allaire 1963 bare particulars

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1/9

Bare ParticularsAuthor(s): Edwin B. AllaireSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 14, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Feb., 1963), pp. 1-8Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318430.

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2/9

PHLOSOP

STU IES

Edited by

WILFRID

SELLARS and

HERBERT FEIGL

with the advice and

assistance

f

PAUL

MEEHL, JOHN

HOSPERS,

MAY

BRODBECK

VOLUME XIV

Contents

January-February963

NUMBERS 1-2

Bare

Particulars

yEdwin

B.

Allaire,

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Does Modal

Logic Rest upon

a

Mistake?by

R.

M.

Martin,UNIVERSITY OF BONN

andUNIVERSITY

OF TEXAS

IndirectSpeech Again

by A.

N.

Prior,MANCHESTER

UNIVERSITY

Indirect

Speech:

A

Rejoinder o Prof.A. N.

Prior

by

L.

Jonathan

Cohen,

QUEEN'S

COLLEGE, OXFORD

Baier's

Test

for

Practical

Rules Re-Examined

byDavid Barry

Lyons,

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

A

Note on

Commitment

by

LennartAqvist,UNIVERSITY

OF

UPPSALA, SWEDEN

Lewis'

Imperatives

of Right by

William K.

Frankena,UNIVERSITY

OF MICHIGAN

A

Note on

Austin's

PerformativeTheory

of

Knowledgeby

Bernard

Mayo,

UNIVERSITY OF

BIRMINGHANM

Bare

Particulars

by

EDWIN

B.

ALLAIRE

STATE

UNIVERSITY

OF

IOWA

CONSIDER

'this

is

red,'

asserted

rulyof a

colored disc.

Some

philosophers

claim

that the

sentence

refers o

a

fact

consistingof

two

(kinds

of)

entities,

an individual(bareparticular)and a character universal),referred o

by

'this'and

'red,'

respectively.

They claim

further

hat

the two

entities

stand

in

the

exemplification

elation,

represented

by

'is.'

Currently,

hat

claimis

1

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3/9

2 PHILOSOPHICALTUDIES

widely rejected.Underlying he many arguments upporting hat rejection

is a rathersimple idea which Russell

once

expressed: One is tempted to

regard This is red' as a subject-predicate roposition;but if one does so,

one finds that 'this' becomes a substance,an unknowablesomething in

which

predicates nhere

. .

Though awkwardly xpressed,Russell's point is clear: The individual-

characteranalysis s at odds with the empirical radition. That is,

if

one

claims

that 'this

is

red'

is a

subject-predicate roposition

n

the

sense

that

'this'

and 'red'refer to

unanalyzable

ntities of differentontologicalkinds,

then one has violated the Principleof Acquaintance

PA),2

a basic tenet

of

empiricism.One is not acquaintedwith a something which could be

construedas an entity of a kind different rom red, except in the sense that

this is a

collection

f

the same

kind of

things

as

red,e.g., square

and

bright.

The heart of Russell'spoint is thus that the individualsof the individual-

character nalysisare unknowable

n

the sense

that

one

is not

directlyac-

quaintedwith them.

I

proposeto explorewhether or not one can propound he individual-

character nalysiswithout abandoning he

PA.

In

particular,

want

to

dis-

cuss

Bergmann's

ssertion3 hat

beingacquainted

with

a red

spot,

and noth-

ing else, one is presentednot with justone thing but two, a particular . .

and a character . . If I understandBergmann, e is maintainingprecisely

what

Russell

denies, namely,

hat

one is on such occasions

acquainted

with

an

individualor,

as he

prefers

o

call

it,

a

particular.

His

motivation s clear.

He attemptsto reconcile he individual-characternalysis

with

the PA.

Before discussinghis attempt

it

will be

helpful

to

examinethe dialectics

which

give

rise

to

the

problem.

will do that

by commentingbriefly

on

two

other

analyses

f the disc:

(I)

The disc is a collectionof

what hassometimes

been called perfectparticulars.

This

is red,'

asserted

ruly of our disc, is

analyzedas follows: 'this'refers

o

a collectionof entities,one of which is

referred

o

by

'red.'

This

latter

entity

is such that

if

there were two

red discs,

there

would

be two

such

entities

(perfect particulars),

ach

unanalyzable

and

numerically

different

rom

the

other.

(II)

The disc is a collection of

characters

universals).

This

is red'

is

analyzed

as

in

(I), except

that

the

entities

are

such

that if

there were

two red

discs,

the

two

collectionswould

have one

member n

common,

.e.,

one

member

which

is

literally

he same.

Each of

these analyses

encounters

an immediate

and,

I

believe,

insur-

mountable

objection.

Consider

wo

discs

of

the same

(shadeof) color, size,

shapeand so on.The objection o (I) is that it cannotaccountforthe same-

ness

of

the discs

since

the members

of

the two

collectionsare

all

unanalyz-

able

and different

rom

each other.

In

other

words, hough

both

collections

contain a

member referred

o

by 'red,' (I) providesnothing they

have in



4/9

BARE

PARTICULARS

3

common

since the membersare

unanalyzable

s well as different.

The

ob-

jection to

(II) is

that it cannot

accountfor

the

difference,

ince

each

collec-

tion has

literally

he same

members.4

The individual-characternalysisencountersneither objection.That is

its strength.

The difference

of the

discs is

accounted

or

by

each

containing

a

different

ndividual;

he

sameness,by

each

containing iterally

the

same

characters

as

in

(II)). The

individual-character

nalysis

hus

allows

one

to

solve the

problemsof

samenessand

difference,

at

least as

they

arise

in

connection

with things.

Speakingmore

traditionally,

t

provides

a

solu-

tion

to the

nominalism-realismssue.

Notice

that a proponent

of the

individual-character

nalysis,or,

as

I

shall

henceforth

call

him, a realist,

explicitlygrounds

(by

means

of

entities)

the

samenessas

well as

the differenceof

the

two discs.

There must be

entities

to

accountfor the

discs

beingcalled the same

or,

less

accurately,

heremust

be a

shared

omething n

order

to

account for

the same

word ('red')

being

truly

predicatedof

'this'

and 'that.'The

objection

to (I) is

in

fact

some-

times

expressed s follows.

Since the

two red

entities

of

the

two

collections

are

different

and

unanalyzable,here

is no

way

of

accounting

or

their

being

referred o by the

same

word ('red'). So

expressed he objection s

mislead-

ing.

Moreover, t tempts a

defender

of (I) to

appeal

mistakenly

o

a

variant

of the meaning-is-use octrine.

The demandfor

grounding

ameness s

at present

suspect.

The suspicion

makes (I)

seemattractive.

Consider wo discs of

different hades

of

red.

In

ordinaryanguage, red'

may

be

correctlyused

to

refer to

either.

It

appears

that

a realist,

o be

consistent,

must

also ground

he sameness

f the

different

shades.For,

if

he

objects

to

(I) because t

does

not

explain

why the

same

word is used to refer o two

perfect

particulars,

e must

take

seriously

he

same

objection

in

the

case

of

'red'

when

applied

to differentshades.More-

over,since each

shade

s

simple

and

unanalyzable

he

ground

(i.e.,

the

shared

entity) mustbe of a differentkind.Thus,a third kindmakes ts appearance.

For

those of

a Platonic

stripe, his

third is

a

transcendent niversal r

con-

cept.

5

Each

shade

s red

by

virtue

of

participating

n

the same

transcendent

universal,

which

is the

proper

eferentof

'red.'

Hence,either

the

PA

cannot

be

maintained

or

we must

be

acquainted

with ( intuit )

concepts.The sec-

ond

alternativehas

been

unacceptable o

those

who embrace

he PA.

The

realist hus seems

doomed

to Platonism.

The proponent

of (I)

who

denies the

need

for

grounding

ameness

does not. This

seemingadvantage

hashad its effects.Recently, it hasbeen argued hat the root of Platonism

is

the

mistaken

way

in which

we

sometimes ookat

language. n

particular,

the

very

attempt

to

ground

samenessreveals he

mistaken

belief that

there

must

be

a

referent

o

justify

the

use

of a word.

Not even

the referring

se



5/9


of a wordrequires referent,or so it is argued.What holds in generalholds

for 'red.'Hence, its use in referringo different hadesneed not be grounded.

Thus, we are told, the samenessof the shades merelymeans that they are

referred o by the same word. Moreover, t is claimed, even in the case of

things of

the

same shade each exemplification

f

it

is

really

different

and

unanalyzable.

n other

words,

their

samenessalso

consists

merely

in

their

being referred

o

by

the

same word.6

A

defenderof (I) may thus attempt to dispose of the objection

that

he

cannot

account

for

the

sameness

of

things by arguing

hat

the

very

at-

temptto accountfor it is mistaken.The attempt,he holds, inevitably

eads

to Platonismwith all its horrorsof transcendent

ntities.

That

shows

why

the

use doctrinemay

be

attractive

o a

defender

of

(I).

Consideragain

two discs

of

the same

(shadeof) color, size, shape,

and so

on. Supposethey are shownto you, one to

the

left

of

the

other.

If

aftera

while you are shown

them

again,you will not be able to tell which is which.

In fact, you will not be able to tell whether he two you now see are the two

you saw earlier.You can only tell that the two you now see have all the

properties hat the two you saw earlierhad.

In

other words, taken as such

and

in

themselves,

wo

perfectparticulars

f the same shade cannot be

told

apart.That means that

in

this case at least the sameness s grounded.We

know how the realistgrounds t. It remains o be shown that he need not

therefore

ground

he sameness

of

different hades n

order o justify

he use

of

'red'

for

any

of

them.

My realist akesadvantage f what the use doctrinehas taughtus, namely,

(a)

that from the fact that

the

same

word

is used

to

refer to two

things

it

does

not always

ollow that the

two

share

an entity. (Indeed,

we could de-

cide to use

just

one word to

refer

to

green

and

red.)

On the

other

hand,

it

does not

follow

(b)

that

they

never

do. The

proponents

of

(I) rashly

nfer

(b)

from

(a).

Their

rashness,

have

argued,may

be due

to

their mistaken

belief that even

(b)

commits

one

to

Platonism.Some things, our two discs

for

example,are

the

same shade

of

color. This is not a linguistic fact; i.e.,

not

merely he fact thatthey

are

referred o by the sameword.They are the

same

in

that theyareindistinguishable

s

such, or, more precisely,one can-

not

differentiate hem by their

color

alone.

Let us take stock. The problemof analyzing uch things as colored discs

arises

n the context of the

realism-nominalism

ssue. That issue, we saw,

cannotreallybe handledby accounting

or

the samenessn the discs n terms

of the samenessof words.At some point samenessmust be grounded n

entities.

To

believe

otherwise

s to

put upon

the

meaning-is-use octrinea

burdengreater han

it

can bear. Thus,

in

our case, it remains he first task

of

analysis

o

single

out the

unanalyzable

ntities which

account

for

the dif-



6/9

BARE

PARTICULARS

5

ference

and

the

samenessof the

two discs.

The

second

task

or

step,

as in

all

cases,

s to

employ

the result

obtained in

the

firststep

to

explicate

certain

philosophical

sesof

words,

hereby

dissolving

he traditional ialectics.

The

realisticanalysisprovidesthe requiredgrounding.Yet it is tainted. Like

Russell,

many

philosophers

claim

that

they are not

acquainted

with indi-

viduals.The

heart

of

the matter

is whether or not

Bergmann's

laim

that

one

is in

fact

acquaintedwith

individuals

bare

particulars)

s

defensible

or,

even,

whether

t

can

be

made

intelligible.

An

obviousobjection

s that the claim

merelysprings

rom

the

dialectical

needs it

satisfiesand

is not

borne out

by a careful

inspection

of

what

is

in

fact

presented.

Indeed,

Bergmann

himself invites this

objection.

I,

of

course,

have

convinced

myself

that

I

am

actuallypresented

with

two

things.

Yet

I

am

loathe

to restthe

case

on this

conviction; or I

am

also

convinced

that a very

major

partof it

is

dialectical.

One

cannot

but

wonderhow

one

does

convince

oneselfof

suchmatters.

In

the

lightof

what he

himself

says,one is

indeed

tempted to

conclude

that

his

conviction is

dialectical

rather

than

phenomenological, f

I

may so ex-

press

myself.

If

so, then he

has

abandoned

he

PA.

Whether or

not under

the

pressureof

the

dialectic he has

actuallydone

that is

not my

concern.

The

point is

rather

whether or

not the

description

e

proposescan

be

defended ndependentlyof the dialectics.

Phenomenological

escription

s

prompted

by

philosophical

puzzles.One

turnsto

the

formeras

a

prelude o the

dissolutionof

the latter.The

dangers

are

obvious.

One

may

think

that one

still

describeswhen

in

fact one

already

argues.

That

makesall

alleged

descriptions

uspect.The

best one can do is

elaborate

hem

in

severalways,

always

n guard

against

hevarious

biases hat

mightcreep

in.

Once a

descriptionhas

been

accepted, he

puzzles

must

be

solved

by

speaking

commonsensically

bout it.

In

the course

of

thus speak-

ing

about it, one

maywell

be led

to

reconsider

t. After

all, it

was

prompted

by

the

puzzles.

Nevertheless,

one must

not and

cannot

give

awaythe

game

by

maintaining

hat

the

description s

forced

upon one

by

the

dialectics.

Bergmann

n the

quoted

passage

omes

dangerously

lose

to doing

just

that.

The

most one

could

say is that

the

dialectics

directs our

attention

toward

what is

presented.

But it

does not

and cannot

tell

us what

actually s pre-

sented.

A

comparison

may

help to

make

the point

clear.

The later

Wittgenstein,

believing that the

philosophical

puzzles

arise from

the

misuse of

words,

undertook o describe heircorrectuse.The misusesareengendered y what

he

calls

misleading

grammatical

nalogies.

Once these

latter

are

recognized

as

such,

the

philosophical

puzzles

disappear.

This is his

basic

idea.To

speak

as

before,

Wittgenstein's

description

of

correct

(and

incorrect)use is

the



7/9


preludeto his solution of the philosophicalpuzzles. Are then his

descrip-

tions unbiased?There is no guarantee.Nor is it reasonable o demand

one

beforehand.Wittgenstein'sdescriptionproceedsdirectly

rom what

he con-

sidersa puzzleand thus indirectly romwhathe considers nillicit use.Thus,

the dialecticsmay have influenced he description.But once more,

the best

one can do is guardagainstthe biases that may have been introduced.

So,

too, with phenomenological escription. n this regardall philosophers

re

in the sameboat. They all start romwhat they considerunproblematical r,

as

it

is sometimesput, fromwhat they hold to be commonsensical.With re-

spect

to

their startingpoint they must always

be

vigilant. One cannot do

more;one must not do less.

I

return o the issue: Can the realisticanalysisbe defendedon phenome-

nologicalgrounds? t will be well to distinguishbetween two uses of 'know.'

First, there is the use of 'know' n which to know something means to be

acquainted

with

it. Second, there is the use

in

which

to know

something

means

to be

able to recognize t.

In

the second sense individuals

as such

or in

themselvesare unknowable.Consideragain he two discsand

the

situa-

tion

in

which you are shown them twice. Since you can only

tell that the

two you now see have all the properties hat the two you saw

earlier

had,

it

followsthat

if

each consistsof an individualand the severalcharacters

t

exemplifies, he individuals s suchor in themselvesarenot recognizable r,

as

I

prefer

o

say,

not

reidentifiable.

he

characters

re.

To

express

he

point

differently,

wo individualsare

merely numerically

different

whereas

two

characters re

intrinsically ifferentas well.

Russell held that individuals re unknowable.

A

defender

of

the

realistic

analysismay

take him to

have

held

merely that they are

not

recognizable,

i.e.,

that

they

cannot

be

known

n

the

second sense

of 'know.'

This, though,

is

not

at

all

what Russell meant. Rather, n sayingthat individualsare

un-

knowable,he

used

'know'

n

the

firstsense.

In

turn,

I

hold with Bergmann

that

while

they

are

indeed

unknowable n

the

second sense they are known

in

the first.

Accordingly, cannot get awaywith just maintaining hat they

are

merelynumerically

ifferent. must

show

n

what senseone is acquainted

with

them.

Not

to

recognize

his

obligation

would be to

confuse again the

two uses

of

'know.'

Nevertheless,

n

pointing out that individualsare not

recognizable, .e., are merely numericallydifferent,one has arrivedat the

heart

of

the matter.Individuals

are

just

those

entities which

do

groundthe

numericaldifferenceof

two things which are the same in all (nonrelational)

respects.

Consider once

more the

two discs. When

presentedtogether, they are

presented

as

numericallydifferent.That difference s presentedas is their

sameness

with

respect

o

shape, (shadeof) color,and so on. What accounts



8/9

BARE

PARTICULARS

7

for that

difference s the

numerically

ifferent

ndividuals.

No

character, r

group

of characters

an do that.

Thus,

to

say

that

there

are individuals s

to

say

that

things

may

be

merely

numerically

different.No matter

what

de-

scriptionone proposes, he numericaldifferenceof two things which are

alike in

all

(nonrelational)respects

must

be

accountedfor. Consider

(IL).

To claim

that both

discs are but

collections

of

literally

he same

universals

does

not account for the thisness

and thatness

which are

implicitly

referred

to in speakingof

them as two

collections.That is,

the two collections

of

characters-if one

persists n speaking hat

way-are, as

presented,

numeri-

cally

different.Clearly,

therefore,

something

other than

a character

must

also be

presented.That

something

s what

proponents

f

the

realistic

nalysis

call a

bare

particular.Or,

perhapsbetter,

that

is their

explication

of

'bare

particular.'

One

difficultyremains.

Bergmannclaims

that

in

being presented

with

one redspot one is

presented

with two things.That

maybe misleading.

The

most

prevalentuse

of 'two'carries spatial

connotation.

That

is,

if there

are

twothings then

they are

spatially elated.Yet

exemplification,he

relation

obtainingbetween a character

nd an

individual, s obviously

not

spatial.

Thus,

the sense in which

there are two things is

merelythe sense

in which

there

are two

characters redand square)

n the

presentation f a red square.

For redand squareare not spatiallyrelated.Nor arean individualand the

character r

characterst

exemplifies. f

one shouldinsist that the

two char-

actersare in fact

spatially elated,arguing

hat they

are at the same place,I

merelyask him

what he

means by 'place.'There is

only one

answerI can

think of

which

would help.

A

placeas

such is itself an

entity. But, then, this

answer

makes

places

into

bare

particulars.This

piece of dialectics s well

known.

Consideragain

'this is red,'

asserted rulyof a

coloreddisc. To

what does

'this' refer?That

it does referto

something is

obvious. It does not always

refer

o

the entity

referred o by 'red.'

That is, 'is' in this

utterancedoes not

alwaysstand

for

identity.

Hence, 'this' can

only referto one of

two things:

an

individualor

a collection of

characters, ne of

which is red.8

We know

already

hat

the latter

alternative ails, for in the case

of two collectionsof

charactershe

membersof

which are the

same, the numerical

differencebe-

tween the

two collections s

left

unaccounted or. The realistic

analysisdoes

accountfor

it.

Moreover, wo individuals

re

presented n the sense that the

two

collectionsare

presented

as numericallydifferent.

That is

not to deny,

though, that individualsare merelynumericallydifferentfrom each other

and thus not

reidentifiable

s

such. That they are

explainswhy

they have

been

overlooked o often.

I

have argued

hat one can

propounda realistic

analysiswithoutabandon-



9/9

8

PHILOSOPHICAL

STUDIES

ing the

PA.Moreover,

one

can single out the bare particulars ithout

using

'exist'philosophically,

hus

avoiding he dialecticsof the

nominalism-realism

issue.

In trying

o do this, I

described,

r triedto describe,

he sortof entity

an individual s. Positively, ndividualsarethe carriers f numericaldiffer-

ence

as directly

presented o

us. Negatively,

ndividuals

re

not rudimentary

Aristotelian

ubstances.

Thus, they

are not

the sortof things Russell

prob-

ably

had

in

mind when he

denied

that they can be known.

To

the

sort

of

thing he had

in mind Locke's

phrase

a something

I know

not what

does

indeedapply.

To what

I meanby an

individual,

t does not.

To one who

ac-

cepts

the

PA,

Locke's phraseprovides

sufficient

ground

for

rejecting

the

entities

he

speaks

of.

The individuals want

to keep

from

being

overlooked

are

not such

entities.

That

is why one need

not abandon

he

PA in order

o

maintain hat

we are

presentedwith

bare particulars.

ReceivedFebruary

0, 1961

NOTES

'Bertrand Russell,

An

Inquiry

nto Meaning and Truth (London: Allen

and Unwin,

1948),

p.

97.

2

The

PA

states

that the

indefinable ermsof any ontological description

must

refer

to entities with which one

is

directly

acquainted.Furthermore, an unanalyzable

ntity

is explicated o

mean an entity represented y an indefinable

erm.

'Gustav

Bergmann,

Strawson'sOntology,

Journalof

Philosophy, 57:616

(Septem-

ber 1960).

'

Cf. Gustav Bergmann, Russell

on

Particulars,

Philosophical Review, 56:59-72

(1947). Reprinted

n The Metaphysics

of

Logical

Positivism (London: Longmans,

Green,

1954), pp. 197-214.

6

For a

discussion

of concepts,see

Reinhardt

Grossman,

Conceptualism,

Review of

Metaphysics,

14:243-54 (December 1960).

'This

explication

of sameness

may

well

explicate the

Hatus-vocis

doctrine

of

some

medievals.

'

Bergmann,

Strawson'sOntology, p.

616.

8

As

I

have

shown,

the

perfect-particular

nalysis(i.e., (I) )

is

unacceptablebecause

it does

not

account

for sameness.

Does Modal

Logic

Rest

upon

a

Mistake?

by

R.

M.

MARTIN

UNIVERSITY OF

BONN

AND

UNIVERSITY OF

TEXAS

PHILOSOPHERS

differ

enormously s to just

what

they wish to include

under

formal

ogic. Some wish to include

the whole of

mathematics,as

devel-

oped, say,within the

simplified heory

of

types

or within

an

axiomaticset

allaire 1963 bare particulars

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