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could

be said

[For

theLove

of

Language

137].

These limits do not

simply

set restrictions

on a

speaker's

or

a writer's

freedom;

hey

ratherdefine a

non-ego-centered

reedom,

one

not conceivable as

a

breaking

down of boundariesor a violation of

rules,

but as

the

creation,

in

accordancewith certain

aws,2

of

an

area

of

choice.

All

of

this

has

been reiterated

n

many

different

ways.

But the

consequences

of this

conception

of

language

and literaturehave not

provided

the

premises

for

a

continuing

research.

On

the

contrary,

he radical

challenge

to certain orthodoxies a

non-speaker-

centered

conception

of

language

containedhas been

imperceptibly

revised,

and the old

has returned

under he

guise

of the new. As the

fittingaccompaniment

o this

revisionism,

another

inguistics

is

currentlyappealed

to,

one Milner has

labeled

an

antilinguistics,

which

renouncesthe difficult

task

of

providing

a formal

account

of

the often recalcitrant

data

of

language

and of

submitting

his account o the standards f

logical economy.

This

is a

linguistics

that,

unwilling

to or

incapable

of

looking

directly

at the

impersonal

aws

of

language

tself and

analyzing

ts forms and

systems,

turns

nsteadto the humanvoice

divine withinlinguisticperformance, ubstituting ommunication orlanguage. Such a

substitute

inguistics goes by

various

names: discourse

analysis,

pragmatics, peech

act

theory,

communications

heory.3

It

provides

the

justification

for

the

returnof

a

unified

authorial

voice,

in

the

guise

of the

speaker,

to literature.

That

returnhas been

disguised:

it

poses

as a

challenge

to the

egocentric

theory

of

language,

which it

submerges

n

the notion of the unicite

or

oneness of the

subject,

and

yet

reintroduces his

egocentricity

under he

formof

a

multiplication

f

speakers

n

certain

configurations.

These are the various theories of dual

voice,

of

dialogism

and

heteroglossia,

of

polyphony,

enjoying

currency

at this

moment. Their

appeal

explains

in

part

the

discovery

and

republication

of

Bakhtin;

it

likewise

explains

the

following

Oswald Ducrothas

in

France.

In

the face

of

the declaration

f

the

deathof the

author

n

writing,

hese theories

perform

he function

of a kind

of

animism,

repeopling

he

text

with the

sound

of

personal

voices.

Moreover,

he

carnivalesque, heteroglossia,

polyphony -all

are

proffered

as

figures

of an

imaginary

reedom

whose

model,

whose

utopia,

s

a

crowd,

overflowing

boundaries,

breaking

ules

and

mingling

many

voices,

and

whose

ultimate

weaponagainst

power

is an

irony

conceived eitheras the

interpenetration

of voices or

as a

preordained ntentionality

which

intervenesdeus

ex voce to

provide

an

ultimate

harmony

and

meaning

that are

personal.

What s

Ducrot's

theory

of

polyphony

andhow

does it reintroduce

speaker-centered

linguisticsat the very momentit denies it? To answer thisquestion,I will counterpose

Ducrot's sketch of this

theory

to what he

rejects

as

that

theory's

contrary-the

most

recent

defense of the

dogme

intouchable

172]

that

chaque

enonce

possede

un et un

seul auteur

171],

namely,

the

theory

of the

language

of

narrative

iction as a

system

of

unspeakable

entences,

in

order

o

argue

that

Ducrot's

very

conception

of the

actualand

2.

The

questionofthefreedom

possible

withina

language

conceivedas a

system

of

rules

might

be

pursued

with

respect

to

Chomsky's

nsistenceon

linguistic

creativity

and

thefact

that he is

often

misunderstood

o

mean

by

this the

ability

ofthegrammar ogenerate

an

infinite

number

ofsentences

from afinite numberof rules and thespeaker's abilitytoproduceand interpret entences he has

never encountered

before.

It is the latter

which

defines

the

parameters of

this

creativity

but does

not

explain

or

predict

it.

3. See For

heLoveof

Language[138].

The

qualificationofthesedisciplines

s

antilinguistics

should

not be taken o mean that

the

questions

hey

reatare

illegitimate

or

without

nterest

but

only

that

they all

outside the

range

of

a

formal

linguistics.

Just as the

limits

of

a

formal

linguistics

are

not

an

argumentagainst

the

validity

of

its

claims,

so the

informal

nature

of

such

disciplines

is in

direct

relation to

the issues

they

address.

Whatrenders them

substitutes s

the claim

of

certain

of

their

practitioners

that

the

inability of formal

linguistics

to

account

for

this or that

aspect of

language

demonstrates he

superiority

of

an

nonformalpragmatics.

It is in this

way

thatthosewho

take

this

position deprive

themselves

of

the

discoveries

of

a

formal linguistics.

22


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possible

alternativesshows how the issues have been obscured. He assumes that the

relevant

dichotomy

exists between the

hypothesis

that

every

utterancehas

one

and

only

one

speaker,

ancredans

a

tradition

inguistique

172],

and

a

polyphonic heory

of

the

utterance hataims

to mettre n doute

e

postulat

selon

lequel

un enonce fait

entendreune

seule

voix

[172].

Ducrot's

implicit reasoning

assumes

that

the

only challenge

to

the

traditional

egocentric

view

of

language

is one that

counterposes

a multitudeof

voices,

assuming

various functions of the

speaker,

to

the

unicite of a

single

speaking

voice.

But

the issues can

be

posed

otherwise

and indeed

have been. Another alternative

exists,

one

that

renders

the

polyphonic

theory

as

only

a variation of

the

existing

one,

because the crucial ssue does not turnon whetheran utterance s restricted o one or more

than one voice but on whether

every

utterance

must have a

voice.

This

question

is

centralto the

theory

of

narrative

have

presented

n

Unspeakable

Sentences. Yet it has

gone

so

universally

unremarkedhat

the

theory

of

unspeakable

entences is

grounded

on

the claimed existence

of

speakerless

sentences that

it is

difficult

not

to

suspect

that it

is

here theattempt,whetherdeliberateorunconscious,appears o wardoff the menace to

the traditional

gocentricconception

of

language,

o echo Ducrot

[172].

But

the

empirical

consequences

of this claim and the

challenge

it

poses

to traditional

assumptions

cannot

be

grasped

until

the notions

author, voice,

speaker,

and

subject

have

been

rigorously

defined

in

terms

of

the data. This neitherDucrot nor other defenders of dual

voice

do,

contenting

themselves

with

what

Ducrot

calls a sketch. It is

in

this

way

that

the hardand inalterable

givens

of

language

and

the

laws

they

yield

can be avoided and

more

reassuring

notions

smuggled

in.

For

what

if

thereexisted utterancesunmarked

y

the

person

of even a

single

speaker?

Then such instancesof

language

would

have lost the

authority

and intentionalcoherence

attributable o that

person

called

by

grammatical

radition he

first.

What would then

be

the

consequence

for

the unicite of

the

speaking subject,

for

the

possibility

of

a

plurality

of voices? To

answer these

questions

we must turn o a

more

detailed

account

of

the

evidence of

narrativeas well

as

to the

theory

of

unspeakable

entences.

This

theory

requires

severalnotions. Some

are

already

a

part

of

generative

inguistic

theory

and hence

not introduced

solely

to account for

the

particular

data relevant to

narrative

style,

and a restrictednumberof others

are

justified by

the

sole evidence of

narrative.Their

meaning

s thus

specific

to the

theory,

even

when,

like

subject

or

SELF,

they

also

have

a

meaning

n

ordinary

anguage,

and t is the

theory-specific

meaning

which

must be understoodwhen interpreting he theoryand weighing its claims against any

alternative.

The

first notionto be

singled

out is thatof an

E,

or

Expression,

which rewrites

Chomsky's

S

(S

=

Sentence),

with

the further

tipulation

hatthis

highest

S

cannotbe

embedded,

that

is,

may

not

appear

subordinated

o

any

other E.

I

have

provided

justification

for this revision of

Chomsky's

S

[see

Conditions

on

Transformations

(1973)]

in

Narrative

Style

and the

Grammar

of

Direct and Indirect

Speech

and

Unspeakable

Sentences.

Once

introduced,

urther

onsequences

follow

from

it,

permit-

ting

a unified accountof what

can

be

referred o as

linguistic subjectivity

[see

Unspeak-

able

Sentences].

It is thus for

purely

syntactic

reasonsthat he two

principles

formulated

in

these two

works,

andwhose

functionDucrotsees as

warding

off

the threat

of

a plurality

of

subjects

172]-namely

thosesummarized s

1E/1

SELF

nd Priority

f

Speaker 4-

4.

1

Ell

SELF s

a

revision

of

Ell

I

or

Speaker

o

accountfor

the data

of represented

hought.

The

ormulation

of Unspeakable

Sentences is the

following:

a.

1

E/1

SELF. For

every

node

E,

there

is

at

most one

referent,

called the

subject

of

consciousness,

or

SELF,

to

whom

all

expressive

elementsare attributed. That

is,

all realizations

of

SELF in an E

are

coreferential.

b.

Priority

of

SPEAKER.

If

there is

an

I,

I is

coreferential

with the

SELF.

In the absence

of

an

I,

a

third-personpronoun may

be

interpreted

as SELF

[93].

diacritics / winter 1991

23


6/13

are

principles

whose domain s the

E

or entiresentence.

(Moreover,

t

should be recalled

that

the notion

Sentence

in

transformational

rammar

s an initial

idealization of the

notion utterance. Such

a

grammar,accounting

for

competence

and not

perfor-

mance,

s a

grammar

not of

utterances,

which

belong

to

performance,

but

of

Sentences,

or

in

the

terminology

used

in

Narrative

Style,

of

Es.)5

Every

E

may

have

at

most one

subject

of consciousness or

SELF,

a second notionthe

theory

defines. The SELF

is

the

point

of

reference

for

a set

of

subjective

elements and

constructions-deictics,

nouns

and

adjectives

of

quality

[see Milner,

De la

syntaxe

d

l'interprdtation],

exclamations,

and

so

forth-which share features of

distributionand

syntactic

behavior. The

generalizationexpressed

in

1

E/1

SELF thus

relates these two

notions-E and SELF-in

a

precise way.

Note,

for

instance,

that the

generalization

applies

to the

unique

reference of a

speaker

in

an

E

only by

virtue

of the

obligatory

coreference

of

speaker

and

SELF,

that

s,

by

virtueof

Priority

of

Speaker.

Moreover,

no

comparable

laim

as

to the

uniqueness

of

the referentof the SELF s made about

any

unit

larger hananE;inparticular,heclaim is not extended o the notionTEXT, which,inthe

special meaning

attributed

o it

in

Unspeakable

Sentences,

is the

unit constituted

by

a

series

of Es

related

by

the

rules of

anaphora

nd of

concordanceof

person

and tense.

On the

contrary,

t is

explicitly

stated

n

Unspeakable

Sentences hat he evidence

supports

no such extension of

1

E/1

SELF to the

TEXT,

held

together,

hen,

only

by

the

rules

of

anaphora

nd

Concordance

f

PersonandTense. Concordance f Person

requires

hatall

instances

of

the first

person

remaincoreferential

hroughout

ll Es of a

TEXT,

but

t makes

no such

requirement

or the referentsof SELF.

As

a

result,

the

subject

or

SELF

may

change

from

E

to

E,

giving

rise to the

famous

shift

n

point

of view

of

the

moder

novel,

whatBlanchotrefers o

in

The

NarrativeVoice

as

the

multiplication

f little

egos

[136].

In

the

theory

of

unspeakable

entences,

the novelistic

text

may

consist

of a

plurality

of

different

hird-person

ubjects,

each one

unable o

penetrate,

o

to

speak,

the

E

or

sentence

occupied by

another,

what Sartreonce called la solitude de

chaque

unit6

phrastique

[117].

The result is a

kind

of

monadology

of the sentence whose

logical

consequence

is

a

plurality

of

subjective

worlds. Insofaras an intuitive

response

to the novelistic

form has

been the

acknowledgement

of

this

plurality

of

perspectives,

the

theory

of

unspeakable

sentences

provides

one model of this atomism of

points

of

view,

one

in

which

the

perspective,

that

s,

the

SELF,

is

a

centerto which

linguisticallysubjective

elements and

constructionsarereferredand

in

which

only

a

single

such center s

permitted

n

an E. But

it is nota model that does not account for multiplepointsof view.

To

point

out the

possible plurality

of

perspectives

which is

deducible

from a

theory

in

which

1E/1

SELF and

Priority

of

Speaker

or I)

apply

to

Es

and not

to TEXTS

is

not,

however,

to

say

that the

theory

of

unspeakable

sentences is a notational variant of a

polyphonic theory

of the utterance. Both

Ducrot's

polyphonictheory

and that

of

unspeakable

entences

confront,

n

part,

he same set of

facts,

which

may

be described-

an

initial

description

depending

on a

terminology

that further

analysis may

reveal to be

misleading-as

texts

containing

a

plurality

of

perspectives,

in

some sense

yet

to be

defined. But the

relegation

of each

single

SELF

(as

one

theory'sconcept

of

a

perspective,

counterposed

o the other's notion of

voice )

to

the

confines

of

one or more

E

and the

Ducrot does

not

seem to be

familiar

either with

the

fuller

presentation of

these

principles

in

Unspeakable

Sentences or with

the criticism

of

the

dual voice

theory

in that context or in The

FormalCoherence

ofRepresented

Speech

and

Thought,

but

only

with

my

1973

article

[

Narrative

Style ].

5. Ducrot also

insists on unedistinction

rigoureuse

entre

l'enonce

et 'la

phrase '

[174].

But

if

the distinction is

appropriately

nvoked

at

the

start,

he

unfortunately

does

not establish an

equally rigorous system

relating

these notions. This undermineshis attack on

1

Ell

SELF,

since

hecanpresent

claims

about

I'

nonce

without

pecifying

nwhat

way

this

constitutes

an

argument

against

a

theory of

Es,

which have

the theoretical

status

of

sentences.

24


7/13

impossibility

of morethanone

SELF

appearing

n

a

single

E

yield

a

quite

different

picture

of the novelistic text

than

the

one

in

the

position

Ducrotoutlines.

(It

should be

pointed

out here

that

the

precisionrequired

and made

possible by

linguistic methodology

and the

formally

representable

vidence of

language

allow one

to

go beyond variously nterpret-

able nonformal

accounts,

such

as

thatof Bakhtin. It

may

not

be

entirelypossible

to decide

whetherBakhtin's

position

is

closer

to

thatof Ducrotor thatof

Unspeakable

Sentences-

at times

his

phrasing

seems to

permit

the

possibility

of

two

points

of

view

in

a

single

sentence,

and at other times it does not-because Bakhtin never

posed

the

question

in

these

terms.)6

What

is

decisive is that the

possibility

of

shifts

in

perspective

arises

in

the

theory

of

unspeakable

entences

under

quite specific

circumstances. For Concordanceof

Person,

the

principle

defining

the

larger

unit

of

the

TEXT,

among

other

things,

as

a

sequence

of

Es

in

which all referentsof the first

person

remain

coreferential,

ogether

with

Priority

of

Speaker,

a

principle affecting

Es,

means that

a

TEXT

may

shift

perspectivesonly

when

it has no firstperson. The crucial condition for the appearanceof a style displaying a

plurality

of

perspectives

thus

emerges

as the

possibility

of

sentences

(technically,

of

Es)

with no

speaker,

that

is,

sentences

in

which

the first

person

is

excluded,

in

which that

central

authority

of

the

personal

voice

of

the

speaker, nterpreting, valuating,

expressing

and

bestowing

coherence and

unity

on a

discourse,7

s absent.

In

the

linguistic analysis

of

that

narrative

tyle

known

in

French

as

style

indirect ibre and which

I

call

represented

speech

and

thought

can

be found the

syntactic arguments

hat Es with a

third-person

SELF cannot also contain a first

person,

or otherwise

they

could not receive the

interpretation

n

which

they

represent

a

third-person oint

of view. To

account

for

such

sentences,

a

subjectiveperspective

must be

isolated

independent

of the first

person

and

thus not

be

assumed

by

the authoritative

peaking

voice

of

any

narrator.

In

this

way,

a

novel

may

represent many

such

subjectivities,

each one

equal

from

a

linguistic

point

of

view,

without

giving

one

point

of

view

priority

over the other

(as

would be the case

if

a

speaker's

voice were allowed to

occupy

the same

E

as

a

third-personperspective),

and

unity

and

meaning

ome

to

reside elsewhere than

n

the

continuous,

personal

voice

of a narrator

ommenting

on

and

guiding

the

reading.

Each

single

perspective

remains

uninterpreted,

owever,

at

any higher

level

in

the

language

of the text.

6. See

Reboulfor

a discussion

of

Bakhtinwith

respect

to Ducrot's

polypony

and the

theory

of unspeakable

entences. For anotherdiscussion

ofBakhtin

andDucrot,see Moeschler. Ducrot's

characterization

of

the

theory of unspeakable

entences

and

the

logical

relations

holding among

its

various

claims

is,

at

any

rate,

inaccurate:

arrivee...

au

momentou

une

pluralit6

de

sujets

pourraient

tre

introduitsdans

1'enonce,

Banfield

formule

deux

principesqui

ecartent a menace. Elle

pose

d'abord

qu'il

ne

peut

y

avoir,

pour

un enonce

donne,

qu'un

seul

sujet

de

conscience,

repoussant

d'emblee

dans

le domaine

de

l'anormal es

exemples

qui

feraient

apparaitre

ne

pluralit6

de

points

de

vue

juxtaposes

ou

imbriques.

Et

ensuite,

afin

de

traiter

es cas ou

le

sujet

de conscience

n'est

pas

l'auteur

empirique

de

l'enonce,

elle

pose qu'il

n'y

a

pas,

dans

ces

enonces,

de

locuteur. Certes, e ne reprocheraipas a Banfield-bien aucontraire-de distinguer e

locuteur,

c'est

a

dire

l'etre

designe

dans l'enonce comme son auteur

(au

moyen, par

exemple,

de

marques

de la

premierepersonne),

et

le

producteur mpirique,

etre

qui

n'a

pas

a

etre

pris

en

compte par

une

description inguistique pr6occupee

seulement des

indications

semantiques

ontenuesdans

'enonce.

Ce

queje reprocherai

Banfield,

c'est

la

motivation

qui

1'amene cette

distinction,

a

savoir

e

souci de

maintenir

oute

que

cofte

l'unicit6

du

sujet

parlant.

[172]

7. Here

I

am

using

discourse

n

its

ordinary

sense. In

Unspeakable

Sentences the

term

is

reserved

or

that kind

of

sequence

of

Es,

that

is,

that kind

of

TEXT-a unit

that

is

not

necessarily

written-which is marked

inguistically by

the

presence of

a

speaker

and

an

addresseelhearer.

diacritics

/ winter 1991

25


8/13

It

is

in

a

quite

different ashion thata

multiplicity

of

points

of view are accounted or

in

Ducrot.

Indeed, polyphony

or

Ducrotdoes not refer o an unlimited

number

in

terms

of

any

limits

imposed

by

the

grammar)

f

equal points

of

view-equal

because each

has

as

its

domain

an

equivalent

grammatical

unit,

the

E,

in

which

each

plays

an

equivalent

role.

For

Ducrot

every

sentence

is

divided between several different

unctions,

n

a

way

reminiscent of the division

between

speaker

and

self

in

the

theory

of

unspeakable

sentences

[see

The FormalCoherenceof

RepresentedSpeech

and

Thought ].

But the

similarity

only goes

so far. For the

division between

speaker

and

SELF

does not endow

the

speaker

with

the

independent

status of a full

speaking

subject grammatically

incarnated

n

the

first

person

and

separate

rom the

third-person

ELF,

whose

perspective

is

subordinated o

it.

The

speakermay appearonly

when it is

coreferentialwith

the

unique

SELF.

As

long

as

a

third

person subjectivity

s

represented,

no

speaking

voice can be

realized.

In

Ducrot's

account,

on the

contrary,

s well as

in

otherversions

of a

dual

voice

theory,

the text

in

which

a

third-person ubjectivity

is

represented

retains a

higher

authoritythat places this representedsubjectivitywithin a system of values-those

spoken

by

the

narrating oice -higher

than itself.

I

will not enter nto a detailedrefutation f Ducrot's

position,

restrictingmyself

to

the

more

important

ask

of

correcting

certain

recurrent

misconceptions

about the differences

between the

theory

of

unspeakable

entences and

what

seems to me

yet

anotherversion

of the

position

I have dealt with elsewhere

under he name of

dual

voice

theory.

There

I

have answered he

objections

of

proponents

f this

theory

n

detail.8

Moreover,

or these

objections

to

carry,

he

citing

of a few

purported

ounterexamples

oes not

suffice,

as

any

version

of

scientific

methodology

will

point

out.

A

countertheory

s

required,

one

accounting

or all the

data he first

theory

accounts

or,

as well

as

for

the

counterexamples.

Until

then,

the burden

of

proof

is on

any counterproposal.

Ducrot, however,

more

than

anyone, cavalierly

dismisses the detailed

edifice

of

rules,

arguments,

and

data- je

signalerai rapidement

une

recherche

americaine

[172]-he

wishes

to

replace

with a

hastily

constructed

sketch. His

methodology

does not

rely

on

logical

argumentation

r

the

marshaling

of

a rich

body

of evidence.

Rather,

each

example

is

just

another

n

a

long

list of

examples

of

different,

supposedly subjective aspects

of the

text,

each

different

example calling

for a new theoretical

onstruct,

nvented

ad

hoc.

Indeed,

the distinctions

Ducrot

makes

seem

ultimately

o

be undone

by

a

methodology

sorely

in

need of that

tool

of

logical economy,

Occam's

razor.

A

finite

number of

theoretical constructs and

principlesare not the means for Ducrotof accountingfor a great varietyof different

donndes,

which

in

turn

ustify

these

constructsand

rules; instead,

a numberof

isolated

examples

or

cases-quite

different

notions than those of

data

and

evidence-are

the

excuse

for

the

proliferation

of

loosely

defined

notions. Where

is the Ducrot of

the

elegantly argued

Peu

et un

peu ?

The

Ducrot

of

the sketchof

polyphony

s not

really

elaborating

a

systematic

theoryargued

on

the

basis

of

linguistic

evidence but is

making

a

loosely classificatory inventory

of

examples

supposedly

inserted

with

difficulty

in

a

theory

of

unspeakable

entences.

The issue of

methodand

argumentation

s

not unconnected o

thatof the

unquestioned

assumptions

and

misconceptions

of

Ducrot's attackon a

theory

of

language

centeredon

a

single subject.

For his whole

countertheory

of

polyphony depends

on a series of

distinctions-between

l'nonciateur,

le

locuteur,

and

l'auteur

empirique,

for

example-that,

if

he is to

make

good

the claim

to have

replaced

a

speaker-centered

linguistics,

he

mustdemonstrate re

empirically

distinct,

hat

s,

that

hey

account or

quite

differentand

clearly

defined

linguistic

phenomena

n

a

consistent

and

systematic

way,

as

8.

Indeed,

Ducrot's

critique

of

Narrative

Style

seems to

rely

on

two

secondary

sources;

it

is not

upon

his own

careful analysis

of

the

theory of

unspeakable

sentences

that

he

bases his

objections,

but

upon

these two

essays

[see

Ducrot

173].

26


9/13

well as

theoretically

distinct from the

single,

unitary

ubject.

But

the

gestures

he makes

toward

a

theory

n which the

authority

of a dominant

peaking

voice is

challenged

never

transcend he idea of a

hierarchy

of

speaking

subjects,reduplicated

at

different evels.

In

insisting,

for

instance,

on the

distinction

between

le

locuteur,

c'est-a-dire l'etre

designe

dans

l'6nonce

comme son auteur

(au moyen, par exemple,

de

marques

de la

premiere

personne),

et le

producteur

empirique

[172]-an

important

distinction-he cannot

conceive

of

the

latter,

he

empiricalproducer

f

the

text,

except

on the model

of

another

speaker.

That the author's role

in

writing,

in

composing,

need

not,

cannot,

receive a

linguistic

representation

nified around he notion

of

a

voice does

not,

however,

seem to

have occurred

o

Ducrot,

and

he can conceive of

him

only

as

in

some

way speaking

n

the

text,

even

if

he

never

says

I,

unless

it

is to

represent

a fictional

persona:

The author

sets

before

us characters

who

in what

I

call,following

Anne

Reboul,

a

'first speech

exert a

linguistic

and

extralinguistic

action,

an

action the

authorhimselfdoes not takeresponsibilityfor.But the authormay, n a second

speech,

address the

public

through

the

characters,

either

by

assimilating

himself

to such and such

a

one

who

he seems to make his

representative

..

or

by thefact

that t seems

significant

that the

characters

speak

and behave n such

and such

afashion.

[205;

ed.

trans.]

When

discussing

Benveniste's notion

of

histoire,

Ducrot

seems to allow an

enonce

which

n'exhibe aucunauteurde la

parole.

But the

consequences

of

this

possibility

are

never

pursued,

nor is it

explicitly integrated

nto the

larger

polyphonic

ystem.

Thus,

the

author,

at one level

seemingly

silenced and banished

from

the text

by receiving

no

linguistic representation,

neverthelessreturns o address an audiencevia a

secondary

speech.

For

this is

ultimately

a

metaphoricway

of

describing

certain

phenomena

for which

it is the task

of

linguistics

and

a

literary heory

aided

by

linguistics

to find a moreaccurate

account. This includes an

analysis

of what it

might

meanto

represent

a

subjectivity

other

than

by expressing

t as a

speaker

would to a

listener.

The notion SELF

s

meant

o

capture

such

an

unspoken

otion of

subjectivity.

Whatfollows

from

this

unspeakability

s that

subjectivity

s

unmediated

by

another

nterpreting

oice.

The

inability

to

conceive

of

the

subject

as other hana

speaking

voice

prevents

Ducrot

rom

grasping

he

notion

of

SELF,

thatis, of a subjectwhich is not also a speaker,crucialto the statementof 1 E/1 SELF:

It

is this

1

Ell SELF

theory

that

permits

the use

of

the

expression

subject

while

presupposing

as

self-evident

hat

there

s a

being

who is

the

unique

author

of

the statement

[enonce]

and

responsible or

what is said in the statement.

If

one

has

no

scruples

or reticence n

using

this

expression,

hen,

it is because one

never even dreams

of calling

into

question

the

uniqueness

of

the statement's

origins.

[189;

ed.

trans.]

But

the

subject

is not

responsible

or

what is

said

n

the

Expression,

according

to

1

E/

1

SELF;

he is the

point

of reference or a

specific

setof

linguistically

subjective

elements

in

the

E,

which is

thereby

aken o

represent

his

perspective.

Yet

nothing

s

said

n

such

a

sentence;

an author

who is not

directly

embodied

n

a

first

person,

as a

speaker

s

in

his

speech, may manipulate anguage

n

accordancewith the

possibilities

inherent

n

it-and

at the

same

time

respecting

the limits

it

imposes,

in

order to

represent

a fictional

subjectivity-but

he does

not

speak

n

it. He

writes,rather,

nd

n

writingdisappears.

This

inability

of

Ducrot's to

get

beyond

the

concept

of a

speaking

voice is tied to the

inability

to see revealed

in

the evidence

of

language-in particular,

he evidence of

narrative-a

vision

of

language

other

than

the

egocentric

one,

a vision

in

which a

territory

s

opened

diacritics / winter 1991

27


10/13

up

withinmanno

longer

governed

y

man,

n

which orms

andconstructions

ppear

emptied

f all human

resence.

Contrary

oDucrot's

xplicit

laim ohave

destroyed

he

onenessof the

speaking

ubject,

t is

preserved

t

every

evel. What eems

to be

the

unstated

onceptualization

ehind

hisclaim s one

in

whicha certain

nified

ubject-

namelyheauthor-is dividedntoanumberfseparateubjects,achunified ndentire,

but each nevertheless

ierarchically

ubordinatedo

the author

n some

undefined

semantic ashion.

In

this

manner,

henomena

uch as

irony

are

brought

ack to and

containedwithin he amiliarormof a

voice,

whereas

o

such

explanation

s

available

to the

theory

of

unspeakable

entences.

Indeed,

n

this

atter

heory

rony

receives

no

explanation.

But far from

being

a

deficiency

of

this

theory,

his lack

of

explanation

reflects

hefact hat

rony

s not

a

linguistic

henomenon,

n

thestrict ense

of thatwhich

is

formally epresentable

ithin

inguisticheory,

ndcanbe

represented

n

it

only

n

an

imaginary

ndnonfalsifiable

ay.9

For this

reason,

a

formal

inguistic heory,

unlike

Ducrot's,

oncedes hat here re

aspects

f

linguistic

erformance

hat

scape

explana-

tionwithin ts frameworkndacknowledgeshe existence f another isciplinewitha

long

andrich

history nalyzing

hose

aspects

of literature

boutwhich

inguistics

has

nothing

o

say-literary

criticism.

The

alternatives,herefore,

ounterpose

ot a

theory

entered

n

a

single unitary

subject

and a

polyphonic

heory

but rather ne

in

whicha

plurality

f

isolatedand

noncommunicating

oints

of vieworcenters

oexist

n

a narrative

tyle

n

which here s

no

first-person,ingle

omniscient

oice,

imposing personal nity,

and

one

in

which

polyphony

onsists

n

a

hierarchy

f

voices,

eachconceived n themodel

of

the

other,

et

one

providing

single,overarching

enter.

Ultimately,

f

course,

hechoice

between he

two

competing

models

will

depend

n

argumentationppealing

o the

evidence.

But

currently

he

issues

have

taken

on

an

ideological

oloring,

nd t

sufficesto name

one

position unitary

nd heother

polyphonic

or t to

appear

hat hesidesare

chosen.

I

have

ried o

suggest,

however,

hat ither

ide

might

hoose o call itself

polyphonic,

so

long

as

this erm emains

vocative

ather

han

learly

efined. havealso

riedo show

that

he

position

roughly

ketched

y

Ducrot

s

farfrom

being

the

one

presenting

he

greatest

hallenge

o the traditional

gocentric

iew of

language,

ar from

being

the

counterpart

n

linguistics

f a

contemporary

iterary

heory.

Instead,

t is

just

one of the

current

ways

n

which

he

returno the

traditional

ormulation

s

negotiated.

On

the

other

hand,

theory

f

the

anguage

f

narrative

n

which

a

configuration

f

sentencespossessingno subjective enterwhatsoeversentences f Narrationer se)

alternating

ith

entences

ossessing

ifferent

hird-person

enters f

subjectivity

ut

n

which

here

s no

single

center

of

subjectivity

olding ogether

he whole

text

is

by

no

means

a

unique

nd

solated ne.

I

have

argued

lsewhere

see

Ecriture,Narration

nd

the

Grammarf

French ]

hat t

is

such

a

view

of thenovel aken

s

the

paradigmatic

ase

of

literaturehat

emerges

n

the

fiftiesand

sixties

n

France ndthat

ays

the

empirical

groundwork

orthenew

theory

f

literaturehat ame o mark

hosedecades.

Itscentral

tenet,

as we have

seen,

tookvarious

orms: the deathof

the author

r

the

notionof an

6criture

which

was

not

the

personal

oice

of

a

writer

onceivedof as a

speaker.

Its

principles

were

to

be

sought

n

the

language

f the novel.

Each

n

a

strikingly

imilar

fashion,Barthes,

lanchot, utor,

Foucault,

nd

Deleuze awa

radical ivisionbetween

9.

In

other

words,

the

ormula

or irony

is

saying

one

thing

and

meaning

another.

But,

of

course,

that

meaning

is other

than the

semantic

meaning assigned

to the

sentences

by

the

grammar.

It is

for

this reason that ironic

intent s

difficult

o

prove

in

libel suits and

also

for

this

reason that

irony

can be a tool

ofpolitical

opposition

when

the

consequences of

direct

opposition

seem

too

severe.

For a

differentposition

on the

possibility

of

aformal

account

of

irony,

see

Sperber

and

Wilson,

Relevance,

sp.237ff. WhileSperber

ndWilsonreat

ronyformally,hey

nonetheless

place

it

outside

ormal

linguistics.

28


11/13

two

possibilities

of

novelistic

style

that

set the

language

of narrative ff from

that

of

the

epic,

that

s,

a

narrative ied to the

spoken

language.

Blanchot

spoke

of it as

a

division

of

the il into an

il/it

and an

il/(s)he.

The

first

becomes the

mpersonal

oherenceof a

story

[135],

the

ndifferent-difference

hat

alters

he

personal

voice and

does not

speak

from

a

centre

[142];

the second marks

he

intrusionof

character: the novelist is

the

person

who

refuses to

say

'I'

but

delegates

that

power

to other

people;

the

novel

is

filled

with

little

'egos'

[135-36].

Blanchot's

distinction

corresponds

o the division of

labor

Barthes,

n

the

chapter Writing

and the Novel

in

WritingDegree

Zero,

sees

performed

by

the

narrative

past

(in

French the

pass6

simple)

and what

he

calls the

third

person

of the

novel,

that

s,

represented

hought.

It is

clear

that

for

both Blanchot and

Barthes these

divisions are

ultimately

grammatical,

ased

upon

differences of

person

and tense.

In

the

development

of the novel out of the

epic,

what are

essentially

two new

forms of

narrative

sentence are

accompaniedby

the

gradual ilencing

of

the

storyteller

and the

development

of a form

in

which

that

experience

one

does not recountbut that is

involved when one

recounts creates a distance that decentres he work [Blanchot139].

The

condition then

of

polyphony

n

this

view-of a

plurality

of

subjectively

centered

worlds,

to

use a

terminology

hatavoids

suggesting

a

speaker-is

the

silencing

of

the

central

person

of

an

author

as

narrator,who,

if

he

continues to

exist,

exists

somewhere

outside the

language

of

the

text,

in

another

dark,

as

Beckett

puts

it

in

Company.

The result s

the

creationof

linguistic

units-nonembeddable

sentences,

or

Es-that

owe

their

tructure o some

otherprinciple,

ome othercenter han he

speaker

and

the time

and

place

of his

speech

act.

In

the

case

of

sentences of

Narration,

hose

appearing

n

French n

thepass6 simple,10

here

s no

subjective emporal

nd

spatial

center

whatsoever.

Such sentences

recount he

past

by placing

discreteentities

that

are

past

events

in

a linear

order. But

there

s no

privileged

moment

o

which the othersare

referred;

he

orderof time

is

that

of

history,

outsideof

any

experience.

One

recognizes

n

this

account he

conception

of

time

that

Bergson,

in

L'essai sur les

donn6es

mmn iates

de la

conscience,

defines

by

contrast o la

dur6e;

t is le

temps que

l'astronome ntroduitdans

ses

formules,

e

temps

que

nos

horloges

divisent en

parcelles

egales

[80].

This

explains why

the French

narrative

past,

as

Benveniste has

pointed

out,

toleratesno

deictics.

In

the case

of

sentences of

represented

hought,

he result is even

stranger

and more

counterintuitive.Such sentencesare

organized,

o to

speak,

around

ubjectivecenters

hat

are not egos but third-personcenters of subjectivity,each representingspatially and

temporally

a

here anda now which does

not

designate

any

speech

act.

Stranger

till,

there

is

evidence

thatversions

of

such sentences

exist

thatare

not

occupied by any

third-person

SELF,

but nonetheless contain

spatial

and

temporal

centers.

They

present

unoccupied

perspectives,

inguistic

representations

f a

theoreticalconstruct

belonging

to

Bertrand

Russell's

theory

of

knowledge,

of

possible

worlds,

n

a

Russellian

reading

of

Leibniz.

Such

sentences describethe

sensibilia

of

the

physical

world as

events

grouped

aroundan

empty

center. It

might

be said that

this model

divides

or

factors out the

subject

into

various

linguistically

defined

aspects

of

subjectivity,

some

of

which

may

occur

in

isolation-the here/now of the

unoccupied perspective-and

others

obligatorily

in

conjunction

with this

spatial-temporal

enter.12There s no a

priori

reason for

deciding

that this account of

linguistic subjectivity

s

less

a

threat o the

oneness

of

the

subject

than

another,

since the

unity

of

the

subject

is

a notion that tself

needs

definition within

a

precise

and

empirically

testable

theory.

10.

Such

sentences

correspond

n crucial

ways

to

Benveniste's notion

ofhistoire.

11.

The notion

of

an

unoccupiedperspective

as a

linguistic

concept

is the

subject

of

my

Describing

the

Unobserved: Events

Grouped

around

an

Empty

Center.

12.

See,

in

particular, Unspeakable

Sentences,

chapter

5,

for

a discussion

of

reflective

and

nonreflective

consciousness.

diacritics

/

winter

1991

29


12/13

The

world

delineated

n

this

theory

is one created

by

a written

anguage

associated

historically

with

realism,

thatrealism

which,

carried o its

logical

conclusions,

became the

modernism

of

Joyce

and

Woolf,

Proustand Beckett.

It is

a world-the one thatsensation

yields-that

is

fragmentary,

bsurd,

awless,

but not

self-contradictory

Russell

199].13

That world

presents

another

figure

of freedom than the Bakhtinianone. This is

the

freedomof a

writing

n which

the

writer,

poised

between two determinisms-a

personal

style,

an individualand

blind

necessity,

on theone

hand,

and a

rule-governed

anguage

on the other-discovers

an arena of choice

where he

can

create,

liberated

from

the

orthodoxies

of

the

past only

at

that

point

where he

relinquishes

personalexpression

and

ceases to

inhabit

and

use his

language

as

a

speaker.

Then,

at a certain

remove from his

style

and

his

language- that

distance that distances

even

him,

removing

him from

the

centre,

since it

constantly

decentres he

work

Blanchot139]-he

discovers

n

it and

with

a certain error

aws and truthswhose mode of

existence is

impersonal

and

which it

is

no

longer

appropriate

o

qualify

with the

possessive

pronoun.

That

discovery

is of

a

possibility inherent n language,butit is the written anguageof narrative hatreveals it.

A

language

and

a

style

are

blind

forces;

a modeof

writing

s an

act of historical

olidarity

[Barthesl4].

We

recognize

here Barthes's ecriture-that

existential freedomBarthes

claimed,

in

the

face

of

Sartre's

action

and

personal

engagement,

for

an

engaged impersonalwriting

rather

han

for an

engaged

writer. Thus he

choice

of,

and afterwards he

responsibility

for,

a mode

of

writingpoint

to the

presence

of

Freedom

16].

It is a

freedom that

must

engage

in

an

untiringstruggle against

that

doxa which it itself creates.

Writing

as

Freedom

is thereforea mere

moment. But

this

moment

is

one of the most

explicit

in

History,

since

History

s

always

and above

all a

choice

and the limits of this choice

[17].

Nor does this

conception

of freedom

reject

a

priori

the

figure

of the

carnivalesque

rowd

of voices

disrespectful

of laws

and limits. It

rather

ecognizes

thatthe

nostalgia

for such

a freedom

s

a

longing

for

something maginary,

or a freedom

seized

once

and

for

all,

a

freedom

in

which no choices are

required

because no real

consequences

would follow

from

them.

The freedomof

writing

s

haunted

by

a

past

far from

prelapsarian-that

past

of its

own

creation,

its own

history,

which

continually

returns to remind it

of the

unintended

consequences

of its own former

freedom,

to

deprive

its

present

of

the old

possibilities.

Such

aconception

of

language

and iterature

ffers no

imaginary

onsolations.

In

this

perioddesperate orconsolation,aperiodthat dentifies tselfwith nomoredecisive label

than

a

post-

which

only rejects

its

own

past,

the

hardvision of

literary

heory

thatwas

inaugurated

n

the

years

of the cold

war

and that

ived

through

1968 is

pushed

back

into

a

past

now

pronounced

rrelevant.Butthis does not

change

the fact thatall the

possibilities

inherent

n

it have

not

yet

been

exhausted,

despite

their

having

fallen

out of fashion.

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