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www.wateralternatives.org Volume1|Issue1Molle,F.2008.Nirvanaconcepts,narrativesandpolicymodels:Insightfromthewatersector.WaterAlternatives1(1):131156

Nirvana Concepts, Narratives and Policy Models:

Insights from the Water Sector

Franois MolleInstitutdeRecherchepourleDveloppement(IRD),UR199,Montpellier,France;[email protected]

ABSTRACT: Analysis of water policy shows the importance of cognitive and ideological dimensions in theformulationofpolicydiscourses.Ideasareneverneutralandreflecttheparticularsocietalsettingsinwhichtheyemerge,theworldviewsandinterestsofthosewhohavethepowertosetthetermsofthedebate,tolegitimate

particularoptions

and

discard

others,

and

to

include

or

exclude

particular

social

groups.

This

article

focuses

on

threetypesofconceptualobjectswhichpermeatepolicydebates:nirvanaconcepts,whichunderpinoverarchingframeworksofanalysis,narratives i.e.causalandexplanatorybeliefsandmodelsofpoliciesordevelopmentinterventions. Itsuccessivelyreviewshowthesethreetypesofconceptspopulatethewatersector, investigateshowtheyspread,andthenexaminesthe implicationsofthisanalysisforappliedresearchonpolicymakingandpractice.

KEYWORDS:Watermanagement,waterpolicy,policymaking,IWRM,narratives

INTRODUCTION

Itis

atruism

that

human

mental

maps,

judgments

and

decisions

are

necessarily

structured,

or

at

least

influenced, by past experiences, formal training, worldviews and idiosyncrasies. Likewise, onesinclinationsandideologiesarerarelyindependentfromonesindividual interests.Theemergenceandthe social life of concepts are therefore tightly linked to the ideas and interests that permeate themilieu in which they evolve. The field of development sciences,just like other fields, is prone tosuccessive, sometimes cyclical,discoveriesof ideasand theories that informor inspirepractice foranumberofyears(CornwallandBrock,2005).Forsome,thesearemerefadsofthedayproppedupby"buzzwords";forothers,theyreflecttheevolutionandgradualrefiningofknowledgeandconcepts;andfor stillothers, they reflect thepowerandembody theworldviewof thosewhohave thepower todisseminatethem.

This paper proposes a tentative and preliminary reflection on how one particular sector of

development

the

development

and

management

of

water

resources

is

influenced

by

ideas

that

manifest themselves throughubiquitous andproliferating "success stories", "bestpractices", "brightspots",or"promisingtechnologies"readilypromotedasuniversalandtransferabletoothercontexts.Thepaperdistinguishesamongthreedifferenttypesofconceptsthatshapepolicyanddecisionmakinginthecontemporarywatersector:nirvanaconceptsunderpinoverarchingframeworksthatpromoteorstrengthen particular narratives or storylines i.e. simple, causal, and explanatory beliefs andlegitimize specific blueprints or models of both policies and development interventions. Nirvanaconcepts,narrativesandmodels/iconsareallideationalandideologicalobjectswhichemergeatsomepointintimetotypifyacertainview,approach,or"solution".Overtime,suchconceptualobjectstendtoacquirealifeoftheirown;theymaybereified,orreworkedandreappropriated.Thedisseminationand the eventual fate of these concepts depend on many factors, not least their usefulness for

Molle:Nirvanaconcepts,narrativesandpolicymodels Page|131
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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WaterAlternatives 2008 Volume1|Issue1

particularactorsandconstituencieswhomayreappropriate,repackageand integratethem intotheirdiscoursesandstrategies.

Influential concepts inpolicymakingarenotmerelyneutralor scientific; theydonotemergebychancebut,rather,aretheemanationofcomplexwebsof interests, ideologies,andpower.Inreturn,

theyalso

shape

the

ways

things

are

framed;

options

are

favoured,

disregarded

or

ignored;

and

particular social groups are empowered or sidelined (Shore andWright, 1997; Keeley and Scoones,1999).Thisarticledrawsontheliteratureonthecognitiveandideologicaldimensionsofpolicymaking(seeApthorpe,1986;Roe,1994;ShoreandWright,1997)andseesestablishingknowledgeasinherentlypartoftheconstitutionofpolicynetworksitself(Latour,1989).

Thepaperdoesnotdiscuss"howdoesanideastimecome"(Kingdon,2002),neitherdoesitaddresstheprocessofpolicymaking;itmerelylooksathowdiscursiveobjectsareusedtodesignpoliciesandsupportparticularagendas,as"devices thatcloakpolicieswith the symboland trappingsofpoliticallegitimacy" (Shore and Wright, 1997). It successively reviews how the three types of conceptsconsidered populate the water sector, investigates how they spread, and then examines theimplicationsofthisanalysisforappliedresearchonpolicymakingandpractice.

NIRVANACONCEPTS

Nirvana conceptsare concepts thatembodyan ideal imageofwhat theworld should tend to.Theyrepresentavisionofa 'horizon'that individualsandsocietiesshouldstrivetoreach.Although,justaswithnirvana,thelikelihoodthatwemayreachthemisadmittedlylow,themerepossibilityofachievingthem and the sense of 'progress' attached to any shift in their direction suffice to make them anattractiveandusefulfocalpoint.

Nirvanaconceptsusuallytaketheformofa'photonegative'oftherealworld.Forexample,asthesocialandenvironmentalcostsofconventionalindustrialdevelopmentbecameapparent,theconceptof sustainable developmentproposed a visionwhereby contradictionswouldbe dissolved,negativeimpacts internalized,andantagonismsreconciled.Likewise,theconceptofgoodgovernanceemergedasamodelinwhichinefficient,corrupt,biasedanddiscriminatorygovernmentswould"asaresultof"or"through"growingtransparencyandpowersharingbecomeaccountabletotheirpopulationsandactforthecommongood.Participationorempowerment,atsomelevelofgeneralization,alsoappearas desirable counterpoints to exploitation and disfranchisement. All these words are "warmlypersuasive" (Williams, 1976), nicesounding, sanitized, and endowed with "almost unimpeachablemoralauthority"(CornwallandBrock,2005),atleastinthespheresofdevelopmentprofessionals.

In the field of water, the main ubiquitous nirvana concept is Integrated Water ResourceManagement (IWRM). IWRMevolved from thecorrectperception thatwatermanagementhasbeenunintegrated, or fragmented: economic sectors and ministries have managed water independentlywhile interventions in, anddevelopmentof,water resources in upper catchments have taken placewithoutadequateconsiderationofimpactsondownstreamareas;waterqualityissueshavebeenofteneitherdisregardedordisconnected fromquantity issues;groundwaterhas frequentlybeenexploitedwithout concern for its hydrological linkages with surface water (and vice versa), and landwaterinteractionshavebeenoverlooked;and last,ecosystemshavebeen impairedand socialequityoftendisregarded.Theseandotherproblemsledtoasituationofperceivedcrisiswhere,inthewakeofthe1992 Dublin Conference and the endorsement of the economic dimension of water, IWRM wasconceptualizedastheoppositeofthisratherchaoticsituation,conveyingthevisionofaworldwherethemultiplicityofdesiredgoalswasreaffirmedandwhereimbalanceswereredressed.

According to its most frequently used definition, "IWRM is a process which promotes the coordinateddevelopmentandmanagementofwater, landandrelated resources, inordertomaximizethe resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising thesustainabilityofvitalecosystems"(GWP,2000).Animportantaspectofthedefinitionisitsemphasisonthe

process

dimension

of

IWRM.

This

rightly

suggests

that

IWRM

is

amoving

target

since

new

problems



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emerge and evolve over time,which requires considerable flexibility and regular attention to thesechanges; inadditionjustaswithnirvanatheobjectiveisalwaysjustbeyondreachandthecruxofthematteristokeepinchingtowardandgraduallyapproachingit.

However, IWRM faces twodifficulties inherent in thenirvanaconcept.By itsverynature, it isan

attractiveyet

woolly

consensual

concept

(nobody

is

against

nirvana).

Such

concepts

typically:

a)

obscure thepoliticalnatureofnatural resourcesmanagement; andb) are easilyhijackedby groupsseekingto legitimizetheirownagendas(WesterandWarner,2002).Theabovedefinitionemphasizesthethreedesired 'E'(Efficiency,EquityandEnvironmentalsustainability)but impliesthattheycanbeachieved concomitantly if as theword 'maximize' suggests problemsolving canbe informedbyneutral and rational approaches, good science 1 and expert knowledge, reflecting these threedimensionsratherthanbeinginformedbyoneofthemonly.Thisparticularviewpointisapparent,forexample,inthedefinitionthatUSAID(2007a)offersforIWRM:

Aparticipatoryplanningand implementation process,basedon sound science, thatbrings stakeholderstogether to determine how to meet societys longterm needs for water and coastal resources whilemaintaining essential ecological services and economic benefits. IWRM helps to protect the worlds

environment,foster

economic

growth

and

sustainable

agricultural

development,

promote

democratic

participationingovernance,andimprovehumanhealth.2

Little ifanything inthisdefinitionsuggeststhatthethreegoalsofIWRMarefrequently, ifnotalways,antagonistic(hencetheconflicts),thattradeoffsarenecessaryandhardtoachieveinsuchsituations.This means that all parties must relinquish something and that the outcome of painful politicalprocessesinwhichthedifferentpartiesrarelywieldequalamountsofpowerwillgenerallyfallshortofthe'optimal'.Patternsofparticipationtendtoreflectpowerasymmetriesratherthaneveningthemout.Inotherwords,thedefinitionofaccesstoscarceandcontestedresourcesisinherentlypolitical.

To be fair, participation features as a key component of 'IWRM in practice' but the approachneverthelessdrawsmoreonaconceptofinstrumentalrationalityinformedbygoodwillandgooddata(hence, thepivotal rolesof thestate inempoweringpeopleandofexperts inproviding information)than on the politics of resource management (Allan, 2003; Miller and Hirsch, 2003; Biswas, 2004;Merreyetal.,2007;Molleetal.,2007).Inthebackgroundproper"policiesandinstitutions"mustbeinplaceandthegovernmentsmustbeabletoexercise"theirresponsibilitiesofgoodwatergovernance",while"ensuringempowermentofthepoor".Supporttothepoliciesiscrucialand"consciousactionstobuildconsensus,alsoatthehighestpoliticallevelmustbebuiltintotheprocess;()awarenessraisingandmultistakeholder involvement iscriticaltothesuccess"(JonchClausen,2004;UNDESAandGWP,2006).

SouthAfrica(andZimbabwe)providegoodexamplesofhowIWRMwasenthusiasticallyadoptedbygovernmentsasacommongroundforblackandwhitewaterusers,offeringthepromisearticulatedintheSouthAfricandefinitionofIWRMtodeliver"equitableaccesstoandsustainableuseofwaterresourcesbyall stakeholdersat catchmentand regional levels,whilemaintaining the characteristicsand integrity of water resources within agreed limits" (Pollard, 2001). However, after ten years ofexperience,expectedbenefitshavenotmaterialized(Manzungu,2002;MerreyandvanKoppen,2007).Althoughexperiencevaries,andreasonsforunfulfilledpromisesarediverse,powerfuluserstendedto

1RiverBasinOrganizations(RBOs),forexample,viewedaspillarsoftheIWRMimperativetomanagewaterresourcesatthebasin level,are said tobe "increasinglypromotedasa scientific/rationalmeansofadministration forwater" (UNDESAandGWP,2006).2Seealso,amongotherexamples,thedefinitiongivenbyFIU(2007):"IWRMintegratespoliciesandmanagementactivitiestoensuresustainablesuppliesoffreshwaterfor1)themultiplesectorsofhumanuseanddevelopment(domestic,agricultural,industrial,etc),2)instreamneedsforecosystemprocessesandbiodiversityconservation,and3)theneedsofupstreamanddownstream human communities and ecosystems, including coastal zones".ADB (2006) states that "IWRM is focused on

deliveringatriple

bottom

line

of

abalance

of

economic,

social,

and

environmental

benefits

resulting

from

an

integrated

approachthatcarefullyconsiderseachtradeoff".



4/26


5/26


forbottomupplanning(NGOForum,2005).Likewise,conservationistsorgreenNGOshaveusedIWRMto promote conservation of nature or environmentalism in general: the 'Ecosystem Approach'incorporatedintheConventiononBiologicalDiversity(CBD,2000),andpromotedbyseveralNGOsandinternationalorganisations(e.g.IUCN),isaperfectexampleofareading(andtranslation)ofIWRMthat

makesecosystem

preservation

both

the

starting

point

and

the

overarching

goal.

Figure1.IWRManditsthree'E'

Green economists

Market toolsfor environmentalregulation

Livelihood-

orientedNGOs

Genderand

Water Alliance

Conservationists,

green NGOs

"Ecosystem

approach"

Resource

economistsPrivatization

Efficiency

IWRM

EquityEnviron-

ment

More generally, consulting firms, bureaucracies and development banks adapt their discourses andrepackage their policies and approaches. Here IWRM is used to uphold and give legitimacy toconventional developmental approaches. The use of the IWRM rhetoric as a depoliticizing act isthereforeprofoundlypolitical in itself,as itdoesnotcriticallyquestionbut,rather,reinforcesthetraditionalrole,mandateandworldviewofthemainactorsinwaterresourcesmanagement,favouringthestatusquoandbusinessasusualstrategies.

Consultingfirms,forexample,haverecycledmanystructuralwaterresourcesdevelopmentprojectsaspartofnew'participatory'and'integrated'riverbasincomprehensiveplanswhich,despiteevidencetothecontrary,claimtodifferfromthemasterplansofearlieryears(Molle,2005).Developmentbanksorcooperationagencieshavealsoembarkedonruraldevelopmentprojectsshroudedinwatershedorriverbasinrhetoric(seeMolleandHoanh,2007,onVietnam)andhavepromotedpolicyreformswithstandard prescriptions allegedly sanctioned by IWRM (establishment of 'apex bodies', RBOs, waterrights,servicesproviders,costsharingagreements,etc.;see,forexample,ADB,2006).Justasalltheiractions "contribute to poverty alleviation", similarly, these recharacterized projects have regularlybeentoutedas IWRMachievements.5Statebureaucracieshavesuddenlyoften 'discovered'thattheyhadbeendoing IWRMallalongwithoutknowing itandhave later framed theiractionsaccordingly.6The tendency is for states touse IWRMas they commonlydowithotheroverriding concepts (food

5AsUSAID's (2007b)webpageon "IWRM success stories" reveals,any story, from villagersgainingaccess to freshwater inSudan,toupgradingan Iraqicanalsystem,toafishcompanytapping intoglobalmarkets inRomania,topurifyingwaterforHaitisfloodvictims,seemstoqualifyasan"IWRMachievement".6InEgypt'sIntegratedIrrigationImprovementandManagementProject(IIIMP),presentedasanIWRMundertaking(UNDESAandGWP,2006), "Watermanagement isbest improvedbyan integratedpackageof servicesand technicalassistance thatrespondstotheusersdemands[while]manykindsoftechnologyandexpertisewillbeusedtooptimizetheresultsof[theproject] activities". See, also, a document on Laos: "The immediate objective of the Water Sector is to foster and

institutionalizethe

IWRM

approach

in

the

mainstream

planning

process

of

the

Government

both

at

the

central

as

well

as

at

theprovinciallevel"(Anonymous,2004).



6/26


security,national independence,selfsufficiency,povertyalleviation,etc)tomanipulateand foreclosedebateandimposepredeterminedagendas.

The influenceofIWRMonwatermanagementpractice isamatterofdebate.WhileJonchClausen(2004) posits that it has inspired reforms that aim atmore integratedmanagement, Biswas (2004)

believesone

can

successfully

argue

that

the

IWRM

label

has

not

"made

any

difference".

Monitoring

progress, evaluating change or singling out success stories becomes essential in the continuedpromotion of IWRM. Thailand, for example, is cited by the GWP as a good example of a countryimplementing IWRMbecause ithasestablished formalRBOs in its25 riverbasins,designeda"policywith full stakeholder participation",while a "frameworkwater law is under preparation through anopen and participatory process seeking the views of the stakeholders" (JonchClausen, 2004). Thissomewhatoverlyoptimisticviewemphasizestheformalexistenceof institutionsandtendstoequateparticipationwiththeconductofmeetingsorpublichearings.7

Despite all these misuses of the concept as a smoke screen to camouflage other agendas andobjectives, IWRMcanalsobeconceivedofasa 'boundaryobject' (Cashetal.,2002;Conca,2006):aconceptthatallpartieswillappropriateanduseandalsoremodelbytheirowndiscourseandpractice.

As

such,

it

can

be

seen

as

a

collective

construct

offering

a

common

ground

to

stakeholders

willing

to

engage other parties. Inclusion of environmental sustainability has, for example, enabled easierpropagationoftheconceptofenvironmentalflow(eflows),anapparentlytechnicalwordwhichallowsdiscussionofmoresensitiveallocationissues.Inthatsense,IWRMmayalsohaveallowed,ashavetheconceptsofgoodgovernanceandparticipation(seeMollinga,thisissue),reintroductionofpoliticsandacknowledgementof the relations of socialpower by the back door, even though these issueshadearlierbeenobfuscated.

NARRATIVESANDSTORYLINES

Anarrative isdefinedhereasastorythatgivesan interpretationofsomephysical/socialphenomena.Many people organize daily experiences and beliefs gathered from social interactions in logicalrelationships fromwhichtheyderiveopinionsonwhat isdesirableandwhat isnot.Narratives inthefieldofdevelopment firstestablishcausal relationshipsbetween twonegativeaspectsofaparticularproblem.Theserelationshipsoftendrawoncommonsenseandthusappearuncontroversial,obscuringboththecomplexityoftheprocessesatplayand,sometimes,theirideologicalunderpinnings:waste(orpollution)ofresourcesoccursbecauseinsufficientpricingfailstoreflectrealcosts(hencethenecessitytopricewater);flood (ordroughts)areduetodeforestation, itselfaresultofabusiveslashandburnpractices(conservationandafforestationwillcounterbalancethisstateofaffairs);poorperformanceofwaterusergroupsreflectslackofhumancapitalorobstructivebureaucracies(trainingisneeded);lackof private investment results from insecure tenure (definition of rights and titling is the solution);limited agricultural diversification follows from the inflexibility of irrigation networks (which needmodernization),etc.

The 'naturalness'ofnarratives,or storylines, seemingly anchored in common sense,makes themvery resilient (Roe, 1991). Their appeal flows from the legitimacy they can afford policies anddevelopmentprogramsbyhelping rationalize them in termsofboth their intended targets and themeanstobedeployedtoachievethosetargets.Bynature,theysimplifyandofferastablevisionandinterpretationofrealityandareabletorallydiversepeoplearoundparticularstorylines.ThecombinedactionsofthesepeopleinthepromotionofastorylinetendtocoalesceintoloosenetworksandwhatHajer (1995) defined as discourse coalitions: a set of storylines and the actorswho promote these

7Foranextremecaseofsimplificationofassessing"progresstowardIWRM",seeJPW(2006)whereparticipationisassessed

byyes/no

answers

to

two

questions:

1)

Do

you

have

alegal

framework

for

participation

of

stakeholders;

2)

Is

there

governmentspendingforparticipationofconcernedparties?



7/26


storylinesandthepracticesthattheyhighlight.Whenasetofactorstriestoestablishhegemonyandtopreemptdebate,severalcoalitionsmayemerge,unitedbytheirrespectivestorylines.

Narratives,just likepolicies (Mosse,2004),areoftenselfvalidatingbecause theytend toproduceevidenceratherthantheotherwayaround.Iftheyareatfaultitisbecausetheprescriptionhasbeen

eitherinadequately

or

insufficiently

implemented.

Higher

water

prices,

more

trees,

or

more

training

wouldhavedonethejobbutunfortunatecircumstances limitedthefullrealizationofthe intendedorexpectedbenefits.8So,evennonrealizationvalidatestheinitialcausalpostulate(Rap,2006).

For the sakeof illustration Iwill considerhere the 'freewater' storyline (seemore inMolle andBerkoff,2007a).Thecausalmodelofthisnarrativeisbasedonthebanalandstraightforwardeverydayexperience that cheap or free goods and services tend to be wasted. If my son does not pay forelectricity(whichhedoesnt)hewillprobablynotbotherswitchingoffthelightortheheaterwhenheleaveshis room (as, indeed, is thecase). Ifmyneighbourdoesnotpayenough forwaterhewillbetemptedtowaterhisgardenthewholenightlong,orwastewaterwashinghiscar(whichhedoes).Insum,cheapgoodsbegetwaste.Thisobviousnesshasaffinitywiththe'lionsshare'narrative:agricultureis responsible for 70% of the world waterwithdrawals and often "gobbles" up to 90% or more in

developing

countries.

This

lions

share

is,

in

turn,

associated

with

the

common

wisdom

that

irrigation

is

awastefulprocess,epitomizedbytheubiquitousstatementthat itsefficiency is lowandthat60%ofwaterdeliveries fail to reach the fields (TheEconomist,2003).The conclusionnaturally follows thatraisingwaterpriceswillforcesquandererstosavewater,whichcanthenbemadeavailabletocitiesortorestoreecosystemhealth.9

Avastliteratureonthesubjectdevelopedduringthe1990sandearly2000s,10largelyfuelledbytheWorldBankandothermainstreaminstitutions.Books,conferences,andjournalarticlesreportedonthepotentialofpricingfordemandmanagementandconservation.Althoughtheroleofwatercharges inoperationandmaintenanceandasabasis for the financialandmanagerialautonomyofwateruserassociationswaswellrecognizedinthemid1980s,theemphasisoneconomicinstrumentswasgreatlyinflatedduringthisperiod.TheWorldBankStrategyof1993stipulatedthat"settingpricesattheright

level

is

not

enough;

prices

need

to

be

paid

if

they

are

to

enhance

the

efficient

allocation

of

resources"

(WorldBank,1993); for Johansson (2000) "The fundamental roleofprices is tohelpallocate scarceresourcesamongcompetingusesandusers.Onewaytoachieveanefficientallocationofwater istopriceitsconsumptioncorrectly".Withhigherpricesthatreflectopportunitycosts,thereasoninggoes,lowvalueactivitiesarephasedout,thusreleasingwaterforhighvalueusesandraisingsocialwelfare.Foranumberofreasons,thepolicybubbleformedduringthisperiodhasbeensubstantiallydeflatedinrecent years.Several key lessons about the "lifetimeof an idea" (Molle andBerkoff,2007b) canbeextractedfromthissetofevents.

First, this example provides a good illustration of how the epistemic community that graduallyformed around irrigation pricebased incentives largely extended from mainstream economicdepartmentsinuniversitiesandinternationalorganizationstoreachpolicymakersinallcountries,andeventuallypercolateddowntonationalwaterlaws.Thenarrativedevelopedbyconflatingevidenceonthe effectiveness of pricing policies in the domestic and industrial sectorwith those in agriculture,

8Thisisgermanetodebatesineconomicswhereneoliberalpoliciesassertedlyfailbecausederegulationhasnotbeencompleteandstateinterventionnotfullydispensedwith.9Thelinkbetweenwaterwastageandunderpricinghasbeenrepeatedlyshowcasedbyallwaterrelatedinstitutions,rangingfrom theWorldBank ("thebiggestproblemwithwater is thewasteofwater through lackof charging: "President JamesWolfensohn,2000), to theWorldWaterVision ("usersdonot valuewaterprovided freeor almost free and sowaste it":CosgroveandRijsberman,2000),andtoenvironmentalistswho favour"developingapricingsystemthatpreventsexcessiveuseofwater" (WWF,2002). For the EU (2000) "Efficientwaterpricingpolicieshave ademonstrable impacton thewaterdemandofdifferentuses.As a resultof changes inwaterdemand, efficientwaterpricing reduces thepressureonwaterresources.Thisisparticularlytruefortheagriculturalsector".Seealso:"Inefficientpricingandmanagementofirrigationwatersupplyleadstomassivewastage"(HansenandBhatia,2004).10

The

phrase

'water

pricing'

entered

as

aGoogle

search

yielded

19,500

hits

in

October

2003

compared

to

338,000

in

March

2007,a17foldincrease.



8/26


without differentiating between sectors.Many studies referring to agricultural useswere based oneconometrics (where correlationandcausalityareoftenundistinguished)oronmodelling (basedonmere farm budgets, which in any case often showed that using prices to regulate use was noteconomicallyandpoliticallyfeasible).Unfortunately,nicheswheresuchincentivescanbeeffectiveare

rathernarrow,

because

of

several

constraints

specific

to

irrigation

(for

more

details

see

Bosworth

et

al.,

2002;CornishandPerry,2003;HellegersandPerry,2004;MolleandBerkoff,2007a).11

Despitelimitedevidenceofsuccess,theideaof'gettingthepricesright'flourishedandtheconcepttook on a hegemonic character at least in the development establishment. It became increasinglydifficulttoofferunorthodoxpointsofview.Forexample,areviewofexperience inoneregionoftheworldon theexistenceofa linkbetweenpricesandefficiency concluded "toa certainextent, yes",whileshowingatthesametimehowlittleimpacttherewasforanumberofreasons.Isnotthesubtle(andperhapsunconscious)semanticshift from"Toa largeextentthere isnoevidencethat"to"Tosomeextent,thereisevidencethat"whattrulyrevealsthehegemonicnatureofanarrative?

Theexampleofwaterpricingpoliciesalsoshowstheresilienceofnarratives.AsRoe(1991)observes,narratives tend toacquirea lifeof theirownandarenoteasilydebunkedbycontradictingempirical

evidence,

as

"they

continue

to

underwrite

and

stabilize

the

assumptions"

for

policy

making

"in

the

face

of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization". For example, although the narrow concept ofirrigation efficiency has been shown to be misleading as far as basin management is concerned,decisionmakerscontinuetojustifycostlycanalliningprogramsinorderto"avoidlosses"eveninclosedbasinswherenowater flowsout,with littleattention tohowwater is implicitly reallocated throughtheseinterventions.

Enduring narratives are perhaps most prominent in economics. Easterly (2001) has shown howvariousnarratives thatallunderpinnedthe logicofaidandexternalcapital investment indevelopingcountries have proven incredibly persistent and resilient, continuing to survive in the minds ofpractitioners long after they had been debunked or proven wrong by scientific work. All thesenarratives,again,areappealing,simple,anddrawoncommonsense.Theyareoftensoundinparticular

contexts

but

generalising

them

across

the

board

takes

them

into

uncharted

terrain

where

key

assumptionsandtheirprescriptionsnolongerhold.

ICONSANDMODELS

Athirdtypeofconceptualobjectisthatofmodels.Modelsarebasedonparticularinstancesofpolicyreformsordevelopmentinterventionswhichostensiblyembodyadimensionof'success'andqualifyas'success stories'. They are apparently sanctioned by experience, approved by experts and powerfulinstitutions, andusing them seeminglyminimizes risk.Althoughwe are chiefly concernedherewithwater policy,models and what Chambers (1997) has called the ModelT12 approach of coursepervade all strands of practice and all disciplines: in the field of hydraulics, for example, they willsupport either upstream or downstream regulation, simplified or elaborate designs, overshot orundershot gates. Agronomists routinely promote(d) zero tillagemodels, vetiver grass, or integratedpest management; sociologists, community forestry management or Community Organizers;extensionists,the"Training&Visit"approach,etc.Genericmodelsareoftensupportedbypetprojectsthatareroutinelyshowcasedtoofficialsandforeignvisitors(Chambers,2008).13

11Many factorsmake irrigationdiffer from thedomestic sector.Farmers are 'water takers'usingwhateverwater ismade

availabletothembyirrigationagenciesandnot(orrarely)customerswhocanaccesswateratwill;inaddition,incentivesforsavingwatercanonlybeeffectivewhenchargesarevolumetric,anexceptionratherthantherule.Eveninsuchcasespricesaregenerallytoo lowtoencourageuserstosavewaterandscarcity is invariablymanagedthroughquotas,withpricesonlyregulatingoveruseatthemargin.SeeMolleandBerkoff(2007a)formoredetails.12

AfterH.Ford'sremarkthatAmericanscouldhavetheirModelTautomobileanycolourtheylikedaslongasitwasblack.13

The

managed

visits

and

the

selected

and

selective

perceptions

of

rural

development

tourism

contribute

to

generating

and

sustaining myths and paradigms. Examples in the water sector have been Sukhomajri in Haryana and the Gram Gaurav



9/26


In thewater sector, threewellknownmodelscan serveasexamples.The firstone is theChileanmodelofwatermarkets; thesecond is theMexicanmodelof IrrigationManagementTransfer (IMT);and the thirdone is theconceptof riverbasinorganizationwithseveral iconicexperiencesvying forpreeminence,includingtheAustralianMurrayDarlingBasinCommissionmodel,theFrenchAgencesde

lEau,and

the

US

Tennessee

Valley

Authority

(TVA).

TheChileanwatermarkets

In 1981 Chile enacted a Water Code that recognized private property rights in water and allowedtransactionsthroughafreemarket.14Thisreformwaspartof,and in linewith,thedeep influenceoftheChicagoBoys15intheshapingofChileseconomicpolicy.Theapplicationofthecodeandtheinitialexperiencewithwatermarketsweredocumented intheearly1990sbya fewpublicationsthatweresubsequentlytakenupbytheWorldBankwhich,togetherwiththeInterAmericanDevelopmentBank,IFPRI,anumberofAmericanuniversitiesandrelatedinstitutions,wasinstrumentalinspreadingitasasuccessstory(Gazmuri,1994;RosegrantandBinswanger,1994;RosegrantandGazmuri,1994;Hearne1995;Hearne and Easter, 1995,1997, 1998;Holden andThobani,1996).According toBauer (2004)

"Sincethe

early

1990s,

these

proponents

have

used

their

considerable

resources

and

influence

to

promote a simplified description of theChileanmodel,both elsewhere in LatinAmerica and in thewider internationalwaterpolicyarena".Countries likeMexico,BoliviaandArgentinawere influencedbythemodelanditstranspositiontoPeruhaslongbeenadvocated(Thobani,1995;Trawick,2003).16

Althoughproponentssometimesrecognizeflawsinthemodel,thegeneraltendencyistodownplaythe importanceof these flawsand toascribe them to thehaste togeteffectivemarketsestablished(RogersandHall,2002)and to stress, instead, thepurported 'adaptiveness'of the system.Problemsencounteredinclude"arangeofcriticalwatermanagementissues,suchassocialequity,environmentalprotection, river basin management, coordination of multiple water uses, and resolution of waterconflicts"(Bauer,2004).Anumberofstudieshavedocumentedthe limitations inherent inthemodel(for example: Bauer, 1997; Hendriks, 1998; Dourojeanni and Jouravlev, 1999; Hadjigeorgalis, 1999;

Budds,2002;

Zegarra,

2002;

Hadjigeorgalis

and

Lillywhite,

2004;

CEPAL,

2004;

Boelens

and

Zwarteveen,

2005).Yet, it is striking to see thepervasivenessof the success associatedwith this iconicmodel intodays literature: this observation isnot intended todismiss itsmeritsbut to stress how commonknowledge isneitherupdated,modifiednorqualified,at least inwiderinternationalcircleswherethemodelhas continued toplay its role in thepromotionof tradablewater rights. Likewise, the iconicSouthAfricanWaterLaw,withits'reserves'forthepoor,itsprovisionsforenvironmentalflows,anditsCatchmentManagementAgencieshasbeen(andstill is)highlypraisedandhasbecomeaworldwidemodel.Yet,andwithoutdownplaying thepositiveaspectsandthe inspirationalroleofthemodelforother countries, increasing evidence documenting that its achievements fall short of its promisesremainsconfinedtospecializedliterature(MerreyandvanKoppen,2007).

Pratistan inGujarat in the early1980s, theMohiniCooperative inGujarat (which generated and sustained amythof thewidespreadexistenceofwatercooperativesinGujaratinthe1970sand1980s),andtheMweaIrrigationSettlementinKenyafrom1960sthroughtothe1980s(Chambers,2008).14

IamdrawingheremainlyonBauer(2004).15

TheChicagoBoys(c.1970s)wereagroupofabout25youngChileaneconomistswhotrainedattheUniversityofChicagounderMiltonFriedmanandArnoldHarberger.TheylaterworkedinAugustoPinochet'sadministrationtocreateafreemarketeconomyanddecentralizecontroloftheeconomy(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_boys).16

Thepowerof theChileanmodel isalsowell illustrated inananecdote reportedbyanexpertwhohadworkedwith thegovernmentofanunnamedLatinAmericancountrytodraftanewwaterlaw.Aftermanyexpertreports,consultantvisits,etc.,thekeygovernmentministerthrewthewholepileofstudiesandrecommendationsoffhisdeskandsaid:"Thisisawasteof

time!What

Iwant

is

acopy

of

the

Chilean

Water

Code

with

the

word

"Chile"

deleted

and

[our

country's

name]

written

instead!"ChilehasreceivedcountlessdelegationsfromothercountriesandinspiredreformsinplaceslikeMorocco.



10/26


TheMexicanIMT

ThegovernmentofMexicolauncheditsIMTprogrammein1992withtheaimofturningthe3.4millionhaofpublic irrigation schemesover to groupsof farmers (mdulos) tobeorganized at the levelofsecondarycanals.Theprogrammewaspartoftheprocessofstructuraladjustmentunderaneoliberal

modelof

economic

deregulation,

downsizing

of

the

public

sector,

reductions

in

public

expenditures,

and the reconfiguration of public administration responsibilities among the federal, state, andmunicipalgovernments(PrezPrado,2003;Rap,2004).Primarilydrivenbymeasuresoffiscalausterity,the programme was successful in transferring to users the costs of operation and maintenance ofinfrastructuresbelowthemaincanals.Lessthantenyears latertheprogrammewasconsideredtobecompleted.

TheMexicanmodelofIMTwasdrivenbyastronginternalpoliticalcommitmentofseniorMexicanengineersandofthegovernmentwhoseviewpointsandinterestsconvergedwiththoseofWorldBankanalysts.WaterengineerssawthereformasanopportunitytoregainanautonomythattheyhadlostwhentheMinistryofAgricultureabsorbedtheirrigationsector.Assuch,itbecameavehicletoadvancethe engineers "autonomy" agenda within a wider context of strategic political realignment and

economicrestructuring

(Rap,

2004;

Wester,

2008).

IMTwassupposedtodeliverothergains intermsof irrigationandeconomicefficiency(Cummingsand Nercessiantz, 1992). Although provisions for temporary trading of water were made suchexchangeshavebeenrare.Theyare limited tomduloswithinasingleschemeandrequire thepriorassentofthegovernment(Kloezen,1998).FurtherresearchfoundthattheimpactofIMTonirrigationefficiencyandproductivityhadbeenneutral(KloezenandGarcsRestrepo,1998;Kloezen,2002;Rap,2004).Despitelaterqualificationsandthediscoveryof"secondgenerationproblems"(Svendsenetal.,1997;Palacios,1999)andnotwithstandingthesuccessesachieved,theMexicanIMThasturnedintoaworldwidemodel.

Riverbasinorganizationmodels

TheUnited States: Although comprehensive river basinmanagement may have startedwith BritishendeavoursintheIndusandNileriverbasins,andalthoughearlyinstancesofriverbasinmanagementcanbefoundinSpainorGermany(Molle,2006),thebeginningof"unified"riverbasindevelopmentisbestassociatedwiththeTennesseeValleyAuthority.EstablishedbyF.D.RooseveltduringtheNewDeal,the TVAwas the first experiment in regional development to be based on full control of the riversystem through a network of multipurpose reservoirs. The TVA would not only attempt to "fully"control the river system by a series of dams, thus providing protection from floods and producinghydropower, but would also tackle poverty by an ambitious range of activities, including training,agriculturalextensionservices,soilconservation,afforestation,productionoffertilizers,stimulationoflocalenterprisesandwelfareorientedprogramsfocusingoneducation,healthandsanitation.

TVAsinitialideologicalunderpinningrestedontheengineeringethosthatscientificknowledgeandsystematicrationalplanningcouldradicallychangesociety iftheycouldemancipatethemselves fromvested interestsandpolitics. Itwasalso tingedwith thedemocratic rhetoricdistilledbyD.Lilienthal(1944),oneof the initialthreecochairmen,whostressedthedangerofcentralizedandtechnocraticauthoritarianism and the need for "grassroots democracy". Despite the gap between rhetoric andrealitiesontheground(TugwellandBanfield,1950),theTVAsdemocraticgloss,marketedinparticularbytheprophetictoneofLilienthals(1944)book"TVA:Democracyonthemarch",wastoproveamajorassetofUSoverseasdevelopmentanddiplomacy,and"anewexportcommodity" in theeraofColdWarpolitics(Ekbladh,2002).

Based on his belief that the TVA "demonstrated for all time the efficiency and the humanity ofcomprehensively planned, multipurpose river basin development", Truman (1949) declared in hispresidentialinauguraladdress:"Wemustembarkonaboldnewprogramformakingthebenefitsofourscientific

advances

and

industrial

progress

available

for

the

improvement

and

growth

of



11/26


underdevelopedareas".TheideawaspickedupquiteenthusiasticallyinIndia(withtheestablishmentin1948oftheDamodarValleyCorporation:SahaandBarrow,1981),inMexico(BarkinandKing,1970),andmanyother countries, including Iran,Columbia,Brazil, Egypt,Mozambique, Salvador, Sri Lanka,Surinam, Tanzania and Turkey, where schemes were planned or implemented with mixed success

(Molle,2006).

Geopolitical

considerations

also

led

to

the

idea

being

floated

for

the

Danube,

the

Jordan

River,andthe"vastMekong[which]canprovidefoodandwaterandpoweronascaletodwarfevenourownTVA"(Johnson,1965).

Most thirdworldeliteswereall tooeager toacceptamodel thatpromised tospreadmodernismandprogress to theirnewly independentcountries,while strengthening their legitimacy through theprovisionof iconicandpolitically rewardingprojects.TheTVAmodelwellbefittedconventionalstatepaternalism andmassive state investment in river system infrastructure and technology: riverbasindevelopmentwouldgeneratesignificantamountsofhydroelectricitytopowerdevelopingeconomies,helpcontrolflooddamage,bringprosperitytoruralmasses,andthuscontributetomodernizationandstatebuilding.

France:Inthelate1960s,FranceestablishedAgencesFinanciresdeBassin(FinancialBasinAgencies)

in

each

of

the

six

main

river

basins,

as

part

of

the

1964

water

law.

The

agencies

were

a

response

to

criticalwaterqualityproblemsaswellasameanstoensurethelargeflowsneededtocoolthenewlybuilt nuclear plants (Nicolazo, 1997). The central feature of the agencies is the mix of economicincentivestousersandpolluterstoimprovetheirpracticescomplementedbyBasinCommitteeswhichfacilitates representation of the state, local government and users (Barraqu, 1999). In interveningyearstheyhavetakenovernewplanningresponsibilitiesandbeenrenamedAgencesde lEau(WaterAgencies)butwaterqualitycontrolremainsacentralgoal,especiallyaftertheEuropeanUnionissuedmorestringentenvironmentalstandardsin1992(Betlem,1998).

Becauseoftheirrelativesuccessinmobilizingfundsandredistributingthemassubsidiestovariouswatersanitationandwaterqualityenhancingprojects,theAgencesweresoonalsoturnedintoamodelwhichwasproposedthroughdifferentjointcooperativeprojectswithcountriessuchasIndonesia,and

later

Morocco,

Algeria,

Venezuela,

Mexico,

Turkey,

and

Brazil

(MMA,

2001).

The

model

was

promoted

by the Government of France which surfed the postRio IWRM wave and supported, in 1994, theestablishmentofthe InternationalNetworkofRiverBasinOrganizations (INBO),hostedby theOfficeInternationalde lEau (OiEAU),anorganizationmainly fundedby the Frenchwater industryand thegovernment(GovernmentofFrance,2007).

The strength of the French model is perhaps best illustrated by its decisive influence on theEuropean Water Framework Directive (WFD), which incorporated the principle of river basinmanagementand imposed itonallmembercountries.Another specific reason for thepowerof thismodel,however, lies in its incorporationof theeconomicallyorthodox 'userpays'and 'polluterpays'principles,especiallyafter theirendorsementby theenvironmentalmovementwhich saw themasapromiseofreduceduseandincreasedwaterflowsinEuropeanrivers.Australia: In Australia, the MurrayDarling Basin Initiative and its implementing body, the MDB

Commission,havebeenresponsibleintheirfirst22yearsofoperationforimplementingthepoliciesnegotiated by the Ministerial Council, which represents the federal government, the four stategovernmentsofQueensland,NewSouthWales,Victoria,andSouthAustralia,andtheAustralianCapitalTerritory.TheMDBinitiativeisconsideredtohavebeenveryinnovativeinexploringandimplementingprocessestoincreasetheefficiencyandsustainabilityofwateruse.Earlyeffortsincludedidentificationof systemwide salinizationproblemsandacomprehensivepackageofmeasures to tackle that issueincludingtradingbetweengovernmentsof 'saltcredits'.MDBCwasalsoakeyplayer inwatersharingagreements, the establishment of a water market, formal agreements to cap the level of waterabstractions in subbasins, and independent public audits of the performance of each subbasin inadheringtocapagreements(Haisman,2004).Despitetheseefforts,thebasinhealthandsustainabilityofproduction isstillseriouslythreatenedandtensionsbetweenthepartnerscontinue.Catalysedbyalonglastingseriousdrought,frustratedbytheunderstandablepartisanshipofindividualmembers,and



12/26


concernedthattheexistinginstancesofcooperationdespitemanypositiveaspectsareinsufficient,in2007thefederalgovernmentlaunchedatakeoverbid.Aswaterhasassumedfargreatersignificanceon the national agenda, the federal government has 'purchased' new powers to exercise moreauthorityonwholeofbasin issuesconsideredcrucialtothesocialandeconomichealthofthenation

(Connell,2006).

This experience, with its successes and failures, is of course linked to particular physical andinstitutional settings. Yet, the Australian federal government widely promoted the MurrayDarlingmodel,especiallyinAsia,andhasbeeninfluentialinsupportingestablishmentofRBOsincountriessuchas China, Sri Lanka and Vietnam, and also the creation of transboundaryjurisdictions such as theMekongRiverBasin(Malanoetal.,1999;Birchetal.,1999;Pigram,2001;Molle,2005).

InterestinglytheconceptofRBOasnecessaryforwatermanagementisbeingpromoteddespitethehugevariation insuchorganizations:althoughtheycomeunderthesametermandtheyalldealwithriverbasins,thethreeRBOmodelsreviewedabovedifferwidely.TheTVAmodelrepresentedastageofstateledmassiveinfrastructuraldevelopment(which,significantly,wasneveragainreplicatedintheUS,notablybecauseofpowerconflictswithbothfederal andstatelevelagencies).TheFrenchmodelwas

designed

to

respond

to

water

quality

degradation

and

to

meet

Frances

need

for

more

nuclear

plants,

whilesimultaneously internalizingcosts.TheMurrayDarlingCommissionspecificallyaddressedwatersharingand,later,managementofenvironmentaldegradationandincreasingwaterscarcity.Althoughthey have distinct purposes these models sometimes find themselves in competition and are allpotentialsourcesof'lessonslearned'forvariedcontexts.

AWorldBankreportnotedthattheTVA"hasperhapsthebestnamerecognitioninthebusinessofriverbasinmanagement.ItisconsideredbymanyoutsidetheUnitedStatesasthemodelforriverbasindevelopmentandmanagement"(MillerandReidinger,1998)17and isstillpresentedbyUSAID(2007c)as an uncontroversial and resounding success, despite the serious reservations that even a limitedreviewofTVAliteraturewouldsubstantiate.TheMurrayRiverBasinCommissionhasbeenpromotedasacaseof"aworldsbestpracticemodelinbasinmanagement,particularlyacrossjurisdictionalborders"

(Linn

and

Bailey,

2002).

Yet

promoters

tend

to

gloss

over

the

respective

weaknesses

or

specific

limitationsofeachofthemodels.Forexample,continuedenvironmentaldegradation(MillerandHirsch,2003) or failure to curb abstraction (Connell, 2006) in theMurrayDarlingbasin, orheateddebatesaroundtheAgencesdelEau(Flory,2003),seldommakeheadlinesininternationalcircles.

Modelsprovetobequitemalleablewhenimplemented.Thisisshown,forexample,bythevariousincarnationsof theTVAmodelwhichhave little in commonwith their forbear. Likewise theTurkishmodelofIMTwasinspiredbytheMexicanmodelbutfellshortofestablishingautonomouswaterusergroups.This is littlewonderbecausemodelsarebynaturedecontextualizedand theirapplication inspecific settings can but lead to utter diversity; but this is also testimony of the preeminence ofpolitical and other motives in the adoption of a given model, especially when the context andmodalitiesofitsimplementationarequitedistinctfromthecircumstances inwhichtheoriginalmodelwas developed. In some cases, this can also signal the excessive zeal of development banks andcooperationagencies in replicatingmodels.18However selective,borrowing from theoriginal IMTorriverbasinmanagementmodelscanalso,morepositively,beconstruedasaninitialsteponacommontrajectory that gradually institutionalizes decentralization in resource management and

17AsnotedbyMillerandHirsch(2002),thispublicationfollowedaWorldBanksponsoredseminar"RiverBasinManagement:

TennesseeValleyAuthorityandtheMurrayDarlingBasin"onFebruary13,1997heldinWashington,DC,andwaswrittenwiththeaimofsummarising"thoseaspectsofTVAparticularlythoserelatedtowaterresourcesmanagementthatcouldserveas a useful reference to Bank staff and client countries in evaluating the various institutional arrangements, operatingprograms, technological bases, and other conditions conducive to comprehensive river basin development" (Miller andReidinger,1998).18

For

example,

the

experience

with

participatory

management

of

irrigation

in

the

Philippines

was

praised

as

amodel

and

replicatedinThailand,Indonesia,SriLanka,andNepal,whereitfailedaltogether.



13/26


democratizationofdecisionmaking(MeublatandLourd,2001). InBrazilor inMexico(Wester,2008),reformshavecreatedpoliticalspaceforthecivilsociety,beyondwhatstateagencieshadanticipated.

Models fit easily into the 'practiceof development', viewed as theprovisionof adequateexpertknowledge, technologyand targeted infrastructure investments thatare traditionallyassociatedwith

theengineering

world

and

state

visions

of

social

engineering

(Long

and

van

der

Ploeg,

1989;

Scott,

1998;

Arceand Long,2000;MollingaandBolding,2004).Models canalsopropup the social legitimacyoftechnical expertise19 as well as of the state. They foster topdown bureaucratic approaches thatprecludesgenuineparticipationofstakeholders(MillerandHirsch,2003);andtheyallowreplicationofcapital intensiveprojectsthatmeetthe interestsofapowerfulcoalitionofconstructionfirms,banks,politiciansandbureaucrats(Ostrometal.,1993;MolleandRenwick,2005).Morefundamentallytheykeeppoliticsatbaybypromotingahistoricalrecipes.

THEEPIDEMIOLOGYOFPOLICYCONCEPTS

Graspingthedynamicinterplayofnirvanaconcepts,narrativesandmodelsisarealchallenge:thereare

validating

linkages

among

these

three

categories

of

concepts

and

self

reinforcing

implicit

causalities

between concepts within the same category. For example IWRM (a nirvana concept) providesjustification for riverbasinmanagement (whichwillbe linked toa specificRBOmodel) thatcalls fordemandmanagementandpricingpoliciesanchored in several storylines (realpricesbringefficiency,etc).Policies,technicalassistance(TA)grants,anddevelopmentprojectstranslatetheseconcepts intoconcreteactions.

An intriguing issue is the social andpolitical lifeof these concepts. Inotherwordshowdo theyemerge, spread, and influence policy, practice and intellectual production; how do they becomeresilient,sometimeshegemonic,adapt/mutateorjustvanish?Conceptsdonot,ofcourseemergefroma vacuum, and canonlybeunderstood as social andpolitical constructs shapedby the interplayofinstitutions,networks,interests,andvisionsofthefuture(Mosse,2004).Afewpreliminaryreflectionscanbedrawnfromtheexamplesgivenabove.Althoughthethreetypesofconceptsare influentialatdifferentlevels,weexaminehere1)howtheyarereproducedandspread,2)the incentivesforactorsinvolvedinthatprocess,and3)theprocessof'paradigmmaintenance'thatisactivatedwhentheyneedtoprotected.

Thesnowballingeffect

Snowballing is the process through which a concept is gradually adopted by a growing number ofdispersed actors, projected in professional events, circulated in academic literature, and graduallyestablished as a consensual and controlling idea. A concept may pursue its course by itself oncelauncheddownhillbutitdoesneedabiginitialpush.Ifthepushisnotsufficienttheconceptmightnotacquireenoughmomentumtoestablishitself.Ifitistoostrong,itmaywellarousestiffoppositionand

bediscredited.

Success

means

that

the

model,

or

the

concept,

is

self

sustaining

because

enough

people

havebeenconvincedandarereadytoutilizeitprofessionally,thusminimizingforallusersthepersonalriskofconfrontingcriticism,andinsomecasesmaximizingusersrewards(seebelow).

Such informalgroupsofactors that takeupand furtherpropagateaconceptcomeclose towhatHaas(1992)hastermedepistemiccommunities,20thatis,"anetworkofprofessionalswithrecognizedexpertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policyrelevantknowledge within that domain or issuearea". An epistemic community may consist of academics,decisionmakersandotherprofessionals fromdifferentdisciplineswho shareasetofnormativeandprincipledbeliefs,aswellascausalbeliefsandcauseandeffectunderstandings.Epistemiccommunities

19SeeforexampletheprestigeassociatedwiththeingenieroinLatinAmericaorthemouhandisintheArabworld.

20

Rap

(2006)

uses

the

concept

of

policy

network

to

designate

the

"network

of

active

supporters

enrolled

in

the

proliferation

of

apolicy".



14/26


typicallyrespondtoademandforexpertopinioninthefaceofincreasinglycomplexsocietalproblems.Members do not need to meet frequently or in a formalmanner and are, rather, linked (typicallythroughacademicorprofessionalliterature)bytheirconsensualbeliefsandknowledgereferences,andbytheirsharedobjectiveofinfluencingpolicy.21

Epistemiccommunities

often

contribute

to

establishing

institutions

which

will

carry

the

message

forwardanddevelop it.ActorsaroundtheIMTparadigmandmodels,forexample,proposedcreatingthe INPIMnetwork (Rap,2006).Those involvedwithpromoting IWRMsupported thecreationoftheGlobalWaterPartnership,whilepromotersofriverbasinmanagementsupportedtheestablishmentofthe InternationalNetwork of BasinOrganizations (INBO); the GWP and INBO have also establishedregionalbranches.All these themes (IWRM,basinmanagement, IMT)havebeensupportedbymanydonors,andhavepaved theway for innumerableMScprogrammes,capacitybuildingactivities, fieldtrips,internationalconferences,WorldWaterForums,andpublications(Conca,2006).

DevelopmentagencieslikeSida,GTZ,USAID,AusAIDorDFID,andUNagencies,haveallcontributedto these dynamics but none of them comes close to the role and influence of the internationaldevelopmentbanks,principallytheWorldBank.TheBankhasalwaysmaintainedakeeninterestinthe

dissemination

of

ideas

and

has

even

recently

morphed

into

a

"knowledge

bank",

claiming

to

be

both

a

neutralgatekeeperandamajorproducerofknowledge (Mehta,2001).Between1997and2002,theBank spent US$283 million reorganizing itself in line with its intent of becoming a "knowledgeinstitution".Farmorewasspentonactualactivitiessuchastrainingandreports.TheBanksresearchiswidelydisseminatedandhighlyrespectedamongmany importantaudiences.22AstudycommissionedbytheSwedishgovernmentin2000concludedthat"theWorldBankcontinuestobedominantasthemainpurveyorofdevelopmentideas"(BrettonWoodsProject,2007).

Bankpublicationpowerisunparalleled:beyonditsownworkingpapers,reports,briefsandscientificjournal (e.g. theWorldBankObserver), it alsopublishesbooks, frequently in associationwithotherpublishers, and supports associatedjournals (e.g. World Development). Bank researchers and theirconsultantsproducednearly4,000papers,books,andreportsbetween1998and2005,orroughly500

documents

annually

(Banerjee

et

al.,

2006).

This

flood

of

literature

is

amplified

by

the

World

Banks

organizationof,orsupportto,manynationaland internationalevents.The literatureemanatingfromtheBank ishighlyselfreferentialand tendstoreproducetheconclusionsof (early)keypaperswhicharerepeatedlycited,disseminated,andthuspassedontooutsideacademiccircles.ArecentreviewofBankresearchduringthe19982005periodissued"criticismsofthewaythatthisresearchwasusedto proselytizeon behalf of Bank policy,oftenwithout taking a balanced view of the evidence, andwithoutexpressingappropriatescepticism.InternalresearchthatwasfavourabletoBankpositionswasgivengreatprominence,andunfavourableresearchignored"(Banerjeeetal.,2006).

As thesnowballgrows insize,dissent tends tobemechanicallysuppressed,1) through the sheerdisproportionbetweendiscourseand literaturepromoting,anddiscourseand literatureopposing,thestoryline; 2) because the risk of professional marginalization increases; and, 3) because key actorspositively internalized the concept and consider it as auniversal 'best practice'. It is then taken forgrantedandcanbecometrulyhegemonicifacceptedwithoutbeingquestionedevenbypeopleagainstwhom these ideas work (Gramsci, 1971). As a World Bank official replied, when asked why he

21According to Haas (1992): "The epistemic communities approach focuses on this process through which consensus is

reachedwithinagivendomainofexpertiseandthroughwhichtheconsensualknowledgeisdiffusedtoandcarriedforwardbyotheractors. Itsprimaryconcern isthepolitical influencethatanepistemiccommunitycanhaveoncollectivepolicymaking,ratherthanthecorrectnessoftheadvicegiven".22

According to the BrettonWoods Project (2007),700,000 users amonth access theBank'swebsite.A1999WorldBanksurveyof271highlevelpolicymakersin36developingandtransitioncountriesfoundthatof itsrespondents84%useBankproducedanalyticalreports;theBankwasratedthemostimportantinformationsourceofalistofdomesticandinternationalorganisations; the majority considered the Bank's work "technically sound, relevant and objective". According to aGovernmentofficialfromBrazilrespondingtoasurveyontheBank'sknowledgesharing"TheBankistheinstitutionwhichwe

addresswhen

we

need

some

kind

of

information

or

advice.

Dont

underestimate

this

fact.

If

you

really

need

an

expert

on

acertainissuerelatedtodevelopment,theWorldBankiswhereyougo[to]"(WorldBank,2003).



15/26


considered theMexican case tobea success:"becausenobodydenies it isa success" (cited inRap,2006).

Somemodels,however, fadeaway rapidlybecause theyare lessconvincingorcredibleandwerenever supportedby a criticalmassofpublicationsor apolicynetwork strongenough to generate a

snowballeffect

(Latour,

1989).

Turkeys

IMT

was

directly

inspired

by

the

Mexican

model

(decision

makersmadeseveraltripstoMexico)andforashorttimeitwasbelievedthatitwouldbecomeanewshowcase;sowasAndhraPradeshwith its 'bigbangreform'(Mooij,2003;Nikku,2006).Otherstravelfarandwidebutatthecostofaselectivepresentationoftheexperience:theNIA(NationalIrrigationAdministration) reform in the Philippines, for example,waspraisedwith regard to transferof smallschemes while the much less successful experience in transferring largescale public schemes toirrigationassociationswasnevercriticallyexamined(Oorthuizen,2003;MollingaandBolding,2004).

Incentiveforinvolvedactors

Theconceptandadoptionofmodelsbringsseveralbenefits to theparties involved, includingpolicymakersandmanagersinrecipientcountries,expertsandacademics,aswellasdevelopmentbanks.This

isapparent,

for

example,

in

the

RBO

models:

beyond

the

genuine

belief

that

success

could

be

replicated

anddevelopmentfostered,TrumansbidtoexporttheTVAmodelwasalsopredicateduponthepowerofthedemocraticrhetoricembeddedinthemodelthatservedgeopoliticalinterestsinthefightagainstcommunism,23 and the interest of engineering and construction companies that couldbenefit fromimplementing hightech dams in countries which did not have the technical capacity to constructthem.24Similar interests inbothpromotingnational industrialandconsulting firms,andexpandingacountryspolitical/symbolic influence,arealsosalient in thesupportbyFranceandAustraliaof theirrespectivemodels.

Fornationalelites,modelsofferfirstofallapossible(atleastapartial)solutiontosignificantwatermanagement problems. Second, they offer a means to espouse the referential of bilateral andmultilateraldonorsandtoattract fundsfromcountrieseagertospread theirmodel,ordevelopment

bankseager

to

place

loans

successfully,

upon

which

technical

staff

members

year

end

bonuses

are

based(Chambers,1997).Third,becausemodelssupposedlybringlegitimacyandembodyapromiseofsuccess (Mollinga andBolding,2004), they areoftenmobilized inbureaucratic struggles inorder tojustify/impose,forexample,aparticularreconfigurationofthebureaucracyordecentralizationpolicies.InIndonesia,theFrenchmodelservedtojustifythelevyofapollutiontax;inBrazilthefederalNationalWaterandEnergyAgencypromotedtheFrenchmodelinanticipationofa'fiscaldrought'asameanstoensureaseparatebudget, independentof thestate (MeublatandLourd,2001).Although IWRMhasbeen largely hijacked by state bureaucracies the concept has also internally been appropriated indifferentways. InVietnamand inThailandthenewMinistriesofNaturalResourcesandEnvironmentsawtheintermediatescaleoftheriverbasinastheirlegitimatelevelofaction,butalsoasawindowofopportunity for obtaining some power and an expanded rolewithin the preexisting administrative

structuredominated

by

the

Ministry

of

Agriculture

and

Rural

Development

(in

Vietnam)

or

the

Royal

Irrigation Department (in Thailand). The concept of integrated river basin management and RBOintroduced, at the instigation of the ADB, as pillars of IWRM became sites and objects of internalstruggleinthecontextofwiderbureaucraticchange(MolleandHoanh,2007).

National policymakers also have significant incentives to rely on sanctioned concepts.Straightforward advantages include travel to international conferences,jointpublications, andotherfringebenefitsbutalso the increasedprofessional reputationandderivedcareerenhancements thatmayaccompanyinvolvementwithasuccessstoryoranirvanaconcept.ManynationalrepresentativesofGWPweregiventheopportunitytoacquireregionalorinternationalstatus.Rap(2006)showedthat

23"TheTVAwasaweaponwhich,ifproperlyemployed,mightoutbidallthesocialruthlessnessoftheCommunistsforthe

supportof

the

peoples

of

Asia"

(Schlesinger,

1949;

cited

in

Ekbladh,

2002).

24

SahaandBarrow(1981)refertothe"hugeprofitsmadebyoverseasconstructionandconsultancyfirms"inmostcases.



16/26


severalMexicanwaterofficials associatedwith the IMT reformwere able to project themselves asinternationalconsultants,virtually'selling'themodel.TheMexicangovernmentbureaucracycontrolledthe releaseofpublic informationon theprogressand successof the transferandorchestratedmassmediacampaigns todrawsupport to the reformandsatisfydonors.Over time, the trajectoryof the

policymodel

mobilised

and

united

these

groups

into

an

epistemic

community

of

transnational

policy

makers. Their activitiesoverlapped,paths crossed, and interrelationsmultiplied throughmultilateralinstitutions, conferences, professional associations, and so forth. Through these influences theyincreasinglysharedanddisseminatedanumberofculturalandideologicalunderstandings,values,andpractices thatunderpin the successof thepolicymodel.This selfreinforcingcongruence shaped theproduction of the policymodel and its acceptance and fashionability amongpeer communities andpolicyelitesinrelevantpolitical,financial,andhydraulicinstitutionsaroundtheworld(Rap,2006).

Models also epitomize the rational and reductionist process of policy and planning, anchored inexpert knowledge and replicability of solutions. Therefore they offer attractive blueprints fordevelopmentbanksor agencieswhichneed to saveon administration and transaction costs and toavoidlengthy,costly,andaboveallconfusingindepthanalysesofeachspecificsituation.Asstressedby

Evans

(2004)

"the

intellectual

difficulties

of

translating

the

complexities

of

institutional

analysis

into

concretesuggestionsfordevelopmentpolicyandpracticearesufficientlydauntingtomakeretreattosimplermodelsaconstanttemptation".Fathomingthecomplexityofaparticulardevelopmentcontextwill,inall likelihood,surfaceconfusedandconflictingviews.Thisinstilsdoubt,hindersaction,anddelegitimizes the application of models that, on the contrary, are based on stable, simplified, anddepoliticizednarratives.Blueprintsandmodelsthusplaykeyroles inpreparingandsellingprojects, inpart because they represent 'certified' testimony that 'development can work'. This importance ofmodelsexplainswhy thebanksarealsokeen to intervenewhen financialorotherdifficulties, in thecourseoftime,threatentounderminetheirstatusasasuccessstory(asshownbythecaseofAndhraPradeshin2001:Mooij,2003).

Severalpowerful incentives targetingdevelopmentagencystaffalso leadto ideologicalorthodoxy

and

elicit

adherence

to

approved

narratives

and

models.

Using

interviews

with

several

World

Bank

staff

andpartners,Broad (2006) singledout severalmutuallyreinforcing structures, including "a seriesofincentives:increasinganindividualschancestobehired,toadvanceonescareer,tobepublished,tobepromotedbytheBanksexternalaffairsdepartment,and,ingeneral,tobeassessedpositively".Theassociationofheftysalaries,lucrativebonusesforsuccessfulloanplacement,postretirementschemesandcontractsthataretemporaryinnatureactsas'goldenhandcuffs'andtendstogenerateconformity,limiting"dissentbyincreasingthe'opportunitycosts'ofanydissidence"(Broad,2006)orevenbydirectcensorship.25 This particularly applies to national staff members employed by the Bank, who areunderstandablynot very keen tojeopardize their gains in social status and salary for the sakeof amundanedoctrinaldisagreement.26JustasoperationspeoplearerewardedforpreparingloansthattheBank approves (Meltzer, 2000; Easterly, 2001), Bank researchers are rewarded for bolstering theeconomicparadigmand ideologicalunderpinningsoftheBank.Suchresearcheffortsmaysometimesamountto"paradigmmaintenance".

25Senior Bank researcher David Ellerman complained of "bureaucratic conformity", with public relations staff acting as

"thoughtpolicetotheblacksheepintheorganizationwhoarenot'onmessage'"(BrettonWoodsProject,2007).26

Asastaffmemberatheadquartersrealisticallyadmitted,"IhavetwosonsstudyinginUSuniversitiesandthatcostsalot;Iamnotgoingtorocktheboat".ForamorestringentcritiqueseeGoldman(2005):"Aconsultantforthe[World]BankinAddismakes the equivalent of thirty timeswhat an equally qualified economistmakes. TheWorld Bank successfully cultivated

transnationalprofessional

class

actors

and

networks

that

not

only

meet

the

Banks

needs

but

have

their

own

interests

and

rolestoplay,suchasservingnationalpoliticalandcorporateagendas".



17/26


Paradigmmaintenance

Justasintheformationofepistemiccommunities,thepromotionofnarrativesandmodelsisrarelytheresultofapurposefulstrategicorconspiracybut,rather,abyproductofthewebofinterestsdescribedabove. As social constructs, these concepts and models are rarely neutral and embody causal

assumptionsabout

how

societies

work

and

normative

beliefs

about

how

they

should

work,

as

well

as

conceptions about international relations, governance, or how to exercise power. Unsurprisingly,economicandpoliticalassumptionsaredeeplyideological,evenifthisisnotalwaysapparent.

Theframingconceptsofpoverty,economicgrowth,governance,andmarkets,whichunderpinthemodelsandbestpracticespromotedbytheBankinevitablyendupbeingbeliedbyparticulareventsorinstances.Insuchacasethenarrativemayrequireactiveprotectionsothatthesnowballdoesnotmelt.Broad (2006), for example, documented how the paradigm linking openness to foreign trade andinvestmentandfastergrowthhadtobeinternallyprotectedbydiscardingcontraryevidenceandevenmassaging executive summaries so that Bank ideological axiomatics (in that case, the WashingtonConsensus)would remainunsullied.More specifically, Easterly (2001)has vividlydescribedhow thenarrativeofthefinancinggap,thatfirstlinksgrowthtocapitalinvestmentandthenjustifiesforeignaid

bythe

lack

of

national

savings

for

achieving

necessary

investments

(hence

the

need

to

'fill

the

gap'),

has

survivedduring50years(andisstillactive),despiterenewedacademicrefutation.27Asimilarexampleof"theartofparadigmmaintenance"relatedtotheinterpretationoftheEastAsianeconomicmiraclehasbeenanalysedbyWade(1996).

Thepreeminenceof ideologicalbias sometimes leads tosituationswhereargumentsareatoddswith reality. One example is the insistence of international organizations on downsizing waterbureaucraciesandinternalizingcostsofactivitiessubsidizedbythestate,whicheventuallyunderminedstateaction(Chambers,1997).Othersincludethemythofefficiencylinkedtoprivatization(Letzaetal.2004), and the argument of the 'fiscal drain': establishing water charges, for example, is oftenpredicatedontheimpossibilityforthegovernmenttocontinueshoulderingsuchcosts,evenincontextswhere this argument is unwarranted.While Sur andUmaliDeininger (2003) stress that in 1997/98,

canalirrigation

subsidies

were

equivalent

to

2.6%

of

the

fiscal

deficit

in

Karnataka

and

7%

of

the

fiscal

deficitinAndhraPradesh,thisonlyamountsto0.1and0.3%ofrespectivestateexpenditures,aratherlimitedsubsidyifredistributiontofarmingpopulationsisconsideredastatepolicy.Likewise,inThailandHalcrow&PartnersandARCADIS/Euroconsult(2001)proposedirrigationcostsharingpoliciesbecauseofthe"hugedrainonthenationalbudget"occasionedbysubsidies,buttheseonlyrepresent0.27%ofThai government expenditures. In Jordan, the presentO&M subsidy to the Jordan ValleyAuthorityamountsto lessthan0.1%ofstateexpendituresestimatedatUS$3.7billion(VenotandMolle,2007).Thisdoesnotmeanthatcostrecoverymeasuresareunsoundbutitisstrikingtoseehowtheycanbefostered by an ideology of 'real costs' propelled by expertswho often come fromOECD countries,whereyearlyaggregatedsubsidiestoagricultureexceed300billiondollars(WorldBank,2008).

The link between poverty and water resource development is another example of a paradigm

infusedwith

ideology

and

interests

that

needs

regular

maintenance

because

of

its

major

importance

for

justifyingfurther investments.Onesubquestion isaboutthetypesof investmentsneededforAfricanagriculture, notably with regard to irrigation. The potential irrigation area established by a reportcommissionedbytheBritishCommissionforAfricawasjudgedtoolowbypoliticalandotherinterestsinwantofahighertarget(andwassubsequentlydoubled).AnotherstudyhasbeencommissionedbyseveralinternationalorganizationstodrawlessonsfromagriculturalwatermanagementinvestmentsinsubSaharan Africa. The drafting of the report was 'hijacked' by one of the partners with a strong

27Themodelisbasedonaworkwrittenin1946byDomar(andlaterrepudiatedbyitsowncreator)andwasgivensaliencein

Rostow'stheoryofeconomictakeoff.Whenthedogmawascriticizedinthe1980sitwasmodifiedsoastostatethat"althoughphysicalcapitalaccumulationmaybeconsideredanecessaryconditionofdevelopment, ithasnotprovedsufficient".This is

probablythe

clearest

example

of

how

afalse

narrative

debunked

by

economic

science

can

nevertheless

endure

over

half

acenturywhenitservespowerfulinterestsbyprovidingadhocjustifications.SeemoredetailsinEasterley(2001).



18/26


interest inpromoting largewater investments. Itusedconsultantswhowrote the report inaway tosupport higher investments in conventional irrigation, and deliberately downplayed the potentialreturns from investing in microagricultural water management technology and upgrading rainfedagriculture, retaining thisbiaseven after a groupof seniorAfricanpeer reviewersexpressed strong

reservationsabout

it

(Merrey,

2007).

Inpracticethejustificationsgiventosupport theborrowingofamodel,thedesignofaparticularproject,ortheestablishmentofaparticularpolicy,oftenrevealshiftingcontradictionsandflawsthataretellingindicationsofideologicalbiasandotherconcealedmotivations.

IMPLICATIONSFORPOLICYMAKING

Regardlessofhowtheseglobalconceptsandiconsemergeandaredisseminated,theyhavebynatureanumber of consequences for development interventions and for policy formulation andimplementation.Not all these implications are negative. Sanctioned concepts andmodels outline arather stable and consensual common ground for water experts or officials worldwide to meet,

exchange,

discuss

and

learn

from

each

other

by

putting

their

own

particular

water

problems

into

perspective(Bauer,2004).ForvanderZaag(2005)IWRMconceptshave"inspiredanewgenerationofwatermanagers and researchers to think out of thebox and act creatively [and] broughtmutualrespect,understandingandcooperationamongwaterprofessionalsinSouthernAfrica".Beyondwaterprofessionals,IWRMasanirvanaconcepthasalsoallowedotherconstituencies,interestgroupsandNGOs tousetheconceptto frameanddisseminate theirownvisions.Sanctionedconceptsallowthediffusionofgeneralprinciplesand the identificationofcommonproblemsand solutionsatagenericlevel; theyoffer support/expertiseand fosternationalprocessesof reflectiononwaterpolicies; theysometimes encourage dialogues between segments of the administration or ministries that shareresponsibilitiesonwaterissuesbutfailtocoordinatetheiractions.

Thedownsideofthesepositiveaspectsistheconceptionofadequateknowledgeasa'bestpractice'that tends to become normative. Yet valueladen 'truths' are insensitive to context, and typicallyoverrideendogenoussolutions.Knowledgeisconceivedofasneutralinformationthatcanbeprovidedlikeanyothercommodityifitisproperlyorganized,archived,andtransmitted.Thereisastrongtensionbetween the World Banks messages that it wants to avoid blueprint approaches, and its manydocumentsandindicatorswhichclaimtomeasure28'therightpolicies'(BrettonWoodsProject,2007).Likewise,whileontheonehandtheADB formallyacknowledgesthat"there isnostandardapproachthat fitsalltheneeds" (Arrins,2004),on theother, itproposesaquiteunambiguousmodelof 'the'appropriate water regime, whereby "modern" water laws are enacted, the state is confined to aregulatory role which it then decentralizes to RBOs, while provision of irrigation and urban water"services" ishandledbyutilitiesorprivate sectorproviders thataredulypaidby their customers inordertoensurefullcostrecovery(Arrins,2004).Changesareevaluatedbasedontheformalexistenceofparticularadministrativedevicesor institutions,withoutexaminingtheircontentsandprocesses inanygreatdepth.29

28SalethandDinar(2000),forexample,reviewwaterreformprocessesin11countriesandextractforeachofthemwhatthey

consider as "best practices", or "healthy practices that can strengthen the institutional basis for betterwater allocation,financing,andmanagement";theseincludeIMT,theformationofRBOs,waterpermitregistry,marketbasedwaterallocation,privatization of urban water supply, water law, etc. These practices are presented as elements whose achievement is ameasureofsuccessandmodernism,butneithertheirrelevance(orlackthereof)toaparticularcontextnorhowtoassessthatrelevanceisdiscussed.29

A graphic example of this is provided by a "progress report" on water sector reforms in Asia (Mosley, 2004), whichestablishes a list of 41 "policy elements" and estimates to which degree different countries have achieved them. These

elementsinclude

"legislation

adopted",

"private

sector

investments",

"cost

recovery",

"river

basins/aquifer

organization",

"rightsandresponsibilitiesofstakeholders",etc.



19/26


20/26


somemodelsornarratives fade awaybecause they fail toestablish themselves in competitionwithmore 'effective' concepts. Voluntary efforts to strengthen or keep afloat embattled doctrinairenarratives(withsomecasesofparadigmmaintenance)alsosuggestthattheyarenotimmunetocriticalanalysis and that practitioners and applied researchers can, with persistence either root out

inappropriateconcepts

or

incrementally

refine

and

improve

those

that

do

offer

real

value

to

acommunityofwaterusersandotheractors.

Ifmodels and nirvana conceptswork to mobilize their promoters and tend to reflect dominantinterestsandthedistributionofpowerinsociety,theyalsoservetomobilizeprotestsandtorallythosewho feel they stand to lose in the conceptual game. Instances of IMT introduced in Sri Lanka orparticipatory irrigationmanagement(PIM)inPakistan,attemptstoestablishirrigationwaterpricinginThailand, or privatization and tradablewater rights in Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru have allconfrontedstiffresistance.Sometimescounterhegemonicdiscoursesandconceptsmayalsoarise.

CONCLUSIONS

This

article

examined

some

of

the

cognitive

dimensions

of

policy

making

in

the

water

sector

by

focusing

onthreetypesofconceptualobjects.Nirvanaconcepts,suchasIWRM,are'photographicnegatives'ofprevailing chaotic situations and embodiments of a consensual reconciliation of antagonisticworldviewsand interests.As theybecomeglobalpoliticalcurrency,nirvanaconceptsare invested in,and reappropriated by, various constituencies as a means of forwarding their agendas or as asmokescreen forbusinessasusual strategies.Yet, theyalsoofferopportunities for contestation andmay serveasboundaryobjectsbyprovidingacommonground fornegotiation. IWRMhasserved todisseminatesociallyandenvironmentallysensitiveconceptsand,perhaps,inspiredanewgenerationofwaterprofessionals.

It has also provided an overarching framework under which various interlinked narratives andmodelshavebeenaccommodated.Narratives structure thinkinganddecisionsbyestablishingcausalbeliefs that are tightly connected with particular policy models. Nirvana concepts, narratives andmodels are disseminated and promoted by a number ofmechanisms inscribed in the professional,social and political sets of incentives faced bymany decisionmakers. They also tend to reflect theideologies and interests of powerful parties and include more active processes of snowballing andparadigm maintenance by which concepts may become hegemonic and fuel a normative andprescriptivepolicymaking.

Roe (1991)doubts thatnarrativesorblueprintswill everbedebunkedby contrary evidence andarguesthatfailednarrativesshouldbereplacedby'betternarratives'or'bettertruths'.Yet,narrativesandmodelsareliabletoinvestigation,canbeweakenedorinvalidatedbyempiricalevidenceandare,inotherwords,falsifiable.Evenifdebatesareneverfullyexhausted,theprincipleofconstantlyreopeningdebates, exposing shortcomings, discussing concepts, engaging opposed views, deconstructinggeneralisations,inotherwordstirelesslypromotingopenness,scrutiny,andaccountability,remainthecentralrecoursesavailabletoactorswhofindtheirinterestsundervaluedorignored,aswaterprojectsareconceptualizedand implemented.Thesearemeanstoforestalldebateclosure(orreopen 'settled'debates)andeffectivelychallengetheneutralizationorexclusionofparticularalternatives,viewpoints,orsocialgroups.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Theauthorwould liketo thankseveralcolleaguesand friends fortheir interest inthispaperand thevaluable comments theymadeonearlierdraftversions: JohnDore,MargreetZwarteveen,PhilippusWester,V.S.Saravanan,JamieThomson,RobertChambersandDougMerrey.SpecialthanksgotoPeterMollingaforfruitfuldiscussionontheconclusion.



21/26


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