e l 1 / 60static.zybuluo.com/fanxy/wejwitry3t44jfgdfdo057mr/ch10.pdf · 2019-12-09 ·...

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Source: https://www.edmaps.com/charlemagne__empire_verdun_partition_843.jpg.

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ã¡5 µ[£2018¤§lmOtto I (912–973), Wilhelm II (1859–1941), and Adolf Hitler (1889–1945)"

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­.ïµ1870–1914

Data Source: Jorda-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database.

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1. î³Úî¤ 1.1 

Hobsbawm(1989): The Age Of Empire 1875–1914

The redistribution of economic power and initiative, that is to say on

Britain’s relative decline and the relative – and absolute – advance of the

USA and above all Germany. In principle, it is not really surprising that

Germany, its population rising from 45 to 65 millions, and the USA, growing

from 50 to 92 millions, should have overhauled Britain, both territorially

smaller and less populous.

The developed world was not only an aggregate of ‘national economies’.

Industrialization and the Depression turned them into a group of rival

economies, in which the gains of one seemed to threaten the position of

others.

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1. î³Úî¤ 1.1 

Hobsbawm(1989): Protectionism and Trade War

Protectionism seeks to barricade each

nation-state economy against the foreigner

behind a set of political fortifications, is

harmful to world economic growth.

Starting with Germany and Italy (textiles) in

the late 1870s, protective tariffs became a

permanent part of the international

economic scene, culminating in the early

1890s in the penal tariffs associated with

the names of MWline in France (1892) and

McKinley in the USA (1890).

Note: Average level of tariff in Europe,

1914. The data of U.S.A. is lowered from

49.5% (1890), 39.9% (1894), 57% (1897),

and 38% (1909). The data is orginal from

Sidney Pollard, Peaceful Conquest: The

Industrialization of Europe 1760?1970

(Oxford 1981), p. 259.

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Ô

Hobsbawm(1989): ‘Territorial expansion’, said an official of the US State

Department in 1900, ‘is but the by-product of the expansion of commerce.’

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2IµúÅÔK]

Source: Romer, D. 2012,

Advanced Macroeconomics,

McGraw Hill Higher Education.

British military spending as a

share of GNP (relative to the

mean of this series for the full

sample) and the long-term

interest rate.

Note: Wikiwand provides more

information of war involving

U.K.

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Note: “Debt Ratio of Four Countries: 1800 – 1950”, with data from Historical Public Debt Database(IMF). The dotted red line

for the American Civil War, the dotted blue line for WWI and WWII.

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Note: Annual growth rate of “Consumer prices” from BIS. The dotted lines indicate 1999 and 2008.

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Note: “Long-term interest rate statistics” from ECB. The dotted lines indicate 1999 and 2008.

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Source: Gros(2012). The right figure is the unit labor cost with 1999 as base year.

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Source: Holinski et al.(2012). Source: Wikipedia.

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Note: “Budget Deficit and Public Debt to GDP: 2009 and 2012”, from Wikipedia, original data from EuroStat.

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Source: Koo(2014).

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European Debt Crisis

2000s European sovereign debt crisis timeline

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Wiki: Causes of the crisis varied by country.

Ireland: private debts arising from a property bubble were transferred

to sovereign debt as a result of banking system bailouts and

government responses to slowing economies post-bubble.

Greece: high public sector wage and pension commitments were

connected to the debt increase.

Cyprus: European banks own a significant amount of sovereign debt,

such that concerns regarding the solvency of banking systems or

sovereigns are negatively reinforcing.

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ã¡5 µÚÕ"

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3. î«uÐ(¸ 3.3 îÅÅ

îÅÅÏmî³1À1*Ü

Source: Wikipedia.

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3. î«uÐ(¸ 3.3 îÅÅ

AéîÅÅÙ¦ü

EU emergency measures

European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)

European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)

Brussels agreement and aftermath

European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

European Fiscal Compact

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3. î«uÐ(¸ 3.3 îÅÅ

î«n­Å

Source: Shambaugh(2012).

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3. î«uÐ(¸ 3.3 îÅÅ

üÚÅ"î5

Limited Lender of Last

Resort

No Fiscal Union

No Banking Union

Sovereign-Bank Doom

Loop

Labor Immobility

Exit Risk

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 42 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.1 o´ÏÊ¢º

What is Secular Stagnation?

Source: Personal website of L. Summers.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 43 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.1 o´ÏÊ¢º

Signs of Secular Stagnation: Prolonged Low Growth

Source: Reflections on the new

‘Secular Stagnation hypothesis’.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 44 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.1 o´ÏÊ¢º

Signs of Secular Stagnation: Low Long-term Interest Rate

Source: CEA(2015), “Nominal 10-Year Yields”, Figure 4 and 10.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 45 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.1 o´ÏÊ¢º

One-Year and 10-Year U.S. Nominal Interest Rates

Source: CEA(2015), Figure 1, original data from Robert J. Shiller (Yale University) and FED.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 46 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.1 o´ÏÊ¢º

Global Interest Rate in History

Source: Schmelzing(2018).

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 47 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.2 $|dzû½Ï

Low Interest Rate and Liquidity Trap

First, if real rates are low in normal times, adverse macroeconomic shocks are more

likely to require negative real rates to restore a full-employment investment-savings

balance. In today’s low-inflation environment, this tends to undermine the effectiveness

of monetary policy.

Source: Krugmann(1999) “Thinking about the liquidity trap”.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 48 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.2 $|dzû½Ï

Low Interest Rate and Financial Instabiltiy

Second, low nominal and real interest rates undermine financial stability. According to

Summers(2014), there are three main channels:

increasing risk-taking as investors reach for yield;

promoting irresponsible lending;

making Ponzi financial structures more attractive.

According to Wikiwand, Hyman Minsky stated that in prosperous times, when corporate

cash flow rises beyond what is needed to pay off debt, a speculative euphoria develops,

and soon thereafter debts exceed what borrowers can pay off from their incoming

revenues, which in turn produces a financial crisis. This slow movement of the financial

system from stability to fragility, followed by crisis, is something for which Minsky is best

known, and the phrase “Minsky moment” refers to this aspect of Minsky’s academic

work.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 49 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.2 $|dzû½Ï

Puzzle of the Falling of Long-run Interest Rate

Source: CES(2015), Figure 5 “10-Year Treasury Rates and Historical Economist Forecasts”.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 50 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.2 $|dzû½Ï

Determination of Interest Rate

The real interest rate of home country:

r =1 + gcβ

− 1

The nominal interest rate for a closed economy:

i = r + πe

The nominal interest rate for an open economy:

i = i ∗ + Risk Premium

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 51 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.2 $|dzû½Ï

Derivation of Real Interest Rate from HOP

Given the discount factor β, the real interest rate r , and incomes of present and

future Q1,Q2 = (1 + gy )Q1, the Household Optimization Problem(HOP) is to

maximize the life-cycle utility (T = 1, 2):

MaxC1,C2

U = lnC1 + β lnC2

s.t. C1 + S = Q1

C2 = (1 + r)S + Q2

After solving the problem, we can get:

C2

C1= 1 + gc = β (1 + r)

r =1 + gcβ

− 1

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 52 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.3 (5Uî³5

ª³Ð"µ¥<NÄø

Source: Rachel and Smith(2016).

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 53 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.3 (5Uî³5

ª³Ð"µR&DÝ\M#£

Source: Rachel and Smith(2016).

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 54 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.3 (5Uî³5

AéÏÊ¢ü£

CEA(2015):

The goal of policy should not be to target a particular rate, but to support

long-run growth, maintain price stability, and strengthen the resilience of

financial markets.

Summers(2016):

The defining challenge is going to be absorbing all the savings in a

satisfactory way in the global economy for the next decade.

The first priority for policy... (should be) a concerted effort to identify and

find the means of financing the most productive investment opportunities

globally.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 55 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.3 (5Uî³5

Teulings and Baldwin(2014)µ(5Uü

Improving the education system

Investing in the physical infrastructure.

Removing barriers for labour mobility between firms by trimming down

employment protection legislation.

Increasing incentives for low-skilled workers to participate on the labour

market.

Simplifying procedures for starting up businesses.

Applying anti-monopoly policies to reduce the profit margins in new IT

industries.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 56 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.3 (5Uî³5

]Ôµ7KÅ

ã¡5 µBarabasi(2013)"

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 57 / 60

4. ÏÊ¢î³5 4.3 (5Uî³5

]Ôµ&^Å

Source: Algan, Y., S. Guriev, E.

Papaioannou, and E. Passari,

The European trust crisis and

the rise of populism, Brookings

Papers on Economic Activity,

2017(2), P309-400

Note: Data from European

Social Survey; Eurostat;

authors? calculations. The

sample includes 24 European

countries at the NUTS 2 level

of aggregation. The

unemployment rate is measured

as a percentage.

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 58 / 60

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]ÔnµSÅ

ã¡5 : #u2015c925F©Ù/î³#c4 m¤0"

% (EƲLÆ) 1ù î 59 / 60

Reference

Council of Economic Advisers, 2015: Long-term interest rates: a survey, CEA Report,

Blog: The Decline in Long-Term Interest Rates.

Hobsbawm, Eric 1989: The Age Of Empire 1875-1914, Vintage

Holinski, N., C. Kool, and J. Muysken 2012: Persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the

euro area: causes and consequences, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 94(1),

P1-20.

Rachel, L. and T. Smith 2015: Secular drivers of the global real interest rate, BOE Staff

Working Paper, No.571, Blog: Towards a global narrative on long-term real interest rates

Schmelzing, P. 2018, Eight centuries of the risk-free rate: bond market reversals from the

Venetians to the ‘VaR shock’, Staff Working Paper No.686, Bank of England

Teulings, C. and R. Baldwin 2014: Secular stagnation: Facts, causes, and cures, Vox

eBook

[§2018µ5ûx­.¤6§ô©²Ñ

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