vécus, est problématique. Car si lification de la premiêre rétention_ ous ne pourrions jamais saisir une t constitué par une intentionnalité à naus. Mais dans le monde sonore,

:ujet pourrait fort bien être rnultiple de ses harrnoniques; la dérive

oniques qui constituent un sujet. Le .ténue au lieu de les modifier. Par là, >roche de sa propre rnort tout en la

i .•

9

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OFMEANING

IN THE LOGJCAL INVESTIGATIONS

SÍNTESE - Este artigo procura mostrar que, apesar de emergir de uma visão tradicional e metafísica da linguagem, a teoria husserliana do significado enquanto espécie ideal nas mvestiga­ções Lógicas não é redutível a urna expressão lingüística de uma adequação essencialista e representacional, mas antes enfatiza o papel da intencionalidade, a idealidade da linguagem e o caráter constitutivo da consciência no preenchi­mento da "significação" (Bedeutung). PALAVRAS-CHAVE - Consciência. Intencionali­dade. Linguagem. Representação. Significação.

lntroduction

Nythamar Fernandes de Oliveira*

To John D. Caputo

ABSTRACT - This article seeks to show that, although emerging out of a so-called traditional, metaphysical view of language, Edmund Husserl's theory of meaning qua ideal species in the Logical mvestigations cannot be reduced to the linguistic expression of an essentialist, representational adequation, but rather emphasizes the role of intentionality, the ideality of language, and the constitutiva character of consciousness in the fulfilment of "meaning" (Bedeutung). KEY WORDS - Consciousness. Intentionality. Language. Meaning. Representation.

Edmund Husserl's theory of rneaning certainly occupies one of the most privi­leged positions in the monumental building of his phenornenology. Perhaps re­cause of its ubiquitous and underlying influence in Husserl's texts, "meaning" is one of those key words which best describe, along with "consciousness" and "intentionality", the very kernal of such a phenomenological project. The fact that both herrneneutics and deconstruction are arnong the legitirnate children of Husserl's phenornenology only serves to confirrn the central place accorded to "meaning" in Husserl's investigations. It would be irnpossible, however, to fully investigate the pervasive rneaning of "Husserl's phenornenology of rneaning" in a limited paper like the present one, which makes no pretensions to an exhaustive

* Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da PUCRS e c~ - Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico.

VERIT AS 1 Porto Alegre 1 v. 45 n. 1 Março 2000 p. 117-134

research but rather seeks to introduce a problematic within Husserl's own shift from the world of things towards a lifeworld phenomenology. 1 I shall thus confine myself to outlining Husserl's theory of meaning in the Logical Investigations and how it contributed to the development of a phenomenology in the Ideas I. I am particularly interested in Husserl's contribution to the hermeneutic "style" of the philosophizing of contemporary philosophers such as Heidegger, Lévinas, Mer­leau-Ponty, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Foucault, and Derrida. It is certainly beyond the scope of the present paper to examine the problematics raised by the hermeneutic movement and the original thinking of these philosophers. It is in the Logical In­vestigations, in effect, that we are to find the conceptual premises to ali the phe­nomenological problems of signification and language, which would be later de­veloped in the 1908 Góttingen lectures on the theory of meaning, but also in Ideas I, the Crisis and The Origin of Geometry.2 As Jacques Derrida points out,

"Dans ce dornaine [du langage] plus qu'ailleurs, une lecture patiente ferait apparaitre dans les Recherches la structure germinale de toute la pensée husserlienne. A chaque page se laisse lire la nécessité - ou la pratique implicite - des réductions éidétiques et phénoménologiques, la présence repérable de tout ce à quoi elles donneront accés. "3

As Derrida remarks, the first of the Investigations appears to command our reading of the subsequent ones. And this is to be taken as a strategic procedure in Husserl's writing, in that the rigor of his phenomenological analyses consists in the necessary absence of presuppositions (Voraussetzungslosigkeit) as a starting point . Even the Faktum of language cannot thus be regarded, according to Husserl's pro­ject, as a presupposition. Nevertheless, as we shall see, Derrida has convincingly shown us that such is not the case, for the Husserlian mathesis does conceal "a metaphysical presupposition'', at the very heart of his theory of meaning, which in effect constitutes phenomenology, as it were, "from within". Long before Derrida, Heidegger had already begun this radical move against Husserl's "ontological pre­suppositionlessness" in a hermeneutic retrieval of the forgotten "Sein" eclipsed by and repressed at the heart of the Husserlian absolutized "Bewusst-sein" . It is pre­cisely within such a hermeneutical perspective, from within the Logical Investiga­tions, that one must explore Husserl's theory of meaning.

There is a gamut of excellent studies on Husserl's theory of meaning, among them Klaus Held, Lebendige Gegenwart: Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentale !eh bei Ed. Husserl (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1966); Ernst Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967); Guido Antonio de Almeida, Sinn und Inhalt in der Genet:ischen Phanomenologie E. Husserls (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1972); Donn Welton, The Origins of Meaning: A Critical Study of Husserlian Phenomenology (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1983); Carlos Alberto Ribeiro de Moura, Critica da Razão na Fenomenologia (São Paulo: EDUSP, 1989); Peter Sirnons, "Meaning and lan­guage", in The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, ed. Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre, Sommersemester 1908, Husserliana XXVI, ed. U. Panzer (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1989). Jacques Derrida, La voix et le phénomene. Introdliction au probleme du signe dans la phénoméno­logie de Husserl (Paris: PUF, 1967), p. 1. Hereafter abbreviated as VP.

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Expression and Meaning

The early Husserl's combined inte1 to concentrate on the epistemology oJ the titles of his Habilitationsschrift, ÜbE important work, Philosophie der Arith subtitle, "Psychologische und logischE the psychologist-philosopher Franz H psychological foundation of logic and ~ forward to the first edition of his Logicé

"I began work on the prevailing ass1 which logic in general, and the Jogic losophical clarification. For this reaso place in the first (the only published) were, however, connections in which satisfy me. "4

It was then maintained that the fou chological grounding of the concept e Husserl's own thought was emerging o by Neo-Kantian epistemology. Accordin by reflection and abstraction upon anc· must be limited to psychic phenomena cal, and logical questions to psycholo gism". Husserl's phenomenology wou11 come both psychologism and tradition nological breakthrough would not take gische Untersuchungen in 1900 and 19( the historical evolution of Husserl's ph note that Husserl's theory of meaninç strongly influenced by German empiric psychologism, which indeed coincide abandon his original philosophy of Husserl's Logical Investigations undem. a phenomenological method, which wa the first volume of his Ideen zu einez gischen Philosophie in 1913. The LogiCé "Prolegomena to Pure Logic", in which skepticism of empiricism. Descriptive r as being relevant to the foundations o

4 E. Husserl, Logical Investigations (London: l abbreviated LI. The German edition used is t Cf. J.N. Mohanty, "Husserl and Frege: A N• Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Scienc va, "Husserl's Philosophy of Mathematics", li

blematic within Husserl's own shift ;ihenomenology .1 I shali thus confine ng in the Logical Investigations and phenomenology in the Ideas I. I ~ )n to the hermeneutic "style" of the : such as Heidegger, Lévinas, Mer­i Derrida. It is certainly beyond the )blematics raised by the hermeneutic philosophers. It is in the Logical In-

1 conceptual premises to ali the phe­language, which would be later de­

i theory of meaning, but also in Ideas Jacques Derrida points out,

JIS, une lecture patiente ferait apparaitre a toute la pensée husserlienne. A chaque e implicite - des réductions éidétiques et : tout ce à quoi elles donneront accés. "

3

'estigations appears to command our J be taken as a strategic procedure in iomenological analyses consists in the ;setzungslosigkeit) as a starting point. regarded, according to Husserl's pro­

re shali see, Derrida has convincingly Husserlian mathesis does conceal "a

rrt of his theory of meaning, which in 1, "from within" . Long before Derrida, >Ve against Husserl's "ontological pre­'al of the forgotten "Sein" eclipsed by absolutized "Bewusst-sein" . It is pre-

ve, from within the Logical Investiga-1f meaning.

; theory of meaning, among them Klaus Held, se des transzendentale Ich bei Ed, Husserl (The llheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: und Inhalt in der Genetischen Phiinomenologie elton, The Oiigins of Meaning: A Clitical Study jhoff, 1983); Carlos Alberto Ribeiro de Moura, )USP, 1989); Peter Sirnons, "Meiming and lan-1, ed. Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith

:er 1908, Husserliana XXVI, ed, U, Panzer (The

;tion au probléme du signe dans la phénoméno­obreviated as VP.

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Expression and Meaning

The early Husserl's combined interest in mathematics and psychology led him to concentrate on the epistemology of arithmetic concepts, as we can infer from the titles of his Habilitationsschrift, Über den Begriff der Zahl (1887), and of his first important work, Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), whose first volume bore the subtitle, "Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen" . Under the influence of the psychologist-philosopher Franz Brentano, Husserl set out to articulate the psychological foundation of logic and philosophy. As Husserl would confess in the forward to the first edition of his Logical Investigations,

"I began work on the prevailing assurnption that psychology was the science from which logic in general, and the logic of the deductive sciences, had to hope for phi­losophical clarification. For this reason psychological researches occupy a very large place in the first (the only published) volume of my Philosophy of Aiithmetic. There were, however, connections in which such a psychological foundation never carne to satisfy me. "4

It was then maintained that the foundation of the concept of number is the psy­chological grounding of the concept of multiplicity. It is important tó recali that Husserl's own thought was emerging out of a "psychologist" milieu, visibly marked by Neo-Kantian epistemology. According to that view, ours is a "world" constructed by reflection and abstraction upon and from physical contents, and ali knowledge must be limited to psychic phenomena. This reduction of philosophical, mathemati­cal, and logical questions to psychological questions has been called "psycholo­gism". Husserl's phenomenology would thus appear as a radical attempt to over­come both psychologism and traditional empiricism. Nevertheless, this phenome­nological breakthrough would not take place until the publication of Husserl's Lo­gische Untersuchungen in 1900 and 1901. Although Ido not intend to examine here the historical evolution of Husserl's phenomenology, it is of utmost importance to note that Husserl's theory of meaning evolved within a philosophical framework strongly influenced by German empiricism and Gottlob Frege's logical criticism of psychologism, which indeed coincided with Husserl's own self-critical move to abandon his original philosophy of arithmetic and pursue the Investigations.5

Husserl's Logical Investi.gati.ons underrnines the psychological approach to ernbrace a phenomenological method, which was not fully developed until the appearance of the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phanomenolo­gischen Philosophie in 1913. The Logical Investigations opens with a long, polemical "Prolegomena to Pure Logic", in which Husserl attacks both psychologism and the skepticism of empiricism. Descrtptive psychology, however, must still be regarded as being relevant to the foundations of logic and, in fact, phenomenology itself is

K Husserl, Logical Investigations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), voL I, p. 42. Hereafter abbreviated LI. The German edition used is the Husserliana, vols. XVIII and XIX. Cf. J.N. Mohanty, "Husserl and Frege: A New Look at their Relationship", in Huber Dreyfus, ed., Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982); Jairo J. da Sil­va, "Husserl's Philosophy of Mathematics", Manuscrito XVI/2 (1993): 121-148.

119

first conceived at this descriptive level. The main systematic purpose of the Prole­gomena is thus to refute the thesis that psychology qua empirical science can pro­vide the philosophical explanation of logical notions and principles. Husserl begins his Introduqtion by pointing out that since John Stuart Mill, and owing particularly to his influence, logic has developed in a threefold direction: metaphysical, formal, and psychological (LI I, 53). It is upon the last one, which has also become the most prevalent, that Husserl must focus the attention of his critical investigations. Never­theless, it would be misleading to reduce the focus of Husserl's efforts to his attack on psychologism. Like Kant, who remains along with Descartes and Hume his life­time maitre à penser, Husserl is particularly interested in the foundations of science (Wissenschaft), the validity of knowledge, and the so-called laws of thought, or, in his own words, in "the relationship, in particular, between the subjectivity of know­ing and the objectivity of the content known" (LI I, 42). That is why, throughout his investigations, Husserl maintains that a science is to be defined according to the realm which it investigates. What is needed now is a Wissenschaftslehre, a theory of science, "whose peculiarity it is to be the science of science [Wissenschaft von der Wissenschaft]" (LI I, 60). Logic is thus established as Wissenschaftslehre, as "pure science", whose threefold task is summarized by Husserl in the last chapter of the Prolegomena (§§ 67-69): "the fixing of the pure categories of meaning, the pure categories of objects and their law-govemed combiriations"; "the laws and theories which have their grounds in these categories"; and, "the theory of the possible forms of theories or the pure theory of manifolds" (LI I, 236-240). However, it is only in the second volume (German edition) of the Logical Investigations that Husserl finally presents a definition of logic as "the science of meanings as such [Wissen­schaft von Bedeutungen a1s solchen]" (LI II, 323/98). This double concem with "sci­ence" and its logical "founding" already delineates the Husserlian spiral of meaning as a phenomenological articulation between the "origin" (eidos) and the "significa­tion" (logos) of the human experience of cognition. After developing the idea of a pure logic with a view to fumishing a "science of science", Husserl proceeds to examine the nature of "meaning" and its .problematics in the second volume of his Logical Investigations. The title of the volume is very revealing (Untersuchungen zur Phanomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis) of Husserl's phenomenology of mean­ing, which is largely developed in the first four investigations. The phenomenological orientation of his studies is carefully expounded in the Introduction:

"We are not here concemed with grarnmatical discussions, empirically conceived and related to some historically given language: we are concemed with discussions of a most general sort which cover the wider sphere of an objective theory of knowledge [objektiven Theoiie der Erkenntnisl and, closely linked with this last, the puie phe­nomenology of the expeiiences of thinking and knowing [einer reinen Phanomenologie der Denk- und Erkenntniserlebnisse) . This phenomenology, like the more inclusive pure phenomenology of expeiiences in general [reine Phanomenologie der Erlebnisse überhaupt], has, as its exclusive concem, experiences intuitevely seizable and analys­able in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts .. . This phenomenology must bring to pure expression [zu reinem Ausdruck], must desciibe in terms of their essential concepts [deskiiptiv in Wesensbe-

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gri[fen) and their goveming formulai themselves known in intuition, and 1 such essences. Each such statement the highest sense of the word." (LI II,

It is thus made clear that, in ordt our objects, we must proceed in "purE to the laws of a pure logic, how these that is, in linguistic expressions:

"The objects [Objekte] which pure 1 therefore given to it in grarnmatical 1

ernbedded in concrete mental stat1 ing-intention or meaning-fulfihnent o1 tuitively illustrating, or intuitively pro phenomenological unity with such ex

What Husserl is concemed about crete mental phenomenon") but the 101 ing, which is one over against ffií

ment-experiences" (LI II, 251). Thus H of signification, by studying the logia "Expression and Meaning" [Ausdruck , Husserl starts this investigation by pc term "sign" (Zeichen): "Every sign is 'meaning', a 'sense' that the sign exi aber nicht jedes hat eine "Bedeutun~ gedrückt" ist]" (LI II, 269/30). Althoug been pointed to by a signifier, not all signs are "expressions" (in Husserlian fiélsignifiant oppositional couple is an ; de Saussure's famous Cours de linguis Moreover, strictly speaking in Saussur shall return to this problematic later, rected against Husserl's theory of me Husserl's conception of language falli view of language. According to this vi and transmitting a thought, which rei tional view, which dates back to Arist between the essence of a thing and i what makes knowledge and language

reality (essence) - thouç

The order of "determination" is thought and language, while the order site direction, as words refer to conc1 notion of "truth" is therefore logically

nain systematic purpose of the Prole-1ology qua empirtcal science can pro-1otions and principles. Husserl begins 1hn Stuart Mill, and owing particularlY aefold direction: metaphysical, formal, one, which has also become the most m of his critical investigations. Never­focus of Husserl's efforts to his attack 1ng with Descartes and Hume his life-1terested in the foundations of science i the so-called laws of thought, or, in llar, between the subjectivity of know-(Ll r, 42). That is why, throughout his

nce is to be defined according to the ow is a Wissenschaftslehre, a theory of .ence of science [Wissenschaft von der lished as Wissenschaftslehre, as "pure i by Husserl in the last chapter of the pure categories of meaning, the pure combinations"; "the laws and theories es"; and, "the theory of the possible 1lds" (Ll I, 236-240). However, it is only .he Logical Investigations that Husserl science of meanings as such [W.issen-123/98). This double concem with "sci-1eates the Husserlian spiral of meaning the "origin" (eidos) and the "signifi.ca­J!lition. After developing the idea of a ence of science", Husserl proceeds to iblematics in the second volume of his i is very revealing (Untersuchungen zur 1 of Husserl's phenomenology of mean­!I investigations. The phenomenological 3d in the Introduction:

cal discussions, empirically conceived and : we are concemed with discussions of a ohere of an objective theory ot knowledge osely linked with this last, the puie phe­md knowing [einer reinen Phanomenologie phenomenology, like the more inclusive

1eral [reine Phiinomenologie der Erlebnisse xperiences intuitevely seizable and analys­not experiences empirically perceived and

· must bring to pure expression [zu reinem JSsential concepts [deskriptiv in Wesensbe-

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giiffenJ and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their roots purely in such essences. Each such statement [AussageJ of essence is an a priori statement in the highest sense of the word." (LI Il, 249/6)

It is thus made clear that, in order to understand the essential constitution of our objects, we must proceed in "purely intuitive fashion" to investigate, according to the laws of a pure logic, how these objects have been given in grammatical form, that is, in linguistic expressions:

"The objects [Objekte) which pure logic seeks to examine are, in the first instance, therefore given to it in grarnmatical clothing. Or, more precisely, they come before us embedded in concrete mental states which further function either as the mean­ing-intention or meariing-tulfilment of certain verbal expressions - in the 18.tter case in­tuitively illustrating, or intuitively providing evidence for, our meaning - and forming a phenomenological unity with such expressions." (LI TI, 250/8)

What Husserl is concemed about is not the psychological judgement ("the con­creta mental phenomenon") but the logical judgement, "the identical asserted mean­ing, which is one over against manifold, descriptively quite different, judge­ment-experiences" (Ll II, 251). Thus Husserl goes on to develop a veritable analysis of signifi.cation, by studying the logical core of language in the First Investigation, "Expression and Meaning" [Ausdruck und Bedeutung). It is interesting to notice that Husserl starts this investigation by pointing out the ambiguity (Doppelsinn) in the term "sign" (Zeichen): "Every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has 'meaning', a 'sense' that the sign expresses [Jedes Zeichen .ist Zeichen für etwas, aber nicht jedes hat eine ''Bedeutung", einen. "Sinn ", der mit dem Zeichen "aus­gedrückt" .ist]" (Ll II, 269/30). Although all signs signify, in that every signifi.ed has been pointed to by a signifi.er, not all signifi.ers have a meaning, insofar as not all signs are "expressions" (in Husserlian terminology). Of course, to speak of the signi­fiélsignifiant oppositional couple is an anachronistic abuse on our part, for Ferdinand de Saussure's farnous Cours de lingu.istique générale was not published before 1916. Moreover, strictly speaking in Saussurean terms, that would be quite problematic. I shall return to this problematic later, since it pertains to much of the criticism di­rected against Husserl's theory of meaning. For now, one must bear in mind that Husserl's conception of language falls within what has been called a "traditional" view of language. According to this view, language is a mere vehicle for expressing and transrnitting a thought, which represents some independent reality. This tradi­tional view, which dates back to Aristotle, maintains that a rational correspondence between the essence of a thing and its thought, and the word referring to both, is what makes knowledge and language possible, as it follows:

reality (essence) - thought (concept) - language (word). '

The arder of "determination" is thus obtained as we move from reality to thought and language, while the arder of "reference" is to be dealt with in the oppo­site direction, as words refer to concepts and things. The traditional, metaphysical notion of "truth" is therefore logically irnplied by this view: truth is the correspon-

121

dence of ideas with reality, adequatio intellectus ad rem . The rational coherence of reality, thought, and language has become, in philosophical tradition, the task of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic, respectively. Following the revival of Kantian philosophy át the end of the nineteenth century, insoluble epistemological problems led some German philosophers of mathematics to tum to logic as a new kind of philosophia prima. And Frege was arnong those logicians whose contributions played a decisive role in the development of Husserl's theory of meaning. According to Frege, the meaning (Bedeutung) of a sentence or name is its reference, while the sense (Sinn) designates how the object referred to is actually thought of. This impor­tant distinction between "meaning" and "sense" was established in a seminal article by Frege, "Über Sinn und Bedeutung", first published in 1892.6 Because subtle dif­ferences between Frege's and Husserl's terminologies may lend to some misunder­standings, one must make clear the following correspondence: what Frege calls "Sinn" is narned "Bedeutung" by Husserl, while Frege's "Bedeutung" corresponds to Husserl's "Gegenstand." One of Frege's own examples can help us to illustrate this distinction: although the two expressions "the moming star" and "the evening star" have the sarne meaning (Bedeutung) for they reter to the sarne object, the planet Venus, they do not have the sarne sense (Sinn), in that they reter to Venus in differ­ent ways.7 For Husserl, however, no distinction is to be made between "Sinn" and "Bedeutung", as we read in the Logical Investigations,

"'Meaning' [Bedeutung] is further used by usas synonymous with 'sense' [Sinn]. It is agreeable to have parallel, interchangeable terms in the case of this concept, particu­larly since the sense [Sinn] of the term 'meaning' [Bedeutung] is itself to be investi­gated. A further consideration is our ingrained tendency to use the two words as syn­onymous, a circumstance which makes it seem rather a dubious step if their meanings are differentiated, and if (as G. Frege has proposed) we use one for meaning in our sense, and the other for objects expressed [für die ausgedrückten Gegenstande]. To this we may add that both terms are exposed to the sarne equivocations [Âquivoka­tionen], which we distinguished above in connection with the term 'expression' [bei der Rede vom Ausgedrücktsein]. and to many more besides, and that this is so in both scientific and in ordinary speech." (LI II, 292/58)

Even though it was Frege's antipsychologism which inspired much ·ot Husserl's phenomenological conception of a pure logic, we can see that Husserl's theory of meaning differs from Frege's precisely because of the former's understanding of psychological concepts such as consciousness and intentionality. The entire prob­lematic of constituting the object of thinking, and therefore what one refers to when speaking of something, is now to be exarnined in our study. Before we go on to consider what Husserl means by "Bedeutung" or "Sinn", we shall first try to ex­pound Husserl's conception of the "Gegenstand", that is, the object of reference of an expression. We have seen that Husserl starts the First Investigation with a re-

6 G. Frege, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kzitik, vol. 100 (1892), p . 25-50; ET: Peter Geach and Max Black, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), p. 56-78. G. Frege, op. cit., p. 58-62, 67 f.

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mark on the arnbiguous sense of the te the general characteristic of "expression stand for nothing, without expressing " tion" (Anzeichen), such as marks and "(t)o mean [Das Bedeuten] is not a pm indicating something". (LI II, 269) An · tung", it is bedeutungslos, in that it e Bedeutungsfunktion). It follows that exp from indicative signs (anzeigenden Zei samen) (LI II 275/37). Furthermore, an refers to certain objects (Gegenstiinde), (über Etwas) (LI II 287/52). And this is expressions narne their object(s). It is p tions that Husserl's theory of meaning associates the meaning (Sinn) of a propc and its reference (Bedeutung) is the tru tion means a Gedanke but refers to a Husserl illustrates this by pointing out such as "a is bigger than b" and "b if state of affairs, in that "the sarne 'matt asserted in two different ways." The p izes Husserl's analysis of meaning canrn ing of symbolic and linguistic functions, selves", to employ the evidence of fully words, and to reconstitute all meaning tion." For the main purpose of Husser the reconstitution of the essential con tungsintention) and meaning"fulfillment tive" and the "objective" are meaning "pure" experiences. I arn deliberately , the implicit move of "recovery" in Hus: uses the verbs auffassen ("construe", " cate") in an interpretive, illustrative sen: paper. The constitution of meaning, frrn cation, is itself reconstituted by Husser nology proper, of which the Logical Inv1 That is why Husserl concludes the Firs ideally unified meaning" (§§ 29-35). E science of theoretical unity", the natu meaning" and that is what makes knc ever, that heis not advocating the met< dil/Íne mind or in some topos ouranios,

8 Ibid., p. 61-64.

;us ad rem. The rational coherence of n philosophical tradition, the task of lvely. Following the reviva! of Kantian y, insoluble epistemological problems cs to tum to logic as a new kind bf those logicians whose contributions usserl's theory of meaning. According tce or narne is its reference, while the i to is actualiy thought of. This impor­e" was established in a seminal article ublished in 1892.6 Because subtle dif­oologies may lend to some misunder-1g correspondence: what Frege calls e Frege's "Bedeutung" corresponds to 3xarnples can help us to illustrate this 1 moming star" and "the evening star" r refer to the sarne object, the planet 1), in that they refer to Venus in differ­m is to be made between "Sinn" and gations,

ias synonymous with 'sense' [Sinn]. It is 3rrns in the case of this concept, particu­ming' [Bedeutung] is itself to be investi­id tendency to use the two words as syn­im rather a dubious step if their meanings roposed) we use one for meaning in our [für die ausgedrückten Gegenstande]. To ed to the sarne equivocations [Âquivoka­)nnection with the term 'expression' (hei v more besides, and that this is so in both 58)

Jism which inspired much of Husserl's :, we can see that Husserl's theory of use of the forrner's understanding of >S and intentionality. The entire prob­and therefore what one refers to when . 1ed in our study. Before we go on to g" or "Sinn", we shali first try to ex­md", that is, the object of reference of tarts the First Investigation with a re-

sebe Kzitik, vol. 100 (1892), p. 25-50; ET: Peter sophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (New York:

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mark on the arnbiguous sense of the term "Zeichen" : on the one hand, a sign has the general characteristic of "expression" (Ausdruck); on the other hand, a sign may stand for nothing, without expressing anything, being simply taken for an "indica­tion" (Anzeichen), such as marks and notes. And Husserl proceeds to assert that "(t)o mean [Das Bedeuten) is not a particular way of being a sign in the sense of indicating something" . (LI II, 269) An indicative sign is thus deprived of "Bedeu­tung'', it is bedeutungslos, in that it does not fulfill a "significant function" (eine Bedeutungsfunktion). It follows that expressions (Ausdrücke) are to be distinguished from indicative signs (anzeigenden Zeichen) in that they are meaningful (bedeut­samen) (LI II 275/37). Furtherrnore, an expression not only has a meaning but it refers to certain objects (Gegenstande), that is, every expression is about something (über Etwas) (LI II 287/52). And this is not always a relation of narning, for not ali expressions narne their object(s). It is precisely at this level of reference of proposi­tions that Husserl's theory of meaning marks itself off from Frege's. Whereas Frege associates the meaning (Sinn) of a proposition with the thought (Gedanke) expressed and its reference (Bedeutung) is the truth-value (Wahrheitswert),ª Husserl's proposi­tion means a Gedanke but refers to a Sachverhalt, "state of affairs" (LI II 288/53). Husserl illustrates this by pointing out that two sentences saying different things such as "a is bigger than b" and "b is smalier than a" express, in fact, the sarne state of affairs, in that "the sarne 'matter' [Sache) is predicatively apprehended and asserted in two different ways." The phenomenological approach which character­izes Husserl's analysis of meaning cannot thus be content with a simple understand­ing of symbolic and linguistic functions, but it seeks to go back to the "things them­selves", to employ the evidence of fully developed intuitions, truly symbolized by the words, and to reconstitute ali meaning by deterrnining their "irrevocable identifica­tion." For the main purpose of Husserl's "phenomenology of knowledge" remains the reconstitution of the essential connection between meaning-intention (Bedeu­tungsintention) and meaning-fulfillment (Bedeutungserfüllung), i.e. how the "subjec­tive" and the "objective" are meaningfully articulated in the essence-structure of "pure" experiences. I arn deliberately using the verb "re-constitute" to emphasize the implicit move of "recovery" in Husserl's theory of meaning, especialiy when he uses the verbs auffassen ("construe", "apprehend") and auslegen ("lay out", "expli­cate") in an interpretive, illustrative sense which we hope to explore throughout this paper. The constitution of meaning, from its founding intention to its fulfilled signifi­cation, is itself reconstituted by Husserl's methodological Einfahrung into phenome­nology proper, of which the Logical Investigations constitutes the ideal propadeutics . That is why Husserl concludes the First Investigation with the logical thesis of "the idealiy unified meaning" (§§ 29-35). Because logic has been established as "the science of theoretical unity", the nature of ali given theoretical unity is "unity of meaning" and that is what makes knowledge possible. Husserl makes clear, how­ever, that heis not advocating the metaphysical existence of "universal objects" in a divine mind or in some topos ouranios, but he is radically seeking to overcome both

B Jbid., p. 61-64.

123

idealism and realism by displacing the center of the epistemological debate, away from its actual reference toward the very correlation of meaning between the "know­ing" subject and the object to be "known."

Objectivity and Meaning

ln the next three Investigations, Husserl develops some of the guiding ideas that have been introduced in the First Investigation, in connection with the essen­tial distinction between "Bedeutung" and "Gegenstand". "Everything that is logi­cal", says Husserl, "falls under the two correlated categortes of meaning [Bedeu­tung] and object [Gegenstand]" (LI II, 325/101). Objectivity (Gegenstiindlichkeit) is determined by the logical laws of meaning, "which consider meanings in respect of their having or not having objects". As an object, "the parallelogram of forces" results from the apprehension of an "ideal meaning", while "the city of Paris" is a "real object" of sensory or imaginary perception. But both require for their "being known" a correlative kind of apprehension (Auffassung) . Therefore, Husserl is no longer prtmartly concerned about the "reality" of the object and its "existence", but heis affirming that only an "objectifying act" gives us an "object" through its "presentation" (if it is actually there) or through its "representation" (if it is not there, but is, for instance, imagined or thought) . That means that we may as well be dealing with purely imaginary objects, objects which are "merely thought." Meaning is given thus in the very signifying intention toward an object:

"If we seek a foothold in pure description, the concrete phenomenon of the sense-informed expression breaks up, on the one hand, into the physical phenomenon forming the physical side of the expression, and, on the other hand, into the acts [Akte] which give it meaning [Bedeutung] and possibly also intuitive fulness [anschau­liche Fülle], in which its relation to an expressed object is constituted [eine aus­gedrückte Gegenstiindlichkeit konstituiert]. ln virtue of such acts, the expression is more than a merely sounded word. It means something [Er meint etwas], and in so far as it means something, it relates to what is objective [GegenstiindlichesJ . This objec­tive somewhat can either be actually present [gegenwartig] through accompanying in­tuitions, or may at least appear in representation [vergegenwiírtigt], e.g. in a mental image [im Phantasiebilde], and where this happens the relation to an object is real­ized." (LI II, 280/44)

Brentano's notion of intentionality in the constitution of mental acts, i.e. the fact that ali consciousness is consciousness of something, is crttically discussed in the Fifth Investigation ("On Intentional Expertences and their 'Contents"'). It is only then that the difference between an "intuitive act" (which reaches its object) and a "sig­nifying act" (which simply aims at it), an essential difference which underlies his entire conception of "fullness" (Fülle) in the (re)constitution of meaning, is phe­nomenologically articulated. Because consciousness is always intentionality, the difference between "pure thought" and "contact with reality" does not lie in the object, but in its mode of giveness, in its mode of being expertenced. Knowledge appears then as the confirrnation by intuition of what was meant in the unfulfilled, signifying intention, in that the "emptinesS" of signifying acts is finally fulfilled by

124

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the "fullness" of intuitive acts. Such is iJ vestigation, "Elements of a Phenomenc though I cannot deal here with Husserl's ply trted to indicate its correlative signi Husserl's phenomenology must always 1 correlated parts inforrn and support eaci ortginally meant to get Iid of "presuppo: the Logical Investigations cannot be fully developments in Husserl's Ideas. As thE (Die ideale Einheit der Spezies und die n notion of "ideality" is to be now extensiv1 the ideality of meaning is bound up wit with "the ideal unities that we here call ' knowledge, in general, and for scientific and "objective meaning" are made poSSi not thus reside in a subjective experteno "Idea": in Husserl's own illustrative worc house, but Red as such" (LI II, 340). Thi! unity is an act "founded" (ein fundiertet gen) of the object, i.e. on oertain aspec subject: "a new mode of apprehension h of the individual house or of its red asp weise] constitutive of the intuitive prese Gegebenheit der Idee Rot konstitutiv ft "meaning" without the givenness of th1 correlative to intuitive acts, which poi (Gegenwarti.gung, "presentation") or by gung, "re-presentation") (§§ 25-30). SincE tion", insofar as it gives us being in per tween "intuition" and "re-presentation", we must find one of the conceptual clue word "meaning" (Sinn!Bedeutung) .

Following Brentano's theory of intE dence of intentional acts and represen1 only gains objective reference by incorp in itself, through which the object is J

gewinnt überhaupt seine Beziehung au ihm ein Akterlebnis des Vorstellens p vorstellig macht]" (LI II, 598/443). We r cism of the theories of abstraction that and Mill, in the Second Investigation, r• tiooal conception of representation as mere "substitution" (§§ 24-31). As over crtticizes the Ianguage of cause-and-ef

!r of the epistemological debate, away ~lation of meaning between the "know-

d develops some of the guiding ideas jgation, in connection with the essen­'Jegenstand" . "Everything that is logi­:elated categories of meaning [Bedeu­n). Objectivity (Gegenstandlichkeit) is "which consider meanings in respect

n object, "the parallelogram of forces" ieaning", while "the city of Paris" is a 1tion. But both require for their "being (Auffassung). Therefore, Husserl is no ty" of the object and its "existence'', J act" gives us an "object" through its mugh its "representation" (if it is not ght). That means that we may as well objects which are "merely thought." intention toward an object:

•tion, the concrete phenomenon of the e one hand, into the physical phenomenon n, and, on the other hand, into the acts nd possibly also intuitive tulness [anschau­xpressed object is constituted [eine aus­In virtue of such acts, the expression is ~ something [Er meint etwas], and in so far 1 objective [Gegenstandliches]. This objec­tt [gegenwartig] through accompanying in-1tation [vergegenwartigt], e.g. in a mental happens the relation to an object is real-

constitution of mental acts, i.e. the fact omething, is critically discussed in the :es and their 'Contents'"). lt is only then n (which reaches its object) and a "sig­issential difference which underlies his te (re)constitution of meaning, is phe­:iousness is always intentionality, the 1ntact with reality" does not lie in the node of being experienced. Knowledge n of what was meant in the unfu1filled, · of signifying acts is finally fulfilled by

t

the "fullness" of intuitive acts. Such is indeed the pervasive theme of the Sixth In­vestigation, "Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge". Even though 1 cannot deal here with Husserl's meticulous theory of intuition, I have sirn­ply tried to indicate its correlative significance for his theory of meaning. ln fact, Husserl's phenomenology must always be taken as a whole, as a complex whose correlated parts inforrn and support each other. Precisely because phenomenology originally meant to get rid of "presuppositions", some of the main groundmotifs of the Logical Investigations cannot be fully understood until we take into account their developments in Husserl's Ideas. As the title of his Second Investigation indicates (Die ideale Einheit der Spezies und die neueren Abstraktionstheorien), Husserl's key notion of "ideality" is to be now extensively expounded. 1 have suggested above that the ideality of meaning is bound up with the fact that pure logic deals exclusively with "the ideal unities that we here call 'meanings'" (Ll II, 322). Such is the basis for knowledge, in general, and for scientific expressions in particular, in that objectivity and "objective meaning" are made possible. The essence (Wesen) of meaning can­not thus reside in a subjective experience, but must be found in its "content", in its "Idea": in Husserl's own illustrative words, "we mean, not this aspect of red in the house, but Redas such" (LI II, 340). This act of meaning as an identical, intentional unity is an act "founded" (ein fundiertes) on underlying apprehensions (Auffassun­gen) of the object, i.e. on certain aspects of this object "meant" by the knowing subject: "a new mode of apprehension has been built on the intuition [Anschauung] of the individual house or of its red aspect, a mode of apprehension [Auffassungs­weise] constitutive of the intuitive presence of the Idea of Red [die für die intuitive Gegebenheit der Idee Rot konstitutiv ist]" (LI Il, 340/114). We cannot thus have "meaning" without the givenness of the object itself; moreover, this givenness is correlative to intuitive acts, which possess its object, whether by "perception" (Gegenwamgung, "presentation") or by memory and irnagination (Vergegenwarti­gung, "re-presentation") (§§ 25-30). Since perception is, for Husserl, a "primary intui­tion", insofar as it gives us being in persona, it is in this correlative opposition be­tween "intuition" and "re-presentation", but especially in (re)presentation itself that we must find one of the conceptual clues to the arnbiguous sense he assigns to the word "meaning" (Sinn!Bedeutung).

Following Brentano's theory of intentionality, Husserl affirms the interdepen­dence of intentional acts and representations, in that "an intentional experience only gains objective reference by incorporating an experienced act of presentation in itself, through which the object is presented to it [Ein intentionales Erlebnis gewinnt überhaupt seine Beziehung auf ein Gegenstandliches nur dadurch, da in ihm ein Akterlebnis des Vorstellens prasent ist, welches ihm den Gegenstand vorstellig macht]" (LI Il, 598/443). We must recall that Husserl's systematic criti­cism of the theories of abstraction that were proposed by Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill, in the Second Investigation, reaches a climax in his attack on .the tradi­tional conception of representation as "a device for economizing thought" or as mere "substitution" (§§ 24-31). As over against idealism and empiricism, Husserl criticizes the language of cause-and-effect which characterizes those theories of

125

thinking, and proposes the psychological explanation which takes into account the intentional nature of consciousness. Furthermore, Husserl maintains that we intend or mean a "generality", in a part-whole correlation of meaning which ulti­mately discloses a unity of fulfilment. He finally denounces the nominalist ten­dency to confuse generality with the representative function of an image or name. For Husserl, meaning is thus bound with intentionality and its fulfilment as ex­pression: expressions as such are constituted by their meaning. As he says in the First Investigation,

"The new concept of meaning therefore originates in a confusion of meaning with fu 1-filling intuition. On this conception, an expression has meaning if and only if its inten­tion - we should say its 'meaning-intention' - is in fact fulfilled, even if only in a par­tia!, distant and improper manner. The unde rstanding of the expression must be given life through certain 'ideas of meaning' (it is commonly said), i.e. by certain illustrative images." (LI II, 295)

An essential distinction is thus upheld between intuition and meaning: as Lévi­nas puts it, "(m)eanings aim at their objects; intuition, and in particular perception, reaches them" .9 It follows that "representation", as opposed to the "direct presenta­tion" of perception, implies different modes of apprehension in the objectifying act. Of course, the use of three different words in Gerrnan (Vorstellung, Reprasentation, and Vergegenwarti.gung) rnight serve to indicate the psychological nuance of their semantic trope, in connection with the theory of intuition. However, Husserl's theory of meaning turns out to emphasize an equivoca!, albeit significant continuity be­tween these words, as we shall see in the next section. It is interesting to note here that Husserl focuses on the arnbiguity of the terrn "Vorstellung", as he sums up some of its different connotations:

1. Presentation [Vorstellung] as act-material [Aktmaterie] or matter, which can be readily completed into: Presentation as the representation [Reprasentation] underlying the act, i.e. the full content of the act exclusive of quality;

2. Presentation as "mere representation", as qualitative modification of any form of belief, e.g. as mere understanding of propositions;

3. Presentation as nominal act, i.e. in the sense of an act-class necessarily repre­sented in every complete act since every "matter" [Materie] (or "representa­tion") must be given primarily as the matter of such an act;

4. Presentation is often opposed to mere thinking. The sarne difference is also operative that we also call the difference between intuition [Anschauung] and concept [Begrift] . To present something to oneself means therefore to achieve a corresponding intuition of what one merely thought of or what one meant [bedeutet] but only at best very inadequately intuited [veranschaulicht];

5. A very common concept of presentation concerns the opposition of imagina­tion [Imagination] to perception [Wahmehmung] .

Emmanuel Lévinas, The Theozy of Intuition in Eusserl's Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern, 1973), p. 73.

126

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Husserl goes on to include in this II, 652-659/520-529). What is of utmos1 that "an act of presentation is as s distinction between a presentation phenomenologically drawn." It is prec we must tum now, as we explore the n

The Meaning of Meaning

ln the previous sections I attem Bedeutung and Gegenstand in the theory of meaning would be incomple Ideas I. As Paul Ricoeur observed in Ideen I, Husserl's masterpiece opens which paradoxically presupposes the tions:

"If phenomenology is to be 'presupI logical framework? Initially it is imp would be just the law of the spiritua tempt to grasp. This law is at firs through a spiral motion it changes le emerges as primary and without pn movement is phenomenology in a pc it. ,,10

Although Ricoeur's "deepening", 1 be dismissed as an "apologetic" one -"faithful" disciple of Husserl -, the "p mains far from being decided. I am ce1 reason, the phenomenological moverr Husserl's liberation from psychologism ing found a "presuppositionless" Archi calness of Ricoeur's herrneneutical cr that this kind of critique is not radical 1

"transcendental", in that it simply assl de facto and de jure. After ali, Ricoeur claims of his own project, when he dE Although I do not intend to re-exami prochement between Husserl and Kan that "Husserl did phenomenology, but

1~ · Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His PI 1

Cf. P. Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical InteJpret inteJprétations (Paris: Seuil, 1969), p. 403.

12 P. Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Ph€ article, "Kant et Husserl", appeared in Ka

:planation which takes into account hermore, Husserl maintains that we le correlation of meaning which ulti­aally denounces the nominalist ten~ 1tative function of an image or name. tentionality and its fulfilment as ex­, by their meaning. As he says in the

iates in a confusion of meaning with tu 1-;sion has meaning if and only if its inte n­- is in fact fulfilled, even if only in a par­standing of the expression must be given 'omrnonly said), i.e. by certain illustrative

tween intuition and meaning: as Lévi­intuition, and in particular perception, ", as opposed to the "direct presenta­r apprehension in the objectifying act. Gerrnan (Vorstellung, Reprasent:ation,

.:ate the psychological nuance of their of intuition. However, Husserl's theory mcal, albeit significant continuity be­ct section. It is interesting to note here e terrn "Vorstellung", as he surns up

al [Aktmaten'e] or matter, which can as the representation [Reprasent:ation] f the act exclusive of quality; IS qualitative modification of any form >ropositions; ense of an act-class necessarily repre­ry "matter" [Maten'e] (or "representa­tter of such an act; thinking. The sarne difference is also ~ between intuition [Anschauung] and to oneself means therefore to achieve

.nerely thought of or what one meant ately intuited [veranschaulicht]; n concems the opposition of imagina­ihmung].

;erl 's Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestem,

•.. . )

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Husserl goes on to include in this list the "content" itself of "Vorstellungen" (LI II, 652-659/520-529). What is of utmost irnportance for our study is Husserl's remark that "an act of presentation is as such directely intuited, precisely where this distinction between a presentation and a presentation of this presentation is phenomenologically drawn." It is precisely to this Vorstellung der Vorstellung that we must tum now, as we explore the meanirlg of meaning in Husserl's Ideas I.

The Meaning of Meaning

ln the previous sections I attempted to understand how Husserl articulates Bedeutung and Gegenst:and in the Logical Investigations, suggesting that his theory of meaning would be incomplete without the clarifications furnished by the Ideas I. As Paul Ricoeur observed in the preface to his French translation of the Ideen I, Husserl's masterpiece opens with an extremely difficult chapter on logic which paradoxically presupposes the pre-understanding of his Logical Investiga­tions:

"If phenomenology is to be 'presuppositionless', in what sense does it presuppose a logical framework? Initially it is impossible to answer this question, for the response would be just the law of the spiritual movement of Ideas I which we are going to at­tempt to grasp. This law is at first supported by a logic and a psychology, then through a spiral motion it changes leve!, is freed from these initial supports, and finally emerges as primary and without presuppositions. Only at the end of this deepening movement is phenomenology in a position to found the science which at first elicited it. .10

Although Ricoeur's "deepenirlg", herrneneutical reading of Husserl should never be dismissed as an "apologetic" one - even though Ricoeur may be regarded as a "faithful" disciple of Husserl -, the "presuppositionlessness" of phenomenology re­mains far from being decided. Iam certainly not suggesting that Ricoeur (or, for that reason, the phenomenological movement in France) would ever be satisfied with Husserl's liberation from psychologism and logicism, as a decisive evidence of hav­ing found a "presuppositionless" Archimedean point. Nor am I questionirlg the radi­calness of Ricoeur's herrneneutical critique of the "transcendental". I simply think that this kind of critique is not radical enough, in that it tums out to think itself to be "transcendental", in that it simply assumes too much - or at least more than it can, de facto and de jure. After all, Ricoeur himself seems to betray the "transcendental" clairns of his own project, when he describes it as a post-Hegelian retum to Kant.11

Although I do not intend to re-examine Ricoeur's hermeneutical critique, his rap­prochement between Husserl and Kant is vey instructive, especially as it concludes that "Husserl did phenomenology, but Kant limited and founded it".12 My point here

10

11 Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis o! His Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestem, 1967), p. 15. Cf. P. Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical InteIJJretation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), p. 3; Le conflit des

12 interprétations (Paris: Seuil, 1969), p. 403. P. Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis o! His Phenomenology, op. cit., p. 201. The original version of this article, "Kant et Husserl", appeared in Kantstudien XLVI (1954). Cf. for an exhaustive study Isa

127

is that Ricoeur succeeds in showing that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology moves away from the ontological ground of Kant's critique towards the constitutive problem of subjective life, and yet he fails to account for the very "foundation laying" (Grundlegung) which allows for the articulation of the limiting function with the self­determination of the in-itself as freedom in the practical use of reason. ln effect, it would be orily in light of Husserl's shift from the "world of things" towards the "life­world", and the transitions from his static phenomenology towards genetic and generative phenomenologies in the later writings, that one can fully undertake the task of a transcendental phenomenology of meaning, particularly for the social sci­ences.13

The essence (Wesen) of phenomenology, its peculiar characteristic as founda­tional, pure science, consists in its radical opposition to what Husserl calls "the natural attitude". As opposed to our naive belief in the world, which we often take for granted in our natural, dogmatic attitude, Husserl challenges us to suspend, to bracket, such an ensemble of doxai we call "world", in arder to become conscious of this very "world" we have constituted as unity of meaning and of our being-in­the-world which conditions this constituting. Phenomenology as we find in Hus­serl's Ideas I may be fairly described as an invitation to see what has been given to us in the constitution of the world and the meaning of this givenness (Gegebe­nheit). "Seeing" must be understood in its most phenomenological sense, the "bringing into light" and "making to appear" (phainesthai) of the phenomena, which Heidegger so neatly explores in § 7 of Sein und Zeit ("Die plianomenolo­gische Methode der Untersuchung"). I remark in passing that Heidegger's "onto­logical investigation" essentially differs from Husserl's "logical investigation" pre­cisely because of the "transcendental" claims of the latter. 14 For the logos Heideg­ger is seeking after is the primordial "gathering" which has been forgotten and eclipsed by the metaphysical eidos of transcendental participation. Husserl's "Pla­tonism", his pedagogy of liberation from doxa to epistémé, even in its subtlest attacks upon realism and idealism, seems to pervade his phenomenology of seeing as a tacit longing for the parousia of the Other. ln effect, Husserl's philosophy gradually moves away from an ideal, transcendental logic towards the intersubjec­tivity of a transcendental, linguistic community. The "transcendental conscious­ness", which appears in between, serves to confirm the "central" place accorded to the Ideas I in the opera husserliana.

Indeed, what we find in the Ideas I is both a description of "pure phenome­nology" and the transcendental propadeutic which introduces us to it, i.e. a "phe­nomenological philosophy" . Therefore, the title of Husserl's magnum opus at once

Kern, Kant und Husserl. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhii.Jtnis zu Kant und Neukantianismus (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964). 13 Cf. the excellent study by Anthony Steinbock, Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology a/ter Husserl (Evanston, Ili.: Northwestern, 1995); 1 alluded to some of Steinbock's guiding theses in my Tractatus ethico-politicus (Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 1999), p. 189-211.

14 Cf. Ernildo J. Stein, Seminário sobre a Verdade (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1993), p. 146-180; 218-256; Zeljko Loparic, "O Ponto Cego do Olhar Fenomenológico;', O que nos faz pensar 10/1 (1996): p. 127-149.

128

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indicates and means what must be 1 Phanomenologie und phanomenologi cerned about the role and place of c The Cartesian cogito is no longer reif tans to the res extensa, but it gives (Bewusstseinsstrom) uniting each dist 34-37). 15 The transcendental spiral of ideal of a Wissenschaftslehre in the drawn against the contrasting backgi alism. Following Kant, Husserl seeks gives or contacts an "object" (Gegem stituting/ constituted experience of C·

constitution of meaning, appears thm §§ 34ff., 76ff., 136ff.). Furthermore, t phenomenological attitude as meanin gest, as John Caputo has shown, t hermeneutics":

"A 'hermeneutic' because it shows b ence by means of certain anticipaton its course, which gives us a rea< hermeneutics' because in the end it covery."16

ln his complex analysis of the Erl jects of a "pure phenomenology", Hus eidetic doctrine of transcendentally p1 nomenological attitude [eine deskrip Erlebnisse in der phanomenologische1 the epoché, i.e. the suspension of the 1

attains by reflection a "region" whicl region of the "pure consciousness" -scendental constitution" of meaning. ' mark by Husserl, in his "General lntrod'

"Concerning our terminology we ma~ in the epistemological problematic, jt which we shall have so much to say tion by which it is reached the transe be divided into different steps of 'e> will assume the characteristic of a sti most occasions, speak of phenomer their collective unity, we shall speak

16 Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology a (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983); hereafter abbr. !. 16 John D. Caputo, Radical Henneneutics (Bloo

serl's transcendental phenomenology mt's critique towards the constitutive count for the very "foundation laying" of the limiting function with the self-.

e practical use of reason. ln effect, it te "world of things" towards the "life-1henomenology towards genetic and igs, that one can fully undertake the eaning, particularly for the social sei-

its peculiar characteristic as founda­pposition to what Husserl calls "the ief in the world, which we often take Husserl challenges us to suspend, to Norld'', in order to become conscious 1nity of meaning and of our being-in-Phenomenology as we find in Hus-

1vitation to see what has been given meaning of this givenness ( Gegebe­most phenomenological sense, the

tr" (phainesthai) of the phenomena, )f Sein und Zeit ("Die phanomenolo­k in passing that Heidegger's "onto­Husserl's "logical investigation" pre­: of the latter.14 For the logos Heideg­ring" which has been forgotten and mdental participation. Husserl's "Pla-1xa to epistémé, even in its subtlest Jervade his phenomenology of seeing )ther. ln effect, Husserl's philosophy idental logic towards the intersubjec­nity. The "transcendental conscious­confirm the "central" place accorded

1oth a description of "pure phenome­which introduces us to it, i.e. a "phe­,le of Husserl's magnum opus at once

sserls Verhiiltnis zu Kant und Neukantianismus

~ and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology alter d to some of Steinbock's guiding theses in my l999), p. 189-211. ipolis: Vozes, 1993), p. 146-180; 218-256; Zeljko ') que nos faz pensar 10/1 (1996): p. 127-149.

indicates and means what must be the_ Sache of the book: Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie. Husserl is above a1l con­cerned about the role and place of consciousness in our experience of cognition. The Cartesian cogito is no longer reified in the dichotomist opposition of res cogi­tans to the res extensa, but it gives way instead to the stream of consciousness (Bewusstseinsstrom) uniting each distinct cogitatio to a distinct cogitatum (I §§ 28, 34-37).15 The transcendental spiral of Husserl's epistemology, predelineated in his ideal of a Wissenschaftslehre in the Logical Investigations, is now more sharply drawn against the contrasting backgrounds provided by both naturalism and ide­alism. Following Kant, Husserl seeks to know how experience as consciousness gives or contacts an "object" (Gegenstand). The meaning (Bedeutung) of this con­stituting/ constituted experience of consciousness vis-à-vis an object, that is, the constitution of meaning, appears thus as one of the major themes of the Ideas I (I §§ 34ff., 76ff., 136ff.). Furthermore, the very modifications brought about by the phenomenological attitude as meaningful descriptions of experience strongly sug­gest, as John Caputo has shown, that we find in Husserl. a veritable "proto­hermeneutics":

"A 'hermeneutic' because it shows how we make our way through the flow of experi­ence by means of certain anticipatory cuts which adumbrate its structure and predicts its course, which gives us a reading or interpretation of things; but a 'proto­hermeneutics' because in the end it backs off from the full implications of its own dis­covery. "16

ln his complex analysis of the Erlebnis, which constitutes one of the main ob­jects of a "pure phenomenology", Husserl defiries phenomenology as "a descriptive eidetic doctrine of transcendentally pure mental processes as viewed in the phe­nomenological attitude [eine deskriptive Wesenslehre der transzendental reinen Erlebnisse in der phanomenologischen Einstellung)" (I 167/171). It is only through the epoché, i.e. the suspension of the natural thesis of the world, that consciousness attains by reflection a "region" which transcends nature - the phenomenological region of the "pure consciousness" - and operates what may be called its "tran­scendental constitution" of meaning. This is summarized in a highly revealing re­mark by Husserl, in his "General lntroduction to Fure Phenomenology":

"Concerning our terminology we may add the following. Important motives, grounded in the epistemological problematic, justify our designating 'pure' consciousness, about which we shall have so much to say, as transcendental consciousness and the opera­tion by which it is reached the transcendental epoché. As a method this operation will be divided into different steps of 'excluding', 'parenthesizing'; and thus our method will assume the characteristic of a step-by-step reduction. For this reason we shall, on most occasions, speak of phenomenological reductions (but also, with reference to their collective unity, we shall speak of the phenomenological reduction) and, accord-,

15 Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenologícal Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten

16 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983); hereafter abbr. I. The German edition is that of the Husserliana, III. John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 38.

129

ing!y, from an epistemological point of view, we shall refer to transcendental reduc­tions. It should be added that these terrns and a1l others must be understood exclu­sively in the senses that our expositions prescribe for them and not in any others which history or the terminological habits of the reader may suggest." (I 66)

Husseri's remarks on terminology often reveal, as in the quotation above, his proto-hermeneutic preoccupation with possible rnisunderstandings on the part of his readers, due to a certain pre-understanding of the matter presented. The interde­pendence of representation, historicity, and understanding is not explicitly articu­lated by Husserl, but is remarkably predelineated in his phenomenological project. ln point of fact, the above confession of the father of phenomenology betrays, at once, the circularity and prolific effectiveness of Husserl's transcendental logos. On the one hand, the innumerable detours and contours of the Husserlian spiralling appear to transcend the traditional delineations of lirniting concepts in philosophy, in that his analyses seem to go deeper, as it were, into the essential Sache of meant ob­jects. For meaning is, in effect, the signifying, interpretative fulfillrnent of positing objects as posited (I §§ 131-134). However, the meaning of the "is" never is com­pletely made explicit by Husserl. ln particular, his inarticulate correlation of being and intuition - almost exclusively articulated as (re)presentation, thence the circular­ity - has to a large extent tilled the soil for the gerrnination of Heidegger's funda­mental ontology and post-Heideggerian hermeneutics. On the other hand, the onto­logical neutralization irnplied by this circularity cannot inhibit the gen:esis of sense, for, as Caputo points out, "(t)he very project of neutralization proceeds from an on­tology of consciousness as self-neutralizing. "11 The proliferation of hermeneutic pro­jects and pro-grarnmes after Husserl, including the retroactive effects of his own deconstruction, are there to prove it. What is at stake, in the ultimate analysis, is "presence" and its "transcendental" place in Husserl's theory of meaning, as we are dealing with a particular problematic which has underlined this entire paper: if meaning is omnipresent, what is the place of such a "(re)presentation" as omni­presence? This is certainly what might be termed the displacement (Entstellung) of the representation (Vorstellung), namely, the transcendental move which keeps placing it-self always "before" (vor) the placing (stellen) of an undecided self. That is why we have found the meaning of meaning, according to the topography of Ideas I, in the "transcendental" (dis)placing of the (re)presentation. And this is a constitutive matter of principle (arché), in fact, the "principle of principles":

"(T)hat every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what is presented as being, but also only within the !imits in which it is presented there." (I 44/52)

The self-givenness of being (als was es sich gibt) is itself expressed in terms of a "transcendental as", a correlation of meaning between the essentia of what is given (Was) and its realitas . that is (Da) the intrinsic possibilitas of the giving itself. Such is the Husserlian meaning of meaning: this "transcendental" movement from

17 . J. Caputo, op. cit., p. 54.

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Between Eidos and Logos:

I shall close this brief study of H tions with a few remarks concerning to be the problematic par excellence i I have indicated throughout this 1

linguistically expressed in terms of a " toward its logical fulfilment. The idea by Husserl in his intriguing study e

French and critically analyzed by Der original meaning of geometry contim this selfsame meaning throughout hif "unity" of meaning associated with ti we call "geometry" .18 The constitu therefore, a "transcendental" ideality'

We have already seen that HussE pression of psychologism or metaphy lirniting concept, correlative to the Ide indicated that, in the Logical Investig with the self-constitution of ideal objE constituted (cf. LI II 248f-256). Derrida l "constituted language" so as to highligl

"To constitute an ideal object is to p1 Now, before being the constituted a toward the truth of sense, linguistic ü tles as what is sedimented or deposit1

18 J. Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Qe, 1989), p .160 f. The original French edition ca

19 Ibid., p. 78.

we shall refer to transcendental reduc­~d all others must be understood exclu­escribe for them and not in any others he reader may suggest." (1 66)

eveal, as in the quotation above, bis 3 mísunderstandings on the part of his )f the matter presented. The interde­mderstanding is not explicitly articu­ed in his phenomenological project. ln 3r of phenomenology betrays, at once, usserl's transcendent.al logos. On the urs of the Husserlian spiralling appear niting concepts in philosophy, in that into the essential Sache of meant ob­J, interpretative fulfillment of positing he meaning of the "is" never is com­!I, his inarticulate correlation of being is (re)presentation, thence the circular­;he gerrnination of Heidegger's funda-3neutics. On the other hand, the onto­Y cannot inhi!)it the gertesis of sense, of neutralization proceeds from an on­, The proliferation of hermeneutic pro­ing the retroactive effects of his own s at stake, in the ultimate analysis, is ~usserl's theory of meaning, as we are 1 has underlined this entire paper: if of such a "(re)presentation" as omni­aned the displacement (Ent.stellung) of e transcendental move which keeps g (Stellen) of an undecided self. That is according to the topography of Ideas I, presentation. And this is a constitutive 1le of principles" :

is a legitimizing source of cognition, that :sonar actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' id as being, but also only within the limits

sich gibt) is itself expressed in terms of ni.ng between the essentia of what is ntrinsic possibilitas of the giving itself. this "transcendental" movement from

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the ideal Sinn/Bedeutung to its real Erfüllung/Bedeutung. Although I have not dealt with the technicalities of Husserl's "noetic-noematic" correlation of meaning, its essential meaning lies precisely in this irnplicit move of signification, from a pre­linguistic Sinn towards its signifying logos {I §§ 124-127): The ideal sense, as a void, an absence, demands to be fulfilled so as to express what the sign stands for. Of course, as we have seen in the previous sections, not every sign has a "meaning" . I have highlighted this double function of the "as" in arder to indicate the transcen­dental placing of Bedeutung between its original sense {Sinn) as given presentation of the Gegenst;and and its teleological fulfilment {Erfüllung) as {re)presentation of givenness. It is precisely at this level of transcendental "between-ness" that I shall attempt to conclude, by retuming to the problematic of origin (arché) and end (telos) of the world qua structure, genesis and horizon of meaning.

Between Eidos and Logos: Displacement of the Critique

I shall close this brief study of Husserl's theory of meaning in the Investiga­tions with a few remarks concerning this problematic of origins, which turns out to be the problematic par excellence in the critique of transcendental analyses . As I have indicated throughout this article, the meaning of meaning can be linguistically expressed in terms of a "transcendental" move from an original sense toward its logical fulfilrnent. The idea of an "original meaning" is largely developed by Husserl in his intriguing study on the Ori.gin of Geometry, translated into French and critically analyzed by Derrida. According to Husserl, the fact that the original meaning of geometry continues to be valid hic et nunc, preserving thus this selfsame meaning throughout history, indicates that there must be a certain "unity" of meaning associated with this "ideal object" (ideale Gegenstandlichkeit) we call "geometry" .1ª The constitution of the geometrical tradition irnplies, therefore, a "transcendental" ideality vis-à-vis its own history.

We have already seen that Husserl's "ideality" cannot be mistaken as an ex­pression of psychologism or metaphysical idealism, but should be regarded as a lirniting concept, correlative to the Idee "in the Kantian sense" (I 166f.). I have also indicated that, in the Logical Investigations, the ideality of meaning is bound up with the self-constitution of ideal objects, as opposed to language which is itself constituted {cf. LI II 248f-256). Derrida points out that, in the Origin, Husserl brackets "constituted language" soas to highlight the "originality of constitutive language":

"To constitute an ideal object is to put it at the permanent disposition of a pure gaze. Now, before being the constituted and exceeded auxiliary of an act which proceeds toward the truth of sense, linguistic ideality is the milieu in which the ideal object set­tles as what is sedimented or deposited. "19

18 J. Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (University of Nebraska Press,

19 1989), p.160 f. The original French edition carne out in 1962. lbid., p. 78.

131

It is thus through language and within language alone that history reveals and makes possible the very "handing down" and "sedimentation" of its objective his­toricity (Geschichtlichkeit). Tradition and language imply together the ideality of meaning which leads Husserl to define history as "the vital movement of the coexis­tence and the interweaving of original formations and sedimentations of meaning".20

There is, therefore, a transcendental movement from an original meaning toward its historically constituted sedimentations, a movement which presents itself as consti­tutive of history and historical meaning. The question that arises now concerns not as much the movement itself, between arché and telas, as the ultimacy of such a transcendental referring. In other words, what is the "absolute" signified/signifier after all? Caputo has shown that "what is ultimately and truly absolute" (I 193) in Husserl's theory of constitution is nothing other than "the time-flow itself, the abso­lute strearning of the stream, the flux (Fluss) itself', under!ying all the acumulations of unities of meaning (including the transcendental ego) and maintaining the pri­mordial absolute of temporality in time-consciousness (I 194-196).21 Derrida points out that the intemal time-consciousness is itself what makes history possible by its implicit dialectic of protention and retention: "In the movement of protention, the present is retained and gone beyond as past present, in order to constitute another primordial and original Absolute, another Living Present. "22 It is in this very lebendig gegenwartig that Derrida discems what he calls "the ultimate form of ideality", the phenomenological incarnation of the metaphysics of presence:

"La forme ultime de J'idéalité, celle dans laquelle en demiêre instance on peut antici­per ou rappeler toute répétition, J'idéalité de J'idéalité est le présent vivant, la présence à soi de la vie transcendantale. La présence a toujours été et sera toujours, à J'infini, la forme dans laquelle, on peut le dire apodictiquement, se produira la diversité infinie des contenus." (VP 4f.)

Derrida goes on to affirm that this ultimacy of presence has, after all, dominated the problematic of metaphysical foundations since the foundation of metaphysics by the Greek opposition between "matter" and "form". The radicalness of such a prob­lematic - the foundation of the foundation - certainly reveals Derrida's indebtedness to bis great maitre à penser Martin Heidegger, whose hermeneutic reading of Kant's Kritik is radicalized by deconstruction. In fact, one of Heidegger's critical remarks in his seminal study on Kant und das Problem der Meta.physik (1929) is directed against the Kantian idea of a "transcendental logic" , which Heidegger denounces as sheer nonsense (§ 45).23 I think, furthermore, that this criticism is certainly also aimed at Husserl's "transcendental phenomenology", as Heidegger maintains the fundamen­tal ontological project of Sein und Zeit, where the disclosedness of Being is said to constitute the very transcendenta.lis of phenomenological truth (§ 7).24 Derrida goes,

20 lbid., p. 174.

21 J . Caputo, op. cit., pp. 46 f.

22 J. Derrida, Origin of Geometry, op. cit., p . 58.

23 Cf. M. Heidegger, Kant et le probléme de la métaphysique, Introduction et traduction de l'allemand par Alphonse de Waelhens et Walter Biemel (PariS: Gallimard, 1953), p. 299.

24 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1986), p . 38.

132

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however, further than the early HeidB! ence at the very ontological levei of tl ing" itself, even if we assume the prir. that Husserl's pre-linguistic, transcen dépassement (an "overcoming"), a rel own self-presentation, which anticipé guage.

We can thus see that, although ei physical view of language, Husserl's 1

guistic expression of a re-presenting somewhere in essentia. Although he r (either real or ideal "presencing"), intentionality, the ideality of langua1 sciousness in the fulfilment of "meanil ning, between an original meaning !

meaning (signification), presupposes tt the general a priori of language" (VP 7 the Husserlian project of a "pure li presuppositionlessness, in spite of its f; of its own presencing as self-constit1 undecidable horizon of meaning whicl the very phenomenological endeavor t! sedimentary graphé, the logos affirrni original ideality as "voice" (la voix, medium for a self-constituting cons essentially tied up with each other, a to "participate" in the "constituted" "between" an un-heard signified and it to respond and to speak. What lie~

arbitrary, since no transcendental pie from. And this crisis of "transcenden1 critique has thus far been capable responding to the voice of Being.

oguage alone that history reveals and "sedimentation" of its objective his­

JUage imply together the ideality of as "the vital movement of the coexis~ ms and sedimentations of meaning"'.2D 1t from an original meaning toward its ~ment which presents itself as consti­ruestion that arises now concems not and telas, as the ultimacy of such a

it is the "absolute" signified/signifier :imately and truly absolute" (I 193) in }r than "the time-flow itself, the abso­tself", underlying all the acumulations 1dental ego) and maintaining the pri­:iousness (I 194-196).21 Derrida points elf what makes history possible by its "ln the movement of protention, the xesent, in arder to constitute another 1g Present. "22 It is in this very lebendig ills "the ultimate form of ideality", the ics of presence:

ielle en derniêre instance on peut antici­'idéalité est le présent vivant, la présence 1. toujours été et sera toujours, à l'infini, la lquement, se produira la diversité infinie

:y of presence has, after all, dominated ince the foundation of metaphysics by [orm". The radicalness of such a prob­ertainly reveals Derrida's indebtedness . whose hermeneutic reading of Kant's one of Heidegger's critica! remarks in

r Metaphysik (1929) is directed against which Heidegger denounces as sheer 1is criticism is certainly also aimed at s Heidegger maintains the fundamen­i the disclosedness of Being is said to nenological truth (§ 7).24 Derrida goes,

rsique, Introduction et traduction de l'allemand fallimard, 1953), p. 299. J86), p. 38.

f'. l however, further than the early Heidegger, as he questions the constitution of pres­ence at the very ontological level of the hermeneutic project: "presence" is "found­ing" itself, even if we assume the primordiality of language. Derrida thinks in effect that Husserl's pre-linguistic, transcendental subject betrays, as it were, a certain dépassement (an "overcoming"), a releve (in the radical sense of verwinden) of its own self-presentation, which anticipates somehow its being constituted by lan­guage.

We can thus see that, although emerging out of the so-called traditional, meta­physical view of language, Husserl's theory of meaning is not confined to the lin­guistic expression of a re-presenting thought or its corresponding reality, present somewhere in assentia. Although he remains on a metaphysical level of "presence" (either real or ideal "presencing"), Husserl wants to emphasize the role of intentionality, the ideality of language, and the constitutive character of con­sciousness in the fulfilmeri.t of "meaning". This arri.biguous phenomenology of mea­ning, between an original meaning (vouloir dire) and its fulfilled constitution as meaning (signification), presupposes thus a "découpage of the logical a priori within the general a priori of language" (VP 7), which Derrida sees already predelineated in the Husserlian project of a "pure logical grammar" (LI Il, 527). The ideal of presuppositiori.lessness, in spite of its failure to avoid the omnipresent presupposition of its own presencing as self-constituting eidos, has nevertheless opened up an undecidable horizon of meaning which resists logical closures. Derrida believes that the very phenomenological endeavor to protect the spoken logos, as opposed to the sedimentary graphé, the logos affirming itself as fulfilled intentionality, betrays its original ideality as "voice" (la voix, phoné), which is also · the living (lebendig) medium for a self-constituting consciousness. (VP 9) If logos and phoné are essentially tied up with each other, a transcendental "between-ness" appears thus to "participate" in the "constituted" and "constituting" aspects of significations, "between" an un-heard signified and its responsive signifier, continually impelling us to respond and to speak. What lies "between" signified and signifier remains arbitrary, since no transcendental place has been found where to judge (krineo) from. And this crisis of "transcendental" thinking continues to remind us that no critique has thus far been capable of deciding the ultimate meaning of our responding to the voice of Being.

133