Londoño, made the Government�sopposition to the bill public4 . In addition, on 26August 2003 he made an appearance in theSenate to serve as the standard bearer for theGovernment�s position. With strong pressurebeing exerted by the Government and the Cath-olic Church, pro-government Senators from theConservative party, together with some liberals,voted a substitution proposal by 55 to 32 votesand succeeded in filing the bill away5 .

One of the arguments made during the de-bate over this bill was of a budgetary nature,consisting in the affirmation that the affiliationof same sex couples to the Social Security sys-tem would place undue burden on the Colom-bian State. This argument illustrates not only thepoor information systematically available on thesubject, but also the scarce political will to grantthe issue legitimacy. The Ministry of Social Pro-

tection, for instance, failed to make any state-ments on the matter.

In the face of this legislative void, and thedearth of government policies and mechanismsfor judicial defense of the rights of sexual minor-ities, the Tutela action would seem to be thesole effectivemechanism available to these pop-ulations. This is why the Government�s deter-mination to limit this mechanism is of grave con-cern to the gay and lesbian community. Althoughlarge part of the Tutelas initiated by members ofthat community relate to the right to liberty, vi-olations of the rights to education, social secu-rity, employment, and the right to form a familycontinue to be perpetrated, and these are pre-cisely the areas which the proposed reform ofthe Tutela seeks to limit6 .

2 April 29 of 2003 Letter directed by the Board of Directors of theSociedad Colombiana de Sexología to Senators Piedad Córdoba andCarlos Gaviria. Bogotá.Some press articles in favor of the bill:Editorial from El Tiempo, August 28 of 2003. �Gays: un debateinconcluso�.Opinion Column. María Jimena Duzán. August 25, 2003. El Tiempo.AMÉN, QUE ASÍ SEA �¿La familia Ingalls?�Opinion Column. Otty Patiño. August 30 of 2003. El Tiempo OBSER-VATORIO �¿Al clóset?�Opinion Column. Jenny Manrique. March 23 of 2003. VanguardiaLiberal. �Padres y madres al cuadrado�El Tiempo. August 19, 2003. �Tres ex presidentes apoyan la unión deparejas del mismo sexo�.El Tiempo, I/12, December 8, 2002. �Por una Colombia Incluyente Avisode prensa suscrito por intelectuales, políticos, ONG colombianas.�Opinion Column. Óscar Collazos. August 28 of 2003. El Tiempo.QUINTA COLUMNA. �Ganó la intolerancia�

3 Maria Margarita Zuleta González. October 11, 2002. Vice-minister ofJustice and Law. Concept paper.Juan Fernando Jaramillo Pérez. September 3, 2002. Delegated De-fender for Constitutional and Legal Issues. Public Defenders Office.Herman Arias Gaviria. November 29, 2002. Personero of Bogotá D.C.�Por una Colombia igualitaria y equitativa.� Concept.

4 Caracol Radio. Saturday, 23 August, 2003. �El Gobierno se opone aproyecto que legaliza unión entre homosexuales, Intervención delMinistro del Interior Fernando Londoño Hoyos en diálogo con 6 A.M.fin de semana�

5 Congressional Gazette, Año XII No 484.March 18, 2003. Letter from the President of the Colombian Episco-pal Conference, Monseñor Pedro Rubiano addressed to Senators ofthe Republic. Reference SPEC 13876/03. Bogotá.

6 Tutela rulings of the Constitutional Court: T-594 of 1993, T-539 of1994, T-097 of 1994, T-SU 476 of 1997, T-268 of 2000, T-618 of2000, T-435 of 2002, T- 808 of 2003, T-301 of 2004.

Populations 295

THEMILITARIZATION OF DAILY LIFE

It has been demonstrated on a global level thatin times of crisis and militarism, marginalizedgroups tend to be blamed, scapegoated and at-tacked. Homosexuals, bisexuals and transsexu-als constitute such a marginalized group, andhomophobic crimes increase in times of crisis.This is partly due to the fact that militarist per-spectives feed a climate of fundamentalismwhich perpetuates heterosexism, a belief systemin which masculinity and femininity are definedthrough rigid norms based on gender7 . The au-thoritarian ideology becomes a justification forthe repression of non-hegemonic perspectivesand lifestyles, in this case alternative sexual ori-entations.

Hence, the policy of democratic security,which is primarily a militarist project, strength-ens the image of masculine men in contrast tothe unrealistic vision of gay men as feminine.The policy legitimizes and justifies the violationsof the human rights of homosexuals, at least bysecurity forces.

President Uribe referred to the guerillas dur-ing the XXXII Communal Council of Governmentin the South of Cesar using the following termi-nology: �Melodious, effeminate voices�let themspeak like strong women or determined men�.This speech sought to humiliate and discreditthe insurgents by homosexualizing them.

VIOLENCE IN THE CITIES

Unfortunately, there are no exact statistics onlevels of violence against homosexuals. This isdue to the undervaluation of the subject, to-gether with dismissal of it by society, by civiladministration and by law enforcement. Sexualorientation is not a part of vital statistics, so thatit is impossible to ascertain what percentage ofviolent deaths correspond to lesbians, bisexu-als, gays and transsexuals.

In Medellín, Cali, Bucaramanga and Bogotá8

the owners of homosocialization establishments

report the practice whereby homosexual menare sought out in these places, then lured backto their homes, in some cases to have photo-graphs taken which are later used for blackmail,and in other cases to be stabbed, have theirgenitals removed, be tortured, be given �lessons�and lastly, killed.

Another type of urban violence that shouldbe noted was the countermarch organized by�skinheads� in Bogotá on 27 June of 2004, thedate of the march for citizenship of lesbians,gays, bisexuals and transsexuals. It is the firsttime an event like this took place, although themarch had been held for the last eight years withpublic knowledge.

Without doubt, as sexual orientations andnon-traditional gender identities gain visibility, thelevels of aggression and violations of the rightsof such populations also grow.

POLICEHARASSMENT

Owners of places of homosocialization in Bogo-ta9 and gay men in Medellín, Bucaramanga andSanta Martha have reported police harassmentin places where they gather, such as discos, res-taurants and public areas. They say that this kindof abuse diminished after the Political Constitu-tion of 1991, but that it has been reactivated inthe last year.

Other cases which should be mentionedoccurred in the cities of Medellín and SantaMarta, where the police have demanded the dis-persal of people from bridges in the OrientalAvenue and the Bahía, which are meeting plac-es for homosexuals and transsexuals.

In the case of Santa Marta, the Constitu-tional Court spoke out through ruling T-301 of1994. This ruling constitutes a legal documen-tation of the fact that there exist violations ofhuman rights in Colombia for the sole reason of

8 Meeting that took place Monday 2 August of 2004, at Avenue 32No.14-46.

9 Ibid

296 Populations

being publicly gay, and also that some peoplehave had the courage to protest the situation.It should be noted that in the cases of Medellínand Santa Marta the actions were submitted byprofessionals and activists from the gay, lesbian,bisexual and transgender movement. The ma-jority of victims prefer not to bring legal actionout of the consideration that keeping a low pro-file adds to their security.

STATUTEOF PENAL ALTERNATIVES

There exists no provision in the proposed Stat-ute of Penal Alternatives, presented by the Gov-ernment to Congress, for the families of homo-sexuals and transsexuals who have been killedby pa.itary groups out of hatred and rejectionof their lifestyle to have the right to know thetruth concerning these crimes. Consequently,there are also nomeasures for them to seek jus-tice for these crimes, nor forms of symbolic,material or economic reparation.

This absence allows many violations perpe-trated against homosexuals and transsexuals,such as rapes, expulsions, threats, appropria-tion of goods, hate messages, public shamingand others to go unpunished or underreportedwithin other categories.10 .

Given these few but dramatic cases, theState�s omission and disregard of hate crimescommitted against homosexuals, whose vulner-ability and discrimination is the best weapon forimpunity, is of grave concern.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Colombian State should define, in concertwith the affected groups, public policies (laws,decrees, development plans) which attend to theneeds of homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals andtranssexuals, and take effective actions againstdiscrimination.

The National Government should employstatistics and information on human rights thatinclude indicators regarding the circumstances

10 Human rights report elaborated by the NGO Diversidad Humana.Barrancabermeja march of 2004, circulated by the electronic net-work of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals affiliated with Pla-neta Paz Sectores Sociales Populares por la Paz de Colombia. Accor-ding to this report, the AUC in Magdalena Medio and in the city ofBarrancabermeja issue ultimatums for people to leave the territoriesthey control, and consider homosexuals to be incapable of living insociety. They establish moral codes, according to which homose-xuality is dirty and immoral. Homosexuals are extorted, and in somecases are forced to walk around the streets bearing signs the say �I ama faggot� in order to induce social shame.

of homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals and trans-sexuals.

The National Government should includetraining on the human rights of homosexuals,lesbians, bisexuals and transsexuals for all mili-tary and police forces at all levels and in the var-ious academies.

The Government and its representativesshould avoid any type of aggression, includingthe use of terminology and symbolism associat-ed with collective misperceptions, designed todiscredit and mock homosexuals, lesbians, bi-sexuals and transsexuals.

297Populations

Cultural Policies inUribes� times

In the shady times that run in thecountry and in the world, when allthat was recognized seems to wantto be measured quantitatively bytheir virtual price in the market,culture would be the fundamental

reference point in order to grant a human di-mension to social relationships.

In all the systems that humanity has known,politics are expressed from the authoritarianismor from the solidarity. Authoritarianism is basedon the hierarchies and the solidarity in the linkrelationships. It doesn�t cease to be paradoxicalbut common point that authoritarian regimenslook for a particular way to control and to elim-inate the solidarity links that are built and areexpressed in the social and cultural movements.

Patricia Ariza*

CULTURE

Culture, like the African poet Amilkar Cabral says,is made of the answers that the towns give tothe crises and it is in fact the human solidaritythe one that has facilitated to face the crisescollectively.

Now they want to deceive us with the mostantihuman of the doctrines that imposes theholiness of the market over work, culture, mem-ory and the art.

From neoliberalism, its philosophical andpolitical sustenance, it is sought to impose a dis-course that intends to invert the meanings of

* Patrician Ariza. Dramaturga, directress and actress. Founder with San-tiago García of the Theater the Candelaria and of the ColombianCorporation of Theater.

298 Populations

the symbolic universe, appropriating in perverseway notions that had their origins in the humansolidarity, like notions of democracy, communi-ty, coexistence, justness and participation. Tothose notions it has robbed them of their sym-bolic load for resignify them in an instrumental,mercantilist and vain speech.

Neoliberalim values production and talentas long as they can be sold in themarket or whenthey contribute a regular �dose �of social condi-tioning for �living together�. In other words, it ismutual adjustment for and with the market. Un-der the assumption that every single object andhuman ability has an economic value, neoliberal-ism seeks to transform creativity and knowledgeintomerchandises as well. For that it is necessaryto reduce the intensity of social conflicts, not bysearching for their structural solutions but mere-ly by the reduction of the protest capacity of thepeople and in particular young people.

That is the reason why every time there islessmoney for artistic creation and there aremorecultural projects oriented toward �coexistence�.

COLOMBIA

Colombia is a human and territorial accumula-tion of mestizo (crossbreeding) origin. We in-habit one of the territories with the greatestbiodiversity in the planet and we express our-selves also in a diverse manner. This culturalaccumulation stem out of the multifarious re-sponses offered by the colombians to crises thathave piled up during centuries and that as isbeing said by PaulOquis have not yet been solved. For centuries the �encomendero� and patriar-chal country of the midlands and of the privileg-es excluded regions and cultures that preciselytoday have been labelled as �conflict zones�.

SUCCESSWITHHONESTWORK

The lack of opportunities to find dignified solu-tions by relying on honest work and the impos-sibility to find a rightful expression outside the

two traditional parties during the second half ofthe last century drove many male and femaleColombians living in the outermost regions andthe poor of the urban peripheries, to open upnew paths outside of the ruling institutions inthe search for short cuts to survive.

This is the real reason for the emergenceand growth of the illegal and informal economyof drug traffic, and not the �culture ofviolence�that is falsely supposed to be embed-ded in the nature of the Colombian population.It explains whymale and female Colombians, par-ticularly in the remote regions were com-pelled to live out of the traditional behaviouralnorms and cultural institutions in order to sur-vive and take part into politics. Some of thesenew cultural answers have exhibit an extremecharacter by relying in the use of �physical force�as in the case of political insurgency.

Those short-cuts also explain, albeit from adifferent perspective, the sources of new narra-tive patterns originated outside the traditionalacademic circles, that pile up to conform the�Gran Relato� or Big Story whereby we are con-ceived as people of the periphery and nomadsbut also as founders and creators. Themain cre-ators of this new wisdom are among others Gar-cia Marquez, Laura Restrepo, Martha CeciliaVelez, the Candelaria Theater, Enrique Buenaven-tura and William Ospina.

It may also be said in the case of culturethat the people have been forced to solve theirown matters in their own way. Some times witha high degree of freedom, as in the case of theCandelaria Theater, but paying a very high cost.

THE DISPERSION

That explains, for example that a literary workthat depict us and narrates the insatiable cul-tural search that fuses and recast the peripherylike �A Hundred Years of Solitude�, have had tobe accepted first and published abroad and thatits author, Gabriel García Márquez, have had tolive during great part of his life big difficulties,until finally he and the novel, found an editorial

299Populations

group in Argentina that granted him, fortunate-ly, the deserved recognition. For sure in Colom-bia there are others García Márquez that havenot found their publisher. This example has beenand is magnified now in the country in hundredof cases in the arts and sciences. Up to this mo-ment we can speak of a true dispesion that hasmoved out the country to live abroad, one outevery eight Colombians. Five millions Colombi-an�s have left in search of better opportunities,some isolated for their diverse thought, manyof them creators and scientists.

ROUTES OF DRUG TRAFFICS

The development of the drug�s traffic routes andtheir later expansion and penetration in multi-ple spaces of the national life including, old andnew social elites is explained, by the demandand complicity of the consumer countries ofEurope and United States. That is not the onlyreason: the internal traditional exclusion in Co-lombia leads thousands of people to find, some-times to their grief, exits in the cultivation andthe export of drugs of illicit use or in the case ofthe culture, exits to the periphery.

GEOGRAPHY OF THEWAR

ThemajorityofColombians,menandwomenhavebeen forced to work in the so called informal sec-tor and under institutional abandonment on thepart of the State. Tomany remote places from theinterior of the country, �modernity� has arrived inthe form of war andmassmedia. Its national geo-graphical, social and cultural � recognition� hasbeen given through combats, attacks or massa-cres that make their marginal but �peaceful� andisolatedprevious existence, suddenly become tur-bulent and newsy. Culturally ignored towns as SanVicente del Cagúan, Rialito or The Gabarra, whoseexistence was ignored, suddenly acquire fame be-cause they become a �conflict scenario�.

The democracy is developed in the per-manent tension between the institutionalization

and the society. The total separation betweenthe institutionalization and the society has gen-erated a very dangerous autism of the two sides.The institutions develop their programs andmethodologies, sometimes in a grandiose butsolitary way, with no regard to the social demandsattending more to external models than to theinternal demands.

PROPOSALSOF THE ESTABLISHMENT

The institutional abandonment of the diversecultures, regions and people which comprise thecountry and their answers from the marginalityand the periphery has generated deep social dis-orders that are expressed, among other things,in the war and in the violence. In order to solvethis �disorder�, product of the exclusion, someproposals to face the crisis, from representativesof the establishment, have arisen. We will men-tion only three of the most outstanding ones:the first one is the process to produce a behav-iour mouldings processes by means of the �civ-ic culture� (Antanas Mockus); the second the�urban modernization� as a �managerial� wayof running the cities �(Enrique Peñalosa).and thethird one is the authoritarian State to end warand violence beginning with the militarization ofthe country (Álvaro Uribe Vélez).

THE ANGRY PRESIDENT

The President wants to frame our destiny froman explicit authoritarian model.

An important fraction of the establishmentand the middle classes have joined the presi-dent in the application of this model. For themthe nature of the national crisis is rooted in thelack of authority. This model is generously sup-ported by the government of the United Stateswhich requires a friendly government in the Lat-in-American neighbourhood to tame neigh-bouring countries (Venezuela).

Uribe leads furiously a State falling aparteconomically but with a publicitary an � insti-

300 Populations

tutional� growth, where citizenship is the leastimportant component because for the pre-vailing Neo-liberal model adaptation to themarket is what really matters. With regard toculture the only important matter is behav-ioural conditioning.

THREENEOLIBERALDISCOURSES

Mockus, Peñalosa and Uribe�s discourses favoura �rupture� between culture and politics becausenone of them stimulate the creation of a polit-ical opposition, the true essence of a democrat-ic system. In the three discourses, the ruler�sactions are magnified, the State is overdimmne-sioned and the genuineness of the social orga-nizations is dismantled; the singularities of theinhabitants and of the social groups are erasedand individuals are reduced to mass �catego-ries� such as �citizens� or �beneficiaries�. Thepresence of independent thinkers is a threat tothis mode of discourse.

The culture is a notion pluridiscursive. Itssense depends on the interests of who enunci-ates the discourse. For some it is like an essenceencased in objects and museums to which theycan only consent nets of �initiate�. For others, itis all that has been built, thought and imaginedin the West.

WEAND THE OCCIDENT

The culture in Latin America has roots previousto its Western traits, because it incorporates thememory and the �weltanschaungs� of the indig-enous towns and afro descendants that are inus; and has a future rooted in the crossbreed�mestizo� that we are. A future based on com-plex world views linked permanently to the West,but without accepting to be reduced to theirfrontiers.

Our miscegenation has a complex relation-ship with the present moment, with the cultureand with the territory. The Colombians and theLatin Americans, men and women, cannot be

understood without the West, but neither with-out their own territory. We could be defined ofmany ways, but overall as inhabitants and resi-dents of this territory.

ART AND CULTURE IN URIBE� S TIMES

Background

The debate on the cultural policy in Colombia isa recent matter. The first proposals of creating anational cultural instance with a worthy budgetarose at the interior of the cultural debates pro-moted by the Movement of the New Theatre inthe seventies. Then, the journalist and commu-nist parliamentarian Manuel Cepeda, murderedwith other three thousand militant of the Patri-otic Union, rushed from the Camera of Repre-sentatives, the proposal of creating the Ministryof Culture that was welcomed by ErnestoSamper government. This new ministry wasstarted in 1998 and was assigned the biggestbudget with which the public policies havecounted in Culture. Today, in times of Uribe, theState has culminated the process of reducingthis budget in half, and the democratic partici-pation of the cultural movement in the designof the cultural politicians is almost zero.

Budgets

According to Professor CarlosMignana, mu-sician and investigator of the National Universi-ty, in his conference on Public Policies on Artis-tic Education, �the state has been reducing thebudget, of culture in constant pesos and in asystematic way. The State spends today less thanhalf of what was spent in 1998. Every year thereis a bigger reduction of personnel. For example,the State saved recently more than four thou-sand millions pesos yearly in salaries, with theNational Symphonic Orchestra�s elimination;however, the expenses in personnel increasedthis year in six thousand million pesos in exter-nal contracts, while the personnel�s plant is with-out musicians and abridged. The total budgets,

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in order to justify non existent investments inart and culture, are �raised� by incorporatingprograms and investments that are neither prop-erly of the Ministry, nor permanent, as the tenthousand millions pesos of the Republic�s Bankwith it�s plan of Reading and Libraries or the twothousand millions of Plan Colombia for Music�sNational Plan for Coexistence.�

There are two ways to see the cultural pol-itics in times of Uribe. One is to observe the cul-tural specificity, if any, of the administration ofthe Ministry, and the other, to examine the val-ues that impel the president and the cabinet.

It worries deeply that this Government,with the help of the media, has been closing thedebate scenarios progressively. It is not that theyare closing the headquarters of the social orga-nizations and the cultural centres physically, butthey deny them the recognition and more andmore impose all type of difficulties for their op-eration. In television, the opinion programs havebeen replaced by entertainment spaces and thesold cultural spaces have been given to themonopolies and in the few national newspapersthat exist, for not saying the only one, the cul-ture billboard has been suppressed. In general,only those who pay are entitled to publicity. .

Uneasiness in culture

Besides the cultural damage generated bythe old exclusions, the government of Uribe triesto close any dialogue that can generate dissi-dence or opposition. This choleric leader faceswith vehemence, inclusive to the reports of theorganizations of international cooperation whenthey criticize his administration and, in particu-lar, when they refer to the systematic violationof the Human Rights on the part of the State.This politic serious consequence is self censor-ship. Themovement of the independent thoughtis atomized and disperse. Diversity has becomedispersion and there are very few intellectualsthat dare to differ. Those who make it, still rec-ognizing the �discretion� of their critic, arethreatened. Today we see, with stupor that thewriter and journalist, columnist of the journal

�El Tiempo�, Oscar Collazos, faces a death threat.The three thousand deaths of the UP

members, the murdered journalists andteachers and the cultural damage generatedby the forced displacement of more than threemillion people, begins to weigh on the collec-tive unconscious. We are reducing the passiondangerously for the circulation of thought thathas been one of our biggest intangible patri-monies.

One of the biggest national tragedies residesin the impossibility of exercising fully the politi-cal opposition and the philosophical debate ofthe ideas. In the name of the vote of trust thatthe elites deposited in Uribe, as a blanc check toend up, as he promised, with the war and togive �democratic security� to the citizens, thepopulation is polarizing between a dangerous andfalse binary scheme: the uribistas and the anti-uribistas; the last ones called that way euphe-mistically, since is implicit its exclusion from ev-erything. This state �of the art� has generated adeep uneasiness in the �restricted democracy�,which the previous governments had alreadydecreased although, for fortune, not accus-tomed the Colombian population.

An invisible country

In spite of this situation, the social and culturalcountry of the �rebusque�, amid the difficultiesand in spite of them, communicates and cre-ates. Hundreds of autonomous creations andcritics travel the universe of the non formal coun-try and dozens of debates circulate in the alter-native universe. It seems that a new, denied andexcluded country is built in the shade.

Of course, we are not living favourabletimes for the development of culture. Cultureresists and it is developed, in spite of the hos-tility that surrounds it. It is no easy for the or-ganizations and cultural groups to survive with-out recognition and without budgets, neitheris it for the artists to live in a country whosegovernment has lost the consideration aboutthe roles that both art and artists play in thesociety

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Art - another displaced

In times of Uribe, like in any other recentadministration, the art has been displaced. It isregarded as a mere component of the Statepolicies or of social events. An important partof the cultural movement is maintained with theconvocations. Meanwhile, the art regarded ascritical is denied all recognition. By the sametoken, the industry of the entertainment flour-ishes and culture is perceived like a show. Thebig philosophical debates on culture have beenreplaced by the President�s audiences that aregovernment�s premodern forms, where the lead-er and their minister transform Government�sadministrative actions into advertising cam-paigns of their own image.

WESAID

We said at the beginning that the culture is thegreat reference point to envision the human re-lationships although the social and cultural knotsare broken by the coldness and the violence.

We intend to reopen together social andartistic organizations, the agora, beyond thepunctual projects referred by the agenda of eachsocial organization and of each cultural group;it is necessary to recapture the word and put atthe core of the debate again the country projectfrom the territory and the culture.

In that order of ideas we, who participat-ed with a lot of enthusiasm in the campaign ofLucho Garzón, for the office of Mayor of Bogotá,propose a great political, social and cultural re-covery to support the opening of a PermanentForum of Culture.