debate: metropolitan governance today · 2010-03-11 · debate: metropolitan governance today...

© (2001) Swiss Political Science Review 7(4): 119-150

Debate: Metropolitan Governance Today

Métropolisation, changement de régime d’urbanisation et fragmenta-tion de l’espace: enjeux de la gouvernance des agglomérations en Suisse

Antonio CUNHA, Institut de géographie, Université de Lausanne struit, Ecole poly-

Introduction st une figure de l’urbain qui n’a plus comme fonction principale la

ns, les processus de métropo-lisa

Structures et dynamiques des agglomérations suisses: le changement de régime

par régime d’urbanisation l’ensemble de processus de territorialisa-

Martin SCHULER, Institut de recherche sur l’environnement contechnique fédérale de Lausanne

La métropole edesserte et l’encadrement spatial de proximité. Pôle d’échanges, elle gère, à des échelles de plus en plus, vastes les mouvements des personnes, les déplacements de capitaux et les flux d’informations et de services. Par sa capacité à rassembler et à développer les équipements stratégiques et les fonctions décisionnelles du plus haut niveau elle est davantage articulée à l’ensemble des grandes polarités qui organisent l’espace national et international. Moteurs et enjeux des mutations contemporaines, les agglomérations urbaines révèlent de nouveaux agencements des centralités. À l’échelle locale, l’analyse de ces mutations élargit et spécifie une question de re-cherche traditionnelle: celle de la fragmentation physique, socioculturelle, écono-mique et politique des agglomérations urbaines.

En Suisse, comme dans la plupart des pays européetion se sont accélérés ces dernières années. Les agglomérations ne parviennent

pas à se limiter elles-mêmes. Elles se dilatent épousant les lignes indécises des loca-lisations périurbaines et des flux pendulaires qui les débordent. L’étalement spatial et la fragmentation urbaine réduisent la gouvernabilité des agglomérations. À l’instar d’autres pays européens, la non-correspondance entre espaces fonctionnels et espaces institutionnels, si caractéristique du nouveau régime d’urbanisation, im-pose la recherche de nouvelles modalités de gestion territoriale. Les structures insti-tutionnelles actuelles, trop figées ou trop lourdes à gérer, semblent intrinsèquement inefficaces pour répondre à la complexité des enjeux.

d’urbanisation Nous entendons tion (localisation, délocalisation et relocalisation des activités et des ménages) assu-rant le renouvellement des centralités urbaines ainsi que la reproduction et le fonc-tionnement des agglomérations en tant qu’espaces économiques, sociaux et physi-

120 DEBATE

ques. L’émergence de l’économie informationnelle impose une nouvelle architec-ture spatiale (Sassen 1991; Castells 1998). Le “régime métropolitain” traduit de nouvelles modalités d’articulation de la ville à l’économie globale, mais aussi une métamorphose des contenus de la centralité urbaine. Celles-ci sont caractérisées par leur capacité à dégager des synergies (globalité), à rassembler les nouveaux services et équipements de la centralité (directionnalité et sélectivité des fonctions) et par la présence d’une multiplicité d’outils de maîtrise de la distance (connectivité). Tableau 1: Le régime métropolitain: caractéristiques

L

balité DirectionnSélectivité Connectivit

sjonction fonctionnelle, ségrégation Expansion spatiale, fragmentation Polynucléation Accroissement d

Global Local

a globalisation se généralise, mais la fragmentation des agglomérations augmente.

La formation de régions métropolitaines: métamorphose de la centralité

itudinalement,

t la “ce

Articulation aux réseaux interurbains Recomposition des espaces intraurbains Glo

alité

é

Di

es mobilités spatiales

À l’échelle locale, le régime métropolitain s’exprime par la formation d’espaces urbanisés denses, hétérogènes, parfois polynucléaires qui se caractérisent par la fragmentation et la transformation du rapport spatial entre le “noyau urbain” de l’agglomération et les zones suburbaines et périurbaines. La fragmentation urbaine traduit une recomposition des interdépendances entre résidents, pendulaires, activi-tés et usagers à l’échelle des agglomérations (May et al. 1998). C’est une notion multidimensionnelle qui associe plusieurs expressions de l’éclatement urbain: phy-siques (déconnexions physiques, discontinuités résidentielles, ruptures de la qualité résidentielle), sociales (ségrégations résidentielles, replis communautaires), écono-miques (spécialisations fonctionnelles, zonage) mais aussi politiques (dispersion et foisonnement des acteurs de la gestion et de la régulation urbaines). L’espace des pratiques des acteurs urbains s’ouvre et se déploie dans une agglomération de plus en plus dilatée par rapport aux frontières administratives.

Une série d’analyses multidimensionnelles, conduites en coupe et longa confirmé que les cinq principales agglomérations urbaines suisses sont bien instal-lées au sommet de la hiérarchie urbaine (Schuler et Bassand 1985; Cosinschi et Cun-ha 1988; Cunha 1993; Schuler et al. 1997; Rumley et al. 2000). Zurich, Genève, Bâle, Berne et Lausanne concentrent à elles seules 51% de la population, 54% des emplois et 56% des revenus nets des 48 agglomérations suisses. Elles polarisent l’essentiel des dynamiques démographiques, socio-économiques et technologiques du territoire.

Pourtant, la superposition traditionnelle de nombreuses variables mesuranntralité” a été brisée, pour la première fois, au cours des années 1970. À la suite

du choc pétrolier, la plupart des branches industrielles ont subi des pertes d’emplois considérables. Après ce premier grand remaniement du système productif, la “cen-tralité” s’est davantage liée à la dynamique de la tertiarisation; les régions des grands centres, de la Suisse romande et des Préalpes en ont profité. Cette image,

METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE TODAY 121

valable au cours des années 1980, a été rompue une deuxième fois à partir de 1990. Depuis, la logique des paires “branches économiques à valeur ajoutée élevée” et “croissance des emplois de ces branches” a perdu de sa signification, et cela même pour les branches du tertiaire.

En dépit des restructurations économiques successives et de leur relative stagna-tion

énomène métropolitain. La

n les bran-che

le dans les agglomérations

• olitaines;

• ions tertiaires de valeur ajoutée faible

• 1990 (notons

démographique, les grandes agglomérations conservent leurs positions au sommet de la hiérarchie urbaine. La tertiairisation grandissante de leurs appareils productifs n’affaiblit pas leur puissance économique. Elle en est l’expression. La notion de services aux entreprises supplante le contenu fondateur des “services aux particuliers” en tant que mesure de la centralité. Les restructurations récentes n’ont fait que confirmer le principe majeur de la métamorphose des centralités urbaines: à ville plus grande, travail plus qualifié. Le régime de métropolisation helvétique as-socie étroitement une tertiairisation sélective des grands centres urbains à une spé-cialisation dans les métiers hautement qualifiés et à une localisation préférentielle des principaux centres de décision économique. Les grandes agglomérations entre-tiennent entre elles des liens privilégiés d’échange que l’on peut lire à travers les choix de localisation des sièges et des filiales des grandes entreprises à établisse-ment unique ou à multi-établissement (Rossi et Pini 1995).

Les analyses permettent également de circonscrire le phrégion métropolitaine zurichoise entre Aarau, Wil, Lachen et Lucerne-Stans,

celle entre Bâle et Liestal, le bassin lémanique et enfin Berne se détachent claire-ment par la sélectivité et la qualification de leurs activités économiques. À part Coire et peut-être Lugano, toutes les agglomérations situées en dehors de ces aires s’opposent à l’image des métropoles tertiairisées: elles sont plus industrielles, elles sont parfois plus spécialisées dans les emplois du tertiaire faiblement qualifié. Elles sont aussi moins riches et dotées de populations moins bien formées. La métropoli-sation ne touche, dans l’expression du “facteur métropolitain”, qu’une partie réduite du territoire et ne justifie pas l’idée d’une métropole suisse. La Suisse urbaine défa-vorisée économiquement se situe dans les cantons comme le Valais, le Jura et la Suisse orientale, mais aussi au pied du Jura. Le Tessin donne une image particulière qui résulte du profil tertiaire de ses activités économiques et notamment du profil de spécialisation de Lugano fortement marqué par les activités financières.

Sur l’ensemble des 48 agglomérations, l’évolution de l’emploi selos entre 1970 et 1998 fait apparaître quelques constats:

• maintien et renforcement de la spécialisation industrielpériphériques, c’est-à-dire situées en dehors des zones métropolitaines; perte de la spécialisation industrielle dans les agglomérations métroptransfert vers une spécialisation tertiaire; maintien et renforcement des spécialisat(tourisme, transports) notamment dans les agglomérations alpines; diffusion spatiale progressive des services aux entreprises jusqu’àtoutefois que 90% des emplois dans les services aux entreprises étaient localisés dans les zones urbaines), mais maintien, voire reconcentration depuis cette date.

122 DEBATE

Grâce à l’infrastructure nouvelle offerte par les technologies de l’information et de la communication, une nouvelle géométrie des flux et une nouvelle recomposition des centralités et des semis urbains émerge.

Changement de régime urbain et fragmentation de l’espace: la recomposition interne des agglomérations

L’analyse des recompositions récentes du territoire helvétique révèle la consolida-tion d’un régime de métropolisation qui se traduit au niveau local par la fragmenta-tion des espaces urbains et un accroissement généralisé des mobilités. Les années 1970 initient un processus caractérisé par la désindustrialisation massive des éco-nomies urbaines, l’expansion corrélative du tertiaire, le passage à la société infor-mationnelle, l’accroissement de la mobilité, mais aussi par la reterritorialisation des centres et des périphéries des agglomérations urbaines sur le mode de la fragmenta-tion. La Figure 1 illustre la manière dont le changement de régime urbain s’est tra-duit, à l’échelle locale, par une transformation du rapport spatial entre le noyau ori-ginal des agglomérations et leurs couronnes suburbaines et périurbaines.

Les centres des agglomérations perdent leur population par rapport aux couronnes suburbaines mais également par rapport aux espaces périurbains et aux villes iso-lées. Les agglomérations urbaines s’étalent sous le mode de la croissance de zones fonctionnelles (résidence, emploi, loisirs, etc.) dont seuls les transports privés par-viennent à assurer une certaine cohérence.

Graphique 1: Indice de croissance démographique selon la zone urbaine, 1850-2000


La transformation du rapport spatial s’exprime par de nouvelles modalités d’occupation du territoire urbain, mais aussi par des changements dans les systèmes des mobilités pendulaires et résidentielles.

L’analyse des flux migratoires montre clairement que le modèle de croissance métropolitain qui s’est accentué au cours des années 1970 est fondé sur la superpo-sition de deux systèmes de relations (Cunha et Racine 1996): • un réseau de relations à longue distance qui alimente la croissance démographi-

que des grandes agglomérations suisses et qui constitue une des modalités de leur articulation à l’environnement international;

• un système de relations de proximité qui se traduit par une redistribution des fonctions résidentielles au profit des couronnes urbaines et qui tend à induire un accroissement des mouvements pendulaires.

En dépit des soldes migratoires internes négatifs avec les autres communes du pays, les cinq grandes agglomérations suisses ont enregistré des taux de croissance démo-graphique positifs (de 1.5% pour Bâle à 10.9% pour Genève durant la période inter-censitaire 1980-1990). Cette évolution globale positive résulte essentiellement d’un renforcement des flux migratoires internationaux.

On observe aussi que 75% de la population des zones rurales vit dans les espa-ces avoisinant les agglomérations urbaines. Comme le montrent Kuster et Meier (2000), ces espaces ruraux situés dans l’aire d’influence des grandes agglomérations ont enregistré entre 1981 et 1995 une croissance démographique (+18%) très supé-rieure à la moyenne suisse (+10%). Selon les mêmes auteurs, le pourcentage de la population active occupée habitant l’espace rural et ayant un emploi dans une ag-glomération urbaine a atteint 29% en 1990, alors que ce taux n’était que de 15% vingt ans auparavant. L’augmentation des flux pendulaires des agglomérations plus petites vers les grandes agglomérations voisines constitue un indice révélateur de l’imbrication croissante de ces espaces urbanisés de plus en dilatés, polynucléaires et fragmentés. Cependant, l’agrandissement du tissu urbain ne se fait plus en conti-nuité et en contiguïté avec le noyau initial.

Ces processus démographiques ont une expression morphologique et un contenu économique, social et culturel. Ils sont lisibles à l’échelle de l’agglomération par un élargissement des taches urbaines des grandes agglomérations, mais aussi par une forte différenciation des “aires sociales” (Joye, Bassand et Schuler 1988; Huissoud et al. 1999). La proportion de citadins d’origine étrangère, mais aussi de personnes âgées, de célibataires et de personnes à revenus modestes ou en situation d’exclusion s’accroît dans les villes-centres des agglomérations. Le croisement des statuts profes-sionnels et des indicateurs d’appartenance nationale renforce l’hypothèse de la duali-sation sociale des agglomérations urbaines. La tendance à une division sociale basée notamment sur l’autoagrégation des couches supérieures de la population est évi-dente: les classes aisées partent régulièrement s’installer dans les communes où la charge fiscale est moins lourde. Aussi bien à Zurich qu’à Lausanne ou à Lucerne, nous constatons des concentrations élevées de dirigeants ou de professions libérales dans les communes dont la taxation est plus favorable. La globalisation et la tertiairi-sation se généralisent, mais la fragmentation urbaine augmente.

124 DEBATE

Structures institutionnelles et enjeux des agglomérations: entre permanences et changements La fragmentation urbaine implique la recherche de nouvelles formes d’exercice du pouvoir urbain. En particulier, la non-correspondance entre espaces fonctionnels et espaces institutionnels préoccupe la politique, la statistique, la science et, dans une mesure assez surprenante, également les mass média et le grand public. À cet égard, la genèse des espaces urbains en Suisse révèle des situations très diverses.

L’organisation spatio-politique de la Suisse se caractérise par une pérennité as-sez extraordinaire. Au niveau communal, la stabilité s’avère être étonnamment grande si l’on considère que le nombre des communes n’a baissé que de 3205 à 2896 entités entre 1850 et l’an 2000. Cette lente évolution institutionnelle est d’autant plus remarquable que les unités spatiales sont extrêmement hétérogènes. L’histoire des changements territoriaux en Suisse ne connaît, au fond, qu’une seule période de réformes, celle du mouvement de fusions des communes urbaines, qui a eu lieu en-tre 1890 et 1930. Mais les solutions étaient locales et elles n’ont pas obéi à des logi-ques communes à l’ensemble du territoire helvétique. Les accroissements démogra-phiques et spatiaux les plus significatifs dus aux fusions ont été ceux des villes de Zurich, Genève, St. Gall et Winterthur. Cependant, les fusions dans les régions de Bienne, Thoune, Bellinzone et Frauenfeld ont également eu une certaine ampleur. Depuis 1945, seules des fusions isolées dans des villes de petite ou moyenne impor-tance, sont intervenues tandis que le découpage des grandes villes est resté inchangé.

La stabilité séculaire des structures territoriales de la Suisse, observée depuis le premier recensement de 1850, n’est pas un cas exceptionnel. Dans la plupart des pays occidentaux, les changements territoriaux ont été, jusqu’ici plutôt l’exception que la règle. Par contre, fait exceptionnel, la Suisse n’a pas participé aux réformes territoriales survenues dans d’autres pays européens dans les années 1960 et 1970. Cette absence de réformes territoriales, couplée à une très forte hétérogénéité des découpages cantonaux et communaux a comme conséquence une correspondance actuelle particulièrement faible entre régions institutionnelles et régions fonctionnel-les. En ce qui concerne la situation des agglomérations, le fait qu’un nombre impor-tant d’entre elles ait désormais une dimension transcantonale et transfrontalière rend la situation encore plus complexe et les modèles de gestion urbaine encore plus va-riés. Plusieurs agglomérations s’étendent aujourd’hui sur des cantons voisins. C’est le cas des agglomérations de Zurich, Bâle, Genève, St. Gall, Lucerne, Olten et Aarau. L’évolution des agglomérations transnationales de Genève, Bâle ou Schaffhouse rap-pelle que l’interdépendance avec les pays limitrophes est économique, mais aussi spatiale. Les espaces urbains en Suisse montrent des variations institutionnelles inattendues, se construisant sur des critères fort variables. Pour citer les plus mar-qués, on observe parmi les cinq grands centres du pays les situations suivantes: • Bâle, ville centre qui forme à elle seule (ou presque) son propre canton et dont

l’agglomération s’étend sur deux pays et trois cantons voisins; • Genève, agglomération urbaine qui correspond, plus ou moins, à un canton (et

dont les zones périurbaines se trouvent essentiellement à l’étranger); • Zurich, région urbaine couvrant un canton et le dépassant même;


• Berne et Lausanne, agglomérations urbaines situées au milieu d’un grand canton dont les caractéristiques économiques et politiques sont encore restées relative-ment rurales.

D’autres modèles d’organisation spatiale existent également, dont celui d’une multipo-larité urbaine à l’intérieur d’un canton (Tessin, Neuchâtel, Soleure), ou celui non basé sur une forte centralité, mais orienté sur un ou plusieurs centres extérieurs (Argovie).

En dépit de la variété des modèles d’organisation, les défis posés aux agglomé-rations urbaines suisses sont identiques. Les questions concrètes qui orientent les débats sur les enjeux de la régulation urbaine sont multiples: déclin démographique des centres, limitation des dépenses publiques, financement des équipements de la centralité (culturels, sportifs, sociaux, etc.) maîtrise de l’urbanisation et organisation de la mobilité et des déplacements, précarisation des citadins, concurrence fiscale, qualification des espaces publics et amélioration du cadre de vie, soutiens aux mi-lieux innovants. Gestion et planification des services collectifs, écogestion urbaine, pilotage des finances publiques et équité de traitement fiscal, renouvellement de l’exercice de la citoyenneté constituent des vecteurs majeurs de la réflexion sur la gouvernabilité des agglomérations. Les possibilités limitées de régulation des asso-ciations et des ententes intercommunales sont aujourd’hui manifestes. Les agglomé-rations sont inexorablement appelées à renforcer leur capacité institutionnelle.

En guise de conclusion: vers une responsabilité partagée Le développement du processus de métropolisation dans un contexte fédéraliste, la balkanisation même des territoires urbanisés, ont engendré une série de processus localisés d’auto-organisation qui s’éloignent pour l’instant d’un agencement forma-lisé et uniforme des rapports intercommunaux et parfois interrégionaux à l’échelle des agglomérations urbaines. Le dialogue et les négociations interviennent entre la ville-centre, les communes suburbaines et périurbaines, le canton et les régions avoisinan-tes intégrant une capacité variable de réglage du fonctionnement d’une réalité ur-baine de plus en plus éclatée dans ses structures et dans son fonctionnement.

La gouvernance urbaine peut-elle constituer le levier du nécessaire renforcement de la capacité institutionnelle des agglomérations et d’une synergie des capacités financières communales? Est-elle un outil permettant aux responsables de l’action publique de faire fonctionner plus efficacement leurs organisations et d’aménager durablement les territoires urbains? Pour répondre aux enjeux posés par le change-ment de régime urbain, les institutions publiques doivent incontestablement renfor-cer les éléments, les activités et l’énergie qui les composent. La régulation du nou-veau régime urbain implique la recherche de nouvelles formes d’exercice du pou-voir, fondées sur la coordination d’une multiplicité d’acteurs. Une entreprise qui, paradoxalement, semble demander plus l’autonomie, plus de pluralisme, mais aussi plus de participation et de responsabilisation des citadins.

Références bibliographiques CASTELLS, Manuel (1998). La société en réseaux. Paris: Fayard.

126 DEBATE

COSINSCHI, Micheline, et Antonio CUNHA (1988). “L’armature urbaine”, in Michel BAS-SAND et al. (dir.) Les enjeux de l’urbanisation = Agglomerationsprobleme in der Schweiz. Berne: OEPR, Lang, pp. 69-91.

CUNHA, Antonio (1993). Développement territorial, régions et centralité urbaine: le cas de la Suisse. Thèse de doctorat, Université de Lausanne.

CUNHA, Antonio, and Jean-Bernard RACINE (1996). Towns and Metropolitan Areas in Switzerland: Federalism Torn Between Radical Mutations in the Work Force and Conser-vative Patterns of Behaviour. Paper presented to the Commission on Urban Development and Urban Life, The Hague, 5-10 August.

HUISSOUD, Thérèse et al. (1999). Structures et tendances de la différenciation dans les espaces urbains en Suisse. Berne: Rapport de recherche FNRS no. 145.

JOYE, Dominique, BASSAND, Michel, et Martin SCHULER (1988). “Ségrégations et diffé-renciations dans les agglomérations”, in Michel BASSAND et al. (dir.) Les enjeux de l’urbanisation = Agglomerationsprobleme in der Schweiz. Berne: OEPR, Lang, pp. 97-113.

KUSTER, Jürg, et Rudolph MEIER (2000). La Suisse urbaine. Berne: Office fédéral du dé-veloppement territorial.

MAY, Nicole et al. (dir.) (1998). La ville éclatée. Paris: Editions de l’Aube. RUMLEY, Pierre-Alain et al. (2000). Réseau de villes suisses. Berne: Office fédéral du déve-

loppement territorial. ROSSI, Angelo, et Giuseppe PINI (1995). L’entreprise multiétablissements en Suisse: sa

répartition et son développement. Berne: Office fédéral de la Statistique. SASSEN, Saskia (1991). The Global City. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. SCHULER, Martin, et Michel BASSAND (1985). La Suisse une métropole mondiale? Lau-

sanne: IREC-DA, EPFL. SCHULER, Martin et al. (1997). Strukturatlas der Schweiz = Atlas structurel de la Suisse.

Zürich: NZZ Verlag. ROSSI, Angelo, et Giuseppe PINI (1992). Entreprises et système urbain. Berne: Rapport de

recherche FNRS.

Identity, Community and Institutional Reform in Swiss Agglomerations1

Daniel KÜBLER, Institut de recherche sur l’environnement construit, Ecole polytech-nique fédérale de Lausanne, and Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Zürich Dominique JOYE, Service suisse d’information et d’archivage de données pour les

r l’environnement construit, Ecole poly-

, the concepts of urban agglomerations and metropolitan areas (groupings of interdependent agglomerations) are designed to

sciences sociales, Université de Neuchâtel Brigitte SCHWAB, Institut de recherche sutechnique fédérale de Lausanne, and Institut d’études politiques et internationales, Université de Lausanne Within the Swiss statistical nomenclatura

1 This contribution is based on the research Metropolitan governance and legitimacy, conducted by

the Institut de recherche sur l’environnement construit (EPFL) on behalf of the Swiss National Science Foundation (PPR “Demain la Suisse”).


reveal the extension and development of functional urban spaces. As in other OECD countries, they are defined through a set of economic and morphological variables (Schuler 1994), several of which pertain to commuter movements between communes and urban centers. Research conducted on Switzerland has shown that these functional spaces have continued to extend over and across institutional boundaries. Since there were no significant territorial reforms after 1934, agglom-erations and metropolitan areas in Switzerland are characterized by high govern-mental fragmentation. Consequently, the debate on metropolitan institutions is strongly focused on the allegedly missing congruence between the functional and the institutional territories. This is consistent with a managerial point of view, seek-ing to improve the conditions for coherent metropolitan problem-solving. However, efficient service provision is not the sole role of urban institutions. Institutions also give shape to citizen identities and political communities (March and Olsen 1995: 50), and attempts to change institutions are likely to provoke resistance among those who identify with them.

Based on the premise that institutions are an important component for citizen and community identity, this contribution examines two issues related to the topic of insti-tuti

l Institutions: Relevance of the Communes

ell beyond the in-l borders in some

been widely used as an indicator for citi

onal reform in urban agglomerations, using data from a survey conducted in 2001 in Switzerland.2 First, in a status quo-oriented perspective, we focus on identities and community-feeling of citizens living in functional urban spaces. More precisely, we will show that existing territorial institutions play only a minor part in local identifica-tion, and that new political identities and community ties have emerged as a result of functional dynamics of spatial integration that are at work in Swiss agglomerations. Second, in a prospective perspective, we will examine citizen’s perceptions of ag-glomeration problems, as well as attitudes towards eventual reforms. In particular, we will argue that, although individual-level variables have a certain significance, there are stark contrasts between the four agglomerations in terms of problem perception and attitudes towards reform.

Territorial Identities Attachment to Territoria

In Switzerland, the functional space of agglomerations extends wstitutional boundaries of communes, cantons and even nationacases. However, among these three institutional tiers, the commune is the one whose relevance is most at stake in the current debate on eventual institutional re-forms of Swiss agglomerations (Geser 1999).

To what extent do people identify with territorial institutions in comparison to functional spaces? Feeling of attachment has

zen identification with territorial institutions (Lowery et al. 1992; Dupoirier 1998) or other types of spaces (Joye et al. 1995). Table 1 shows that the attachment

2 The survey involved standardized telephone interviews on a representative sample of 2010 Swiss

citizens aged 18 to 74, living in the agglomerations of Lausanne, Lucerne, Lugano and Zurich (roughly 500 interviews in each agglomeration). Interviews were conducted in April and May 2001. The survey was financially supported by the National Science Foundation and the “Projekt Stadt und Agglomera-tion Luzern” of the Fachhochschule Zentralschweiz. Details are given in Kübler et al. (2001).

128 DEBATE

to various institutional and non-institutional territories is generally high. Although there are significant variations across the four agglomerations, levels of attachment between communes, agglomerations and cantons are only marginally different. Table 1: Feeling of Attachment to Institutional and Non-institutional Territories

(Percent Saying “Rather” and “Strongly” Attached)

Besides, it must be emphasized that levels attach t to l a p l rritories are not antagonist but independent from each other – thus supporting the

territorial identities. But to what ex-ten

commune.4 Concerning individual-level variables, it m

of men loca nd su ra-locate

ongly do you feel attached to…” Lausanne Lucerne Z

““Your agglomeration?” (non-institutional) 70.8% 68.9% 63.3% 79.6% 70.7%“Your canton?” (institutional) 68.1% 72.9% 64.8% 92.4% 74.5%“Your linguistic region?” (non-institutional 87.4% 81.3% 84% 93.6% 86.6%“Switzerland as a whole?” (inst 85.3% 89.2% 90.8% 92.6% 89.5%“Europe?” (non-institutional) 70% 69.7% 74.4% 54.2% 67.1%Total (N=) 511 498 501 500 2010

idea of glocalization, i.e. that the inhabitants of the metropolis simultaneously par-ticipate in a local as well as in a global order.3

Compared to other institutional but also non-institutional territories, the com-mune has only limited relevance for citizens’

t do they identify, more specifically, with the agglomeration as a greater spatial ensemble? Table 2 shows that the majority of the respondents do indeed feel they belong to the agglomeration beyond their commune of residence. However, there is a significant difference between the four agglomerations under scrutiny: identifica-tion with the agglomeration is highest in Lucerne, second highest in Lausanne, third in Lugano and lowest in Zurich.

Multivariate analysis shows that identification with the agglomeration is lower with people living in a peri-urban

ust be emphasized that identification with the agglomeration correlates posi-tively with free time spatial mobility, i.e. commuting for leisure activities such as shopping, going out, sports and social events. These results suggest that integration

“How str urich Lugano Total

)itutional)

Your commune?” (institutional) 68.5% 72.9% 67.4% 74.8% 70.9%

3 This is suggested by a Principal Component Analysis on the six items of Table 1, extracting two factors. The first factor denotes a locally oriented feeling of attachment, whose main components are attachment to the canton, to the agglomeration and to the commune. The second factor, in contrast, designates an internationally/nationally oriented feeling of attachment, with attachment to Europe and to Switzerland as a whole being the main components.

4 According to the Swiss communal typology (Joye et al. 1988), peri-urban communes are situated on the periphery of agglomerations and their built environment is characterized by recently constructed single-family housing.


of agglomerations as functional territories and social identification with them are indeed two parallel processes.

Community Ties in Agglomerations

In his seminal work on the problems of fragmented metropolitan areas, Robert Wood (1958) emphasized the high political interdependence between single con-stituencies. On the one hand, due to their centrality functions, political choices of core cities have consequences on the whole metropolitan area. On the other hand, policy choices of suburban communes may also have significant impacts on the central cities (e.g. lowering levels of taxation, failure to invest in public infrastruc-tures, etc.). Wood thus argued that metropolitan areas form a community of fate, whose inhabitants are artificially disenfranchised by institutional fragmentation.

Based on this idea, we can say that the more inhabitants of an agglomeration show interest in politics of the constituencies other than the one in which they have citizens’ rights, the more plausible it is to speak of community ties across single constituencies.

Although the frequencies shown in Table 3 suggest that there is interest for other communes, it is only in combination with multivariate analysis that the existence of community ties can really be confirmed. Individual level variables account for most of the observed variance, with the single most important explanatory factor for in-terest in politics of other communes than one’s own is interest in politics in general.5

Table 2: Identification with the Agglomeration “Do you feel you belong to the agglomera-tion of x?”

Lausanne Lucerne Zurich Lugano Total

Yes, very much 58.7% 65.3% 50.7% 42.8% 54.4%Yes, quite 14.5% 14.9% 19.0% 30.0% 19.6%No, not really 11.9% 7.8% 13.2% 15.8% 12.2%No, not at all 14.5% 11.4% 15.0% 10.4% 12.8%Don’t know/no answer .4% .6% 2.2% 1.0% 1.0%Total (N=) 511

100% 498

100% 501

100%500

100% 2010100%

Table 3: Interest in Politics of Other Agglomeration Communes “How interested are you in politics of other communes of the agglomeration?”


“Not at all interested” 24.5% 17.7% 19.4% 8.4% 17.5%“Not very interested” 40.1% 36.7% 33.7% 41.4% 38.0%“Rather interested” 28.8% 33.1% 33.3% 39.4% 33.6%“Very interested” 6.7% 12.0% 13.2% 10.8% 10.6%Don’t know, no answer .4% .4% .2%Total (N=) 511 498 501 500 2010

5 This is confirmed by Multiple Regression Analysis with interest in politics other than one’s com-

mune of residence as the dependent variable and individual-level variables as well as contextual vari-

130 DEBATE

This confirms that citizens’ interest in local public affairs does not stop at the com-munal border – hence supporting Wood’s allegation that agglomerations are com-munities of fate artificially torn apart by institutional boundaries. Nevertheless, some contextual variables also have a significant influence: interest in politics of other communes is lower with residents of the core cities, as well as with residents of peri-urban type communes.

Prospects for Institutional Reform Perception of Agglomeration Problems

In Switzerland, the public debate on agglomeration problems and possible solutions is an old one (Bassand et al. 1988). Positions on the matter are generally quite clear cut (Union des villes suisses 1997): core cities (usually dominated by the left) tend to identify spillovers and free-riding by surrounding municipalities as the main problem. By contrast, non-central municipalities (usually dominated by the right) tend to argue that spillover effects are exaggerated and that core cities should reduce unnecessary public services, especially social welfare.

What is the resonance of these elite positions on agglomeration problems and solutions among the citizens? Table 4 shows the scores for agreement to four often heard statements derived from the two aforementioned positions on agglomeration problems.

These results are somewhat paradoxical, since they suggest that respondents simul-taneously agree to statements that were supposed to be contradictory. Further analy-sis into these responses shows that, on the one hand, it is certainly plausible to speak of two different views on agglomeration problems: first, in terms of spillover effects

Table 4: Agreement with Positions on Agglomeration Problems and Solutions (Per-cent of Respondents Strongly or Somewhat Agreeing)

“Do you agree or disagree with the fol-lowing statements?”


1. “The core city should be better compen-sated for services it offers for the whole agglomeration”

44.6% 59.2% 67.3% 33.4% 51.1%

2. “Communal taxes should be harmo-nized in the whole agglomeration”

68.9% 71.7% 63.7% 59% 65.8%

3. “If the core city has financial problems, it should solve them alone and stop ask-ing surrounding municipalities for help”

58.3% 53.6% 48.3% 60% 55.1%

4. “It is too often omitted that, besides the core city, other communes also deliver public services for the whole agglomera-tion”

73.7% 58.6% 54.4% 73.8% 65.3%

Total (N=) 511 498 501 500 2010

ables that were entered stepwise to the model (adjusted R2 = 0.279 with individual level variables only; adjusted R2 = 0.321 with individual-level and context variables).


and centrality charges, and, second in terms of a denial of the emphasis on centrality charges and spillover effects in the public debate.6 On the other hand, these two views seem to be independent from each other rather than antagonist. In other words: agreeing that spillover and centrality problems exist, does not necessarily preclude people from thinking that they are largely exaggerated.

How can these two perceptions on agglomeration problems be explained? Mul-tivariate regression suggests a strong effect of contextual variables. Indeed, respon-dents living in the Lucerne and Zurich agglomerations are more likely to perceive spillover and centrality problems, whereas respondents of the Lugano and Lausanne sub-samples more often think that these problems are over-emphasized. Within ag-glomerations, perceptions of agglomeration problems correlate strongly with the taxation index of the commune of residence. Residents of communes with high lo-cal taxes, as well as inhabitants of core cities are more likely to perceive spillover and centrality problems, and vice versa. Individual-level variables also have some significance. Perception in terms of spillover and centrality problems is associated with higher education, positioning on the left of the left-right scale, as well as with interest in local politics other than one’s commune of residence. In contrast, the view according to which centrality problems are exaggerated is associated with lower education, positioning on the right of the left-right scale, age, as well as low interest in local politics other than one’s commune of residence.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this: First, perceptions of agglomeration problems are specific to each agglomeration, and are thus built locally. Second, ex-istence of community ties across communes has political consequences, in that they raise awareness for spillover problems that can result from a lack of coordination between single constituencies.

Attitudes Towards Local Government Reforms in Agglomerations

In spite of continued extension of agglomerations and metropolitan areas in Swit-zerland since the second world war, the institutional structure of local government has largely remained the same (Schuler 1994). Responses to the growing interde-pendence between communes within agglomeration usually consisted in pragmati-cally adapting and extending schemes of inter-communal cooperation and coordina-tion (Ladner et al. 2000). However, recent initiatives in various regions have re-newed the institutional question: without necessarily advocating amalgamations of communes (such as in the canton of Ticino, for instance), they promote the creation of a new tier of agglomeration-wide institutions (such as in the case of Fribourg). To which extent are these reform proposals supported by the citizens?

6 A Principal Component Analysis extracted two factors. Items 1 and 2 were the main components

of the first factor, thus denoting a perception of agglomeration problems in terms of centrality and spillover effects. Items 3 and 4 were the main components of the second factor, thus pointing to a view considering spillover problems as largely exaggerated in the public debate. The fact that two factors were extracted suggests that these two views are unrelated.

132 DEBATE

Table 5 shows that in neither of the four agglomerations, is there much support for extensive reorganization of the institutional structure. The solutions proposed to respondents were ordered in decreasing degree of constraint for individual com-munes, with the last item being in fact the status quo – clearly favored in all ag-glomerations studied here. It is interesting to note that the support for amalgama-tions is highest in the Lugano agglomeration. This is probably an effect of the ongo-ing cantonal program to reduce the number of communes by means of amalgamation; apparently the acceptance for such solutions has increased as the program goes along.

Table 5: Attitudes Towards Proposals of Institutional Reforms in Agglomeration “To solve problems of cooperation be-tween communes, would you prefer…”


“Amalgamation of the core city with sur-rounding communes”

11.0% 12.4% 7.4% 22.8% 13.4%

“Create a new agglomeration-wide institu-tion”

8.8% 12.4% 10.0% 6.8% 9.5%

“Compel the communes to cooperate if necessary”

38.7% 14.7% 18.8% 30.4% 25.7%

“Leave it to communes whether to coop-erate or not” (status quo)

41.1% 58.6% 60.7% 39.4% 49.9%

Don’t know, no answer .4% 1.8% 3.2% .6% 1.5%Total (N=) 511

100% 498

100% 501

100% 500

100% 2010 100%

What are the factors that explain the attitude of respondents towards favoring re-form over the status quo? Besides differences between agglomerations (Lugano residents being most in favor of changing the status quo, Zurich residents least), there are significant effects of the type of commune of residence: residents of core cities as well as of suburban communes are more favorable to reform. At the indi-vidual-level, favoring reform is only associated with territorial attachment: respon-dents with strong local attachment are less in favor of changing the status quo. However, other individual-level variables, such as gender, education, age or posi-tion on the left-right scale, have no significant effect.

In sum, this analysis suggests that institutional reforms in Swiss agglomerations are rather unlikely to be supported in a near future. However, the important differ-ences between the agglomerations suggest, again, that attitudes towards reform are shaped locally.

Conclusion

The aim of this analysis was to go beyond the usual “functional” look at Swiss ag-glomerations, in order to examine whether they are also socially or politically rele-vant. First, we showed that territorial identities in agglomerations are glocal (i.e. local and global at the same time), and that they are relatively independent from institutional territories. In particular, the communes do not appear to be the primary identity-providers as they are often presented. Second, we found the existence of community ties that go beyond single communes. Third, we argued that perception


of agglomeration problems is locally specific, but strongly influenced by the exis-tence of community ties. Last, but not least, we showed that generally there is not much support for reform, although in some agglomerations this support is more developed than in others.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, functional integration of urban spaces seems to go along with social and political integration of these same spaces. Not only institutions, but also functions create identities and ties of community. However, functionally and institutionally induced identification and community are strongly intermingled: both are important parts in the mosaic of territorial commu-nities. Therefore, the answer lies not in building new institutions at the expense of existing ones, but rather in re-articulating or re-arranging them with each other. Second, the attitude towards institutional reform in agglomerations is strongly linked to the ways in which agglomerations and problems within them are per-ceived. These perceptions are agglomeration-specific, thereby highlighting the autonomy – but also the responsibility – that local societal forces have on this topic. This means that, on the one hand, each agglomeration must find its own ways of articulating institutions and identities, but that, on the other hand, there is enough leeway for the local political debate to influence and shape this process. In this sense, institutional reform in agglomerations must be understood as the process of self-constitution of a political community.

References BASSAND, Michel, JOYE, Dominique, et Martin SCHULER (dir.) (1988). Les enjeux de

l’urbanisation = Agglomerationsprobleme in der Schweiz. Bern: Lang. DUPOIRIER, Elisabeth (1998). “Les identités régionales”, in: Elisabeth DUPOIRIER (dir.)

Régions à la croisée des chemins: perspectives françaises et enjeux européens. Paris: Presses de sciences po, pp. 185-200.

GESER, Hans (1999). “Die Gemeinden in der Schweiz”, in Ulrich KLÖTI et al. (Hrsg.) Hand-buch der Schweizer Politik = Manuel de la politique suisse. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, S. 421-468.

JOYE, Dominique, HUISSOUD, Thérèse, et Martin SCHULER (1995). Habitants des quar-tiers, citoyens de la ville? Zurich: Seismo.

JOYE, Dominique (1988). Le système des communes suisses: approche typologique du mo-dèle centre-périphérie. Berne: Office fédéral de la statistique.

KÜBLER, Daniel et al. (2001). Vers des métropoles démocratiques? Gouvernance et légiti-mité dans quatre agglomérations en Suisse. Lausanne: IREC-DA, EPFL. (A paraître)

LADNER, Andreas et al. (2000). Gemeindereform zwischen Handlungsfähigkeit und Legiti-mation. Bern: Universität Bern, Institut für Politikwissenschaft; Institut für Organisation und Personal.

LOWERY, David, DeHOOG, Hoogland, and William E. LYONS (1992). “Citizenship in the Empowered Locality: An Elaboration, a Critique and a Partial Test”, Urban Affairs Quar-terly 28(1): 69-103.

MARCH, James G., and Johan P. OLSEN (1995). Democratic Governance. New York: Free Press.

134 DEBATE

SCHULER, Martin (1994). Die Raumgliederungen der Schweiz = Les niveaux géographi-ques de la Suisse. Bern: Bundesamt für Statistik.

UNION DES VILLES SUISSES (Hrsg.) (1997). Die Stadt morgen = Demain les villes. Berne: Geiger.

WOOD, Robert C. (1958). “Metropolitan Government, 1975: An Extrapolation of Trends. The New Metropolis: Green Belts, Grass Roots or Gargantua?”, American Political Sci-ence Review 52(1): 108-122.

The Case of Fribourg: A Model for Switzerland? Some Notes on a Re-cent Institutional Innovation

Bernard DAFFLON, Centre for Studies in Public Sector Economics, University of Fribourg Jean RUEGG, Institute of Geography, University of Fribourg

Introduction This article reports on an experiment that started in the Canton of Fribourg with the introduction of the cantonal law on agglomerations (LAgg) of 19 September 1995. This law has been marketed throughout the country as innovative for solving the persistent problems of urban areas: free riding, spillovers, and congestion costs due to commuters. This experiment originated from the observation that the existing institutional arrangements for inter-communal co-operation were not adequate for urban areas, although they have been widely used by neighboring municipalities mainly to gain economies of scale. The objective of the 1995 LAgg is to propose a new institutional framework addressing the specific situation of agglomerations.

After five years of debate and reluctance, a first experiment is about to start within the agglomeration called “Grand Fribourg” and including nine municipalities around the center town.1 A constituent assembly, designated by the communes in June 2001, will have the task of writing the statutes of the agglomeration, including its organization, the assignment of functions and its funding. It is not yet possible to propose a first estimation of the pros and cons in the implementation of the LAgg, because the actual situation is at a starting point in defining the agglomeration’s future policies, and also because the law itself presents the constituent assembly with several choices. To address this situation, this paper is organized in three sec-tions. In the first section, we propose a tentative framework defining a theoretical (“ideal”) agglomeration. This model is used in section two to compare the options of the LAgg with respect to its functions, funding, authority and democracy. The third section aims at answering the title question.

1 These communes are Fribourg – the capital town of the canton with 31 000 inhabitants –, Belfaux,

Corminboeuf, Givisiez, Granges-Paccot, Grolley, Marly and Villars-sur-Glâne (which are French-speaking communes in the district of Sarine), Düdingen and Tafers (two German-speaking communes in the district of Singine). These ten communes consist of approximately 66 000 inhabitants.


An Idealized Agglomeration

The debate on agglomerations usually stems from the fact that the political borders of local governments (the institutional territory) do no longer coincide with the eco-nomic boundaries required for an efficient provision of many local public goods (the functional territory), and certainly not with the relational territory (Rüegg 1996: 15ff.), which arises out of the residents’ private life as they consume, commute or migrate. The main matter of concern is the partial reorganization of these three cir-cles of the deciders (the communes), the beneficiaries (the users) and the (tax)payers in a new, coherent public institution.

Several financial or spatial solutions are possible to restore the coincidence be-tween the three circles. If we abstract from financial transfers, the “idealized ag-glomeration” is based on the spatial reorganization of the three territories. Within the range of the possible statutes for inter-governmental local co-operation (Della Santa 1996: 139), it is positioned between the traditional association of communes and the amalgamation of communes. The model is based on a theorem stating five propositions:

1) The agglomeration is a “selective” amalgamation of communes: the re-assignment of functions concerns only a limited number of local public services, explicitly indicated.

2) It has its own financial resources (taxes and user charges), which are independent of the budgets of the communes lying within the agglomeration’s limits.

3) Members of the political authorities of the agglomeration (execu-tive and legislative councils) are elected following the same rules as those for the election of the communal executives and the legisla-tive (local parliament) in the canton of reference.

4) Democratic rights, especially initiative and referendum, in the ag-glomeration follow the same rules as in the communes of the canton of reference.

5) The electoral ward in the agglomeration includes in a single account all the resident citizens of the communes within the perimeter of the agglomeration; it is not the addition of local jurisdictions.

This theoretical, spatial organization of the agglomeration does not cover the entire national territory as in a continuous web. Thus, it is part of the local layer and does not create a new intermediary level of government.2 At the horizontal level, there are two types of local governments: the communes and the agglomerations (the lat-ter for a limited number of specific functions only). In the vertical relations between the communes and the canton, the agglomeration replaces the communes for the specific functions that have been assigned to it.

2 This interpretation conforms to the European Charter of Local Self-Government (Council of Europe 1986), in particular article 10 paragraph 1. It is also generally accepted in fiscal federalism and decentralisation theories.

136 DEBATE

Following proposition 1 of the theorem, the powers given to the agglomerations should normally be exclusive. A first concern is the problem of overlapping respon-sibilities. For clarity and to avoid any tendency towards a progressive dilution of responsibility, powers should be well defined and the limits of any function stated explicitly. Exclusive functions are not necessarily specific.3 Complementary actions by different authorities and co-ordination are required in certain fields and it is im-portant that in these cases the intervention of each authority takes place in accor-dance with clear legislative provisions.

The second concern stems from the relation between the agglomeration and the neighboring communes. The aim of the agglomeration is to merge the institutional and functional territories in order to obtain the best possible internalization of all spillovers for the public good it produces. However, since the limits are not tight, and free riding from outside residents cannot be ruled out: residual spillovers may remain. The agglomeration must be in a position to decide whether these effects are relevant or not. If they are, the agglomeration should have the power to obtain from the beneficiary communes a financial compensation at least proportional to the amount of the average cost.

In proposition 2, financial independence is necessary to promote fiscal account-ability. Propositions 3 and 4 have much simpler implications. Since electoral and democratic rules differ among cantons, these two propositions state in relative terms that the rules of election, initiative and referendum should be exactly the same for the agglomeration as for the communes in the canton of reference. Proposition 5 derives its logic from the definition of local public goods in the agglomeration. If these goods are collective in nature, their “benefit” can neither be attributed to indi-vidual residents nor divided among the communes within the agglomeration. The logic of collective action is therefore one of the total jurisdiction, and not an addi-tion of communes.

The 1995 Law on Agglomerations in the Canton of Fribourg The law on agglomerations in the Canton of Fribourg of September 19, 1995 gives to neighboring communes the power to organize in the form of a new institutional and functional territory, recognized as an independent unit in public law, on condi-tion that these municipalities: • have a common urban center; • are closely linked from the points of view of urban development, economy and

culture; • have at least 10 000 inhabitants altogether. The first and last conditions are easily fulfilled by the ten communes forming the agglomeration of the “Grand Fribourg”. The second condition is open to discussion,

3 For example, local public transport is an exclusive function of the communes within the organisa-

tional perimeter, but this function is not specific. Public transport is only a component of the much larger question of urban mobility, which also includes private traffic, pedestrian zones or streets, park-ing, and so on.


particularly with respect to the qualification of the “close links”, which has given rise to no less than eleven proposals of perimeter (Dafflon and Perritaz 2000b: 35-40).4

Whatever the solution will be, the great interest of the 1995 law lies in its open-endedness. It leaves to the communes a leeway in the institutional organization of the agglomeration. Five specifications give the upper and lower limits of choice, called Agglomax and Agglomin in Table 1. With Agglomax, the communes would totally use the innovative leeway given by the law; on the contrary Agglomin de-velops into an institution which is similar to the actual associations of communes. The open-ended specifications concern (1) the transfer of functions from the com-munes within the perimeter of the agglomeration to the agglomeration itself as a new institutional and functional territory; (2) its financial resources; (3) its authori-ties; (4) democracy and (5) the majority decision rules. These specifications are ana-lyzed in the following sections; but only the differences between the three possible choices are taken into consideration. Table 1: The “Idealized” Agglomeration, Agglomax and Agglomin possible choice specifications

“Idealized” agglomeration

Agglomax Agglomin

1. Functions exclusive policy co-ordination principal–agent

yes yes yes

yes yes yes

yes yes no

2. Financial resources taxes transfers user charges pricing

yes yes yes yes

no yes yes yes

no yes yes no

3. Elected authorities executive legislative

yes yes

yes yes

no no

4. Democratic rights initiative

yes: 1/10 of the citizens in the ag-glomeration

yes: 1/10 of the citizens in the ag-glomeration or 1/3 of the communes

yes: 1/10 of the citizens in the ag-glomeration or 1/3 of the communes

facultative referendum yes: as for the initiative

yes: as for the initiative

yes: as for the initiative

compulsory referendum yes yes yes 5. Majority rule of vote:

initiative voters

double majority

double majority

facultative referendum voters voters voters compulsory referendum voters double majority double majority

Source: adapted from Dafflon and Perritaz (2000b: 33)

4 The provisional perimeter of the “Grand Fribourg” agglomeration has been fixed by the cantonal

government in July 2000. See note 1.

138 DEBATE

Functions

Policy co-ordination and exclusive functions exist in the three columns of Table 1 along the lines explained for proposition 1 of the theorem. The representatives of the communes in the constituent assembly of the agglomeration will have to decide on the exclusivity of the functions transferred to the agglomeration, and to which extent these functions are specific. Of course, the less they are, the more emphasis on policy co-ordination is needed. This is by no means simple, because the choice has to trade-off full authority (for the transferred tasks) and persuasion (for co-ordination), with no legal sanction given when co-ordination is not respected by the communes. The law is open to any solution and sets no barrier for an optimal com-bination of the institutional and functional territories in the new jurisdiction.

In addition, because perfect coincidence between the three circles of deciders, users and payers is not always possible when one starts from existing communal jurisdictions, residual spillovers with regard to a particular exclusive function may remain for neighboring communes. The law proposes a “principal–agent” solution that gives to the agglomeration the capacity of providing these services at a cost-covering price, as an elegant way of internalizing fringe spillovers. Table 1 indi-cates that the Agglomin might ignore this opportunity: but this issue is more theo-retical that real because the agglomeration would be a loser if it abandoned this avenue. Two difficulties exist. (i) The law requires that the statutes of the agglom-eration specify from the outset which particular tasks could be provided outside in a contractual form. This is a restrictive requirement indeed, for such future situations may not be known at the beginning and subsequent changes in the statutes are al-ways intricate. (ii) The “principal–agent” solution for fringe spillovers requires the contractual consent of the communes outside the agglomeration; yet the law does not encompass free riding behavior, a favorite in any urban context.

A fundamental question remains about the constitution of an agglomeration. Ac-cording to the law, an agglomeration starts with the definition of a provisional pe-rimeter listing the communes which could be included in the new jurisdiction. Then, a constituent assembly analyses the possible future tasks of the agglomeration and its resources. In other words, the definition of the tasks follows the definition of the limits. This has given rise to the opposition from communes which wanted to know the detailed arrangements before starting. According to the canon of fiscal federal-ism, this sequence should be reversed. The optimal size of a local jurisdiction is closely related to the function assigned to it on the basis of criteria such as econo-mies of scale, spillovers, congestion costs, preferences, information and organiza-tion costs (King 1995: 55ff.). The relevant factor is population; local boundaries are the variables, so that the optimal size in terms of population is obtained by widening the service boundaries. Or, if an agglomeration has the ambition of providing new tasks and services within an enlarged territory, it cannot simply aggregate existing associations of communes: multi-purpose associations are legally possible and exist already, but they have not been able to solve the specific problems of urban areas. Thus, to set up an agglomeration, one should consider simultaneously the assign-


ment of functions and its perimeter.5 Close attention should be paid in the law and in the constituent assembly to practical solutions and arbitration when the tasks of the agglomeration and those of the existing associations of communes are concurrent and partly overlap.

Financial Resources

A weak point of the new law is the absence of taxation powers in Agglomax and Agglomin in comparison to the “idealized” solution. The main financial resources are annual transfers from the communes. This solution creates a strong financial dependence of the agglomeration on the communes within its boundaries. It softens the fiscal accountability of its authorities. For the sharing formula, current transfers from the communes imply that it is possible to assign the benefits of the service provision to each of them individually. But this runs against the logic of local public goods in the agglomeration. By definition, local provision is collective because it is not possible to individualize the beneficiaries, and therefore it is not possible to sum the benefits accruing to the residents of a single commune. Financial resources ought to be general within the agglomeration. True, transfers based on a per capita basis could be a proxy for generality. Thus, three characteristics of the financial resources are important: general, independent from other governments and promot-ing fiscal accountability. Limited taxation powers, taken from the communes and given to the agglomeration, meet this triple requirement. General current financial transfers do not.

The absence of “pricing” for the Agglomin is coherent with the fact that the ag-glomeration may opt out of the contractual provision of particular functions for communes outside the agglomeration – for example, when it estimates that fringe spillovers are not relevant.

Authorities

In Agglomin, the legislative and executive authorities are not elected. The members of the legislative council are nominated by the assembly or by the general council of each commune. The executive is appointed by the delegates themselves. This is typical of circular elections (Kirsch 1997: 286ff.), similar to the designation of the authorities of an association of communes.

Democratic Rights and Rules of Vote

The three forms of agglomeration guarantee democratic rights in terms of initiative, facultative and compulsory referenda. However, the implementation in Agglomax and Agglomin differs from the idealized model. In the model and in the law, the electorate constitute a single entity and refers to the total territory of the agglomera-tion. It is not the addition of communal electorates. This is the recognition that an agglomeration exists only when it provides exclusive functions for its entire terri-tory because the collective dimension of the services is larger than individual com-

5 It is interesting to note that, in the law on the communes of the Canton of Fribourg, the statutes of an association of communes must spell out in advance the exact function that shall be provided. This requirement, however, does not exist for the agglomerations.

140 DEBATE

munes within its limits. The spatial reference for the votes coincides with the terri-tory of the functions. Yet, this logic is not fully respected here. Initiatives can be taken or facultative referendum demanded not only by the citizens, but also by the executive councils of one third of the communes within the perimeter of the ag-glomeration. Initiatives and compulsory referenda succeed only with the double majority of the voters and of the communes. In these democratic processes, the ag-glomeration is not an institutional and functional single territory: in fact, it is viewed as the addition of electoral wards, one for each commune.

Conclusion The 1995 law on agglomerations in the Canton of Fribourg proposes at the same time: • with the Agglomax: a challenging institutional innovation for urban service pro-vision at a supra-communal level in urban areas. It is a form of selective amalgama-tion of communes for the local functions that are explicitly and exclusively trans-ferred to this larger jurisdiction. • with the Agglomin: a conservative, and not very promising, approach to urban problems that is very closed to the actual multi-purposes associations of communes proposed by the law on communes. In its present form, “Agglomax” may serve to initiate reforms in the functional and institutional organization of urban areas in Switzerland. Yet, to transform this initia-tive into a “model”, three challenges should be answered. First, following the logic of local public goods, the assignment of functions and the boundaries of the ag-glomeration should be designed in a simultaneous time momentum. Second, for financial independence and accountability, the agglomeration should receive tax powers. Third, once in activity and for the assigned functions, the agglomeration should be one single electoral ward because it is a unique functional territory. Solv-ing these three challenges would place the agglomeration, for a limited number of explicit functions, in a position analogue to what exists for the communes.

References COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1986). European Charter of Local Self-Governments and Explana-

tory. Strasbourg. DAFFLON Bernard, et Steve PERRITAZ. (2000). De la définition de l’agglomération à la

délimitation de son périmètre. Fribourg: Université de Fribourg, Faculté des SES. (Wor-king Paper, 340)

DAFFLON Bernard, et Jean RÜEGG (2001). Aujourd’hui communes, demain aggloméra-tion? Réflexions sur l’agglomération à partir du cas fribourgeois. Université de Fribourg. (Miméo, à paraître)

DELLA SANTA, Monica (1996). Dalla collaborazione alla fusione: analisi degli aspetti economici, istituzionali e sociologici del Comune. Vico Morcote.

KING, Desmond (1995). “A Model of Optimum Local Authority Size”, in Giancarlo POLA et al. (eds.). Developments in Local Government Finance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 55-76.


KIRSCH, Guy (1997). Neue Politische Ökonomie. Düsseldorf: Werner Verlag. (Fourth Edition) Loi du 19 septembre 1995 sur les agglomérations (LAgg), RS Fribourg 140.2. Loi du 25 septembre 1980 sur les communes (LCo), RS Fribourg 140.1. RUEGG, Jean (1996). “Champ du MT”, in Stéphane DECOUTERE et al. (dir.). Management

territorial. Lausanne: PPUR, pp. 11-24.

Die Agglomeration im schweizerischen Föderalismus

Walter SCHENKEL, synergo, Zürich, und Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universi-tät Zürich

Ausgangslage Die Problemursachen in Agglomerationsgebieten sind in der funktionalen und sozi-alen Segregation zu suchen. Frey (1997) fasst diese mit den vier Teufelskreisen Verkehr (Verkehrszunahme bei Rückgang des Anteils des öffentlichen Verkehrs), Umwelt und Bodennutzung (sinkende Lebensqualität und Verdrängung von Wohn- und Arbeitsraum), öffentliche Finanzen (weniger Steuereinnahmen bei hohen Defizi-ten, Leistungsabbau und Steuererhöhungen) sowie Wohnen und Arbeiten (Unteraus-lastung von Flächen und Wohnraum) zusammen. In Bezug auf konkrete Massnah-men sieht Frey die Lösung in der Kostenwahrheit des Verkehrs, in der erschlies-sungsgerechten Raumplanung, in der innerstädtischen Verdichtung, in der Deregu-lierung auf dem Wohnungsmarkt, in der Integration von Problemgruppen sowie in der Schaffung von funktionalen Agglomerationsgebieten. Diese Massnahmen wer-den aber auf sich warten lassen, sofern nicht die drei grundsätzlichen Problemdi-mensionen im dreistufigen Föderalismus der Schweiz angegangen werden: a) In Bezug auf die territoriale Dimension liegt die Vermutung nahe, dass mehr Zusam-menarbeit zwischen den Staatsebenen nötig ist, um die komplexen, zunehmend grenzüberschreitenden Probleme effektiver und effizienter lösen zu können. Denk-bar sind hier auch Kantons- und Gemeindefusionen. b) Auf der Akteurdimension ist heute ein vermittelndes und koordinatives Rollenverständnis der übergeordneten staatlichen Instanzen gefordert. c) Auf der Policydimension muss vermehrt zwi-schen den einzelnen Politikbereichen koordiniert werden; die Rolle der Planungs- bzw. Koordinationsinstanzen ist zu stärken.

Mit dem Bundesbeschluss über eine neue Bundesverfassung vom 18. Dezember 1998 wurde in Artikel 50 die verfassungsrechliche Voraussetzung geschaffen, die besondere Situation der Städte und Agglomerationen über alle drei Staatsebenen hinweg besser zu berücksichtigen. Gerade die zur Zeit diskutierten Strukturrefor-men im schweizerischen Föderalismus werden vermehrt unter dem Aspekt der Ag-glomerationsproblematik beurteilt (siehe zu Grossregionen: Schuler et al. 1999; siehe zu Neuer Finanzausgleich und neuen Kooperationsformen: Schenkel und Ser-dült 1999). Formell hat sich aber für die Stellung der Agglomerationen in der Schweiz nichts geändert; ähnlich wie die Ausgestaltung der Gemeindeautonomie untersteht auch die formelle Schaffung einer Agglomerationsebene der kantonalen

142 DEBATE

Staatshoheit. Anders sieht es in der politischen Praxis aus: So ist in der Neuausrich-tung von Bundespolitiken die Absicht erkennbar, den Agglomerationen eine zu-nehmend prominente Stellung einzuräumen (BRP 1996; seco und BRP 1999). Auch vertikale wie horizontale Zusammenarbeitsgremien von Bund und Kantonen befas-sen sich verstärkt mit Agglomerationsfragen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund geht dieser Diskussionsbeitrag der Frage nach, wie der Bund auf die neuen Anforderungen in der Agglomerationspolitik eingeht, welche neuen Tendenzen in der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Bund, Kantonen und Städten aus-zumachen sind und welche Herausforderungen sich für Forschung und Politik stellen.

Bundespolitik Ab Mitte der neunziger Jahre nahm der Bundesrat die Agglomerationspolitik auf seine Traktandenliste. Im Kernstadtbericht (seco und BRP 1999) und im Bericht über die Grundzüge der Raumordnung Schweiz (BRP 1996) stellte er fest, dass die Agglomerationen der Schweiz erhebliche Zentrumslasten zu tragen haben. Er rea-gierte damit auf vorliegende Forschungsresultate (z.B. NFP 25 “Stadt und Ver-kehr”) und auf Forderungen seitens der Städte (Kritik des Städteverbands am Neuen Finanzausgleich, Postulat der nationalrätlichen Kommission für Wirtschaft und Ab-gaben). Als Folge davon liess er die Handlungsmöglichkeiten des Bundes in einzel-nen Politikbereichen untersuchen: Im Zentrum stand die Raumordnungspolitik. Dort wurden neue Schwerpunkte bei der gegenseitigen Ergänzung von Kernstädten, Ag-glomerationsgebieten und ländlichen Regionen gesetzt. Im weiteren wurde die Stärkung des Städtesystems Schweiz im Hinblick auf den europäischen Standort-wettbewerb vorgeschlagen. Die neuen Ziele und Prioritäten sollen in Zusammenar-beit mit Kantonen und Städten aktiv kommuniziert und umgesetzt werden.

Aber auch in einzelnen Sektoralpolitiken wurde eine bessere Berücksichtigung urbaner Bedürfnisse geprüft (Infras 1998; seco und BRP 1999): In der Verkehrspolitik könnte der Bund z.B. im Rahmen der Verkehrstrennungsverordnung oder im Rahmen des Umweltschutzgesetzes die Städte direkt unterstützen. Mit einer Revision der Verkehrstrennungsverordnung wären mehr Mittel aus der zweckgebundenen Treibstoffzollkasse für den Agglomerationsverkehr verfügbar; Ende Mai 2001 schlug eine Expertenkommission des Bundes den sogenannten “Benzinfünfer” für den Agglomerationsverkehr vor (NZZ, 30. Mai 2001). Ausserdem müssten die Rahmenbedingungen für stadtspezifische Lenkungsabgaben geschaffen werden (Road Pricing). In der Umweltpolitik könnte den Städten mehr Handlungsspielraum für das Erreichen der Immissionsgrenzwerte eingeräumt werden. Zudem sollen betroffene Städte und Gemeinden mehr Mitsprache bei der Überarbeitung kantonaler Massnahmenpläne erhalten. In der Sozialpolitik sollte der Bund eine Harmonisierung der Sozialhilfestandards mit den Kantonen und Städten vorantreiben. Der sozialpoliti-sche Dialog zwischen Bund und Städten ist – ähnlich wie in der Drogenpolitik – zu institutionalisieren. Generell haben die Städte in der Sozialpolitik trotz sehr grosser Vollzugslasten und -leistungen kaum Mitsprache in der Phase der Politikformulie-rung auf Bundesebene. In der Finanzpolitik könnten die geplanten Bundesregelungen zum Finanzausgleich im Sinne eines Rahmengesetzes auch auf den innerkantonalen


Finanz- und Lastenausgleich ausgedehnt werden. Es wären so Anreize für die bessere Berücksichtigung der zentralörtlichen Leistungen von Kernstädten zu setzen.

Die Kantone zeigen sich erfahrungsgemäss skeptisch gegenüber einer Stärkung der Agglomerationspolitik auf Bundesebene. Es ist deshalb im Hinblick auf eine mögliche Umsetzung der vorgeschlagenen Massnahmen eine vordringliche Aufga-be des Bundes, die vertikale Zusammenarbeit und Koordination zwischen Bund, Kantonen und Städten zu fördern.

Neues Kooperationsverständnis zwischen Kantonen und Städten? Es kann vorweggenommen werden, dass die Forderungen aus Forschung und Poli-tik nach einer Stärkung der Zusammenarbeit in der Agglomerationspolitik nicht ohne Wirkung geblieben sind. Bei Bund, Kantonen und Städten hat seit Mitte der neunziger Jahre der Wille zu mehr Kooperation eindeutig zugenommen. Das aktu-ellste Beispiel ist die seit Beginn 2001 wirkende Tripartite Agglomerationskonfe-renz. Nach langem Seilziehen zwischen Bund, der Konferenz der Kantonsregierun-gen (KdK), dem Städteverband (SSV) und dem Gemeindeverband (SGV) wurde beschlossen, diese Zusammenarbeitsform zu institutionalisieren. Die Federführung liegt bei der KdK. Bund, Kantone und Städte bzw. Gemeinden delegieren je acht Vertreter in den Vorstand. Ziel ist es, Informationen auszutauschen und eine ganz-heitliche nationale Agglomerationspolitik zu formulieren. Die von Bund, Kantonen und Städten gemeinsam getragene Koordinations- und Dienstleistungsplattform Sucht und Drogen diente in gewisser Weise als Vorbild, obwohl sie nur auf einen einzelnen Politikbereich ausgerichtet ist. Die Plattform hat seit Mitte der neunziger Jahre wesentlich dazu beigetragen, das Drogenproblem in den grossen Schweizer Städten zu mildern.

Es gibt aber auch noch andere Beispiele, die auf mehr Zusammenarbeit in der Agglomerationspolitik hindeuten: Die kantonalen Direktorenkonferenzen sind hori-zontale, politische Zusammenarbeitsformen zwischen allen kantonalen Departe-mentsvorstehern in den jeweiligen Politikbereichen. Auch sie betreiben zunehmend Agglomerationspolitik und haben sehr rasch auf die Anregung reagiert, Städtever-treter einzuladen oder gar in den Vorstand aufzunehmen (z.B. Sozial-, Verkehrs- und Baudirektorenkonferenzen). Die Plattformen Aargau-Zürich (PAZ) und Aar-gau-Solothurn (PASO) sind eine breit angelegte, vertikale Zusammenarbeitsform zwischen den Kantonen Aargau, Zürich und Solothurn. Regierungsratsdelegationen, Präsidenten grösserer Städte und Gemeinden sowie die Präsidenten der Regional-planungsverbände suchen abgestimmte Lösungen für grenzüberschreitende Agglo-merationsprobleme. Ähnlich die Trinationale Agglomeration Basel: Dort arbeiten die Nordwestschweizer Kantone mit den Gemeinden und dem angrenzenden Aus-land zusammen. In erster Linie werden Verkehrs- und Planungsfragen angegangen.

Was diesen Gremien noch fehlt, sind genügend eigene Ressourcen und Ent-scheidungskompetenzen. Dies liegt zum Teil auch daran, dass die territorial gebun-denen Organisationsstrukturen der Kantone, Städte und Gemeinden nicht auf jene der Zusammenarbeitsgremien angepasst sind. So gehen Budgetpläne kaum auf die grenzüberschreitende Kooperation ein.

144 DEBATE

Wo steht die Agglomerationspolitik heute?

Um eine Zwischenbilanz ziehen zu können, wird der heutige Stand der schweizeri-schen Agglomerationspolitik mit jenen Empfehlungen verglichen, welche 1993 im Rahmen einer Studie des NFP 25 “Stadt und Verkehr” entwickelt wurden (Klöti et al. 1993).

Die Empfehlung, es brauche eine ausgeglichene Finanzpolitik des Bundes und der Kantone, ist teilweise erfüllt: In verschiedenen Kantonen (z.B. Zürich, Bern) wurden Finanzausgleichsprogramme eingeführt, welche städtische Probleme etwas besser berücksichtigen. Wie weit in dieser Hinsicht die Neuordnung des Finanzaus-gleichs zwischen Bund und Kantonen gehen wird, ist noch offen. Immerhin finden die entsprechenden Diskussionen nicht mehr unter Ausschluss der Städte statt.

Die Empfehlung, die vertikale Zusammenarbeit zwischen Bund, Kantonen, Städten und Gemeinden zu stärken, ist teilweise erfüllt: Die Tripartite Agglomerati-onskonferenz ist institutionalisiert und die kantonalen Direktorenkonferenzen haben städtische Vertretungen aufgenommen. Nach wie vor umstritten sind die Direktkon-takte zwischen Bund und Städten.

Die Empfehlung, dass die bestehende urbane Regionalpolitik des Bundes nicht nach unten delegiert werden sollte, ist erfüllt: In Artikel 50 der neuen Bundesverfas-sung ist die Agglomerationspolitik des Bundes formell verankert und die Berichte über die Raumordnung Schweiz und die Kernstädte zeugen vom Willen, die Ag-glomerationspolitik auf Bundesebene zu stärken.

Die Empfehlung für eine bessere Koordination zwischen den Politikbereichen ist teilweise erfüllt: Auf Bundesebene haben reorganisatorische Massnahmen auf Departementsstufe (z.B. UVEK) zu einer besseren Koordination zwischen agglo-merationsrelevanten Politikbereichen wie Raumplanung, Verkehr und Umwelt bei-getragen. Auch der Raumordnungsbericht und der Kernstadtbericht versuchen die verschiedenen Politikbereiche besser zu koordinieren. Von der Tripartiten Agglo-merationskonferenz wird ähnliches erwartet.

Die Empfehlung zur Schaffung von sogenannten Agglomerationskonferenzen ist teilweise erfüllt: Auf kantonaler bzw. lokaler Ebene gibt es nur wenige Beispiele (z.B. Kanton Freiburg, Verein Region Bern). Hinzu kamen aber grenzüberschrei-tende Gremien wie die Plattformen Aargau-Zürich und Aargau-Solothurn sowie die Trinationale Agglomeration Basel. Die oben erwähnte Tripartite Agglomerations-konferenz hat nationalen Charakter und ist kein regionales Entscheidungsgremium, wie bei dieser Empfehlung angestrebt.

Die Empfehlung, die kommunale Führung in Städten und Agglomerationsge-meinden zu stärken, ist nicht erfüllt: Zum Teil hat sich zwar das politische Klima zwischen Kernstadt, Agglomerationsgemeinden und Kanton verbessert. Trotzdem ist bei Stadt- und Gemeindebehörden das Bewusstsein noch gering, die Zusammen-arbeit auch ressourcenmässig auszubauen.

Es lässt sich den Schluss ziehen, dass in den letzten zehn Jahren die Agglomera-tionsproblematik verstärkt in die politischen Agenden auf allen föderalen Ebenen eingedrungen ist. Im föderalistischen Sinne gelöst sind die Probleme damit noch nicht, obwohl sich bereits neue Herausforderungen für Politik, Verwaltung und For-schung ankündigen.


Städtenetze schaffen In der bisherigen Agglomerationsforschung standen einzelne Gebiete bzw. die wirt-schaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Zusammenhänge zwischen Kernstadt, Ag-glomerationsgemeinden und umliegenden Regionalzentren im Vordergrund. Anders als im Ausland ist in der Schweiz das Städtenetz in seiner Gesamtheit als interde-pendentes Gebilde mit den unterschiedlichsten Personen-, Waren-, Kommunikati-ons- und Dienstleistungsströmen noch wenig zum Thema gemacht worden. Frank-reich, Deutschland und die Niederlande beschäftigen sich schon seit längerem mit strategischen Städtenetzen (Danielzyk und Priebs 1996). Dabei geht es nicht nur um die funktionalen Beziehungen, sondern zunehmend um den Aufbau von eigentli-chen Steuerungsgremien. Für die Schweiz stellten Muggli et al. (1992), Racine et al. (1995) und Rumley et al. (2000) eine funktionale Hierarchie zwischen den städti-schen Zentren fest. Die wertschöpfungsintensiven Funktionen und Arbeitsplätze befinden sich in den fünf grossen Agglomerationen, insbesondere in Zürich. Dieser Trend wird auch in Zukunft weitergehen. In der Bundespolitik wird die Stärkung des schweizerischen Städtenetzes v.a. als Strategie im Rahmen des Netzes europäi-scher Städte verstanden. Der Bundesrat geht davon aus, dass die Vernetzung der Städte untereinander und mit dem ländlichen Raum die Ungleichgewichte und Kon-fliktpotentiale abbaut. Sollte es politischer Wille sein, der funktionalen Zentralisie-rung entgegenzuwirken, dann spielt die Steuerung der Wechselbeziehungen zwischen den Agglomerationen und der Veränderungspotentiale innerhalb der Agglomeratio-nen eine Schlüsselrolle. Eine so verstandene Stärkung des Städtesystems bedeutet aber, dass die Städte untereinander stärker zusammenarbeiten und ihr Einfluss auf Bundesebene deutlich zunimmt. Dies wäre im Hinblick auf die Agglomerationspo-litik des Bundes und auf die Förderung der vertikalen Zusammenarbeit zu begrüs-sen. Letztlich geht es um eine Stärkung der urbanen Schweiz im Städtesystem Euro-pas und nicht um eine Schwächung der Kantone im schweizerischen Föderalismus.

Bibliographie BRP (1996). Bericht über die Grundzüge der Raumordnung Schweiz. Bern: EDMZ. DANIELZYK, Rainer und Axel PRIEBS (Hrsg.) (1996). Städtenetze: raumordnerisches

Handlungsinstrument mit Zukunft? Bonn: Verlag Irene Kuron. FREY, René L. (1997). “Städtische Wirtschaft, Mobilität und Umwelt”, in SCHWEIZERI-

SCHER STÄDTEVERBAND (Hrsg.). Die Stadt morgen = Demain les villes. Publikation zum hundertjährigen Jubiläum des Schweizerischen Städteverbandes 1897-1997. Bern: Geiger, S. 19-27.

INFRAS (1998). Erneuerung und Stärkung der Städte: Auswirkungen der verschiedenen Bundespolitiken. Eine Diskussionsgrundlage. Bern: BRP.

KLÖTI, Ulrich et al. (1993). Die Stadt im Bundesstaat: Alleingang oder Zusammenarbeit? Zürich: Rüegger.

MUGGLI, Christoph, und Hans-Rudolf SCHULZ (1992). Grossstädte und Städtehierarchie in der Schweiz. Zürich: NFP 25. (Bericht 21 des NFP “Stadt und Verkehr”)

146 DEBATE

RACINE, Jean-Bernhard et al. (1995). Système productif et structures urbaines: le rôle mo-teur des villes et des agglomérations dans l’économie helvétique. Zurich: PNR 25. (Rap-port 13 du PNR “Ville et Transport”)

RUMLEY, Pierre-Alain et al. (2000). Réseau de villes suisses. Berne: ODT. SCHENKEL, Walter, und Uwe SERDÜLT (1999). “Bundesstaatliche Beziehungen”, in Ulrich

KLÖTI et al. (Hrsg.). Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. Zürich: NZZ Verlag, S. 469-507. SCHULER, Martin et al. (1999). Die Grossregionen der Schweiz. Neuchâtel: OFS. SECO/BRP (1999). Bericht über die Kernstädte. Bern.

Conclusion: Conditions and Prospects for Metropolitan Governance in Switzerland

Daniel KÜBLER, Institut de recherche sur l’environnement construit, Ecole poly-technique fédérale de Lausanne, and Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Zürich Michel BASSAND, Institut de recherche sur l’environnement construit, Ecole poly-technique fédérale de Lausanne The second and last round of this debate on metropolitan governance focused on the Swiss context. The first two contributions aimed at depicting the conditions for governance of urban regions in Switzerland. The third and the fourth contribution discussed current initiatives aimed at improving governance of Swiss metropolitan areas. Resuming and concluding the main arguments of the contributions, it seems to us that there are two problematic issues with respect to current initiatives in Swit-zerland: the lack of a reflection on citizen participation, as well as the absence of debate on genuine political projects for metropolitan societies.

Conditions of Metropolitan Governance in Switzerland In their portrait of the urban phenomenon in Switzerland, Antonio Cunha and Mar-tin Schuler show that urbanization dynamics have profoundly changed since the 1970s. De-industrialization, growth of the service sector and internationalization have characterized the Swiss urban economies in the last three decades. Unlike other countries, this restructuring has not significantly affected the hierarchy of Swiss urban regions. On the contrary, tertiarization has strengthened the economic power of the five traditionally most important agglomerations: Zurich, Geneva, Ba-sle, Bern and Lausanne. Extending more and more on their hinterland, they now constitute genuine metropolitan regions. Taken together, they centralize the lion’s share of the socioeconomic and technological dynamics in Switzerland. At the same time, this metropolization process has also reshaped the internal structure of the Swiss urban agglomerations: urban sprawl has increased, and so has social segrega-tion. Meanwhile, the institutional structure of local and regional government in ur-ban areas largely remained unchanged since the early 20th century. Hence, there is


only little correspondence between institutional territories and functional spaces. Generally speaking, the institutional fragmentation of Swiss urban agglomerations is quite high. However, there is a surprisingly wide array of ways in which func-tional and institutional dynamics articulate: every agglomeration seems to be its own special case.

The specificity of the local context also appears in the second contribution by Daniel Kübler, Dominique Joye and Brigitte Schwab. Based on survey data, they provide a point of view that complements the ‘functional territory-perspective’. More precisely, they tackle the question to what extent Swiss agglomerations can be considered as socially and politically integrated entities. Their analysis shows that territorial identities and community ties in agglomerations exist relatively independ-ently from institutional boundaries. They further argue that this process of socio-political integration of agglomerations is parallel to their functional integration, and that it has significant impact on prospects of institutional reform: it shapes citizens’ perceptions of agglomeration problems and influences their attitude toward reform proposals. Although support for agglomeration reform is rather limited at present, there seems to be a significant autonomy for agglomeration communities in finding and shaping the ways in which institutions and identities can be articulated in order to build metropolitan governance.

The conditions of governance in Swiss agglomerations, such as depicted in these two contributions, can be summarized by two major elements. First, challenges in-duced by the metropolization process are surprisingly similar for agglomerations across Switzerland. As Cunha and Schuler show, these challenges result from a combination of various issues such as demographic dynamics (decline of the core cities), public finance (fiscal competition and financing of centrality services), urban planning (refurbishment of disaffected industrial zones), infrastructure management (transport, energy, communication), environmental issues (pollution), economic development (managing research and development for technological innovation), etc. If these multiple challenges are to be steered actively, rather than passively ex-perienced, there is probably no alternative to increasing governance capacity in ag-glomerations. As Kübler et al.’s analysis showed, this is not only justified in the managerial perspective of being better equipped for facing metropolitan problems. There is evidence that Swiss agglomerations, besides being functional areas, also start to show signs of sociopolitical communities that await the creation of proce-dures enabling them to express themselves.

Second, structures of governance in Swiss agglomerations appear as locally spe-cific networks of relatively independent actors. Cunha and Schuler argued that insti-tutional settings across agglomerations and metropolitan areas are impressively var-ied. This suggests that there will not be one best approach to handle urban chal-lenges, but the improvement of metropolitan governance must build on locally spe-cific arrangements, capable of producing coordination between a great variety of actors. The good news is, that there seems to be rather favorable conditions for this endeavor: perception of agglomeration problems and attitudes towards reorganiza-tion are locally determined and formed. This means that, at least as far as citizen

148 DEBATE

support is concerned, agglomerations do indeed possess significant leeway in find-ing their own path for improving governance.

Current Initiatives for Improving Metropolitan Governance in Switzerland Turning to current initiatives responding to agglomeration problems in Switzerland, Bernard Dafflon and Jean Rüegg’s as well as Walter Schenkel’s articles show that, indeed, adaptation to local circumstances and conditions seems to be a major thrust of efforts to improve metropolitan governance in the Swiss context. In their contri-bution, Bernard Dafflon and Jean Rüegg discuss the ongoing process of institutional reform in the agglomeration of Fribourg. Besides a reform project in the canton of Ticino, during which amalgamations of agglomeration communes are likely to oc-cur in the near future, the Fribourg project is one of the rare examples of a genu-inely consolidationist agglomeration reform in Switzerland. Although it is still in its beginnings, the Fribourg project has been widely regarded as a promising approach that could serve as a model for other agglomerations in Switzerland, as well. Daf-flon and Rüegg show, however, that unconditional enthusiasm is misplaced. By comparing it to a theoretically constructed “ideal” agglomeration institution, they show that the Fribourg reform project presents three major flaws. First, difficulties stem from defining a spatial perimeter for the new institution before assigning it concrete policy functions. The absence of taxation powers for the new agglomera-tion institution is seen as a second weak point. Finally, Dafflon and Rüegg are criti-cal of the foreseen procedures for citizen participation, due to the fact that they rep-resent basically an addition of communal electoral wards rather than agglomeration-wide democratic processes. They conclude that, unless these three problems are addressed, the Fribourg initiative cannot serve as a model for other agglomerations in Switzerland.

In the final contribution, Walter Schenkel examines current tendencies and the remaining challenges of recent responses to agglomeration problems in the three-tier Swiss political system. First, he shows that agglomeration problems were put on the Federal government’s agenda in the mid-1990s. The main response consisted in examining how specific urban needs could be respected in relevant federal policies, notably in the fields of transport, environment, social security and taxation. Second, Schenkel argues that the willingness for policy-coordination between the Federal, cantonal and communal governments with respect to agglomeration problems has increased in recent years. Several coordination structures emerged, where represen-tatives of federal, cantonal and city governments coordinate their activities – such as the Tripartite Agglomerationskonferenz. Schenkel insists that, as limited as these efforts may seem, agglomeration policy in Switzerland has come a long way. To-day, agglomeration issues are well established on the agenda of all governmental tiers. However, approaches towards increasing governance capacity in agglomera-tions are strongly oriented at the dynamics found in single policy sectors, and usu-ally aim at improving horizontal and vertical coordination among actors who are involved in formulating and implementing agglomeration-relevant public policies – which is also a way of adapting to local specificities. Nevertheless, Schenkel argues, this can only be the beginning, especially with respect to the current trend of grow-


ing interdependence between agglomerations. In the near future, he concludes, the central urban issue in Switzerland will no longer be to resolve conflicts between core cities and surrounding communes, but rather to strengthen the position of the whole Swiss urban system within the European city network.

Conclusion: Participation and Self-determination of Metropolitan Societies Current initiatives of metropolitan governance building in Switzerland seem to have become more respective of the conditions for realization. Indeed, as the past dec-ades showed, prospects for extensive reorganization of territorial institutions cannot be regarded as very promising. In this sense, more locally customized initiatives will probably emerge in various Swiss agglomerations in the near future. Nevertheless, in the light of the contributions to this debate, it seems to us that mainly two problematic issues transcend current initiatives of metropolitan governance in Switzerland.

First, there is a lack of debate on the architecture of metropolitan democracy. With respect to the Fribourg agglomeration reform, Dafflon and Rüegg argued that democratic rights and rules of vote remain strongly tributary to the communes as the main electoral wards. This is quite contradictory to the rationale of consolidation allegedly driving the Fribourg process, namely to merge the territories of commu-nity, institutions and functions. The absence of a thorough reflection on democracy and citizen involvement is even more urgently felt in the sectoral initiatives aimed at improving horizontal and vertical coordination for agglomeration-relevant poli-cies, pointed out by Schenkel. Indeed, these processes are largely propelled and debated by executive politicians and high civil servants, whereas citizens are gener-ally absent in the process. Of course, there are different theoretical arguments on the role of democracy and participation for building metropolitan governance. The pub-lic choice position (Frey and Eichenberger’s contribution) views democratic par-ticipation as a possibility to simulate market mechanisms for public goods, and thus ultimately as a prerequisite for efficient allocation of public resources. The consoli-dationist position (Lowery’s contribution) recently endorsed the argument devel-oped by participatory democracy theorists, that citizens’ involvement in public af-fairs is an important vector of community building and thus contributes to the vital-ity of metropolitan societies. Even though these lines of argument differ considera-bly, both approaches make clear that democratic features in metropolitan govern-ance are central issues when it comes to the question of the ultimate essence of met-ropolitan institutions. This aspect, it seems to us, is given only little attention in cur-rent Swiss initiatives for improving metropolitan governance. Sure enough, citizen participation has such a strong tradition in Switzerland that it is almost impossible to dismiss it in any kind of reform, especially at the local level. No one questions the idea that we need democracy in governing metropolitan areas – and luckily so, one should think. However, this taken-for-granted attitude toward democratic pro-cedures seems to prevent reflection on their ultimate aims and on how they fit into metropolitan governance building as a political project. Why do we need democracy and participation in resolving metropolitan problems is a question that is not often asked, and consequently less often answered.

150 DEBATE

Second, and related to this, current initiatives of improving governance in Swiss agglomerations seem to have a rather “managerial” focus. As Walter Schenkel argued in his contribution, most initiatives are concerned with solving problems within ag-glomerations, such as improving technical infrastructure, reducing the distortions of fiscal competition, financing centrality services, etc. In general, there is only little emphasis on the challenges that agglomerations face as a whole and that may request them to act and react as such. The public debate on metropolitan governance seems indeed to be dominated by “managerial” aspects of how to resolve internal conflicts and fine-tune internal mechanisms of coordination and cooperation. This prominence of “managerial” aspects is unfortunate, especially in the light of evidence showing that some sort of a metropolitan consciousness has emerged in parallel to functional integration of metropolitan areas (Kübler et al.’s analysis). Governance is about collectively steering society. However, in the current public debate on metropolitan governance in Switzerland, there is much more emphasis on steering than on the collective. It is mainly a debate about incrementally reacting to day-to-day prob-lems, and far too little a debate about visions on metropolitan societies. Indeed, building metropolitan governance is not only about improving public service deliv-ery in urban areas, it is also about metropolitan societies’ self-determination.

debate: metropolitan governance today · 2010-03-11 · debate: metropolitan governance today...

Documents