siachen glacier conflict

8/3/2019 Siachen Glacier Conflict

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The Conflict at Siachen

The human and economic costs of sustaining a two-decade long bloody conflict over the possession of the geographically remote and climatically inhospitable Siachen Glacier continues to bleed both Pakistan and India dry despite several rounds of talks between two nuclear-armed neighbours to resolve the dispute, variedly

described as a war on the rooftop of the world.The two-day Islamabad talks between Indian and Pakistani defence secretaries on resolving the Siachen issue haveagain ended inconclusively. This was the third dialogue session since the January 6, 2004 Islamabad Declaration that kicked off the normalization process between the two sides. But at the end, a bald statement merely repeated the diplomatic doublespeak for deadlock: that the two sides held "frank and constructive discussions" and would continue to talk without specifying any new date. In real terms, therefore, the position, if it has not actually regressed, remains the sameas the one that prevailed when the then Indian premier, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, had come to Islamabad for talks with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in July 1989.

Originally known as Saicher Gharni, the Siachen means the place of roses (Sia-ro

se, chen-place of). Since April 1984, when the Indian army carried out a clandestine operation code-named "Meghdoot" and established permanent posts at the Siachen Glacier, the two nuclear-armed neighbours have confronted each other militarily for control over the icy wasteland and its approaches in the eastern Karakoram mountain range, adjacent to the borders of India, Pakistan and China. The longest-running armed conflict between two regular armies in the twentieth century,the Siachen conflict has resulted in thousands of casualties from both sides, primarily because of adverse climatic conditions and harsh terrain. This is despite the fact that the leaderships in India and Pakistan acknowledge the human andeconomic costs of the Siachen dispute.

According to careful estimates by Pakistani defence experts, to maintain threebattalions at the icy wasteland of Siachen, Islamabad spends Rs. 15 million a da

y, which makes Rs. 450 million a month and Rs. 5.4 billion a year. On the otherhand, the deployment of seven battalions at the Glacier costs India Rs. 50 million a day, Rs. 1.5 billion a month and Rs. 30 billion a year. On average, the experts say, one Pakistani soldier is killed every third day on the Glacier, showing approximately 100 casualties every year on average. Similarly, one Indian soldier is killed every other day on the Glacier, at an annual average of 180 casualties. According to unofficial figures, over 2,200 Pakistani soldiers lost theirlives on the Glacier between 1984 and 2004 as against over 4,000 Indian casualties.

The cost of a loaf of bread that would be less than a rupee in the Kashmir Valley is estimated by the Times of India to be worth Rs10,000 (US$217) by the time

it reaches Indian soldiers on Siachen. The fight for the Siachen Glacier involves territory claimed by both states but not controlled by either until the mid-1980s. In twenty years of fighting, India and Pakistan have chosen to keep the waralmost entirely out of the press. It is a war neither side wants to fight. Yet,it has lasted for two long decades. Thousands of soldiers from Pakistan and India stand muzzle to muzzle all along the Glacier, the disputed ice chunk betweentwo hostile neighbours. India controls about two-thirds of the Glacier besides commanding two of the three passes while Pakistan occupies the Gyong La Pass, which overlooks Shyok and Nubra river valleys and India's access to the Glacier from the Leh district in Ladakh.At 5,472 meters above sea level, the Siachen Glacier is located in the Karakorammountain region, which has some of the highest peaks in the world. The northern

mountains of the Glacier mark the watershed between the Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent. Bereft of vegetation, the Glacier happens to be one of the world's most inhospitable regions where temperature hovers around minus 40 degree


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centigrade. If bare skin touches metal, it bounds as if with glue and can be torn off. In winters, strong winds from Central Asia can further bring down the temperature to minus 50 degrees. The Glacier receives 6 to 7 meters of the annualtotal of 10 meters of snow in winter alone. Blizzards can reach speeds up to 150knots (nearly 300 kilometers per hour).The Indian army controls Siachen heights, holding on to the tactical advantage o

f high ground. But the Pakistan army is slightly better off since it occupies smaller portion of the Glacier, and its road-head is only 20 km away from the farthest post. Indian troops on the other hand are stationed about 80 km away from the road-head and have to be maintained entirely by air, which is not only cost prohibitive but also risky because of the adverse weather conditions most of thetimes. Interestingly, the Pakistani soldiers cannot go up to the Glacier and theIndian forces cannot come down.

While the Pakistani troops stationed on the Glacier are confronted with a lessforbidding terrain as compared to their Indian adversaries, their military presence forces Indians to retain their troops on the more elevated and hazardous mountain passes, resulting in higher attrition rates because of the dangerous altit

ude, weather and terrain. Daily existence at the Glacier is simply agonizing dueto frostbiting and other such tribulations. Over 95 per cent of the casualtiesat the Glacier are because of extremely cold weather and forbidding terrain while only five percent fall in combat. The Indian casualty rate is a staggering 63per cent of every two soldiers sent up to the Glacier, one will be a casualty.

The Pakistanis are no better off since they lose fewer men to the hostile elements and more to the Indian firing. Pakistani authorities had admitted in 1994 that their non-combat casualties since 1984 accounted for over 80 per cent of total attrition. Pakistani positions are, for the most part, at a lower altitude inthe Glacier area, ranging between 9,000 to 15,000 feet (some are at a much higher altitude such as Conway Saddle, at 17,200 feet, which controls doorway to theGlacier). Over the last two decades, Pakistan has tried many times to displace t

he Indian forces, but had to retreat each time. The Indian troops have to do nothing but sit tight and periodically repel a Pakistani assault.

Despite wearing five layers of clothing, paratroopers shiver as they wait to board an air force transport at the world's highest air base at Leh. The AN-32A planes approach the stark runway at Leh in snowy mist, pushed by tail winds. The pilots navigate the steep mountains by sight. Higher on the icy Himalayan peaks,helicopter pilots battle downdrafts as they land on helipads to deliver precioussupplies or rescue injured soldiers. The pilots stay on the ground no more than30 seconds for fear of being shot by the enemy troops. Soldiers brought down tobase camp often suffer hearing, eyesight and memory loss because of prolonged use of oxygen masks. Many lose eyes, hands or feet to frostbite.

The roots of the conflict over Siachen lie in the non-demarcations on the western side of the map beyond a grid point known as NJ 9842. Hostilities between India and Pakistan over ownership of the Glacier date back to the first Indo-Pak war of 1948, over the territorial dispute of Jammu & Kashmir. A Cease-Fire Line (CFL) was established as a result of the 1949 Indo-Pak agreement that concluded the war in Jammu & Kashmir. The CFL ran along the international Indo-Pak border and then north and northeast until map grid-point NJ 9842, located near the ShyokRiver at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. Because no Indian or Pakistanitroops were present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyondNJ 9842, the CFL was not delineated as far as the Chinese border. Both sides agreed, in vague language, that the CFL extends to the terminal point, NJ 9842, and "thence north to the Glaciers".

After the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the Tashkent agreement resulted in troop withdrawals to positions along the 1949 CFL. No attempt was made to extend the CFL f


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urther. Following Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India, the Simla Agreement of 1972 established a new Line of Control (LoC) as a result of the December1971 cease-fire. The Siachen Glacier region, where no fighting had taken place,was left un-delineated, and no attempt was made to clarify the position of the LoC beyond NJ 9842. The LoC was merely described as moving from Nerlin (inclusiveto India), Brilman (inclusive to Pakistan), up to Chorbat La in the Turtok sector. Since the Siachen Glacier region falls within the un-delineated territory be

yond the last defined section of the LoC, map grid-point NJ 9842, Indian and Pakistani territorial claims are based on their respective interpretations of the vague language contained in the 1949 and 1972 agreements. Pakistan draws a straight line in a northeasterly direction from NJ 9842 up to the Karakoram Pass on its boundary with China. India instead draws a north-northwest line from NJ 9842 along the watershed line of the Saltoro Range, a southern offshoot of the Karakoram Range.

As things stand today, neither of the two sides is ready to alter the status quoon Siachen. Pakistan claims the Siachen Glacier is a part of the country's northern areas, over which it enjoyed continued administrative control since her independence from the British Raj in 1947. On the other hand, India stresses that t

he un-demarcated area was never in the Pakistani control as per the Simla agreement wording of 1949. But Pakistan cites the boundary agreement of 1963 with China to support its case.

India is determined to keep the Glacier since its northern mountains divide theCentral Asia and the Indian sub-continent. Whoever owns the Glacier controls the Shyok and Nubra valleys, as well as the region bordering China. India fears that Pakistan's control of the Glacier would endanger the security of Ladakh in particular and the state of Jammu & Kashmir in general. The Indians further believe that China and Pakistan want to occupy the Siachen to secure a common border with China to facilitate a closer military link. Although Islamabad had affectedits control over the Siachen Glacier since the 1960s, it did not establish any permanent post because of the harsh climatic conditions there. However, scouting

missions kept climbing to the Glacier from time to time. The Indians were firstto deploy their troops and establish permanent posts at the Siachen Glacier in April 1984, through a major air-mobile operation, code-named "Meghdoot". The Indian army quietly moved an advance unit from the Kumaon regiment to occupy key mountain Passes and successfully established permanent posts at the Siachen heightsin violation of all the previous agreements reached between the two countries.

As a result of operation "Meghdoot", two out of three passes on the Siachen SiaLa and Bilfond La -- came under India's control, while the third pass -- Gyong La remained under Pakistan's control. The Indian army is permanently stationed all along the 110-km long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), backed by a formidable array of surface weapons, including anti-aircraft guns, missiles and artillery. The Pakistani arsenal is comparable: sniper rifles, machine guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers and artillery pieces. Though the twoarmies used to clash on the Glacier quite often, Pakistan announced a ceasefirein November 2003 as part of a border truce with India. With the installation ofthe Congress-led coalition government in India, both the countries are once again talking to each other on all the contentious issues, including that of the Siachen.

For the first time in the past twenty years, the two countries decided last yearto discuss the Siachen issue at the defence secretaries' level. Pakistan's defence secretary Lt. Gen. (retd) Hamid Nawaz Khan visited India in August 2004 to meet his Indian counterpart Ajai Vikram Singh, who led his country's team at thenegotiations in Hyderabad House of New Delhi. During these talks, which remained

inconclusive, members from both the teams reportedly questioned the terrible waste of human lives in a so-called war of prestige and urged that it must be brought to an end. During the second round of talks held in Islamabad on May 26-27,


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2005, the Indian delegation was headed by Defence Secretary Ajay Vikram Singh while Defence Secretary Lt Gen (retd) Tariq Wasim Ghazi led the Pakistani side.

While Pakistan proposed a negotiated withdrawal of troops from the disputed region to the 1980 position, the Indian side was keen to get the whole area declared as demilitarised zone before vacating it. Yet, no agreement could be reached between the two sides, primarily because India's six-point proposal, starting wit

h cessation of "cartographic aggression" and culminating in the "withdrawal of forces", was dramatically in conflict with Pakistan's two-point formula of firstwithdrawing forces and then delineating an extension of the Line of Control (LoC) beyond NJ 9842 (Latitude 98 degrees East and Longitude 42 degrees north). So divergent were the views on both sides that no meeting point was possible.

Analysts say one way to look at the problem is to shrug one's shoulders and saythis un-declared war can go on even as India and Pakistan normalise on other fronts. Fair enough. But does this logic take into account the plight of the troops on both sides and even the bigger logic of normalisation itself? No. There arevarious proposals, including some very good non-official ones, on the table. Itis time both sides got out of the old grooves and began to look at the issue in

the larger political context rather than simply in the narrow military sense. Amore earnest attempt should be made to at least agree on withdrawal to less harsh and more civilized positions and to pledge that no patrols in uncharted territory will be carried out by either side. This too should be seen as a confidence-building measure.

siachen glacier conflict

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