FIFTH FRAMEWORK RESEARCH PROGRAMME (1998-2002)

Democratic Participation and Political Communication in Systems of Multi-level Governance

Turnout and abstention at multi-level elections in France

Stéphanie Abrial

Bruno Cautrès

Nadine Mandran

Centre d’Informatisation des Données Socio-Politiques

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Grenoble

Work in Progress

March 2003

Draft text not to be quoted without permission of the authors.

Introduction

As in other European countries, the political debate in France is dominated since few years by

two related questions: the rising importance and structured role of extremist parties (not only

the extreme-right voting but also now the extreme-left one) and the level of abstention. In

2002, two main national elections took place (presidential and five week later legislative

elections) : on April the 21st, the first ballot of the presidential election shown that more than

half of the French electorate either abstained, voted “blank” or voted for the extremist parties.

The last two referendum organised in France, one was a key institutional question (to reduce

or not the mandate of the French president from 7 to 5 years), also shown high level of

abstention. All of that are visible signs of an increasing gap between the French electorate and

the political supply, a gap which is also visible by the emergence of new political cleavages in

the electorate, specially those linked to the question of European integration.

On the evening of 21 April 2002, the country faced up two phenomena which still occupy the

media and political life today: the presence of the Extreme Right candidate at the second

ballot and the record abstention level for this type of election. Of France’s 39,350,086

registered voters, only 28,721,939 voted at this ballot. Abstention rose to over 27% in an

election which has traditionally been the French population’s favourite and which has

consequently shown the strongest levels of mobilisation during the Fifth Republic. If this

result was quite spectacular it was not an exception or a “storm in a blue sky” : abstention to

any level of voting is increasing in France since the mid eighties. Another sign of it can be

seen if we look to the European Parliament elections : in 1999, less than half of the registered

electorate turned out, more precisely the abstention rose to 53% !

Overall, then, a significant decrease in turnout in France has thus took place in France over

the last twenty years even if differences exist according to the type of election as can be seen

on figure 1. This figure does only indicate turnout at the main elections and wiil be completed

later by indicating the same trend at the local elections.

Figure 1 – Turnout trends in France (1978-2002) P = Presidential elections L = Legislative elections E = European elections

EE

E

E

E

Turnout evolution in France

L

L

L

L L

L

P PP

P

19781980

19821984

19861988

19901992

19941996

19982000

20022004

Year

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

Turnout (%)

What is spectacular with figure 1 is the evidence of an underlying trend and phenomena

whatever the type and level of election : presidential election is an election with high media

coverage, strong personalisation of the debates (one national constituency); legislative

elections have gained in political importance since the three experience of “cohabitation”

(1986-1988, 1993-1995 and 1997-2002) and European elections have revealed the impact of

extreme right voting in 1984 and still again since that. Whatever the specificities and

importance of these different elections, trend in declining turnout is the same.

Turnout and abstention in France have been studied mainly through the analysis of post-

electoral surveys and ecological data. We will also rely on these two types of data and will

investigate the sociological and political explanations of turnout and abstention in the light of

a body of academic tradition. Indeed, since Alain Lancelot’s seminal research published in

1970,2 quite a body of evidence has accrued in the French political science about the

explanations of turnout. At the level of individual analysis using survey data, abstention and

non-registration have been analysed using both social integration and political integration

indices. From the sociological perspective, age, education, degree of social stability and of

social integration have been identified as major factors affecting abstention. Since abstention

2 Lancelot, Alain, L’abstentionnisme électoral en France, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1968

is also linked to electoral registration, geographical and social mobility have also played their

part in explaining the propensity to abstain at the individual level. From the political

perspective, interest in and knowledge of politics, and electoral politics socialisation also have

significant effects. The short-term factors – interest in the election campaign and contextual

political effects – interact to produce a political "climate" in which electoral participation

occurs.

In this chapter, we precisely aim to analyse the phenomenon of turnout and abstention in

France, using individual and aggregate data and dimensions.

I - Participation and Abstention across level of governance

I- 1 : Trends over time in turnout

The study of abstention in France has always fed contrasting analyses regarding the future of

national and European political life. These analyses have been at times optimistic,

emphasising political issues and contextual explanations and, at other times, they have been

pessimistic, even shedding doubt on the democratic system. If we look at data on electoral

participation in the mid-60s (Table 1), we see that, beyond the real phenomenon of a decrease

in voter turnout in the last few years - especially if one looks at the 2002 election -, this

decline may not be as critical as it may appear. Indeed, in the long term, the gap in

participation levels between the different election types (presidential, legislative and

European) remains constant.

Electoral data have been collected from several data files (origins : Home Office) deposited at

the BDSP3 which is the French link to the CESSDA. The basic unit for France is the "canton",

the smallest unit possible since the census data are not available at the communes level for

every commune. In the quasi-nested hierarchy of geographical units in France, the "canton"

follows immediatly the "communes" (more that 36 000 communes) and is still small enough

to catch, for example, the urban-rural cleavage. The canton is a very old administrative unit :

its creation, in fact linked to the creation of the "départements", is as old as 1789. At the

moment there are 96 departements on the territory of France (what is called "France

métropolitaine") and 4 more departements for the overseas French territories. As a whole

there is a little bit more that 4000 cantons. When aggregate data are not available at the canton

level, we use information at the constituency or département levels.

3 Banque de Données Socio-Politique. http://www.cidsp.com

Table 1 – Turnout in France (1965-2002) : descriptive statistics

Minimum Median Maximum Mean Standard deviation Units (a)

Présidential 1965, 1er tour 53.29 85.28 91.14 84.95 3.63 N=474 Circonscriptions 1969, 1er tour 58.54 78.35 96.73 78.25 3.72 N=474 Circonscriptions 1974, 1er tour 65.25 85.15 91.46 84.84 2.81 N=474 Circonscriptions 1981, 1er tour 43.66 82.55 96.90 81.97 4.28 N=3696 Cantons 1988, 1er tour 54.08 83.01 98.17 82.47 3.86 N=3829 Cantons 1995, 1er tour 52.06 80.86 90.38 80.23 4.02 N=3927 Cantons 2002, 1er tour 56.71 73.17 81.64 72.54 3.86 N=555 CirconscriptionsLégislative 1973, 1er tour 62.65 81.65 90.61 81.30 3.75 N=474 Circonscriptions 1978, 1er tour 68.75 83.63 88.32 83.39 2.80 N=96 Département 1981, 1er tour 62.07 71.72 78.96 71.52 3.49 N=96 Département 1986, 1er tour 71.74 79.15 86.23 79.24 2.73 N=96 Département 1988, 1er tour 47.19 67.85 91.65 67.76 5.70 N=3810 Cantons 1993, 1er tour 54.25 70.52 97.98 70.34 4.70 N=3860 Cantons 1997, 1er tour 51.63 69.96 87.46 69.71 4.87 N=3861 Cantons 2002, 1er tour 29.52 64.97 78.02 64.29 6.10 N=577 CirconscriptionsEuropean 1979, 1er tour 46.96 60.97 72.03 61.16 4.41 N=96 Département 1984, 1er tour 38.06 58.99 80.59 58.79 6.12 N=3696 Cantons 1989, 1er tour 21.79 50.75 100.00 51.02 5.91 N=3828 Cantons 1994, 1er tour 4.84 54.60 97.87 54.74 5.89 N=3861 Cantons 1999, 1er tour 21.43 48.99 70.44 48.95 5.99 N=3943 Cantons (a) : “circonscriptions” means legislative electoral constituencies (N=577 in 2002); “cantons” means the electoral constituencies on the basis of which the departemental assemblies are elected (what is called the “conseils généraux”). Cantons are the smallest geographical units used in this chapter.

Presidential elections have always succeeded in mobilising the higher percentage of voters.

Since 1965 (the first direct universal suffrage election), such elections have shown to be

highly legitimate and expected periods of political mobilisation : the election of the French

President represents what can be called the “key election” since the President nominates the

Prime minister and the Constitution organizes a distribution of power highly favourable to the

President. Since 1965, the Presidential election also is a highly “personalised” election : the

candidates have to dominate their camp at the first round and then to enlarge their audience at

the second round. With a two-rounds majority vote, this election structures political cleavages

around national issues4, in addition to the personality phenomenon related to the candidates.

One can be surprised by the 969 election low turnout : it can be explained by the period’s

political context and by the succession of several political events (a referendum in April on

the creation of regions, the senate’s reform and General de Gaulle’s departure). This, in

addition to the presidential election, probably gave voters the feeling that they had already

voiced their opinion during the referendum (only 19.4% turnout)5.

For the 2002 election, the explanation for the relatively low voter turnout is much more

complicated as it involves the whole electoral process. As put forward by a number of

researches6, we have to take into account the juxtaposition of two phenomena related to

political supply and demand. While voters are more demanding when it comes to the

transparency of political issues, candidates have an increasing difficulty in distinguishing the

content and the hierarchy of the political projects they offer. What is fascinating about the

2002 sequence of elections if the following. Abstention declined strongly between the first

and second ballot of the presidential election (from 27% to 20.3%) in an exceptional context :

Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the Front national, was opposed to Jacques Chirac, the

incumbent President, during the second round. The presence of the extreme-right leader at this

round created such a reaction in the electorate (huge demonstrations in the main cities, call

from the left parties to their electorates to join their vote to the moderate right candidate

Jacques Chirac) than turnout jumped. But five week later; for the first round the legislative

elections, abstention went back to 35.6% for first round, and 39.7% for the second ! Which

means that there is a room for specifically highly mobilizing contexts even in a trend of rising

abstention : an interesting perspective which indicates that the sociological explanation of

abstention (more individualistic European societies, less social attachments and loyalties) is

not the whole story.

European elections since 1979, in France like in several European countries7, are showing

decreasing turnout rates. Here too, contextual factors - such as the Kosovo crisis of 1999 -

may help explain this low rate on European issues. However, it seems also necessary to

analyse - through the framework of ‘second-order’ elections8 - the impact of the political

spectrum's explosion, the primacy of national issues over European ones and the emergence

4 Cf. PERRINEAU, Pascal, "Elections présidentielles", Dictionnaire du vote, PUF, Paris, 2001. 5 Cf. BRECHON, Pierre, (sous dir.), Les élections présidentielles en France. Quarante ans d'histoire politique, La Documentation Française, Paris, 2002. 6 BRECHON, Pierre, "Comprendre les logiques de l'abstention", Revue Politique et Parlementaire, n°1020-1021, Paris sept-oct./ nov-déc. 2002. 7 Cf. ABRIAL, Stéphanie, PINA, Christine, "Les élections européennes de juin 1999 dans les quinze pays de l’Union : une consultation de “second ordre” ?", Revue Française de Science Politique, Paris, volume 49, n°4, août-octobre 1999. 8 Cf. REIF, Karlheinz, SCHMITT, Hermann, "Nine Second Order National Elections. A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results", European Journal of Political Research, 8, 1980.

of sanction voting. What is interesting to note about France is that turnout for the Maastricht

Treaty referendum in 1992 was high

I- 2 : Regional variations in turnout

Figure 1 gives only national trends in levels of turnout. But regional variations are significant

and sociologically decisive to an understanding of abstention in France. If we look at the

geography of voter turnout, we see great differences between zones of high and low electoral

participation. These differences between regions last through time: a look at the map (figure

2) shows the existence of high participation and abstentionist strongholds, beyond election

types. Participation levels represented on the map (darker shades show high participation

regions) show strong contrasts between regions. Thus, France’s southwest regions (Aquitaine,

Midi-Pyrénées), Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Picardie and other relatively isolated departments such

as Côtes d'Armores or Vendée, are high voter turnout regions. On the other hand, the eastern

part of the country (Alsace, Champagne-Ardennes), Ile-de- France, the Provence-Alpes-Côte-

d'Azur region, as well as some isolated departments such as Pyrénées Orientales are high

abstention areas.

Figure 2 – Regional variations of turnout in France

I- 3 : The spatial cleavages basis of turnout : agreggated data analysis

To understand the patterns of regional variations and their stability through time, one need to

conduce more sophisticated statistical analysis able to identify if there are latent dimensions

underlying the spatial distribution of abstention in France. To do this, we decided to realise a

principal component analysis (so called PCA analysis) using data from the more recent census

available, the 1990 one. What we did was using 17 socio-demographic variables as “active”

one : it means that we have considered spatial variations of France as the phenomena to be

shown. We’ve then projected on this 15 electoral variables (percentages of abstention) and 8

socio-professional categories (1990 census) as supplementary variables. Basically it means to

analyze the latent socio-demographic structure of the French cantons and to observe how

abstention, on different elections, fits on these new structures. The appendix 1 gives the

complete list of variables used in this analysis.

Actually, we suppose that the 8 “socio-professional categories” express a sort of "ideal"

socio-demographic combinaison that is quite redundant with other variables like age,

education or employment situation. There is, for example, a strong statistical association

between cantons that are characterised by a great number of higher grade managers or

teachers and cantons of highly education people (R2 = .95). In the same way, cantons having

a population with a lot of retired people vary in the same direction than cantons characterized

by 65-69 years old people (R2 = .94). Thus, we decide to exclude the socio-professional

categories from the active variables list in order not to have the PCA solution dominated by

the socio-professional categories variables.

Basically, a principal component analysis is a factor analysis which indicates if there are

latent dimensions (ie factors) explaining the variation (the variance in statistical terms) of the

units (here the cantons) according to the “active” variables (here the 17 socio-demographics

census data). One can then look at the correlation between this underlying latent dimensions

and the “supplementary” variables (here the 15 rates of abstention observed at the cantons

levels for the presidential, legislative and European elections since 1988).

The first factor can be described as an opposition between “young-precarious-urban” and

“old-well-established-rural” populations in the different cantons. This factor captures 38.13%

of the variance or inertia. It looks like the “urban/rural” cleavage that we previously

discovered but it is, in reality, much more “precise” than that. This first factor presents indeed

two supplementary elements of the territorial units : their structure by age and property

status. It means than in cantons where lots of urban people can be counted, there is also a

great number of 18-24 years young people, a great number of HLM lodging renters and a

great number of non permanent employees. Conversely, in cantons where a lot of people live

in rural communes, there is a great number of self-employed and employers, a great number

of owners and a great number of 65-69 years old people. The sociological interpretation of the

first axis of our PCA is thus more than just an “urban/rural” cleavage : we propose to label

and name it a “social roots” factor. It involves that the content of this opposition goes beyond

the general cleavage between “towns and countryside” : it emphasizes that beyond the urban

or rural composition of the cantons discriminated by the first axis, there is something related

to a social integration dimension : to be, or not to be, socially integrated into a precised place,

for a long period of time (social stability through space and time).

Observing supplementary socio-professional category variables, we can confirm the

coherence of the interpretation : in “young-precarious-urban” cantons there are also lower

grades (CSP4) + employees (CSP5) + higher grade (CSP3) ; in “old-well-established-rural”

areas we find a lot of farmers (CSP1) and a lot of retired people (CSP7).

The second factor expresses the opposition between actives who have a job and unemployed

people. This factor captures 14.90% of the variance. The distinction between cantons

characterised by a great number of active people and the cantons with numerous inactive ans

unemployed individuals is straight forward. This distinction is well structured around

employment (active people, 40-44 years old, owners) and unemployement (no matter the

reasons for the lack of activity : unemployment = lack of activity ; without diploma =

difficulties being active ; retirement = end of activity). There is strong coherence in the

interpretation of that second axis with the supplementary variables : in one hand, into the

"inactive" cantons, we find retired people (CSP7) ; in the other hand there are higher grade

teachers, professors, administrative and business managers.

The third factor is a little bit more difficult to understand but is worth keeping in the analysis:

it structures a cleavage cleavage between variables related to “intellectual professions-non-

owners-females” and “males-HLM tenants” people. This factor captures 11.87% of the

variance, not so far from the proportion of inertia explained by the second factor. It is

sociologically very interesting as it is characterised by the opposition between rather urban

cantons that include rather well educated individuals who do not own but rent without being

renters of HLM ; and rather urban cantons characterised by males having to live in social

housing. Its interpretation is thus like a second version of the “urban/rural” cleavage that was

underlying the first factorial dimension of our analysis. We propose to label this third

dimension as an opposition between cantons under more or less “social constraint”. In “less

social constraint” cantons, we find high level managers, retired people as well as artisans and

small business owners. In the “more social constraint" cantons, we find inactive workers and

students-others.

We can resume our principal component analysis by the way of table 2.

Table 2 : Principal component analysis of the spatial socio-demographic cleavages of the French cantons (1990 census data) : main findings.

Actives variables Supplementary variables : socio-professional category

+ •18-24 years old

•urban

•renter of HLM lodging

•precarious

•primary schools teachers, technicians and business lower level (CSP4)

•Employees (CSP5)

•higher grade teachers, professors, administrative and business managers (CSP3)

1st axis

- •rural

•self-employers/employers

•owners

•65-69 years old

•farmers (CSP1)

•retired (CSP7)

+ •unemployed

•no diploma

•retired (CSP7) 2nd axis

- •active

•40-44 years old

•owners

•primary schools teachers, technicians and business lower level (CSP4)

•higher grade teachers, professors, administrative and business managers (CSP3)

+ •renter of non-HLM lodging

•end of secondary education + university graduation

•65-69 years old

•women

•retired (CSP7)

•artisans and small business owners (CSP2)

•higher grade teachers, professors, administrative and business managers (CSP3)

3rd axis

- •men

•renter of HLM lodging

•workers (CSP6)

•students and other non-active (CSP8)

I – 4 : Matching the spatial sociodemographic cleavages and turnout

Abstention rates as supplementary variables

We now would like to use our turnout electoral data as supplementary variables in order to

analyze the relation between the spatial socio-demographic cleavages revealed by the PCA

and the territorial logics of turnout in France.

1st factor : social roots / social instability

Generally, no matter the type of election, we find the highest rate of abstention in the cantons

characterised by a large number of young precarious urbanites. This means the abstention rate

of a canton varies positively with the rate of “social rooting” of individuals living in those

cantons. From the variables used, the lower the rate of “social roots” in a canton, the higher

the abstention rate is.

The elections that best fit with this schema are the presidential (2ndr), the legislative (2ndr) and

the 1998 regional elections. On the first dimension of the PCA, abstention rate is thus not

specifically related to a type of election. This is not surprising as the territories defined by this

first axis are characterised by a strong left-right partisan opposition, which are at the heart of

national and local political issues. On the other hand, we see the absence of European

elections among those that mobilise the least: as these elections stigmatise less the left-right

cleavage, they do not give rise to an ideological type of opposition in those cantons

characterised by the urban-rural opposition.

2nd factor : active / non-active

We can observe that the abstention rate is highest in the cantons characterised by the most

inactive population. Indeed, abstention and inactivity are positively correlated: the higher the

inactivity rate of a canton, the higher its abstention rate as well. The elections that best

illustrate this are the presidentials.

3rd axis: urban opposition between cantons exposed to more or less “social constraint”

The abstention rate is highest in the cantons where individuals seem most preoccupied by

their material situation. Opposingly, the abstention rate is lowest in cantons characterised by a

“less social constraint" population (intellectuals, high level of education and tenants). We

observe that the abstention rate is there especially high in European elections.

It is on this third axis that we see emerging the distinction between abstention in national

elections, from the abstention in European elections. The territories of national election

abstentions are more closely related to the rural-urban cleavage which itself is underlined by a

well known political effect arising from the left-right dichotomy. As for the phenomenon of

high abstention in European elections, we do not find the same territorial dimension. Indeed,

it is in those areas where social and material preoccupations are strongest that European

elections attract least voters, especially compared with national elections. Thus, we can

formulate the following hypothesis: the areas with a high abstention rate in European

elections, more than in the case of national elections, are territories where social exclusion is

higher.

Multiple linear regression analysis

We now are using the coordinates of the cantons on the three dimensions of the PCA as

explanatory factors in regression analysis models. The aim is to understand the effect of our

three variables, i.e. weak social rooting, inactivity and urban social constraint, on abstention

in cantons. The dependent variables are the abstention rates at the different level of

governance elections from 1988 to 1999.

Table 3 : Regression analysis : abstention explained by socio-demographic cleavages (aggregated data analysis, 1988-1999).

1988 General elections

1st Ballot 2nd Ballot

Coeff. Standard deviation Coeff. Standard deviation Intercept 32.238 0.07** 27.646 0.08** Factor1 1.276 0.03** 1.271 0.03** Factor 2 0.540 0.04** 0.756 0.05** Factor 3 -0.389 0.05** -0.571 0.05** R2=.37, R=.61, Model significant 0.0001

R2=.346 R=.60, Model significant 0.0001

1993 General elections 1st ballot 2nd ballot Coeff. Standard deviation Coeff. Standard deviationIntercept 29.661 0.06** 30.865 0.10** Factor1 0.906 0.02** 0.979 0.04** Factor 2 0.767 0.04** 0.485 0.06** Factor 3 -0.01 0.04 (ns) 0.001 0.07 (ns) R2=.31, R=.56, Model significant 0.0001

R2=.14, R=.38, Model significant 0.0001

1997 General elections 1st ballot 2nd ballot Coeff. Standard deviation Coeff. Standard deviation Intercept 30.288 0.06** 26.955 0.07** Factor1 1.141 0.02** 1.206 0.03** Factor 2 0.507 0.04 0.652 0.04** Factor 3 0.274 0.04** -0.039 0.05** R2=.40, R=.63, Model significant 0.0001

R2=.35, R=.59, Model significant 0.0001

1988 Presidential election

1st ballot 2nd ballot

Coeff. Standard deviation Coeff. Standard deviation

Intercept 17.526 0.05** 14.475 0.04** Factor1 0.528 0.02** 0.712 0.02** Factor 2 0.783 0.03** 0.793 0.03** Factor 3 0.506 0.04** 0.159 0.03** R2=.27, R=.52, Model significant 0.0001

R2=.41, R=.64, Model significant 0.0001

1995 Presidential election

1st ballot 2nd ballot

Coeff. Standard deviation Coeff. Standard deviation

Intercept 19.773 0.05** 18.462 0.05** Factor 1 0.714 0.02** 0.898 0.02** Factor 2 0.745 0.03** 0.851 0.03** Factor 3 0.51 0.04** -0.056 0.03 (ns)

R2=.32, R=.56, Model significant 0.0001

R2=.43 R=.66, Model significant 0.0001

1989 European election Coeff. Standard deviation Intercept 48.978 0.08** Factor 1 0.937 0.03** Factor 2 0.807 0.05** Factor 3 -1.068 0.06** R2=.29, R=.53, Model significant 0.0001 1994 European election Coeff. Standard deviation Intercept 45.257 0.08** Factor 1 0.864 0.03** Factor 2 0.692 0.05** Factor 3 -0.541 0.06** R2=.20, R=.44, Model significant 0.0001 1999 European election Coeff. Standard deviation Intercept 51.048 0.08** Factor1 0.980 0.03** Factor 2 0.823 0.05** Factor 3 -0.978 0.06** R2=.28, R=.53, Model significant 0.0001

The first element we will deal with here is the model’s significance level: no matter the type

of election, the regression model fitted to the data is significant. This means that there is a

relationship between the socio-demographic variables chosen and the abstention rate in

cantons : three axis have a significant influence on the abstention rate in all of the elections

surveyed. For any level of governance, getting a low score on the first factor (which means

being characterized as a canton as low “social root”) increase the level of abstention in a

significant way; getting a high score on inactivity factor (our second dimension of PCA) as

also a positive effect on the increase of abstention. A remarkable result of the regression

analysis is that scores of cantons on the third dimension have a different effect on national and

European elections levels of abstention: for national elections (either legislative or

presidential) the effect is positive in about every case; for European election, the effect is a

negative one. It will be necessary in our final version to go into more detailed explanation.

II/ Institutional facilitation and mobilisation

II – 1 : Institutional facilitation

In the French electoral system, vote is not an obligation. The best source to observe the

impact of electoral institutions on voting behavior is the electoral code that currently governs

elections. For some years, it can be noticed a sort of political will to further ease the electoral

process, at the same time maintaining the tradition and solemnity of voting.

French citizens, older than 18 years old and not deprived of their civil and political rights can

vote in general elections. In May 1997, there were 39 361 138 registered electors. Concerning

European and local elections, the citizens of the European Union residing durably in France

profit from the voting rights. For the 1999 European election, they were about 55 000

« European foreign citizens » registered. Because of the non-registration of certain voters, the

electorate has been cut down on average, for 15 years, about 9% of the citizens who could

claim to form part of it. According to official figures (INSEE surveys), the French electorate

would also be on the way to be dominated by rather old citizens. We know, for example, that

the average age of the registered voters passed from 46,2 to 47,4 years between 1988 and

1995.

In order to be registered on the electoral list, people have to sign up at their local town hall.

But since 1997, this measure has become easier with people reaching the age of 18 being

automatically registered. This first political step targeted at young voters has thus been

considerably simplified. This is interesting as it shows how political authorities are attempting

to face the problem of young voters’ registration - and turnout - by integrating them directly

into their electoral list. However, this could have an unexpected and negative effect: while the

number of unregistered voters is mechanically decreased, it necessarily implies a higher

abstention level9.

Voting by post does not exist in France, but by proxy does. Until 1975, it was possible to vote

by post but the number of frauds recorded involve a cancellation of this procedure. Today, the

postal way has to be used only for the professional and the university elections. The vote by

proxy thus became the only possible process for those who cannot vote personally. The right

to vote by proxy only applies to those who can produce evidence of their unavailability

(professional obligations, physical disability…). But, we can notice that for the last 2002

general elections these conditions were relaxed : people who could prove they were away due

to the regional variation of the school holidays had been able to apply for proxy rights. Once

again, we can observe that this "punctual" enlargement of proxy conditions emphasizes the

political determination to support the voter turnout. Without modifying the text the procedure

was actually facilitated. Depending on the choice of the mandant, the proxy can be given for

one ballot or for one year. The proxy representative must be registered in the same commune

as the mandant. The step does not comprise real difficulty. Even if it requires to move

preliminary in a place of public authority (like the police station), the proxy constitutes a

practice well used.

The elections take part in every district, where several polling stations can be provided. Each

polling station refers to a specific area and number of voters. The geographical and "material"

organization of the vote (place of the polling station, place of polling boothes, the panelling

round the room…) is always the same one. Whatever the type of elections, voters always find

the same spatial diagram of voting.

9 In his 2002 election analysis, Pierre Bréchon estimates the increase in abstention related to this new measure at 1%. Cf. BRECHON, Pierre, "Comprendre les logiques de l'abstention", Revue Politique et Parlementaire, n°1020-1021, Paris sept-oct./ nov-déc. 2002.

Ballot takes place during one day, always Sunday. One could disgree with the fact that

everybody must vote on the same day. But at the same time, we should bear in mind that this

electoral method belongs in French history and is deeply rooted in the political habits of the

population.

II-2 : Institutional mobilisation

If we now look at the socio-political characteristics present in the electoral competition,

several aspects of the French political system could also be integrated in an analysis of

electoral mobilisation.

Described up until the 1980s as a “bipolar four-part” system (i.e., two poles and four parties

with the same political weight - UDF/RPR versus PS/PC), the French party system has

considerably changed. 1981 was indeed a fundamental rupture point in the balance created by

the hegemony of the RPR and the Socialist party10. The appearance of the far right and the

gradual disappearance of the communist party (only 3.4% in the 2002 presidential elections)

have also modified the make-up of an increasingly diverse party system. In the long run,

presidential French elections are characterised by an increasing number of candidates: six in

1965, seven in 1969, 12 in 1974. Then, in 1976, the minimum number of signatures necessary

for running changed, increasing from 100 to 500, however, this seems to have only a limited

impact: in 1981, there were10 candidates in 1998; nine in 1995 and; 16 in 2002.

The 2002 legislative elections also beat all records in the number of candidates, with 8446, or

approximately 15 for each electoral county. This multiplication can be seen both between and

within partisan blocs11. However, this dynamic political life is probably accompanied by a

greater difficulty in clearly seeing issues and traditional political partisan differences. This

probably contributes to the electoral volatility and abstention.

Another change in the French political system is related to party campaign and funding

procedures. Due to several corruption and dirty financing cases, several laws that did not exist

prior to 1988 were implemented, aiming at regulating campaign funding. In 1990, a national

commission on political and campaign financing was created. Three years later, funding from

private firms and more generally ‘moral’ persons was forbidden. These measures aimed at

10 Cf. MARTIN, Pierre, Comprendre les évolutions électorales. La théorie des réalignements revisitée, Presses de sciences Po, Paris, 2000. 11 Cf. ABRIAL, Stéphanie, CAUTRES, Bruno, EVANS, Jocelyn, "Stabilité et recomposition du système de partis français", Revue politique et parlementaire, Paris, n°1020-1021, sept.-oct./nov.-déc. 2002.

improving not only political transparency but also politicians’ image. But, with the continued

decline in electoral participation, one is bound to wonder about the impact of these measures

on voter turnout.

The change that took place within the 2002 electoral calendar - the legislative and presidential

elections were reversed - also contributed to further complicate our attempts at explaining the

decrease in voter turnout. Indeed, one can raise the question of the goal behind this change:

what other reason can there be for the change in the electoral calendar than the elite’s -on each

side of he left-right spectrum - convenience?

In a context in which electoral campaigns do not allow debates on programmes nor on issues

(demonstrated by the universal conviction that Lionel Jospin and Jacques Chirac would be the

final two candidates in 2002), it would thus appear that the very nature of competition has

been modified.

III - Individual facilitation and mobilisation In now look at the individual level of analysis using mainly Eurobarometers surveys (the post-

European election studies conduced in 1994 and 1999), but also the ASES study and the

national elections studies.

III-1 : Facilitation

By personal facilitation of turnout we mean the main characteristics of individuals that make

voting more easy, or let’s say less “costly”. Voting requires electoral registration, at least

some interest into the elections and taking time going to the polling station. One of the main

indicator of the facilitation characteristics of individuals is education. Does education matters

on voting per se? Or do we have interactive effects of education and age, two individual

characteristics that are closely linked? Does other socio-economic resources of individuals

(such as income, social status and social class, religious integration) facilitates or not turnout

[this section has to be completed]?

Age and education

The observation that age and turnout are correlated in true in France as in other European and

Western countries. In France, the 18-24 years group knows an abstention rate which is much

higher than the other age groups. This difference corresponds to what Anne Muxel has called

a “political moratoire”, a period of entrance into the civic life, still marked by the wish of

experiencing and keeping some distances to the “adult” world of politics. Our data also

suggests that there is in France, as in other Western countries, an increase of that abstention

rate among young French citizens in more recent cohorts. Age per se is not a “pure” age effect

: age is in fact an aggregated indicator, an index of both social and political integration.

Young people are less politically and socially integrated in that they still experience

geographical, professional and familial mobility and instability. Their lack of political

experience and political knowledge could explain their lack of participation to elections, but

their recent or still not started entrance on the job market also. Values associated to politics

could (lack of trust and confidence into the efficacy of politics and elections) also be part of

the story. An interesting result coming from table 4 is that age differences are stronger for EP

elections than for national elections.

Table 4 : Voter turnout and reasons for abstention by age in the 1994 and 1999 European elections in

France EP94 (EB41.1) 18-24 yrs 25-34 yrs 35-54 yrs 55+ yrs Total N

Voted 39.8 51.0 71.2 83.9 67.5 590 Voluntary abstainer 29.5 23.7 18.1 9.7 17.8 156 Circumstantial 13.6 15.2 7.8 3.9 8.8 77 Other reasons 17.0 10.1 2.9 2.5 5.8 51 Total 100 100 100 100 100 874 N 88 198 309 279 874

EP99 (EB52.0)

18-24 yrs 25-34 yrs 35-54 yrs 55+ yrs Total N Voted 38.2 49.8 61.5 68.3 56.9 551 Voluntary abstainer 26.5 28.6 24.3 14.9 23.5 228 Circumstantial 21.3 14.5 10.8 13.1 13.7 133 Other reasons 14.0 7.1 3.5 3.6 5.9 57 Total 100 100 100 100 100 969 N 136 241 371 221 969

1995 Presidential election (CEVIPOF 1995 election study)

18-24 yrs 25-34 yrs 35-54 yrs 55+ yrs Total N Did not vote 22.1 22.8 16.5 13.1 17.4 3364 Voted 77.9 77.2 83.5 86.9 82.6 709 Total 100 100 100 100 100 4073 N 561 833 1323 1356 4073

Education is another important element that may facilitates turnout at the individual level. It is

also an element of social status which is related to age and we will have to control age effect

for education levels differences among age groups.

As can be seen in table 5, the turnout rates differences among levels of education are not so

big for national elections than for EP elections, a result which recalls the one obtained on age

effects. It looks like if participating to EP elections was a more “difficult” task, or one could

say that EP elections participation revealed stronger social cleavages than participating to

national elections, a result which will have to be confirmed by using more data on national

elections.

Table 5, Voter turnout and abstention by level of education in the 1994 and 1999 European elections and 1995 presidential election EP94 (EB41.1)

PrimaryLower

secondary Higher

secondary Third level Total N Did not vote 25.7 27.9 39.4 32.4 34 Voted 74.3 72.1 60.6 67.6 66 Total 100 100 100 100 100 N 35 204 360 293 892 ASES (1995 presidential election)

PrimaryLower

secondary Higher

secondary Third level Total N Did not vote 3.3 13.4 14.0 12.0 11.5 113 Voted 96.7 86.6 86.0 88.0 88.5 870 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 N 153 336 178 316 983 CEVIPOF 1995 presidential election study

PrimaryLower

secondary Higher

secondary Third level Total N Did not vote 17.5 17.1 15.6 19.1 17.5 714 Voted 82.5 82.9 84.4 80.9 82.5 3364 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 4078 N 1239 1438 486 915 4078 EP99 (EB52.0)

PrimaryLower

secondary Higher

secondary Third level Total N Did not vote 63.9 36.9 46.3 42.7 63.9 440 Voted 36.1 63.1 53.8 57.3 36.1 528 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 968 N 108 179 400 281 968

Socio-economic status : social class and income. Income differences also matters (table 6) : turnout is not only associated with age and

educational differences but also with socio-economics characteristics. Turnout is also

associated with social class differences : working class or employees occupation people are

les likely to vote to either national or European elections. Unemployed people also.

Table 6 :Voter turnout and abstention by level of income in the 1994 and 1999 European elections and the 1973 and 2002 general elections (per cent) in France EP94 (EB41.1) Lowest Low High Highest Total NDid not vote 37.4 35.0 34.2 25.9 33.6 268Voted 62.6 65.0 65.8 74.1 66.4 530Total 100 100 100 100 100 798N 195 214 231 158 798 EP99 (EB52.0) Lowest Low High Highest Total NDid not vote 43.2 26.5 25.7 38.3 32.5 114Voted 56.8 73.5 74.3 61.7 67.5 237Total 100 100 100 100 100 351N 74 83 113 81 351 ASES (1995 presidential election) Lowest Low Middle High Highest Total NDid not vote 47.6 16.3 9.6 8.4 7.9 11.1 101Voted 82.4 83.7 90.4 91.6 92.4 88.9 810Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 911N 102 166 230 274 139 911 CEVIPOF 1995 presidential election study Lowest Low Middle High Highest Total NDid not vote 25.2 21.7 15.7 14.5 15.1 17.6 667Voted 74.8 78.3 84.3 85.5 84.9 82.4 3122Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 3789N 540 627 720 958 944 3789

III – 2 : Mobilisation

We now would like to turn our attention to factors that may concern the mobilization process

that conduce to turnout.

Media exposure and political knowledge

Media use is among the mobilisation factor a good indicator of interest into political matters

and exposure to information. As table 7 shows, exposure to the media has a significant effect

on turnout either for national or European elections. Regular readers of newspapers specially

are more likely to participate in European election and the readership of newspaper is, not

surprisingly, more significant than exposure to TV channels. Again we can see from the

ASES study that exposure to the media is more significantly related to turnout in EP elections

than in national elections.

Table 7 : Voter turnout and abstention by media use in the 1999 European elections in

France Newspaper use: EP99 (EB52.0)

Never Less oftenOnce or twice a

weekSeveral times

a week Everyday Total NDid not vote 56.2 58.2 49.4 49.4 30.4 45.6 441Voted 43.8 41.8 50.6 50.6 69.6 54.4 527Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 968N 153 165 164 160 326 968 Television use: EP99 (EB52.0)

Never Less often Once or twice a

weekSeveral times a

week Everyday Total NDid not vote 57.1 56.1 64.1 45.9 40.3 45.6 442Voted 42.9 43.9 35.9 54.1 59.7 54.4 527Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 969N 35 41 117 196 580 969

Table 7 (continued) : Voter turnout and abstention by media use in the national election in France Level of media usage: ASES : 1995 presidential election - Local media use Never From time to time Regularly Total N Did not vote 15.4 15 7.8 11.5 113 Voted 84.6 85 92.2 88.5 870 Total 100 100 100 100 983 N 143 353 487 983 ASES : 1995 presidential election - National media use Never From time to time Regularly Total N Did not vote 19.8 14.4 8.9 11.5 111 Voted 80.2 85.6 91.1 88.5 870 Total 100 100 100 100 983 N 91 284 608 983 ASES : 1995 presidential election - Foreign media use Never From time to time Regularly Total N Did not vote 11.2 13.4 8.5 11.5 113 Voted 88.2 86.6 91.5 88.5 870 Total 100 100 100 100 983 N 615 262 106 983 ASES : 1999 EP election - Local media use Never From time to time Regularly Total N Did not vote 39.3 29.0 17.8 25.0 247 Voted 60.7 71.0 82.2 75.0 741 Total 100 100 100 100 988 N 145 355 488 988 ASES : 1999 EP election - National media use Never From time to time Regularly Total N Did not vote 44.6 31.5 19.0 25.0 247 Voted 55.4 68.5 81.0 75.0 741 Total 100 100 100 100 988 N 92 286 610 988 ASES : 1999 EP election - Foreign media use Never From time to time Regularly Total N Did not vote 24.4 29.8 16.7 25.0 247 Voted 75.6 70.2 83.3 75.0 741 Total 100 100 100 100 988 N 618 262 108 988

Exposure to the media has obviously to see with the capacity of voters to get into an interest

to politics process (even if it is a necessary but not sufficient condition of interest into

politics) and has to see with political knowledge. Competence and political knowledge is a

“double face” indicator, both a facilitating and a mobilisating one. Table 8 shows that

political knowledge as it is measured by Eurobarometers as very a strong impact on turnout,

perhaps one of the most significant impact seen in our analysis. We have to question this

result that may have some “tautology” component. It is worth interesting to look at the

differences between Eurobarometers and ASES indicator of political knowledge, the former

being much more related to turnout than the latter.

Table 8 : Voter turnout and reasons for abstention by level of political knowledge for the 1994 and 1999 European elections and the 1995 presidential election. EP94 (EB41.1) 0 1 2 3 4 Total N Voted 49.1 59.3 74.6 80.3 89.0 67.5 591 Voluntary abstention 29.5 24.1 12.4 9.0 4.9 17.7 155 Circumstantial abstention 13.2 9.3 8.6 5.3 4.9 8.9 78 Other reasons 8.1 7.4 4.3 5.3 1.2 5.8 51 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 875 N 234 162 209 188 82 875 EP99 (EB52.0) 0 1 2 3 4 Total N Voted 45.1 55.8 62.1 69.4 80.0 58.4 566 Voluntary abstention 33.8 24.6 15.0 13.2 12.7 22.6 219 Circumstantial abstention 14.0 14.6 15.0 13.2 5.5 13.3 129 Other reasons 7.2 5.0 7.8 4.1 1.8 5.8 56 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 970 N 293 240 206 121 110 970 ASES : 1995 presidential election 0 1 2 3 4 Total N Did not vote 11.9 5.3 13.1 13.9 10.2 11.5 113 Voted 88.1 94.7 86.9 86.1 89.8 88.5 870 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 983 N 285 38 99 187 374 983 ASES : 1999 EP election 0 1 2 3 4 Total N Did not vote 27.6 13.2 30.0 29.1 20.8 25.0 247 Voted 72.4 86.8 70.0 70.9 79.2 75.0 741 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 988 N 286 38 100 189 375 988 Note: the numbers 0-5 refer to the number of correct answers to a series of political knowledge questions. These questions

generally refer to the identification of the holders of political office or leadership positions within parties.

Opinions and attitudes towards EU and turnout

Attitudes towards EU integration is a factor that may increase or not the political mobilization

process when it comes to the EP elections. Table 9 compares the attitudes toward the power of

European and national parliaments : in both cases, a positive perception of the role of EP or

national parliament increase turnout at EP elections, showing that turnout is linked with a

kind of ‘civic’ political culture. It is worth interesting to note that there anyway still high

abstention rates among people scoring high the role of EP. One has to be careful in that

interpretation since it is based on small n. Table 10 presents the effects on turnout of the

difference between the actual perceived speed of EU integration (on a 7 point scale) and the

desired speed of it (on the same scale): people getting a negative difference would like to see

EU integration going slower than it is, people having a 0 score are jus satisfied with the actual

speed of EU integration and people having a positive score would like to EU making faster

progress. The scores obtained are good indicators of a general attitude towards EU and are

associated with other indicator of attitudes towards it. The gap between turnout rates of the

different populations discriminated by this indicator have changed from 1994 to 1999 : EU

integration attitudes seems to be more associated with turnout in 1999, a result that would

have to be checked by further analysis.

Table 9 : Voter turnout and perceptions of the power of the European Parliament in 1994 and 1999 in France Perceived power of the European Parliament No power at all A great deal ofEB41.1 (1994) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9Did not vote 44.4 33.3 30.1 27.4 37.3 30.3 36.3 30.9 9.5Voted 55.6 66.7 69.9 72.6 62.7 69.7 63.7 69.1 90.5Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0N 27 42 103 117 228 119 91 55 21 No power at all A great deal ofEB52 (1999) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9Did not vote 63.6 58.1 59.0 48.6 43.2 34.8 41.7 41.8 42.1Voted 36.4 41.9 41.0 51.4 56.8 65.2 58.3 58.2 57.9Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0N 11 31 78 138 236 158 127 79 19

Perceived power of the French Parliament (Assemblée nationale) No power at all A great deal ofEB41.1 (1994) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9Did not vote 43.5 29.6 35.1 33.9 36.2 31.0 32.4 28.2 26.2Voted 56.5 70.4 64.9 66.1 63.8 69.0 67.6 71.8 73.8Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0892N 23 27 37 59 163 126 136 149 65 No power at all A great deal of

EB52 (1999) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9Did not vote 71.4 55.2 49.2 42.7 48.0 39.4 48.6 37.5 38.1Voted 28.6 44.8 50.8 57.3 52.0 60.6 51.4 62.5 61.9Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0N 7 29 61 96 225 188 140 112 42 Table 10 : Voter turnout and perceptions of the current and desired speed of the European integration (difference between desired and perceived speed of integration) Perceived speed of European integration - = + Total NEB41.1 (1994) Did not vote 36.6 40.0 32.2 33.9 303Voted 63.4 60.0 67.8 66.1 590Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 893N 82 150 661 893 - = + Total NEB52 (1999) Did not vote 50.8 50.6 41.1 45.5 441Voted 49.2 49.4 58.9 54.5 529Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 970N 199 245 526 970 A multivariate analysis could obviously be done to resume all the conclusions about

mobilisation and facilitation individuals factors on electoral turnout in EP elections in France.

This will be done in full details in the coming book.

To resume it anyway, one can say that abstention in France is highly determined by

sociological and political individual factors which affect the mobilisation of French voters.

We also know from our ecological data analysis that individual voters are not actors without

contexts : the geographical context of voters do affect their propensities to vote or abstain :

the urban/rural cleavage, the active/non-active one also strongly impact on abstention. The

understanding of turnout in France is a mix between this two main explanations : individual

factors of mobilisation and geographical contexts. All theses factors apply to the different

type of elections, EP elections being specially affected by the level of cognitive mobilisation

of voters and their interest in European affairs.

Appendix 1

A- The list of variables used for the Principal component analysis

Active socio-demographics : : sh90 : men counts ; ag90.1 : 18-24 years old people ; ag90.5 : 40-44 years old people ; ag90.7 : 50-54 years old people ; ag90.10 : 65-69 years old people ; dip90.12 : education, no diploma ; dip90.17 : education, baccalauréat (end of secondary education) or professional, technical equivalent ; dip90.19 : education, university graduation (baccalaréat + 3 or 4 years), postgraduation (baccalauréat + 5 years and over), engineer high schools diploma ; emp901 : employment status, non permanent employment contract (sandwich course between job and vocational training + contract for a limited period of time + contract under a temping agency + firm trainee ; emp90.21, employment status, self-employed, employers ; tac90.11 : employement status, active having a job ; tac90.12 : employement status, unemployed ; stoc90.1 : property status, owner, householder ; stoc90.2 : property status, tenant, renting of a non furnished and non HLM lodging ; stoc90.3 : property status, tenant, renting of a non furnished and HLM lodging ; tu_rur, rural communes, -2500 inhab. ; tu_urb : urban units, + 200 000 inhab.

Supplementary electoral variables1 (rates of abstention) : L881abp : legislative elections, 1988, 1st round,

abstention ; L882abp: legislative elections, 1988, 2nd round, abstention ; L931abp: legislative elections, 1993, 1st round, abstention ; L932abp: legislative elections, 1993, 2nd round, abstention ; L971abp: legislative elections, 1997, 1st round, abstention ; L972abp: legislative elections, 2nd round, abstention ; P881abp : presidential elections, 1988, 1st round, abstention ; P882abp: presidential elections, 1988, 2nd round, abstention ; P951abp: presidential elections, 1995, 1st round, abstention ; P952abp: presidential elections, 1995, 2nd round, abstention ; E89abp : european elections, 1989, abstention ; E94abp: european elections, 1994, abstention ; E99abp: european elections, 1999, abstention ; R92abp : regional elections, 1992, abstention ; R98abp : regional elections, 1998, abstention

Supplementary socio-professional category : cs901: farmers ; cs902 : artisans and business owners ;

cs903 : higher grade teachers, professors, administrative and business managers ; cs904 : primary schools teachers, technicians and business lower level ; cs905 : employees ; cs906 : skilled and unskilled workers ; cs907 : retired ; cs908 : unemployed never worked, students and other non active

B – Statistical results of the Principal component analysis Table1 : Eigen value and associated variance Eigen value % variance Sum of eigen value Sum % variance 1 6.481785 38.12815 6.48179 38.1281 2 2.532348 14.89616 9.01413 53.0243 3 2.017670 11.86865 11.03180 64.8930 4 1.059270 6.23100 12.09107 71.1240 5 0.945401 5.56118 13.03647 76.6851 6 0.658799 3.87529 13.69527 80.5604 7 0.601510 3.53829 14.29678 84.0987 8 0.547905 3.22297 14.84469 87.3217 9 0.491172 2.88924 15.33586 90.2109 10 0.370552 2.17972 15.70641 92.3907 11 0.298137 1.75375 16.00455 94.1444 12 0.247969 1.45864 16.25252 95.6030 13 0.225333 1.32549 16.47785 96.9285 14 0.186591 1.09759 16.66444 98.0261 15 0.178014 1.04714 16.84246 99.0733 16 0.141968 0.83511 16.98442 99.9084 17 0.015576 0.09162 17.00000 100.0000

Table 2 : contribution actives variables Fact. 1 Fact. 2 Fact. 3 SH90_P 0.057508 0.035686 0.088979 A901P 0.074051 0.004792 0.017134 A905P 0.023964 0.139191 0.058433 A907P 0.000021 0.019802 0.010417 A910P 0.072038 0.026814 0.139999

DIP9012P 0.063065 0.121364 0.000236 DIP9017P 0.047043 0.069029 0.127285 DIP9019P 0.066244 0.027976 0.148774 TAC9011P 0.035106 0.174972 0.005681 TAC9012P 0.018276 0.201671 0.006260 STOC901P 0.094066 0.084009 0.006081 STOC902P 0.039920 0.022490 0.195508 STOC903P 0.065481 0.053814 0.090397 EMP9012P 0.072121 0.002805 0.017760 EMP9021P 0.083155 0.008713 0.072774 tu_rurp 0.115818 0.006553 0.000388 tu_urbp 0.072125 0.000319 0.013893

Table 3 : coordinates active and supplementary variables Fact. 1 Fact. 2 Fact. 3

Active SH90_P -0.610537 -0.300617 -0.423709

A901P 0.692809 0.110155 -0.185934 A905P 0.394117 -0.593701 -0.343364 A907P -0.011573 -0.223934 0.144977 A910P -0.683328 0.260582 0.531481 DIP9012P -0.639356 0.554379 -0.021836 DIP9017P 0.552197 -0.418098 0.506774 DIP9019P 0.655271 -0.266168 0.547884 TAC9011P 0.477019 -0.665650 -0.107065 TAC9012P 0.344178 0.714634 -0.112387 STOC901P -0.780841 -0.461237 -0.110767 STOC902P 0.508677 0.238646 0.628069 STOC903P 0.651485 0.369154 -0.427072 EMP9012P 0.683717 0.084274 -0.189296 EMP9021P -0.734162 -0.148545 0.383189 tu_rurp -0.866433 -0.128817 0.027964 tu_urbp 0.683737 -0.028419 0.167429

Supplementary *L881ABP 0.580149 0.153475 -0.098562

*L882ABP 0.545951 0.202738 -0.136813 *L931ABP 0.496415 0.262723 -0.005040 *L932ABP 0.362711 0.112457 0.000206 *L971ABP 0.603287 0.167518 0.080937 *L972ABP 0.557556 0.188424 -0.010079 *P881ABP 0.353615 0.328031 0.189022 *P882ABP 0.524157 0.365257 0.065369 *P951ABP 0.453728 0.295794 0.159788 *P952ABP 0.563859 0.333813 -0.019707 *E89ABP 0.410146 0.220764 -0.260950 *E94ABP 0.378093 0.189385 -0.131993 *E99ABP 0.417038 0.218935 -0.232120 *R92ABP 0.548833 0.177238 -0.072918 *R98ABP 0.607311 0.068012 -0.148796 *CS901P -0.776674 -0.068714 0.166541 *CS902P -0.349372 -0.161442 0.414293 *CS903P 0.719799 -0.375822 0.408063 *CS904P 0.802267 -0.427773 0.021940 *CS905P 0.795176 -0.070044 -0.109931 *CS906P -0.091187 0.190747 -0.694219 *CS907P -0.668982 0.248365 0.516979 *CS908P 0.254913 0.149302 -0.500753