Editor:Smt Sutapa Bhattacharya, AERBsbhattacharya@aerb.gov.in

Editorial Consultant :Dr. K.S. Parthsarathi, Ex-Secretary,AERB

From the Chairman�s DeskThe Indian nuclear power programme is presently at the crossroads. There arepresently 14 power reactors in India out of which 12 reactors are 220 MWepressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) and two are boiling water reactors(BWR). In addition two 540 MWe PHWRs are nearing the commissioning stage.Seven more reactors of different types, four 220 MWe PHWRs, two 1000 MWeVVERs and one 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) are in differentstages of construction.

Thereafter there are plans to induct 700 MWe Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors,500 MWe Commercial Fast Breeder Reactors and Advanced Heavy WaterReactors (AHWR) based on utilizing thorium.

These reactors are of different types with respect to design, materials ofconstruction, instrumentation and control features. The regulatory review processneeds to be properly tuned to the requirement of these new designs, for ensuringprotection of the operating personnel, the public and the environment.

The 700 MWe PHWR is presently in the design stage. This reactor is an improvedversion of the 540 MWe PHWR and has some similar design characteristics.The improved reactor has the same reactor geometry and coolant features,but the partial boiling of the coolant changes the reactor physics and thermalhydraulics. This in turn affects the reactor control and instrumentation. Thesechanges require changes in the regulation. AERB will have to study the safetyaspect of similar reactors in operation abroad having features of partial boilingand evolve a suitable mode of regulatory control.

The second type next generation reactor would be the commercial fast breeder

CONTENTS

From the Chairman�s Desk ................. 1

News .............................................. 2-3

Fast Breeder Reactor SafetyO.P.Singh, Director, ITSD, AERB........... 4

AERB�s Safety Review of Plants/Projects .............................................. 5

Views of Electronics Corporation ofIndia Limited on the regulatoryprocess of AERB�G.P. Srivastav, CMD, ECIL ................... 6

The Atomic Energy Act, 1962(Some Select Provisions) ..................... 6

Hindi Day Celebration ........................ 8

Home Page ........................................ 8

Vol. 17 No.2April-June 2004

reactor (FBR). Unlike the PHWR and PWR, the FBR has unique safety characteristics and features to deal with the newcoolant, liquid sodium, and no moderator is used. Sodium being highly reactive catches fire in contact with air and alsoreacts violently in contact with water. Hence an inert gas cover and double walled pipe and guard vessels are provided. Allthese factors cause corrosion erosion problem and a focussed attention is required to gain public acceptance for thisreactor. This is another challenge for the regulatory body.

The AHWR can be considered as an evolutionary design of the PHWR. Principal safety features are essentially engineeredpassive systems such as cooling based on natural circulation flow. Achieving uniform flow in the natural circulation modeis going to pose a challenge for the designers.

All these reactors are to be constructed in the next decade or two and there is a need to look into the regulatory requirementsof these next generation reactors in India starting from siting, design, construction, reliability of components, and operation.Critical components having new design will require particular attention. There will be a need for more continuous interactionbetween the designer and the regulator with a feedback from both the sides for finalising the design as well as theregulatory aspects. The ultimate objective must be to evolve better and safer designs.

NEWS

2

AERB -Expansion Project -Additional Building

AERB is expanding its activity along withenhancement of India�s Nuclear PowerProgramme and also to cope up with thetask of monitoring thousands of radiationfacilities in non-DAE sector. An additionalbuilding adjacent to the existing one atAnushaktinagar, Mumbai has beenplanned and the technical verification ofvarious contractors considered forconstruction was carried out. Thedismantling of the temporary shedswhere the additional building would beconstructed has been done. The buildingis expected to be constructed andoccupied by the year 2006.

Reconstitution of Committeesfrom April to June 2004:

No. Name of the Reconstituted

Committee on

1. Advisory Committee May 31, 2004

on Occupational Health

(ACOH)

2. Safety Review Committee June 21, 2004

for Operating Plants

(SARCOP)

Press Releases:

Unit-1 of Kakrapar Atomic PowerStation shut down as per directiveof AERB (April 22, 2004) :

The Kakrapar Atomic Power Station(KAPS) situated near Surat in Gujarat hastwo units of 220 MW each. On 10 March2004, when Unit-1 was in operationgenerating 170 MW of electricity, anevent involving rise of reactor poweroccurred. For controlling reactor power,adjuster rods are provided which movein or out of the reactor core as per thecommand from the Automatic ReactorPower Control System. While carrying outsome maintenance work, power supplyto these rods failed rendering theminoperable. At the same time, anotherdesign feature of the reactor powercontrol system, called Automatic LiquidPoison Addition System got inhibited dueto erroneous operator action. Also, the

reactor overpower trip was notappropriate to the operating power levelat that time. Reactor power increasedslowly and the reactor trippedautomatically on sensing of higher thanpermissible power by the reactor safetysystem as per design intent. The incidentdid not result in any damage to the plantor the reactor fuel and there was noradiological consequence. However, theevent reflected certain weaknesses insafety culture at the plant and need forimproving safety practices. Taking allthese factors into account AERBprovisionally rated the incident at level-2 of the International Nuclear EventScale (INES). Levels 1 to 3 of INES relateto safety significant nuclear events andlevels 4 to 7 are assigned to accidents.India is a participant in the INESreporting system.

KAPS and Nuclear Power Corporation(NPCIL) were asked to carry outinvestigations to identify the causes ofthe incident. Results of investigationsand analyses by Expert Groups werediscussed at length by the Safety ReviewCommittee for Operating Plants ofAERB on 31 March and again on 21April 2004. Since the exact reasons forreactor power rise have not yet beenclearly established, AERB directed theunit to be shut down as a measure ofabundant caution. The station andNPCIL have been asked to carry outfurther detailed investigations.Accordingly, KAPS Unit-1 was shutdownin the early hours of 22 April 2004.

Kakrapar Atomic Power Stationshut down as per directive ofAERB (May 21, 2004):

On 10 March 2004, an event involvingfailure of the reactor regulating systemhad occurred in Unit - 1 of KakraparAtomic Power Station (KAPS).Consequently, reactor power hadincreased slowly and the reactor trippedautomatically on sensing of higher thanpermissible power by the reactor safetysystem as per design intent. Even though

the incident did not cause any damageto the plant or the reactor fuel and therewere no radiological consequences, itreflected certain weaknesses in safetyculture at the plant and the need forimproving safety practices. Further as theinvestigations carried out till 21 April 2004could not clearly establish the exactreasons for reactor power rise during theincident, AERB had directed the Unit tobe shut down as a measure of abundantcaution. The Unit continues to remain shutdown since 22 April 2004. The incidentwas provisionally rated at Level-2 of theInternational Nuclear Event Scale (INES).Levels 1 to 3 of INES relate to safetysignificant nuclear event and levels 4 to7 are assigned to accidents. India is aparticipant in the INES reporting system.

KAPS and Nuclear Power Corporationcarried out further detailed investigationsand analyses and these were reviewedby an expert group constituted by AERB.With this, the reason for reactor powerrise during the incident could beexplained and modifications to systemhardware and procedures were identifiedto prevent recurrence of such events. Theinvestigation results and the report of theexpert group were discussed in AERB�sSafety Review Committee for OperatingPlants (SARCOP) on 14 May 2004 andin the Board of AERB on 20 May 2004.

Based on these detailed deliberations, theBoard directed that modifications asrecommended by the expert group beimplemented in Unit - 1 as also in Unit -2 of KAPS. Unit - 2 will also be shut downfor this purpose. The Board also directedthat with a view to improving the safetyculture at the plant, refresher trainingpertaining to various aspects of theincident shall be carried out for alllicensed operators and management staffof KAPS. They will be required to berelicensed after this training is imparted.KAPS Units - 1 & 2 will be permitted torestart only after implementation of therequired system modifications andrelicensing of the station personnel. ●

3

NEWSAppraisal Programme forManufacturers/ Vendors ofIndustrial Ionising RadiationGauging Devices (IRGD):The use of ionizing radiation all over theworld has registered a phenomenal growthfor a wide variety of purposes in medicine,research, agriculture industries andeducation. A number of physicalparameters, viz. measurement of level inhuge silos/tanks; density measurement;moisture content of soil; thicknessmeasurement; concentration ofhydrocarbons; ash content in coals;exploration of coal and oil, etc. aredetermined by using ionizing radiation,namely gamma rays, X-rays, chargedparticles - beta & alpha rays and neutrons.In India, about 7000 IRGD (NucleonicGauges) are being used in nearly 1300institutions for on line industrial processcontrol and quality control parameters. Thenumbers of IRGD are increasing becauseof their versatile industrial applications.Different types of radiation sources withactivity ranging from few Giga Becquerelto several Mega Becqueral are being usedfor this purpose depending on theapplications and characteristics of sources.Though the activity of the radiation sourcesare very small, sealed sources withreasonably long half-lives are used in IRGD.Hence the sources have the potential tocause significant radiological hazards if theyare not handled safely and are not providedwith adequate physical security during theiruse, transport and storage. This necessitatesthe need of long lasting and effectiveregulatory control to ensure that the sources

are safely used and disposed off. It hasbeen observed in several parts of the worldthat that there is high probability ofradioactive sources (used in IRGD)becoming orphan sources (not underregulatory control). This has caused fatalitiesor injuries to innocent members of the publicand also posed adverse environmentalimpact and serious economicconsequences.On June 16, 2004 AERB organised anappraisal programme for manufactures andsuppliers of IRGD. The objectives of theprogramme werei) to familiarise manufacturers / vendors

of IRGD/ Nucleonic Gauges with currentradiation safety and regulatoryrequirements,

ii) to explain the role and responsibilities ofmanufactures / vendors inimplementation of the radiationprotection programme of AERB relevantto IRGD, and

iii) to obtain feedback from them on existingregulatory procedures in ensuringradiation safety while handling IRGD.

The programme was attended by35 manufacturers / suppliers ofIRGD in India, two representativesfrom abroad viz England andGermany, experts from the Boardof Radiation & Isotope Technology(BRIT), Radiological Physics &Advisory Division (RPAD), BARCand Radiological Safety Division,AERB. Shri S.P. Agarwal, Head, RSDnarrated the objectives of the

programme, Shri J.K.Ghosh, Chief Executive, BRITin the presidential addressmentioned that the sourcehousings are mainly importedand BRIT is taking the initiativefor indigenisation. Shri S.K.Sharma, Vice Chairman, AERBstressed the necessity of thebuilt-in-design safety features inthe design of IRGD mainly toavoid high probability - lowconsequence events.The deliberations broughtout suggestions and

recommendations for● conducting such appraisal programmes

at least once in two years;● organizing appraisal programme for the

Department of Customs, Airport andPort Authorities,

● passing on information to AERB(bymanufacturers/vendors) about theindustries using IRGD/ sources;

● issuing circular to user institutions ofIRGD asking them to declare thepossession of unauthorized IRGD/radiation sources procured (without theknowledge of AERB);

● keeping track of end users to whomIRGD are supplied and ensuring thatthe schedule for servicing andmaintenance is adhered to

● organizing joint meetings betweenAERB, the Directorate General of CivilAviation (DGCA) and Manufacturers/Vendors of IRGD regarding theprocedures for air transport of IRGD /Sources and

● initiating measures by the BRIT (Boardof Isotope & Radiation Technology), toexplore the possibility of indigenous

manufacture of IRGD/ source/ sourceassemblies.

Shri S.P. Agarwal, Head, RSD and Shri S.K. Sharma, ViceChairman, AERB in appraisal Programme for

Manufacturers/Vendors of Industrial Ionizing RadiationGauging Devices.

Manufacturers and Venders attending theAppraisal Programme of Industrial Ionizing

Radiation Gauging Devices.

AERB ColloquiaAERB colloquia on the following topicswere conducted in the AERB Auditorium.1) Shri S. Sankar, Director, Reactor

Group delivered a talk on �LifeManagement of Research Reactor-CIRUS� on May 03, 2004.

2) Dr. Om Pal Singh, Director, I&TSDmade a presentation on the topic�Safety Design aspects of PFBR� onMay 28, 2004.

4

FAST BREEDER REACTOR SAFETY

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear reactors are basically of twotypes, i.e., thermal and fast. In thermalreactors, most of the fissions are causedby thermal (low energy) neutrons andin fast reactors, most of the fissions arecaused by fast (energy in keV range)neutrons. In fast reactors, more numberof neutrons are emitted per neutronabsorbed by a fissile material like Pu-239. Hence more neutrons areavailable to convert uranium (U-238)into Pu-239. This is a special advantageof fast reactors especially for U-Pu fuelcycle. That is, these can be used notonly to produce power but also fissilematerial. When more fissile material isproduced than consumed, these arecalled Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). FBRshave special significance in the Indiancontext. Natural uranium resources inIndia are limited (~60,000 t). This isenough to set up only 15,000 MWecapacities. However, through breederroute, it can be increased by a factor of60 to 80.

Unlike in thermal reactors, there is nomoderator in a FBR to reduce the energyof fission neutrons. Thus, FBRs are ofsmaller size. Consequently, powerdensity in fast reactors is high and acoolant with high heat transferproperties and minimum neutronmoderating characteristics, is needed.In almost all FBRs, liquid sodium is usedas the coolant. FBRs have unique safetycharacteristics and features. Here, thesefeatures are highlighted and the safetydesign aspects that bring a high levelof safety in a FBR, are presented. It maybe noted that reactor safety essentiallymeans to protect the operatingpersonnel, public and the environmentfrom the radioactivity that is producedduring the fission processes taking placein the reactor. This demands adequateshielding and means to keep containedthe radioactive fission productsgenerated in the reactor. Essentially, allthe time a proper balance between heatproduced and heat removed should be

maintained.

SAFETY RELATEDCHARACTERISTICS

The physics design of fast reactors issuch that any disturbance in the systemdoes not lead to divergence in powerbut tries to stabilize the power at asteady state. There are prompt reactivityfeedbacks like Doppler that try to arrestuncontrolled power rise. Like thermalreactors, the kinetics of the reactor isgoverned by delayed neutrons and notby prompt neutrons. So the control ofthe reactor is quite easy. In FBR, thereactor core containing fissile material,is not in most reactive configuration.Therefore, there is potential of itsacquiring more reactive configurationlike in melting conditions and soleading to power rise. However, overthe years, large number of experimentsconducted in countries like France andUSA have shown that under theconditions of fuel melting, the fuelsweeps out of the core that tends to shutdown the reactor. Calculations done byexperimentally validated computercodes also supports this observation.Moreover, sufficient measures areprovided in the design to preventmelting of fuel/breach in clad andreactor is shutdown on detection of anyfault leading to core over-heating orcore under-cooling.

In a medium size or large size fastreactor, sodium voiding can lead topower rise. Suitable design provisionslike core temperature and reactivitymonitoring, are provided to preventvoiding of the core due to gas passingthrough the core and sodium boiling.The superheat of sodium in reactor issmall. So there is no fear of suddensodium vaporization. Molten fuel andcoolant thermal interaction, is found tobe benign.

Sodium is a reactive material andcatches fire if it comes in contact withair. It also reacts violently if it comes incontact with water. To reduce the

probability of sodium fire due to a leak,an inert gas cover and double walledpipe and guard vessel are provided.The material chosen for sodiumcomponents is highly ductile stainlesssteel for which leak before break criteriaapplies. So catastrophic failure is notpossible. Provision is also made to drainsodium into the dump tank if a leakdevelops. Ability to detect very smallleaks and time available for a small leakto develop into a large leak, enablesto limit the consequences of leaks fromsodium systems. Sodium-water reactioncan occur in steam generators due toleak in tubes. The reaction products likehydrogen and sodium hydroxidepromote corrosion and widen the leak.Therefore, provisions are made tomonitor continuously the steamgenerator to detect the leak before itgrows and to take measures to isolatesodium and water to minimize thequantities reacting in the event of a leak.

UNIQUE SAFETY FEATURES

Sodium as coolant provides largemargin between the normal operatingsodium temperature and the boilingpoint of sodium. Thus, significanttemperature rise can beaccommodated in the event ofmismatch of heat generation and heatremoval. High thermal conductivity, lowviscosity and large difference betweenthe temperature of hot sodium andambient air, permit decay heat removalthrough natural convection mode. Pooltype concept in which primary coolantcomponents like pumps andintermediate heat exchangers are putin a big pool of sodium, is followed.This provides large thermal inertia incase of exigencies. Thermodynamicefficiency is high in FBR. Therefore,thermal pollution of the environment isless in FBRs. During normal operation,the radioactivity release to theenvironment and the exposure ofoperating personnel is significantlylower due to leak tightness of sodiumcircuit ensured by safety provisions such

O.P. SinghDirector, Information & Technical Services Division, AERB

5

Clearance Granted forConstruction Beyond +17.0 mElevation for Kudankulam NPPReactor Building

Clearance for Construction Beyond +5.4m and up to +17.0 elevation for hermeticportion of Reactor Building was grantedin November, 2003 with a stipulation thatfurther construction beyond +17.0 m isto be taken up only after satisfactoryreview of design of the liner around majorpenetrations. Following satisfactoryreview of the liner design around majorpenetrations, AERB granted Clearancefor Construction Beyond +17.0 melevation for Reactor Building ofKudankulam NPP on June 15, 2004.

Excavation Clearance Extendedfor PFBR

Clearance for Site Excavation forPrototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) was

first granted during July, 2002 and it wasvalid for a period of one year, i.e. uptoJune 30, 2003. As the excavation workscould not be taken up in the prescribedtime frame, validity of excavationclearance was extended for a furtherperiod of one year i.e. up to June 30,2004 on request from IGCAR. Onemore extension for a period of 3 monthsupto September 30, 2004 has beenaccorded to facilitate completion ofbalance excavation works for PFBR.

Hot Conditioning of Primary HeatTransport System of TAPP Unit - 4

NPCIL has submitted an application onJuly 2, 2004 for starting Hot-Conditioningof Primary Heat Transport System of TAPPUnit � 4. This is under review by AERB.This is the first time that an indigenouslyevolved PHWR design of 540 MWecapacity is under review by AERB and is

being commissioned by NPCIL.

Study on the Effect of Soil StructureInteraction

The Civil & Structural EngineeringDivision has undertaken a study on theeffect of soil structure interaction vis-à-vis modeling of soil springs duringseismic analysis of building structures. Itinvolves modeling of underlying soilmedia with different distribution oftranslational and rotational springs andstudy of the response of structuralelements during an earthquake. Adetailed analysis by modeling the soilmedia below using finite elements is alsoin progress. This would be helpful duringthe review of seismic analysis of nuclearpower projects, particularly atKalpakkam (PFBR) and Kudankulam(NPCIL).

●

AERB�s SAFETY REVIEW OF PLANTS/ PROJECTS

FAST BREEDER.....(Contd. from page 4)

as guard vessel and pipes and inertargon cover gas above sodium freelevel. Fast reactors make betterutilization of fuel. Consequently, theenvironmental impacts of operationslike mining and subsequentprocessing is correspondingly lower.

SAFETY ASPECTS IN DESIGN

As in any other reactors, a defense indepth approach is followed byproviding mult iple barriers toradioactive Fission Products (FP) andby providing safety measures at threelevels. Multiple barriers to the fissionproducts are the fuel matrix that triesto retain the FPs, the clad material inwhich fuel is contained, closedprimary coolant circuit and thecontainment building. Further, thefollowing safety design measures areprovided for proper control of thereactor, safety against operationaltransients, to prevent occurrence ofaccident and to mit igate theirconsequences.

Components and systems aredesigned as per established

standards, codes and guides andquality assurance measures arefollowed in design, construction,commissioning and operation. Inservice inspection provisions areprovided for all the important safetyand safety related components andsystems. To prevent total f lowblockage in the coolant channels,multiple radial openings in sleeves ingrid plate and in the feet of all thesubassemblies are provided.Emergency power supply from dieselgenerators backed up by battery arealso provided to the primary pumps.These features reduce the probabilityof fault occurrence and provide firstlevel safety. At second level, coremonitoring is done to detect any faultand ensure reactor shutdown. Tomaintain core integrity after reactorshutdown, the decay heat is removedby decay heat removal systems. Theunreliability of these redundant anddiverse systems is <10-6 per reactoryear. These measures reduce theprobability of fault propagation. Atthird level, the reactor containmentbuilding is provided as containmentso that even for a severe accident,radioactivity is contained and the dose

rates for the public at the si teboundary are less than the acceptablelimit prescribed by regulatory bodies.

All the conceivable events that canlead to or have potential to lead tothe fuel failure are postulated andanalyzed using computer codesvalidated against theoreticalbenchmark and experimental results.This is to establish that safety systemslike shutdown system, decay heatremoval system and containmentperform their designed function.

SUMMARY

Fast reactors have a number of goodfeatures that bring in them a good levelof safety. Some initial fears related withreactor core and the use of sodium ascoolant have turned out to beimaginary. Choice of good designconcepts and structural materials, useof established standards, codes, guidesand good quality assurance practicesin design, construction, commissioningadd to their safety. Extensive coremonitoring, highly reliable shutdownand decay heat removal systems andanalysis of all the conceivable eventsassure enhanced safety.

●

6

THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT, 1962(Some select provisions)

An Act to provide for the development, controland use of atomic energy for the welfare of thepeople of India and for other peaceful purposesand for matters connected therewith.Be it enacted by Parliament in the ThirteenthYear of the Republic of India as follows :-1. Short title, extent andcommencement(1) This Act may be called the Atomic Energy

Act, 1962.(2) It extends to the whole of India.(3) It shall come into force on such date as the

Central Government may, by notificationin the Official Gazette, appoint.

2. Definition and interpretation(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires -(a) �atomic energy� means energy

released from atomic nuclei as a resultof any process, including the fission andfusion processes;

VIEWS

Electronics Corporation of India Limited(ECIL) is an industrial unit of theDepartment of Atomic Energy,Government of India and was set up inthe outskirts of Hyderabad on 11th April1967 by Dr A.S. Rao, the founding father.The basic mandate was to set up acomprehensive state-of-art electronicsindustry within the country to support theprogrammes of Indian Atomic Energy,Dept. of Space, Military equipmentdevelopments and the electronicsrequired by general public.

The thrust has been to set upmanufacturing facilities right from theElectronic Components level,Consumers� Electronic Devices, AntennaProducts, Control Instrumentation,Radiation Monitors, Nuclear Detectors,Communication Equipment (for Civiland Defence), Electrical Instruments,Oscilloscopes, etc.

By and large, the industrial operationalenvironment here can be broadlycategorized as follows:

● Most of the Divisions are equippedwith their own mechanical workshops

VIEWS OF ELECTRONICS CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITEDON THE REGULATORY PROCESS OF AERB

Shri G.P.SrivastavaChairman and Managing Director, Electronics Corporation of India Limited

consisting of machines like sheetmetal, cutting, painting, drilling,milling, etc. These workshops wouldalso be linked with plating andpainting shops.

● Electrical Sub-systems anddistribution thereupon.

● Few Divisions would havemechanical activities related withhandling of Assembly Shops dealingwith large size objects like Antennas,their mounts and testing afterassembling on the test ranges.

● By and large, large section ofCompany deals with fabrication ofprinted circuit boards, wiring theracks and carry out their tests as perQA plans involving theenvironmental chambers andprocess of lacquering.

● A few laboratories utilize theradioactive substances for theirusage in either development orproduction of detectors in non-destructive inspection systems.

● There are a few products, which use

small quantities of explosives.

The factory is set up in the area of around200 acres in a well laid out manner. Thishelps in creating support facilitiesdistinctly away from each other makingoverall operational safety requirementsrelatively simpler. While the issues relatedto radioactive substances and explosives,have been placed in full accordance tothe stipulations of AERB, the safetyconsiderations at other places are by andlarge in tune with industrial safetyrequirements. Adequate care in respectof employees working around is in place.The regular inspections of theprofessionals from AERB, Mumbai hasbeen providing continuous feedbacktowards upgrades required from time totime. The general awareness of safetyin ECIL is reasonably high. We, at ECIL,strongly believe and try to promote forpollution free environment to all ouremployees taking care of industrial safetyrequirements � mechanical, chemical,electrical, radiations and environmental.We look forward to AERB towardssuggestions to upgrade and maintain theexcellent safety record at ECIL.

n

(b) �fissile material� means uranium-233,uranium-235, plutonium or anymaterial containing these substancesor any other material that may bedeclared as such by notification by theCentral Government;

(bb)�Government Company� means acompany in which not less than fiftyone percent of the paid up sharecapital is held by the CentralGovernment;

(c) �minerals� include all substancesobtained or obtainable from the soil(including alluvium or rocks) byunderground or surface working;

(d) �notification� means notificationpublished in the Official Gazette;

(e) �plant� includes machinery, equipmentor appliance whether affixed to landor not;

(f) �prescribed equipment� means anyproperty which the CentralGovernment may, by notification,prescribe, being a property which inits opinion is specially designed or

adapted or which is used or intendedto be used for the production orutilisation of any prescribed substance,or for the production or utilisation ofatomic energy, radioactive substances,or radiation, but does not includemining, milling, laboratory and otherequipment not so specially designed oradapted and not incorporated inequipment used or intended to be usedfor any of the purposes aforesaid;

(g) �prescribed substance� means anysubstance including any mineral whichthe Central Government may, bynotification, prescribe, being asubstance which in its opinion is or maybe used for the production or use ofatomic energy or research into mattersconnected therewith and includesuranium, plutonium, thorium,beryllium, deuterium or any of theirrespective derivatives or compounds orany other materials containing any ofthe aforesaid substances;

(h) �radiation� means gamma rays, X-rays,and rays consisting of alpha particles,

(Contd. on page 7)

7

VIEWS(d) to declare as �prohibited area� any area or

premises where work including research,design or development is carried on in respectof the production, treatment, use, applicationor disposal of atomic energy or of anyprescribed substance;

(e) to provide for control over radioactivesubstances or radiation generating plant inorder to �(i) prevent radiation hazards;(ii) secure public safety and safety of persons

handling radioactive substances orradiation generating plant; and

(iii) ensure safe disposal of radioactivewastes;

(f) to provide for the production and supply ofelectricity from atomic energy and for takingmeasures conducive to such production andsupply and for all matters incidental theretoeither by itself or through any authority orcorporation established by it or a GovernmentCompany;

(g) to do all such things (including the erectionof buildings and execution of works and theworking of minerals) as the CentralGovernment considers necessary or expedientfor the exercise of the foregoing powers.

16. Control over radioactivesubstances.

The Central Government may prohibit themanufacture, possession, use, transfer by sale orotherwise, export and import and in an emergency,transport and disposal, of any radioactivesubstances without its written consent.

17. Special provisions as tosafety(1) The Central Government may, as regards any

class or description of premises or places,being premises or places, in which radioactivesubstances are manufactured, produced,mined, treated, stored or used or anyradiation generating plant, equipment orappliance is used, make such provision byrules as appear to the Central Governmentto be necessary �(a) to prevent injury being caused to the

health of persons employed at suchpremises or places or other persons eitherby radiations, or by the ingestion of anyradioactive substance;

(b) to secure that any radioactive wasteproducts resulting from suchmanufacture, production, mining,treatment, storage, or use as aforesaidare disposed of safely;

(c) to prescribe qualifications of the personsfor employment at such premises orplaces and the regulation of their hoursof employment, minimum leave andperiodical medical examination and therules may, in particular and withoutprejudice to the generality of this sub-section provide for imposingrequirements as to the erection orstructural alterations of buildings or thecarrying out of works.

(2) The Central Government may, as respects thetransport of any radioactive substance or anyprescribed substance specified by an orderissued under this Act as being dangerous tohealth, make such rules as appear to benecessary to prevent injury being caused by

such transport to the health of personsengaged therein and other persons.

(3) Rules made under this section may providefor imposing requirements, prohibitions andrestrictions on employers, employed personsand other persons.

(4) Any person authorised by the CentralGovernment under this section, may, onproducing, if so required, a duly authenticateddocument showing his authority, enter at allreasonable hours any premises, or anyvehicle, vessel or aircraft for the purpose ofascertaining whether there has beencommitted, or is being committed, in or inconnection with the premises, vehicle, vesselor aircraft, any contravention of the rulesmade under this section.

(5) In the event of any contravention of the rulesmade under this section, the CentralGovernment shall have the right to take suchmeasures as it may deem necessary to preventfurther injury to persons or damage toproperty arising from radiation orcontamination by radioactive substancesincluding, without prejudice to the generalityof the foregoing provisions, and to the rightto take further action for the enforcement ofpenalties under section 24, the sealing ofpremises, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, and theseizure of radioactive substances andcontaminated equipment.

23. Administration of FactoriesAct, 1948Notwithstanding anything contained in theFactories Act, 1948, the authority to administerthe said Act, and to do all things for theenforcement of its provisions, including theappointment of inspecting staff and the makingof rules thereunder, shall vest in the CentralGovernment in relation to any factory owned bythe Central Government or any authority orcorporation established by it or a GovernmentCompany and engaged in carrying out thepurposes of this Act.27. Delegation of powersThe Central Government may, by order, directthat any power conferred or any duty imposedon it by this Act shall, in such circumstances andsubject to such conditions as may be specified inthe direction, be exercised or discharged also by�

(a) such officer or authority subordinate tothe Central Government, or

(b) such State Government or such officeror authority subordinate to a StateGovernment as may be specified in thedirection.

5180 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA: DECEMBER31,1983/PAUSA 10,1905 [PART II-SEC.3(II)]DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY, NewDelhi the 15th November, 1983S.O.4772 � In exercise of the powersconferred by Section 27 of the Atomic EnergyAct, 1962 (33 of 1962), and all other powersenabling him in this behalf, the President ispleased to constitute an Atomic EnergyRegulatory Board (AERB) to carry out certainregulatory and safety functions envisagedunder Section16, 17 and 23 of theAct.;........ The Board shall be responsible tothe Atomic Energy Commission.

beta particles, neutrons, protons andother nuclear and sub-atomic particles,but not sound or radiowaves, or visible,infrared or ultraviolet light;

(i) �radioactive substance� or �radioactivematerial� means any substance ormaterial which spontaneously emitsradiation in excess of the levels prescribedby notification by the CentralGovernment.

(2) Any reference in this Act to the working ofminerals shall be construed as including areference to the mining, getting, carryingaway, transporting, sorting, extracting orotherwise treating of minerals.

(3) Any reference in this Act to the production oruse of atomic energy shall be construed asincluding a reference to the carrying out ofany process, preparatory or ancillary to suchproduction or use.

3. General powers of the CentralGovernmentSubject to the provisions of this Act, CentralGovernment shall have power -(a) to produce, develop, use and dispose of

atomic energy either by itself or through anyauthority or Corporation established by it ora Government company and carry outresearch into any matters connectedtherewith;

(b) to manufacture or otherwise produce anyprescribed or radioactive substance and anyarticles which in its opinion are, or are likelyto be, required for, or in connection with, theproduction, development or use of atomicenergy or such research as aforesaid and todispose of such described or radioactivesubstance or any articles manufactured orotherwise produced.

(bb)(i) to buy or otherwise acquire, store andtransport any prescribed or radioactivesubstance and any articles which in itsopinion are, or are likely to be, requiredfor, or in connection with, the production,development or use of atomic energy;and

(ii) to dispose of such prescribed orradioactive substance or any articlesbought or otherwise acquired by it eitherby itself or through any authority orcorporation established by it, or by aGovernment company;

(c) to declare as �restricted information� anyinformation not so far published or otherwisemade public relating to -(i) the location, quality and quantity of

prescribed substances and transactionsfor their acquisition, whether by purchaseor otherwise, or disposal, whether by saleor otherwise;

(ii) the processing of prescribed substancesand the extraction or production of fissilematerials from them;

(iii) the theory, design, construction andoperation of plants for the treatment andproduction of any of the prescribedsubstances and for the separation ofisotopes;

(iv) the theory, design, construction andoperation of nuclear reactors; and

(v) research and technological work onmaterials and processes involved in orderived from items (i) to (iv);

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New Appointments in AERB during April to June 2004

Name Grade Date ofJoining AERB

Shri Pravin Patil SO/C 01/04/2004

Shri F.A.A. Sheikh Driver 07/04/2004

Retirements from AERB during April to June 2004

Name Grade Date ofRetirement

Smt. Sarojini L. PPS 30/04/2004

Shri C.P. Raghvendran SO/F 30/06/2004

Smt. Sheela Menon receiving award for

Hindi Competitions from Chairman AERB.

HINDI DAY CELEBRATION

A prize distribution function for AERB employees wasorganised on May 31, 2004 for various competitions inHindi, held in the year 2003. Prof S.P.Sukhatme, ChairmanAERB as Chief guest distributed the prizes among thewinners and released the second issue of �Niyamika�, theHindi House Magazine of AERB. Shri S.K.Sharma was theChairman of this function. Shri S.P.Agrawal, ChairmanOfficial language Implementation Committee presented theactivities of the Hindi Section of AERB.

Hindi competitions on quiz, translation, debate, dictation,extempore speech, typing, slogan, memory test and crossword puzzle were conducted. A total of 34 prizes werepresented in three groups A, B and C i.e, Hindispeaking(group-A), mother tongue similar to Hindi (group-B) and non Hindi speaking(group-C). Shri Kavi Upreti gotthe maximum number of prizes in Group A, Shri VikasSatvilkar in Group B and Smt Sheela Menon in Group C. Acultural programme was held at the end.

Workshop on �AERB Code and Guides for Safety inDesign of NPPs� :

A workshop on �Safety Design Codes and Guides� wasconducted in the AERB auditorium during 28-29 June 2004. Itwas attended by sixty technical staff from NPC Head quarters,NPP sites, BARC, IGCAR and AERB. Shri S.B.Bhoje, FormerDirector IGCAR inaugurated the Workshop.

The faculty from NPCIL, BARC and AERB made presentationson fifteen published design documents and one manual at thepublication stage. The discussions which followed by thepresentation were informative and a need for improvementsand modifications in the documents was felt, keeping in viewthe latest developments highlighted during the discussion.

A panel discussion was held at the end. The panelists were ShriS.K. Sharma, Vice-Chairman, AERB, Shri S.S. Bajaj, Sr. ExecutiveDirector (Safety), NPCIL, Shri S.A. Bhardwaj, Sr. Executive Director(Engineering), NPCIL, Shri P. Hajra, Head, Safety Analysis andDocumentation Division, AERB. It was chaired by Shri S.B. Bhoje.The major suggestions were made are as follows:

● In 220 MW and 500 MW PHWRs, information andregulatory requirements for Pressurised Water Reactors andFast Breeder Reactors should be given in the documents.

● The development of the documents should be based onestablished practices, experience gained in analysis, testingand usages.

● The design code under revision should also contain aspectsof civil engineering, industrial safety and security and physicalprotection.

● Frequency of occurrences of all events at stations should becompiled and compared with the design basis events toserve as a good feedback to reactors of new design.

● Analysis of certain identified �beyond design basis accidents�(BDBAs) should be added.

● Deterministic analysis should be added during ProbabilisticSafety Analysis studies/ reviews.

Workshop in AERB Codes or Guides.

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