Responsi ble Care ®

D E P A R T E M E N T T E C H N I Q U E

Guide ICCA* sur les indicateurs

de sécur i té des procédés

* International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA)

DT 118

Mars 2017

Guide ICCA sur les indicateurs de sécurité des procédés – Mars 2017

Avertissement

L'Union des Industries Chimiques décline toute responsabilité quant à l'usage qui sera fait de ce document. Il reflète l'état des connaissances scientifiques et techniques au moment où il a été écrit.

Guide ICCA sur les indicateurs de sécurité des procédés – Mars 2017

La protection des hommes et de l’environnement constitue l’objectif le plus important pour les entreprises de la chimie à l’échelle mondiale. La mise en place d’un système efficace de management de la sécurité des procédés qui identifie, réduit, ou élimine les risques associés aux opérations industrielles est un prérequis pour atteindre cet objectif. Les performances en sécurité des procédés d’un site industriel s’évaluent, entre autres au travers d’indicateurs de performance qui mesurent et analysent les incidents de sécurité des procédés. L’ICCA (Organisation professionnelle internationale de l’industrie chimique) a établi un guide décrivant les critères harmonisés pour qualifier les incidents de sécurité des procédés (PSE= Process Safety Event) afin de de disposer d’un référentiel commun. Le présent guide UIC DT118 est constitué de deux parties :

• Partie 1 : RESUME DU GUIDE ICCA SUR LES INDICATEURS DE SECURITE DES PROCEDES- Version Française

• Partie 2 : GUIDE ICCA SUR LES INDICATEURS DE SECURITE DES PROCEDES- Version

Anglaise Notes Le guide ICCA annule et remplace le guide CEFIC de 2011 que l’UIC avait traduit. Les évolutions proposées par l’ICCA par rapport au guide CEFIC de 2011, concernent les seuils de soumission qui sont abaissés via le guide ICCA.

Guide ICCA sur les indicateurs de sécurité des procédés – Mars 2017

Guide ICCA sur les indicateurs de sécurité des procédés – Mars 2017

PARTIE 1

RESUME DU GUIDE ICCA SUR LES INDICATEURS DE SECURITE DES PROCEDES

Version Française

Guide ICCA sur les indicateurs de sécurité des procédés – Mars 2017

RESUME DU GUIDE ICCA SUR LES INDICATEURS DE SECURITE DES PROCEDES

Version Mars 2017

Groupe de travail « Responsible Care »

1

Sommaire Résumé ..................................................................................................................................................... 2

Données à collecter .................................................................................................................................. 3

Résumé des critères de sélection des PSE ................................................................................................ 3

Critères clefs pour définir un PSE (Process Safety Event) ......................................................................... 4

Critères détaillés pour définir un PSE ....................................................................................................... 4

Table 1 – Critères selon règlement CLP .................................................................................................... 7

Foire aux Questions .................................................................................................................................. 8

2

Résumé Les critères qui permettent de savoir si un événement se produisant sur une unité de procédés est à qualifier d’événement de sécurité des procédés sont résumés sur le logigramme en page 3. Le groupe de travail ICCA estime que cette proposition de reporting permettra de constituer une base de reporting des PSE commune aux industries chimiques et pétrochimiques dans le but de l’amélioration continue de performances de sécurité des procédés. Note UIC : les évolutions proposées par l’ICCA comparativement au guide CEFIC de 2011 traduit par l’UIC concernent les seuils de soumission qui sont abaissés via le guide ICCA.

Remarque : Le groupe de travail ICCA ayant rédigé le présent guide estime que les deux systèmes de reporting ICCA et API 754 sont proches, mais recommande de ne pas comparer les données issues de deux sociétés différentes, l’une utilisant l’ICCA et l’autre l’API 754. En effet les critères retenus par l’ICCA pour qualifier un événement procédé d’événement sécurité des procédés (PSE : Process Safety Event) sont identiques à ceux issus du guide API 754 niveau II. La seule différence réside dans la quantité rejetée. Note UIC : l’UIC préconise d’utiliser de préférence le système ICCA plus simple et basé sur le règlement CLP plutôt que l’API 754 utilisé par les groupes pétroliers. C’est pourquoi l’UIC n’a traduit que la partie du guide explicitant le système ICCA. Les entreprises qui souhaitent se référer à l’API 754 peuvent se reporter en partie II page 12 du présent guide UIC.

3

Données à collecter Les données à rapporter annuellement sont les suivantes :

Nombre total d’heures travaillées (salariés organiques et d’entreprises extérieures)

Nombre total d’événement sécurité des procédés (PSE : Process Safety Event)

Le taux PSE (PSER : PSE rate) sera normalisé comme suit : Calcul du PSER pour 100 employés : On considère que chaque employé travaille 2 000 heures 1par an. Pour 100 employés il faut donc multiplier le PSER par 200 000 pour obtenir le PSER normalisé. PSER normalisé = (nombre total de PSE / nombre total d’heures travaillées (employés et EE)) x 200 000 Résumé des critères de sélection des PSE

1 Note UIC : cette valeur peut paraître élevée. C’est la valeur retenue par le guide ICCA dans le cadre de la

normalisation

Une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique

est-il directement impliqué dans les dommages ?

L’incident s’est-il produit en unité de production, de distribution de stockage, sur les utilités, en unité

pilote à l’intérieur du site ?

Il y–a- t-il eu rejet de substance ou d’énergie

(feu, explosion, implosion) depuis l’unité

de production ?

OUI OUI

OUI

NON Incident/accident conduisant à arrêt de

travail, ou décès, hospitalisation personne sur site ou à l’extérieur ?

Dommage

≥ 2500 euros de coût

direct pour l’entreprise ?

Plan d’urgence déclenché (mise à

l’abri, (évacuation…)

NON

OUI

NON

OUI : Process Safety Event rapportable

OUI

OUI

OUI

Début

NON : Ne remplit pas le critère de PSE (Process Safety Event)

Seuils tableau 1 ou API 754 Niveau II

atteints ?

NON

NON

NON

NON

4

Critères clefs pour définir un PSE (Process Safety Event) Nombre total d’heures travaillées L’UIC devra rapporter le nombre total d’heures travaillées (heures des salariés organiques et heures travaillées par les entreprises extérieures). Les heures travaillées dans le cadre de nouvelles constructions ou d’extension majeure du site ne sont pas à prendre en compte. PSE Un événement procédé est un PSE au sens du guide ICCA si les critères suivants sont réunis :

A - Une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique est impliqué et B - L’incident se déroule en production, distribution, stockage, utilités, laboratoire pilote au sein

du site industriel et C- Il y a un rejet de matière ou d’énergie (ex : feu, explosion, implosion) sur une unité et D- Un ou plusieurs des seuils suivants sont dépassés

1- Sécurité / Blessure

Blessure résultant d’un évènement rapportable (arrêt de travail, décès, admission à l’hôpital d’une personne travaillant sur site ou à l’extérieur),ou

2. Coût direct des dommages feu, explosion ou nettoyage nécessaire pour éviter ou remédier à un dommage

environnemental avec un coût direct supérieur ou égal à 2,500 euros; ou 3. Mise à l’abri / Evacuation

Mise à l’abri officielle (POI, PPI); ou Déclaration d’évacuation (sur site en zone sécurisée ou hors site); ou Mise à l’abri ou évacuation hors site par précaution ou

4. Seuil de matière relâchée La quantité rejetée est supérieure ou égale aux quantités définies au tableau 1

page 7 (masse rejetée sur une heure)

Critères détaillés pour définir un PSE A. Substance chimique Une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique est impliqué

Une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique est directement en cause dans l’incident. Le terme « procédé » inclut l’équipement et la technologie pour la production pétrochimique, incluant réacteurs, réservoirs, tuyauteries, échangeurs, tours de refroidissement, système de réfrigération, etc. Un incident qui n’est pas lié directement à une substance chimique ou un procédé chimique, par exemple un feu dans un bureau même si celui-ci est sur le site de production n’est pas rapportable en tant que PSE. B. Localisation L’incident se déroule en production, distribution, stockage, utilités, laboratoire pilote au sein du site industriel

5

L’incident se déroule en production, distribution, stockage (réservoirs et entrepôt), utilités, laboratoire pilote au sein du site industriel. Cela inclut les parcs de stockage, les locaux annexes (type chaufferie, traitement des eaux usées) et les canalisations de transport sous contrôle du site industriel. Tous les incidents qui se déroulent dans un endroit exploité sous la responsabilité de l’entreprise sont à rapporter. Il faut donc prendre en compte les incidents se déroulant sur des zones où les travaux sont réalisés par une entreprise extérieure. Dans le cadre d’un complexe multi-exploitant, l’entreprise qui opère l’unité où se produit l’incident reporte l’évènement. C. Rejet de substance Il y a un rejet de matière ou d’énergie (ex : feu, explosion, implosion) sur une unité

Rejet de substance– rejet non planifié et non contrôlé de matière, incluant les substances non toxiques et non inflammables (ex : vapeur, eau chaude, azote, dioxyde de carbone comprimé, air comprimé), issu d’un procédé avec une conséquence telle que précisé ci-après au chapitre D.

Un rejet vers la torche ou un vers un système d’épuration n’est pas considéré comme relevant d’une perte de confinement primaire dès lors que le système a fonctionné dans des conditions normales sans rejets au-delà des seuils définis pour des opérations normales (standards de dimensionnement).

Un rejet vers un système de confinement secondaire (traitement des eaux ou rétention) est qualifié de PSE car la substance a été rejetée au travers du système primaire avant d’atteindre le système secondaire.

D. Seuils Un ou plusieurs des seuils suivants sont atteints. 1. Sécurité / Blessure Blessure résultant d’un évènement rapportable (arrêt de travail, décès, admission à l’hôpital d’une personne travaillant sur site ou à l’extérieur) Blessure rapportable : blessures liées au travail avec les conséquences suivantes : décès, arrêt de travail, poste aménagé, traitement médical en plus des premiers soins, perte de conscience ou blessure significative diagnostiquée par un médecin. Décès ou blessure avec arrêt résultant d’une perte de confinement procédé, d’un feu, d’une explosion et concernant :

Employés (Accident avec arrêt/ou décès)

Entreprises Extérieures (Accident avec arrêt/ou décès)

Tierce partie (Blessure/maladie conduisant à un décès ou à une admission à l’hôpital)

Admission à l’hôpital– admission formelle à l’hôpital en dehors d’un passage aux urgences non suivi d’une hospitalisation

Exemples d’évènement PSE : brûlure résultant d’un jet de vapeur lors du nettoyage d’un équipement, blessure physique suite à un test de pression, brûlure chimique lors d’une prise d’échantillon.

6

Exemples d’évènement ne relevant pas de la définition de PSE: chute de hauteur lors de travaux de maintenance, brûlure suite à un feu de laboratoire ou à un feu de bureau.

2. Coût direct Feu, explosion ou nettoyage nécessaire pour éviter ou réparer des dommages environnementaux avec des coûts directs supérieurs ou égaux à 2 500 euros Les coûts sont ceux attribués directement aux impacts tels que le remplacement d’un équipement, les travaux de réparation, les nettoyages, les mesures d’urgence. Les coûts ne prennent pas en compte les pertes d’exploitation. 3. Mise à l’abri / Evacuation Mise à l’abri officielle (POI, PPI); ou déclaration d’évacuation (sur site en zone sécurisée ou hors site); ou mise à l’abri ou évacuation hors site par précaution Déclenchement officiel – Déclaration officielle (sécurité civile, pompiers) avec mise à l’abri, évacuation Mesures de précaution – Evacuation ou mise à l’abri nécessaire par précaution pour protéger la sécurité / santé du public Mise à l’abri – Utilisation d’un local dédié pour mise en sécurité Evacuation – Déplacement des personnes d’un endroit pour protéger leur sécurité 4. Seuil de matière rejetée Rejet de matière supérieur ou égal à ceux définis tableau 1, page 7 Note UIC : Seul le système basé sur le règlement CLP est repris dans cette note.

Rejet – Rejet de matière selon les données du tableau 1

Système de décharge de pression (soupape, disque de rupture) : Les rejets prennent en compte ceux vers un système dédié dès lors que la quantité est supérieure à celle définie au tableau 1 et que le rejet conduit à une ou plusieurs des quatre conséquences ci-après :

1. Un entraînement de liquide ; 2. Un rejet en un lieu potentiellement non-sûr ; 3. Mise à l’abri officielle (POI, PPI); ou déclaration d’évacuation (sur site en zone sécurisée ou hors

site); ou mise à l’abri ou évacuation hors site par précaution

Les rejets vers un système conçu pour cela, tels que torche, laveurs, etc. n’ont pas à être rapportés s’ils ne respectent pas les critères mentionnés ci-dessus.

Règle 1 heure de fuite

Les pertes de confinement sont mesurées sur une durée de 1 heure.

Si le taux de rejet d’une substance atteint ou dépasse le taux défini pour une période d’une heure, il est rapportable.

Dans le cas où la durée de fuite n’est pas connue, on suppose que la durée est d’une heure.

7

Confinement primaire : un réservoir, une colonne, une tuyauterie sont considérés comme des confinements primaires. Ils peuvent être reliés à un confinement secondaire, tels que une cuvette de rétention, un système de collecte des eaux avec séparation des eaux huileuses, une double paroi pour les réservoirs, etc…

Sévérité : Un tableau proposé par l’ICCA (non traduit sur ce résumé) peut permettre de hiérarchiser les événements et de guider l’amélioration des performances.

Le niveau de sévérité est calculé pour chaque événement en additionnant pour chaque conséquence les points proposés. L’ICCA recommande d’utiliser aussi cet indice. Ce niveau permet de comprendre les événements de façon plus pertinente.

Tableau 1 – Critères selon règlement CLP

Catégories Catégories Catégories

Dangers pour la santé

Toxicité aigüe Annexe 1 CLP point 3.1

1 et 2 3 et 4 Non applicable

Mentions de dangers CLP H300, H310 ou H330

H301, 302, 311 , 312 , 331 ou 332

Non applicable

CMR (Cancérogène, Mutagène, Reprotoxique) STOT exposition unique Annexe 1 CLP point 3.5 à 3.8

Non applicable Non applicable Toutes catégories

Autres dangers pour la santé Annexe 1 CLP autres points 3.x non visés ci-dessus

Dangers physiques Annexe 1 CLP point 2.x

Non applicable Non applicable

Dangers pour l’environnement Annexe 1 CLP point 2.x

Seuil (pour une durée de 1 heure)

≥1 kg ≥10kg ≥100kg

8

Foire aux Questions

Applicabilité

Les entreprises doivent rapporter les incidents se déroulant sur des sites détenus ou exploités par l’entreprise, à l’exception de :

1. Événement s’étant déroulé en dehors de la propriété de l’entreprise ; 2. Incident sur un bateau, un camion ou un wagon, sauf si le bateau, le camion ou le wagon est raccordé au site

industriel pour des opérations de chargement/déchargement ; 3. Émissions habituelles dans les limites des autorisations d’exploiter ; 4. Contaminations des sols qui ne sont pas induits par un événement procédé ; 5. Incidents se déroulant dans les locaux administratifs ; 6. Incidents touchant le personnel (chute, glissade, etc.) non directement associés à une perte de confinement ; 7. Perte de confinement d’équipements accessoires non liés au procédé ; 8. Rejet programmé et contrôlé ; 9. Interventions mécaniques conduites en dehors du procédé ou en atelier de maintenance.

Interprétations et exemples

Evénement PSE

rapportable ou non

Commentaires - Explications

LIEUX CONCERNÉS

1

Une citerne affrétée par une tierce partie charge un liquide inflammable sur le site de l’entreprise, doit faire face à une fuite suivie d’un incendie et des dommages consécutifs évalués à

7 000 € (coût direct).

Oui

La citerne est opérée par un tiers, mais elle est connectée au procédé.

Les dommages dépassent 2 500 €.

2

La même citerne, après avoir quitté le site, se retourne sur la route, à l’extérieur du site, avec pour conséquence un incendie et la perte du camion.

Non L’accident s’est produit en dehors du site.

PERTE DE CONFINEMENT

3

La défaillance d’une jauge de réservoir a pour conséquence le sur remplissage d’un réservoir contenant des liquides inflammables. Environ 700 kg de liquide débordent dans la cuvette de rétention.

Oui

L’incident concerne une fuite soudaine de plus de 100 kg, sans tenir compte du confinement secondaire.

9

4

Un salarié d’une entreprise extérieure de maintenance ouvre une vanne procédé et reçoit une projection d’acide sulfurique avec pour conséquence de sévères brûlures et une incapacité temporaire.

Oui

Evénement non intentionnel mettant en jeu un équipement et une perte de confinement. Dans le cas d’accident mortel ou de blessures ou maladies, il n’y a pas de seuil-plancher.

5

Un opérateur ouvre un point d’échantillonnage de contrôle qualité pour un échantillon de routine et, du fait du flacon de verre qui se brise, se blesse à la main, ce qui occasionne des points de suture et un jour d’arrêt de travail.

Non L’incident n’est pas lié à une perte de confinement.

FUITES SOUDAINES

6

Alors qu’il repère un débit de gaz naturel supérieur à la normale, un opérateur détecte une vanne de sécurité sur la ligne de gaz naturel qui ne s’est pas refermée correctement et qui laisse échapper du gaz à l’évent à travers un séparateur. Après plus ample recherche, il est avéré que 100 000 kg de gaz naturel ont été dégazés sur une période régulière de 6 mois.

Non

Cela ne constitue pas un PSE rapportable du fait que le taux de fuite (≈ 10 kg/h) s’étale sur une longue durée (inférieur à 100 kg/h pour une vapeur inflammable).

TORCHÈRES OU SYSTÈMES D’ÉMISSIONS CONTRÔLÉS

7

Un produit chimique est dirigé vers une torche ou un système d’épuration (ex : laveur).

Non

Dès lors que le système a fonctionné dans des conditions normales sans rejets au-delà des seuils définis pour des opérations normales (standards de dimensionnement).

10

8

Un laveur est saturé par un flux dépassant les conditions normales de fonctionnement et laisse s’échapper une substance chimique au-delà des seuils rapportables.

Oui

Une émission incontrôlée issue d’une source autorisée ou réglementée – y compris une soupape – d’une quantité supérieure ou égale aux seuils mentionnés au tableau sur une période d’une heure, et ayant l’une ou plusieurs des conséquences suivantes :

Un entraînement de liquide ;

Un rejet en un lieu potentiellement non-sûr ;

Mise à l’abri officielle (POI, PPI); ou déclaration d’évacuation (sur site en zone sécurisée ou hors site); ou mise à l’abri ou évacuation hors site par précaution

doit être rapportée en tant que PSE.

SOUPAPES – DISQUES DE RUPTURE

9

Il se produit un incident suivi de l’ouverture d’une soupape à l’atmosphère sans conséquence néfaste.

Non

Les vapeurs ou gaz émis à l’atmosphère au travers d’une soupape, d’un disque de rupture ou tout système similaire, correctement conçu pour ce type d’événement selon l’API 521 ou équivalent sont exclus, tant que la fuite n’a pas pour conséquence un entraînement de liquide qui créerait un PSE relatif au liquide (ex : accident du travail avec arrêt, décès, incendie ou explosion causant plus de 2 500 € de coûts directs, etc.) ou le déclenchement d’une mise à l’abri ou de mesures de protection du public.

10

Il se produit un incident suivi de la non-ouverture d’une soupape à l’atmosphère. Il en résulte une surpression de l’équipement et un rejet soudain de gaz inflammable sur une bride. La quantité rejetée est supérieure à 100 kg (en 1 heure).

Oui Les fuites de brides ne sont pas exclues du reporting PSE.

11

ACCIDENTS AVEC ARRÊT

11

Un opérateur marche, glisse et tombe, ce qui entraîne un arrêt de travail. Cette chute est due aux mauvaises conditions météorologiques, au sol perpétuellement gras et à des chaussures glissantes.

Non

Les accidents de déplacement qui ne sont pas directement associés à une perte de confinement sont spécifiquement exclus du reporting PSE.

12

Même incident que le précédent, sauf que l’opérateur se déplace pour faire face à une petite fuite de liquide inflammable (moins de 10 kg en 1 heure).

Oui

L’opérateur est occupé à traiter une perte de confinement, indépendamment des quantités rejetées.

13

Même incident que le précédent, sauf que l’opérateur glisse et tombe plusieurs heures après la fin de l’incident.

Non

Les accidents de déplacement qui suivent un incident terminé ne sont pas rapportables.

14

Un échafaudeur est mis en arrêt de travail après une chute d’échafaudage lors d’une évacuation consécutive à une perte de confinement.

Oui

L’échafaudeur est tombé lors d’une évacuation consécutive à une perte de confinement, indépendamment des quantités rejetées.

15

Un opérateur marche et passe devant une purge de vapeur défectueuse. La purge projette de la vapeur et l’opérateur est brûlé, occasionnant un arrêt de travail.

Oui

Même si la perte de confinement concerne de la vapeur, l’état physique du matériel est en cause.

16

Une enceinte a été intentionnellement purgée avec de l’azote. Un employé d’une entreprise extérieure ne respecte pas les mesures de consignation, entre dans l’enceinte et meurt.

Non Il n’y a pas de perte de confinement non-programmée et non-contrôlée.

17

Même accident que le précédent, sauf que l’azote a été introduit de façon non intentionnelle dans l’enceinte.

Oui Il s’agit d’un décès consécutif à une perte de confinement accidentelle.

18

Un opérateur se déplaçant pour une alarme de fuite d’H2S tombe et est blessé.

Oui/Non

Si l’alarme est déclenchée par une perte de confinement non-programmée et non-contrôlée d’H2S, l’incident est un PSE rapportable. S’il s’agit d’une fausse alarme, il ne l’est pas car il n’y a pas réellement de fuite.

PIPELINES

19

Une fuite sur une tuyauterie occasionne la perte de 1000 kg de vapeur inflammable sur le sol durant une heure. Cependant, la fuite se déroule dans un lieu fermé à l’intérieur du site.

Oui Le fait que la fuite se déroule en un lieu fermé ne permet pas l’exclusion.

12

FEUX ET LIBÉRATIONS D’ÉNERGIE NON ASSOCIÉS AVEC UNE FUITE DE PRODUIT CHIMIQUE

En règle générale, un feu ou une libération d’énergie constitue un PSE rapportable seulement s’il est causé par une fuite de produit chimique ou s’il engendre une fuite de produit chimique dépassant les seuils rapportables. Exemples :

20

Un feu électrique impacte l’exploitation d’un procédé, avec pour conséquence la fuite de 400 kg de toluène.

Oui La quantité répandue dépasse le seuil de 100 kg applicable au toluène.

21

Un feu électrique, une perte d’alimentation ou toute autre perte d’utilité entraîne un arrêt d’atelier suivi de dommages dépassant 2 500 € (ex. : dommage aux équipements consécutifs à un arrêt d’urgence), mais ne cause pas de fuite dépassant les seuils ou de blessure grave ou de décès.

Non

Les dommages aux équipements n’ont pas été causés par un feu ou une explosion lié au procédé et il n’y a pas eu de rejet de substance chimique supérieur aux seuils mentionnés.

TRANSPORTS MARITIMES

22

Une entreprise de transport maritime déplore à bord une fuite soudaine de matière combustible supérieure à 100 kg.

Non

Les incidents à bord de bateaux de transport maritime sont spécifiquement exclus, sauf si le bateau est relié à une unité pour chargement/déchargement.

23

Une barge est poussée par un remorqueur et heurte le ponton d’une entreprise chimique. Le réservoir de la barge est perforé et 1 000 kg de gazole se répandent dans la rivière.

Non

La barge n’est pas amarrée au ponton ni engagée dans un processus de chargement/déchargement.

CAMIONS ET WAGONS

24 Une citerne ferroviaire en circulation sur le réseau SNCF déraille et plus de 1000 kg d’essence se répandent.

Non L’incident se déroule en dehors des limites du site industriel.

25

Une citerne routière se retourne à l’intérieur du site de l’entreprise ; il en résulte une fuite soudaine de 1 000 kg d’essence.

Non

La citerne n’est pas raccordée à une installation de chargement/déchargement. Cependant, nous recommandons aux entreprises de disposer d’indicateurs d’incidents de transport vis-à-vis desquels cet incident sera rapporté.

26

Un camion-citerne est en cours de déchargement de soude caustique et le flexible se désaccouple, créant une fuite et un épandage de 2 500 kg de lessive de soude.

Oui

La quantité de soude excède le seuil de 100 kg et la citerne est raccordée aux installations de l’usine.

13

BUREAUX

27

Il se produit un feu de bouilloire dans les bureaux de l’usine et le coût des dommages atteint 75 000 €.

Non Les événements se déroulant dans les bureaux sont spécifiquement exclus.

INCIDENTS À L’INTERFACE HOMME/MACHINE

28

Un technicien est blessé lors de l’installation d’un équipement dans une usine de polymères. La blessure est causée par un élément mobile de la machine.

Non Il n’y a pas eu de perte de confinement de matière dangereuse.

MÉLANGES

Si un mélange est classé au titre de CLP, on utilisera cette classification pour déterminer le seuil. Si le mélange n’est pas classé au titre de CLP, on doit revenir aux composants du mélange et prendre en compte la contribution massique de chaque composant en la confrontant aux seuils correspondants et calculer un « rejet équivalent ». Exemple :

29

Une fuite de 100 kg d’un mélange non classé au titre de CLP sur une période d’une heure contient 0,5 kg d’une substance classée « toxique aigu », catégorie 1, portant la mention H300 ; 4,5 kg d’une substance classée « toxique aigu » catégorie 3, portant la mention H301 ; 40 kg d’une substance portant un mention H indéterminée et 55 kg d’eau. La quantité équivalent est calculée comme suit : 0,5/1 + 4,5/10 + 40/100 = 1,35 (les valeurs 1, 10 et 100 placées aux dénominateurs sont les seuils relatifs à chaque catégorie).

Oui

Ce résultat est supérieur à 1 et conduit à qualifier l’incident de PSE rapportable, même si aucun des composants, pris individuellement, ne dépasse le seuil correspondant à sa catégorie.

COÛT DIRECT DES DOMMAGES

Le coût direct des dommages pris en compte pour le seuil de 2 500 € se rapporte au coût attribué directement au feu ou à l’explosion, tels que la valeur de remplacement de l’équipement ou des structures perdus, le coût des réparations, le nettoyage et la remédiation environnementale, le coût du plan d’urgence, les amendes éventuelles. Il ne comprend pas les coûts indirects tels que les pertes d’exploitation, le coût d’achat de produit à l’extérieur pour livrer les clients. Exemples :

30

Une fuite de gaz inflammable se produit sur une conduite de traitement de gaz. Dans le même temps, une défaillance du procédé permet à de l’air d’entrer dans la conduite. Une explosion se produit et la surpression endommage la conduite et l’équipement situé en amont incluant une garde hydraulique. Personne n’est blessé. Le coût de réparation atteint 12 000 €.

Oui

Considérant le coût de réparation des dégâts occasionnés par le feu ou l’explosion

14

31

Après un événement PSE, une entreprise rejette 50 kg d’une substance inflammable qui cause 2 000 € de dégâts aux équipements. La substance rejetée est clef pour les activités de l’entreprise, laquelle doit faire face à une perte d’exploitation de 50 000 €.

Non

La quantité rejetée est inférieure au seuil associé aux substances inflammables (100 kg) et le coût des dommages directs est inférieur à 2 500 €.

CATASTROPHES NATURELLES

Les catastrophes naturelles peuvent constituer un risque substantiel vis-à-vis des procédés chimiques et occasionner des dommages aux équipements pouvant causer des pertes de confinement de substances dangereuses. Lorsque le potentiel pour un ou plusieurs types de catastrophes naturelles est jugé significatif vis-à-vis des opérations du site, des mesures de maîtrise des risques appropriées doivent être mises en œuvre.

32 Si votre site est confronté à une catastrophe naturelle qui peut déclencher une perte de confinement au-delà des seuils, elle doit être rapportée comme un PSE.

MESURE DE PRÉCAUTION VIS-À-VIS DU PUBLIC

33

Une mesure vis-à-vis du public peut résulter de la mise en place de mesures de précaution. Par exemple, une entreprise peut exiger de ses salariés qu’ils se mettent à l’abri en cas de perte de confinement dont les conséquences n’ont pas été évaluées. Par exemple, les autorités peuvent ordonner une mise à l’abri, une évacuation ou des mesures de protection publique (ex. : barrage routier), en l’absence d’information de l’entreprise qui doit faire face à un PSE, par crainte de changement de direction du vent ou dans le cas où des populations sensibles pourraient être affectées (école, maison de retraite, etc.).

ENTREPÔT « ACTIF »

34

Un entrepôt « actif » est un hangar sur site dans lequel sont stockés des matières premières, des intermédiaires ou des produits finis utilisés ou produits sur site. De ce point de vue, un entrepôt actif est l’équivalent d’un réservoir de liquide ou de gaz liquéfié. En l’occurrence, les matières premières, les intermédiaires ou les produits finis sont stockés dans de petits contenants (fûts, bidons, conteneurs, etc.). Tout incident mettant en jeu des quantités supérieures aux seuils mentionnés est donc susceptible d’être un PSE rapportable.

Guide ICCA sur les indicateurs de sécurité des procédés – Mars 2017

PARTIE 2 GUIDE ICCA SUR LES INDICATEURS DE SECURITE DES PROCEDES

Version Anglaise

GUIDANCE FOR REPORTING ON THE ICCA GLOBALLY HARMONIZED PROCESS SAFETY METRIC

June 2016

The Responsible Care® Leadership Group

1

Contents Background ............................................................................................................................................... 2

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................... 2

Data to be reported by RCLG Associations to RCLG ................................................................................. 4

Overview of ICCA Process Safety Event Criteria as a Flow Chart .............................................................. 5

Key Criteria for Reporting Process Safety Events to RCLG ........................................................................ 6

Detailed Guidelines on Identifying a Process Safety Event ...................................................................... 7

Table 1 – GHS Classification Table ....................................................................................................... 11

Table 2 – API RP 754 Tier II Classification Table ................................................................................. 12

Appendix A – Severity Table: Using A Severity Weighting System is Encouraged for All Associations . 14

Appendix B – Frequently Asked Questions ............................................................................................. 16

Appendix C – List of RCLG Taskforce Members ...................................................................................... 22

Appendix D – Detailed Schedule of Events ............................................................................................. 23

Appendix E – Optional Excel Reporting Form ......................................................................................... 24

FINAL DRAFT

June 15, 2016

2

Background The Responsible Care

® initiative began in 1985 and as the chemical industry’s commitment to

continuous performance improvements. Process Safety has been a pillar of Responsible Care

since its inception, and many regional approaches to tracking and reporting process safety

performance have developed over the 30 years of Responsible Care implementation, yet no

globally harmonized system had been put into place. In 2012, in the wake of several high profile

process safety events, the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) Board of

Directors directed the Responsible Care Leadership Group (RCLG) to develop a

recommendation for a globally harmonized process safety performance reporting by no later than

2015.

Throughout 2013 and 2014, a Taskforce comprised of multinational companies and RCLG

associations, chaired by Dr. Peter Schmelzer, Head of Health, Safety and Environmental

Protection Bayer HealthCare AG, worked to develop a globally harmonized ICCA approach to

process safety performance reporting. A list of Taskforce members can be found in Appendix C.

During the same timeframe, the American Petroleum Institute (API) also initiated a process to

update its Recommend Practice 754 (RP-754) – Leading and Lagging Process Safety Metric

Standard. RP-754 is broadly used in the refining and petrochemical sector and in the Americas

region to track process safety performance. To optimize global adoption of a unified standard,

the RCLG Taskforce strived to achieve full harmonization of its recommendation with the

revised API RP 754 metric, expected to be finalized in the first quarter, 2016.

Executive Summary After more than 2 years of discussion, research, debate and feasibility assessment, the Process

Safety Harmonization Taskforce recommends that ICCA adopt a process safety event rate

metric. The adoption of this metric would require each RCLG association to collect the number

of process safety events experienced by their members on an annual basis, as well as total

number of worker hours (employees and contractors) experienced by their members each year.

The process safety event rate is the ratio of events to hours. The Taskforce also recommends that

reporting of these data points to the RCLG be phased in over the next 3 years, allowing regions

with the desire and ability to report immediately to do so, while also allowing additional time to

companies and organizations that are developing the ability to track these data for the first time.

The criteria that determine whether a process-related event qualifies as a process safety event are

based on a loss of primary containment of a chemical or a release of energy triggering thresholds

any one of four impact areas: 1) safety/human health consequences; 2) direct cost due to damage

from incident; 3) community impact; and 4) chemical release quantity (see the flow chart

showing reporting triggers). These four impact areas in the recommended ICCA process safety

event definition are identical to the impact areas in the RP-754 Tier II incident standard. The

thresholds for reporting are also identical in all areas with the exception of the chemical release

quantity thresholds. To address this difference, the ICCA process safety event definition will allow

companies the use of either the GHS-based reporting thresholds developed by ICCA for the

chemical release criteria, or the UN Dangerous Goods (UNDG)-based reporting thresholds used

in the RP-754 standard for Tier II incidents. The Taskforce believes that the two systems,

though different, are comparably robust in the universe of chemicals covered and the severity of

incidents captured by reporting. While there will be relatively little difference in the numbers of

3

events captured and reported using the two different threshold approaches, there may be

differences that would be most clearly seen at the company level based on raw material and

product use; hence the Taskforce cautions companies not to compare their results with

companies that use a different chemical release threshold approach. Regardless, under the RCLG

proposal, companies can choose the chemical release thresholds by which they report in to their national

and regional associations. If associations are interested in translating results based on one

reporting approach to another, the RCLG will provide a translation table. However, given the

complexity of this exercise and the need to access raw incident data, the Taskforce does not

believe that this adds value and recommends against it.

The Taskforce believes that this proposal for process safety event reporting will enable broad-

based global reporting of process safety performance across the chemical and petrochemical

industries. It will provide a roadmap for regions, associations and companies that are currently

not tracking process safety performance to recognize the benefits that tracking and reporting will

bring. For regions, associations and companies that are already experienced in gathering process

safety data, this recommendation allows for broader global alignment and focus on continuous

improvement in process safety performance. The systems that are built to improve process

safety performance are informed by robust process safety event data, and this is the major

objective of this initiative.

4

Data to be reported by RCLG Associations to RCLG

On an annual basis, RCLG Associations will be asked to report two data points into ICCA using

the RCLG KPI Reporting Website on the schedule provided below.

1. Total Member Company Worker Hours for Association (employee and contractor)

2. Total Number of Process Safety Events

ICCA will use the above two data points to report process safety performance in the form of

Process Safety Event Rate (PSER), normalized per 100 employees where an employee works

2,000 hours a year.

(Total Events / Total Hours) x 200,000 = PSER

Recommended Reporting Schedule

The Taskforce recommends a phased-in approach for reporting process safety event rate. Such a

schedule will allow more experienced companies and associations to report in the next several

years, while allowing other companies and associations to begin reporting by 2019. RCLG

Associations would be asked to report the two process safety event rate data points annually to

the ICCA through the RCLG KPI metrics reporting system: http://kpi.responsiblecare.eu If you

do not know your association’s username and password, please contact the RCLG.

The proposed schedule for process safety event rate reporting by RCLG associations is as

follows:

April 2015 RCLG considers Taskforce proposal

June 2015 ICCA Board of Directors considers RCLG final

recommendation

July 2015 RCLG releases the first detailed reporting guidance

document for associations and member companies

Feb, 2016 RCLG Reporting RCLG initiates process safety reporting pilot program

through association volunteers with updated an enhanced

guidance document; RCLG rolls out final guidance

document in June, 2016

2017 RCLG Associations begin collecting data from its

membership

2018-2019 RCLG Reporting Optional process safety data reporting by RCLG

Associations

2020 Reporting RCLG includes process safety as a mandatory metric in

the KPI reporting program

See Appendix D – Detailed Schedule of Events

5

Overview of ICCA Process Safety Event Criteria as a Flow Chart

Was a chemical substance or a chemical process

directly involved?

Incident in production, distribution, storage, utilities, pilot plants within a company’s

facility?

Release of material, fire, explosion or implosion

from/at a chemical process unit?

YES YES

YES

NO

NO Recordable injury

Or hospital admission of people on or off site?

Damage ≥ $2,500

direct cost to company?

Officially declared shelter in place or

evacuation? Or Precautionary off site shelter in

place or evacuation?

NO

YES

Substance Release Thresholds met?

NO

Yes: Reportable as a Process Safety Event

YES

NO

YES NO

YES

Start

NO: Does not meet the criteria for a Process Safety Event

ICCA or API 754 Tier II chemical release

thresholds exceeded?

NO

6

Key Criteria for Reporting Process Safety Events to RCLG

Total Worker Hours

RCLG Associations should report the total number of employee hours worked for each member

company in their association and the total number of contractor hours worked for each member

company as a combined, single number. For the purposes of this guidance document, each

association should refer to their local and regional definitions for employee and contractor. The

goal for reporting total hours is to include all individuals who are involved with chemical

manufacturing, except where those individuals are tasked with major construction projects such

as large scale investments with specific, one-time project organizations created for design,

engineering, and construction of new or significant expansion to existing process facilities. When

reporting total worker hours, companies should report the same hours used for reporting

personnel hours. This way, companies can have the same data set for occupational and process

safety. Personnel hours should include those hours from all chemical manufacturing operations,

not just from facilities where a process safety incident occurred.

Process Safety Event

For the purposes of this ICCA Reporting, a process safety event has occurred when:

A. When a chemical substance or a chemical process is directly involved; AND

B. The incident occurred in production, distribution, storage, utility, pilot plant within the

site boundaries of company’s facility; AND

C. There was a release of material or energy (e.g. fire, explosion, implosion) from a process

unit; AND

D. One or more of the following Reporting Thresholds have been met:

1. Safety / Injury

Injury resulting in a Recordable, Lost Time Accident or Fatality; or

Hospital admission of anyone on or off site; OR

2. Direct Damage Cost

A fire, explosion or clean up necessary to avoid/remediate environmental

damage resulting in a direct cost equal to or greater than $2,500 USDs;

OR

3. Shelter in Place / Evacuation

An officially declared shelter in place (on or off site); OR

An officially declared evacuation (on or off site); OR

A precautionary off site shelter in place or evacuation OR

4. Threshold Release

The material released meets one of the GHS thresholds in Table 1.

(measured in amount released during one hour)

As an alternative, companies can choose to use the release thresholds contained in the API RP-754

standard – Table 2. Note – Individuals who would like to view the API RP-754 Standard may purchase

and download that standard at - http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/health-and-safety/process-

safety/process-safety-standards

7

Detailed Guidelines on Identifying a Process Safety Event

A. Chemical Involvement

When a chemical substance or chemical process is directly involved

A chemical or chemical process must have been directly involved in the event or incident. For

this purpose, the term "process" is used broadly to include the equipment and technology needed

for petrochemical production, including reactors, tanks, piping, boilers, cooling towers,

refrigeration systems, etc. An incident with no direct chemical or process involvement, e.g., an

office building fire, even if the office building is on a plant site, is not reportable.

B. Location

The incident occurred in production, distribution, storage, utility, pilot plant within the site

boundaries of company’s facility

The incident occurs in production, distribution, storage (including active storage areas such as

warehouses – see FAQ section), utilities or pilot plants of a facility reporting metrics under these

definitions. This includes tank farms, ancillary support areas (e.g., boiler houses and waste water

treatment plants) and distribution piping under control of the site. All reportable incidents

occurring at a location will be reported by the company that is responsible for operating that

location. This applies to incidents that may occur in contractor work areas as well as other

incidents. At tolling operations and multi-party sites, the company that operates the unit where

the incident initiated should record the incident and count it in their reporting.

C. Release of Material

There was a release of material or energy (e.g. fire, explosion, implosion) from a process unit

Release of Material – an unplanned or uncontrolled release of any material, including non-toxic

and non-flammable materials (e.g. steam, hot water, nitrogen, compressed CO2 or compressed

air), from a process that results in consequences that exceed one or more of the 4 Reporting

Thresholds listed in this document.

A release to a flare or scrubber is still considered to be within the primary containment as long as

the mitigation system (e.g. scrubber, flare) is operated under normal conditions without any

release above the thresholds defined for normal operation. A release to a secondary containment

(e.g. waste water treatment or dike) will qualify as a process safety event because the substance

is leaving the primary process system.

8

D. Thresholds

One or more of the following Reporting Thresholds must be met for reportable process safety

events.

1. Safety / Injury

Injury resulting in a Recordable, Lost Time Accident or Fatality; or Hospital admission of

anyone on or off site;

Recordable injuries are work-related injuries that results in any of the following: death, days

away from work, restricted work or transfer to another job, medical treatment beyond first aid,

loss of consciousness, or a significant injury diagnosed by a physician or other licensed health

professional.

Lost time injuries and fatalities that occur as a result of process related loss of primary

containment, fire, or explosion are those that fit into one of the following categories:

Employee (Lost time and/or Fatality)

Contractor and Subcontractor (Lost time and/or Fatality)

Third Party (Injury/illness resulting in Hospital Admission or Fatality)

Hospital Admission – formal acceptance by a hospital or other inpatient health care facility of a

patient who is to be provided with room, board, and medical service in an area of the hospital or

facility where patients generally reside at least overnight. Treatment in the hospital emergency

room or an overnight stay in the emergency room would not by itself qualify as a “hospital

admission.”

Examples of injury or fatality cases that would be reportable include a burn injury resulting from

steam released during cleaning; a physical injury from a cap blown off by pressure during a

pressure test; or a chemical burn from a spill while taking a sample. Examples of injuries or

fatality cases that would not be reportable include a fall from an elevated work station while

performing maintenance; a burn from a fire in a laboratory or office building; or injuries from an

excavation cave-in. None of these cases are directly due to the release of energy or material from

the process.

2. Direct Damage Cost

A fire, explosion or clean up necessary to avoid/remediate environmental damage resulting in a

direct cost equal to or greater than $2,500 USDs

Costs to be considered for this threshold should be those costs directly attributed to the fire

and/or explosion, such as the replacement value of equipment lost, structures lost, cost of repairs,

environmental cleanup (on and off site), emergency response and/or fines. Direct cost does not

include indirect costs, such as business opportunity losses, loss of profits due to equipment

9

outages, cost of obtaining or operating temporary facilities or cost of obtaining replacement

products to meet customer demand (product losses).

3. Shelter in Place / Evacuation

An officially declared shelter in place or evacuation either on or off site OR a precautionary

shelter in place or evacuation off site

For the purposes of this reporting, an officially declared shelter in place or evacuation, on or off

site, OR a precautionary shelter in place or evacuation is declared off site would trigger this

threshold

Officially Declared – A declaration by a recognized community official (e.g. fire, police, civil

defense, emergency management) or delegate (e.g. Company official) authorized to order the

community action (e.g. shelter-in-place, evacuation).

Precautionary Declaration - A precautionary public response is a measure taken from an

abundance of caution and issued by a recognized community official or delegate whom has

reasonably determined that such an evacuation or shelter in place was necessary to protect the

public health and safety.

Shelter in Place – is the use of a structure and its indoor atmosphere to temporarily separate

individuals from a hazardous outdoor atmosphere

Evacuation – the act or process of removing persons from a place for reasons of safety or

protection

4. Threshold Release

An acute release that exceeds one of the GHS thresholds in Table 1 or in the API 754 standard

for Tier II process safety release thresholds in Table 2 (measured in amount released during one

hour)

As mentioned in the Executive Summary, the ICCA process safety event definition allows use of

either GHS-based reporting thresholds developed by ICCA for the chemical release criteria, or

the UN Dangerous Goods (UNDG)-based reporting thresholds used in the RP-754 standard for

Tier II incidents. The GHS thresholds are listed in Table 1. It is intended for companies to

decide which table to use and to allow companies the option to use one system globally.

Acute Release – A release of flammable, combustible, or toxic chemicals from the primary

containment (i.e., vessel or pipe) greater than the chemical release threshold quantities is

described for GHS Classification Table 1 and in the API 754 standard for Tier II process safety

release thresholds in Table 2.

10

Pressure Relief Device: Acute Releases, defined above, include releases to a properly designed

and operating pressure relief device if a quantity is released greater than or equal to the threshold

quantities in Table 1 OR in the API 754 standard for Tier II process safety release thresholds

Table 2, that results in one or more of the following four consequences:

1. Rainout;

2. Discharge to a potentially unsafe location;

3. A n on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation, excluding precautionary on-site shelter-

Ain-place or on-site evacuation;

4. Public protective measures (e.g., road closure) including precautionary public protective

measures.

Releases to a properly designed and operating pressure relief device (such as a flare, scrubber,

etc.) do not have to be reported if they do not meet one of the four criteria above.

Individuals who would like to view the API RP-754 Standard may download that standard at -

http://www.api.org/environment-health-and-safety/process-safety/process-safety-

standards/standard-rp-754.

1 Hour Rule

For the purpose of the reporting under this metric, release thresholds are established for materials

over a one-hour time frame. If the release amount of a material reaches or exceeds the reporting

threshold in a 1-hour time period or less, it is reportable. Typically, acute releases occur in 1-

hour or less. If the duration of the release cannot be determined, the duration should be assumed

to be 1 hour.

Primary Containment – A tank, vessel, pipe, rail car or equipment intended to serve as the

primary container or used for the transfer of the material. Primary containers may be designed

with secondary containment systems to contain and control the release. Secondary containment

systems include, but are not limited to, tank dikes, curbing around process equipment, drainage

collection systems into segregated oily drain systems, the outer wall of double walled tanks, etc.

Severity Table Severity weighting can provide additional useful information about process safety

events that may help drive performance improvement. Appendix A is the RCLG methodology for

calculating a severity weight for process safety events. Using Appendix A, a severity weight for each

process safety event may be calculated by summing the points associated with each consequence

category. The ICCA strongly encourages the use of a severity weighting system as the use of such a

system increases the ability to communicate performance and is an easier way for our stakeholders

to understand process safety events. Also, the severity weight will not be comparable among other

process safety metric reporting formats.

11

Table 1 – GHS Classification Table

12

Table 2 – API RP 754 Tier II Classification Table

Threshold Release Category

Material Hazard Classification a,c,d,e,f

Threshold Quantity

(outdoor release)

Threshold Quantity

(indoorb release)

T2-1 TIH Zone A Materials ≥ 0.5 kg (1.1 lb) ≥ 0.25 kg (0.55 lb)

T2-2 TIH Zone B Materials ≥ 2.5 kg (5.5 lb) ≥ 1.25 kg (2.75 lb)

T2-3 TIH Zone C Materials ≥ 10 kg (22 lb) ≥ 5 kg (11 lb)

T2-4 TIH Zone D Materials ≥ 20 kg (44 lb) ≥ 10 kg (22 lb)

T2-5

Flammable Gases OR

Liquids with Normal Boiling Point 35 °C (95 °F) and Flash Point

23 °C (73 °F) OR

Other Packing Group I Materials (excluding acids/bases)

≥ 50 kg (110 lb) ≥ 25 kg (55 lb)

T2-6

Liquids with Normal Boiling Point 35 °C (95 °F) and Flash Point 23

°C (73°F) OR

Other Packing Group II Materials (excluding acids/bases)

≥ 100 kg (220 lb)

or

≥ 0.7 bbl

≥ 50 kg (110 lb)

or

≥ 0.35 bbl

T2-7

Liquids with Flash Point 23 °C (73 °F) and 60 °C (140 °F) OR

Liquids with Flash Point 60 °C (140 °F) released at a temperature at

or above Flash Point OR

strong acids/bases (see definition Refer to draft RP 754 document) OR

UNDG Class 2, Division 2.2 (non-flammable, non-toxic gases) excluding air OR

Other Packing Group III Materials

≥ 200 kg (440 lb)

or

≥ 1.4 bbl

≥ 100 kg (220 lb)

or

≥ 0.7 bbl

T2-8

Liquids with Flash Point 60 °C (140 °F) and 93 °C (200 °F) released

at a temperature below Flash Point OR

Moderate acids/bases

≥ 1000 kg

(2200 lb)

or

≥ 7 bbl

≥ 500 kg

(1100 lb)

or

≥ 3.5 bbl

13

It is recognized that threshold quantities given in kg and lb or in lb and bbl are not exactly equivalent. Companies should select one of the pair and use it consistently for all recordkeeping activities.

In determining the Threshold Release Category for a material, one should first use the toxic (TIH Zone) or flammability (Flash Point and

Boiling Point) or corrosiveness (Strong Acid or Base vs. Moderate Acid or Base) characteristics. Only when the hazard of the material is not

expressed by those simple characteristics (e.g., reacts violently with water) is the UNDGL Packing Group used.

a Many materials exhibit more than one hazard. Correct placement in Hazard Zone or Packing Group shall follow the rules of DOT 49 CFR

173.2a [14] or UN Recommendations on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods, Section 2 [12]

. See Annex F.

b A structure composed of four complete (floor to ceiling) walls, floor and roof.

c For solutions not listed on the UNDG, the anhydrous component shall determine the TIH zone or Packing Group classification. The

threshold quantity of the solution shall be back calculated based on the threshold quantity of the dry component weight.

d For mixtures where the UNDG classification is unknown, the fraction of threshold quantity release for each component may be calculated.

If the sum of the fractions is equal to or greater than 100 %, the mixture exceeds the threshold quantity. Where there are clear and

independent toxic and flammable consequences associated with the mixture, the toxic and flammable hazards are calculated

independently. See Annex E, PSE Examples & Questions 49 - 53.

e A LOPC of Liquids with Flash Point > 60 °C (140 °F) and 93 °C (200 °F) released at a temperature below Flash Point cannot be Tier 1

PSE based upon quantity released no matter the volume.

f A LOPC of a moderate acid/base cannot be Tier 1 PSE based upon quantity released no matter the volume.

14 (K = 1,000 MM = 1,000,000) (For Environmental Impact, companies and associations should agree on input criteria where definitions aren’t readily available)

Appendix A – Severity Table: Using A Severity Weighting System is Encouraged for All Associations Event Incident Categories

Severity

Level Safety/Human Health Direct Cost from Fire or

Explosion

Material Release

Within 1-Hr Period Community Impact

Environmental Impact

[off-site]

Level 4

1 point

Injury requiring treatment beyond first aid to an employee, contractor, or subcontractor. (Meets local regulations)

Resulting in Direct Damage Cost of

$2.5 K ≤ up to $25 K

Release volume between

1x ≤ TQ < 40x

Officially declared shelter-in-place or officially declared evacuation

(on or off site)

Precautionary off site shelter in

place or evacuation

≤ 3 hours

Acute Environmental Remediation Cost

$2.5 K ≤ up to $25 K

Level 3

3 points

Days Away From Work injury to an employee, contractor, or subcontractor, or

Injury requiring treatment beyond first aid to a third party (Meets local regulations)

Resulting in Direct Damage Cost of

$25 K ≤ up to $250 K

Release volume between

40x ≤ TQ < 160x

Officially declared shelter-in-place or officially declared evacuation (on or off site)

Precautionary off site shelter in

place or evacuation

3 hours ≥ up to 12 hours

Acute Environmental Remediation Cost

$25 K ≤ up to $250 K

Level 2

9 points

A fatality of an employee, contractor, or subcontractor, or

A hospital admission of a third party

(Meets local regulations)

Resulting in Direct Damage Cost of

$250 K ≤ up to $25 MM

Release volume between

160x ≤ TQ < 640x

Officially declared shelter-in-place or officially declared evacuation (on or off site)

Precautionary off site shelter in

place or evacuation

12 hours ≥ up to 24 hours

Acute Environmental Remediation Cost

$250 K ≤ up to $25 MM

Level 1

27 points

Multiple fatalities of employees, contractors, or subcontractors, or

multiple hospital admission of third parties, or

A fatality of a third party (Meets local regulations)

Resulting in Direct Damage Costs of

≥ $25 MM

Release volume

≥ 640x TQ

Officially declared shelter-in-place or officially declared evacuation (on or off site)

Precautionary off site shelter in

place or evacuation

≥ 24 hours

Acute Environmental Remediation Cost

≥ $25 MM

15 (K = 1,000 MM = 1,000,000) (For Environmental Impact, companies and associations should agree on input criteria where definitions aren’t readily available)

Severity Table (Appendix A) Details

Appendix A above is designed to be used with the GHS Classification System ONLY (Table 1). If your company is using the API RP 754 Tier II Process Safety

Metric Threshold Table, Table 2 in this document, please use the API RP 754 Process Safety Severity Table. It is important to state that the severity table in the

API RP 754 Standard is for Tier 1 incidents only. Comparing the relative severity of events using different tables will not be statistically valid.

Acute Environmental Cost - Cost of short-term cleanup and material disposal, associated with a PSE with off-site environmental impact. Companies may choose

to assign severity to costs associated with off-site environmental impacts in a separate category.

Rate Adjusted Metrics

Utilizing the severity table described above, there are a variety of rate-based metrics which can be generated. These include:

Process Safety Total Incident Rate (PSTIR): Total event incidents x 200,000 ___

Total Worker Hours

Process Safety Incident Severity Rate (PSESR) (i.e., severity-weighted Process Safety incident rate formula):

Total severity score for all events incidents x 200,000___

PSESR = Total Worker Hours

In determining this rate, 1 point is assigned for each Level 4 incident attribute, 3 points for each Level 3 attribute, 9 points for each Level 2 attributes, and 27

points for each Level 1 attributes. Theoretically, a process safety event could be assigned a minimum of 1 point (i.e., the incident meets the attributes of a Level 4

incident in only one category) or a maximum of 135 points (i.e., the incident meets the attributes of a Level 1 incident in each of the five categories.)

PS Level “X*” incident rate: Total Severity Level “X*” PS incidents x 200,000

Total employee, contractor & subcontractor work hours

Where X* can be the total count of Severity Level 4, 3, 2, or 1 incidents. The severity level of an incident is the maximum severity rating of the five consequence

categories.

Normalization – In some associations and member companies, process safety events are normalized on a ‘per 100’ employee basis given that a one worker

averages 2,000 per year. So, to normalize on a ‘per 100’ employee basis, events are multiplied by 200,000 worker hours. In other associations and member

companies, events are normalized on a ‘per 500’ employee basis and events are multiplied by 1,000,000 worker hours. Associations and members should discuss

this option and come to a conclusion together. The above formulas are set at a ‘per 100’ employee rate.

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Appendix B – Frequently Asked Questions

Applicability

It is recommended that companies record and report Process Safety Events occurring at Company-owned or

operated facilities, except as noted below:

1. PSEs that originated off Company property

2. Marine transport vessel incidents, except when the vessel is connected to the facility for the purposes of crude

or product transfer

3. Truck and/or rail incidents, except when the truck or rail car is connected to the facility for the purposes of

crude or product transfer

4. Routine emissions that are allowable under permit or regulation

5. Underground contamination that had no process safety consequences. Note: The exclusion does not apply if

the release resulted in an aboveground reportable PSE, such as release of toxic vapors or pooling of

flammable liquids

6. Office building incidents (e.g., office heating equipment explosions, fires, spills, releases, personnel injury or

illness, etc.)

7. Personnel safety "slip/trip/fall" incidents that are not directly associated with evacuating from, or responding

to a loss of containment incident

8. Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) incidents from ancillary equipment not connected to the process (e.g.,

small sample containers)

9. Planned and controlled drainage of material to collection or drain system designed for such service (Note:

Exclusion does not apply to an unintended and uncontrolled release of material from primary containment

that flows to a collection or drain system)

10. Mechanical work being conducted outside of process units or in maintenance shops

Interpretations and Examples – Based on GHS Table 1

The following interpretations and examples have been prepared to help clarify areas of potential uncertainty in

the evaluation of reportable Process Safety Incidents (PSE).

COMPANY PREMISES

1. A third-party truck loading a flammable product on Company Premises, experiences a leak and

subsequent fire and property loss damages of $7,000 (direct costs). Although the truck is "Operated-by-

Others", it is connected to the process. The incident would be a reportable PSE if property losses in direct

costs were equal to or greater than $2,500 or some other PSE threshold was met or exceeded (e.g., a

fatality).

2. Similar example as #1. The truck loaded with flammable product overturns in route out of the plant,

resulting in a fire and loss of the truck. This would not be reported as a PSE since the truck is no longer

connected to the plant.

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LOSS OF CONTAINMENT

3. A faulty tank gauge results in the overfilling of a product tank containing “flammable liquids”.

Approximately 700 kg of liquid overflows into the tank's diked area. This incident is a reportable PSE

since it is an "acute" spill greater than 100 kgs, regardless of secondary containment.

4. A maintenance contractor opens a process valve and gets sprayed with sulfuric acid resulting in a severe

burn and lost time injury. This would be a reportable PSE. It is an unintended event involving a material

and a loss of containment. For fatalities and days away from work injuries and illnesses, there is no

release threshold amount.

5. An operator opens a quality control sample point to collect a routine sample of product and receives a

bad hand laceration requiring stitches due to a broken glass bottle and misses the next day of work. This

is not a reportable PSE because it is not related to a loss of containment.

ACUTE RELEASES

6. While troubleshooting a higher-than-expected natural gas flow rate, operating personnel find a safety

valve on the natural gas line that did not reseat properly and was relieving to the atmospheric vent stack

through a knock-out drum. Upon further investigation, it is determined that a total of 100,000 kg of

natural gas was relieved at a steady rate over a 6 month period. This is not a reportable PSE as the release

rate (~10 kg per hour) is not “acute”, (i.e. does not exceed the 100 kg TQ for flammable vapors per 1

hour time period).

FLARES & EMISSION CONTROL DEVICES (e.g., scrubbers)

7. If a chemical is routed to a flare or emission control device (e.g., scrubber), it would not be classified as a

PSE as long as that flare or control device operates as designed.

8. If a scrubber is overwhelmed by a flowrate greater than the design of the scrubber system and discharges

a chemical in excess of the reporting threshold, it would be reported as a PSE as noted about in this

document.

As a note, an upset emission from a permitted or regulated source – including pressure relieve devices -

of a quantity greater than or equal to the threshold quantities in Table 1 or 2 in any one-hour period, that

results in one or more of the following four consequences:

o rainout;

o discharge to a potentially unsafe location;

o an on-site shelter-in-place or on-site evacuation, excluding precautionary on-site shelter-in-place

or on-site evacuation;

o public protective measures (e.g., road closure) including precautionary public protective

measures;

Should be reported as a PSE.

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SAFETY RELIEF DEVICE / SYSTEM

9. There is a unit upset and the relief valve opens to an atmospheric vent which has been designed, resulting

in a gas release to the atmosphere with no adverse consequences. This would not be a reportable PSE

since vapors and gases released to atmosphere from safety valves, high-pressure rupture disks, and

similar safety devices that are properly designed for that event per API Standard 521 or equivalent are

excluded, as long as the release did not result in (1) a liquid carryover that created a reportable PSE

related to the liquid (e.g., lost time incident, fatality, a fire or explosion that caused $2,500 or more of

direct cost, liquid release or toxic aerosol release at or above threshold amounts, etc.), or (2) activation of

a shelter-in-place response on or off-site, or (3) public protective measures be taken.

10. There is a unit upset and the relief valve fails to open, resulting in overpressure of the equipment and an

"acute" release of flammable gas from a leaking flange. The amount released is above the 100 kg (within

1 hour) threshold. This is a reportable PSE. Releases from flanges are not excluded from PSE reporting.

DAYS AWAY FROM WORK INCIDENTS

11. An operator is walking, then slips and falls to the floor and suffers a lost time injury. The slip/fall is due

to weather conditions, "chronic" oily floors and slippery shoes. This is not a reportable PSE. Personnel

safety "slip/trip/fall" incidents that are not directly associated with evacuating from or responding to a

loss of containment incident are specifically excluded from PSE reporting.

12. Same as above, except that the operator slipped and fell while responding to a small flammable liquid

spill (e.g., less than 10 kg in 1 hour). This would be PSE reportable since the operator was responding to

a loss of containment incident. A PSE is reportable if the loss of primary containment occurs on

Company Premises and results in a lost time incident or fatality. For fatalities and lost time incidents,

there is no release threshold amount.

13. Same as above, except that the operator slipped and fell several hours after the incident had concluded.

This would not be PSE reportable. The terms "evacuating from" and "responding to" in the reporting

exclusion mean that the loss of containment and associated emergency response activities are on-going.

Slips/trip/falls after the event have concluded (such as "after-the-fact" clean-up and remediation) are

excluded from PSE reporting.

14. A scaffold builder suffers a lost time injury after falling from a scaffold ladder while evacuating from a

loss of containment incident on nearby equipment. This is a reportable PSE.

15. An operator walks past an improperly designed steam trap. The steam trap releases and the operator's

ankle is burned by the steam, resulting in a lost time injury. This is a reportable PSE because even though

the loss of containment was steam (vs. hydrocarbon or chemical), the physical state of the material was

such that it caused a lost time injury.

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16. An enclosure has been intentionally purged with nitrogen. A contractor bypasses safety controls, enters

the enclosure and dies. This is a reportable fatality, but not a reportable PSE since there was no

unplanned or uncontrolled loss of primary containment.

17. Same as above, except that nitrogen inadvertently leaked into the enclosure. This would be a reportable

PSE (and fatality) since there was a fatality associated with an unplanned loss of primary containment.

18. An operator responding to an H2S alarm collapses and has a injury. If the alarm was triggered by an

actual unplanned or uncontrolled H2S LOPC, the event would be a reportable PSE. If the alarm was a

false alarm, the event would not be a reportable PSE because there was no actual release.

PIPELINES

19. A pipeline leaks and releases 2000 lbs (900 kgs). of flammable vapor above ground within 1 hour.

However, the release occurred in a remote location within the site. The release is PSE reportable, since

"remoteness" is not a consideration.

FIRES or ENERGY RELEASES NOT ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL RELEASE

As a general rule, a fire or energy release is reported as a PSE only if caused by chemical release or results in

a chemical release in excess of the reporting quantities. Examples include:

20. An electrical fire impacts the operation of the process resulting in the release of 400 kg of toluene. This

event would be reported as a PSE since if the chemical release exceeds the 100 kg reporting threshold for

toluene.

21. An electrical fire, loss of electricity, or any other loss of utility occurs which may cause a plant shutdown

and possibly incidental equipment damage greater than $2,500 (e.g., damage to reactors or equipment

due to inadequate shutdown) but does not create a chemical release greater than the threshold quantity, or

cause a fatality or serious injury. This event would not be reported as a PSE since the equipment damage

was not caused by a chemical process fire/explosion and there was not a chemical release greater than the

threshold quantity.

MARINE TRANSPORT VESSELS

22. A company operated Marine Transport Vessel has an onboard "acute" spill of combustible material

greater than 100 kg. The event is not PSE reportable since Marine Transport Vessel incidents are

specifically excluded, except when the vessel is connected to the refinery, petrochemical, or chemical

manufacturing facility for the purposes of crude or product transfer.

23. A third-party barge is being pushed by a tug and hits the company dock. A barge compartment is

breached and releases 1,000 kg of diesel to the water. The event is not a reportable PSE since the marine

vessel was not berthed at the dock and actively involved in crude or product transfer operations.

20

TRUCK AND RAIL

24. A company railcar derails and spills more than 1,000 kg of gasoline while in transit. The incident is not

PSE reportable since rail incidents off company property are specifically excluded.

25. A third-party truck/trailer overturns while in the Company Premises, resulting in an "acute" spill of

gasoline greater than 1,000 kg. The incident is not reported as a PSE reportable if the truck is no longer

connected to the loading/unloading facilities. However, it is recommended that companies also have

transportation incident metrics, which would capture this event.

26. A contract truck hauler is unloading caustic and the hose separates and generates an airborne aerosol

and/or liquid caustic spill of 2500 kg. The event is a reportable PSE since the caustic TQ of 100 kg was

exceeded and the truck was still connected to the loading/unloading facility immediately prior to the

incident.

OFFICE BUILDING

27. There is a boiler fire at the Main Office complex, and direct cost damages totaled $75,000. The incident

is not PSE reportable since Office Building incidents are specifically excluded.

MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE INCIDENTS

28. An operations technician is injured while working around the finishing equipment in a polymers plant.

The injury is caused by the mechanical, man-machine interface with the equipment. This would not be a

reportable Process Safety Event because there was no loss of containment of hazardous material.

MIXTURES

29. If a mixture by itself has a GHS classification you use that classification to determine the threshold. If the

mixture itself does not have a GHS-classification, we go back to the individual components of the

mixture and based on kg released per threshold group calculate a ‘weighted’ contribution to the

thresholds. Example: a release of 100 kg of a mixture in a one hour period that consists of 0.5 kg of a

substance classified as acute toxic H300, 4.5 kg of substance classified with H301 and 40 kg of a

substance with another H-number and the remaining 55 kg of water with no GHS classification would be

calculated as 0.5/1 + 4.5/10 + 40/100 = 0.5 + 0.45 + 0.4 = 1.35 is exceeding 1 and would be counted as a

reportable process safety incident even though none of the individual hazardous components exceeded

the threshold for the individual substance.

DIRECT DAMAGE COSTS

30. Direct damage costs are considered for this threshold should be those costs directly attributed to the fire

and/or explosion, such as the replacement value of equipment lost, structures lost, cost of repairs,

environmental cleanup, emergency response and/or fines. Direct cost does not include indirect costs,

such as business opportunity losses, loss of profits due to equipment outages, cost of obtaining or

operating temporary facilities or cost of obtaining replacement products to meet customer demand

(product losses).

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31. As an example, a leak of flammable gas occurred in a vent line connected to a gas treatment system. At

the same time, a failure in the process allowed air to enter in the same vent line. An explosion occurred

and the over pressure damaged the vent line and associated upstream equipment including a seal pot.

Nobody was hurt. The cost for repair was about $12,000. This is a PSE considering the cost to repair the

equipment due to the explosion and fire.

32. As an example, after a PSE event, a company releases 50 kg of a very special, GHS Category 5 product

which causes $2,000 of damage to equipment. The product released was a very special blend of

materials and the company incurs over $50,000 in materials associated with the product loss. This event

is not reportable as PSE since the reportable threshold for GHS Category 5 releases is 100 kgs and

product losses do not count as Direct Damage Costs.

NATURAL DISASTERS

33. Natural disasters can present substantial risks to chemical process operations and damage to plant

equipment which may result in a loss of containment of hazardous substances. Where the potential for

one or more types of natural disasters is deemed relevant to plant operations, process safety and

operational systems shall address the applicable risk in terms of hazards and consequence analysis, plant

design, operating procedures for loss of utilities and process shutdown, and emergency planning and

response.

Types of natural disasters includes hurricanes and typhoons (including associated storm surge) , floods,

tornadoes, earthquakes, derechos (straight line wind storms) , wildfires, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis,

and avalanches.

If your facility experiences a natural disaster that triggers one or more of the thresholds, it should

be reported as a process safety event.

PRECAUTIONARY PUBLIC RESPONSE

34. A precautionary public response is a measure taken from an abundance of caution. For example, a

company may require all workers to shelter-in-place in response to an LOPC independent of or prior to

any assessment (e.g., wind direction, distance from the LOPC, etc.) of the potential hazard to those

worker. For example, a recognized community official (e.g., fire, police, civil defense, emergency

management) may order a community shelter-in-place, evacuation, or public protective measure (e.g.,

road closure) in the absence of information from a company experiencing a process safety event, or ‘just

in case’ the wind direction changes, or due to the sensitive nature of the potentially affected population

(e.g., school children, the elderly).

ACTIVE WAREHOUSE

35. An active warehouse is an on-site warehouse that stores raw materials, intermediates, or finished

products used or produced by a process. From a process perspective, an active warehouse is equivalent

to a bulk storage tank. Rather than being stored in a single large container, the raw materials,

intermediates, or finished products are stored in smaller containers (e.g., totes, barrels, pails, etc.).

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Appendix C – List of RCLG Taskforce Members

Name Affiliation

Peter Schmelzer Bayer, CEFIC - Chairman

Americo Diniz Carvalho Neto Braskem

Bradford Johnson American Chemistry Council

David Cummings DuPont

Debra Phillips American Chemistry Council

Hans Schwarz BASF

Kathryn Walton Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association

Kazuyuki Akita Japanese Chemical Industry Association

Kelly Keim ExxonMobil Chemical Company, API Representative

Kenan Stevick Dow

Kiyokazu Murata Japanese Chemical Industry Association

Larry Bowler SABIC

Lorna Young Chemical Industry Association of Canada

Louisa Nara Center for Chemical Process Safety

Luiz Shizuo Harayashiki Associação Brasileira da Indústria Química

Masatoshi Kumamoto Japanese Chemical Industry Association

Milton Lacerda Petrobras

Phil Scott Chemical Industries Association

Piet Knijff DSM, European Process Safety Centre

Scott Donaldson and Eamon

Chandler

Shell

Scott Wallace Olin Corporation

Shakeel Kadri Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.

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Appendix D – Detailed Schedule of Events

2016

2017 2018 2019 2020

Feb - April RCLG PS Pilot Program May – Adjustments/clarification to guidance document June Report outcomes of pilot program to RCLG and ICCA Board July - December

RCLG associations consider guidance and develop reporting methodology for their memberships

RCLG associations can request ICCA capacity building funds for PS reporting workshops for members, if needed

Jan - Dec RCLG Association membership begin collecting PS data from their members Jan – Dec Associations hold workshops on Process Safety and performance reporting, utilizing RCLG funds and experts if needed

Jan – Feb Reporting of process safety incidents to RCLG begins for associations with data (2017 data) April RCLG reviews outcomes, challenges and raw data from the first reporting cycle (internally) June RCLG share draft data with ICCA Board July - December Update and adjust guidance as necessary Associations hold workshops on Process Safety and performance reporting, utilizing RCLG funds and experts if needed

Jan – Feb Reporting of process safety incidents to RCLG begins for associations with data (2018 data) April RCLG reviews outcomes, challenges and raw data from the second reporting cycle (internally) June RCLG share draft data with ICCA Board July - December Update and adjust guidance as necessary Associations hold workshops on Process Safety and performance reporting, utilizing RCLG funds and experts if needed

Jan – Feb Reporting of process safety incidents to RCLG begins for all associations Process Safety incident reporting becomes part of the recommend base set of RCLG KPI metrics (2019 data) April RCLG reviews outcomes, challenges and raw data from the second reporting cycle (internally, consider external reporting) June RCLG share draft data with ICCA Board

24

Appendix E – Optional Excel Reporting Form

When member companies begin tracking process safety events, a single form should be utilized for all member companies to make data analysis

easier and to allow all members to work from the same tracking sheet. The RCLG has developed an optional tracking sheet that members and

associations can start with when developing their own tracking sheet.

DOWNLOAD TRACKING SHEET HERE:

ICCA Process Safety Event Tracking Sheet.xlsx

This document consists of a contact page, the survey itself, and a ‘do not edit’ page where the drop down menu answer are stored.